


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A CRITIQUE ON THE VIVARANA SCHOOL

Studies in some fundamental Advaitic theories

27774

By

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TO
MY MOTHER
WHO WOULD HAVE BLESSED ME
HAD SHE LIVED TO-DAY

Thesis approved for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Faculty of Arts by the University of Calcutta, in 1956.

PREFACE

The following pages embody the results of my studies spread over a number of years on one of the greatest branches of Indian Philosophy, viz. Advaita Vedānta. The greatness and vastness of this branch were at the outset somewhat overwhelming to my limited powers, but it was the inspiring advice, guidance and schooling of my teachers that emboldened me to undertake and execute the work. I may here recall with a sense of genuine pride and fortunate satisfaction that it was through a chance interview with that great savant of India of recent memory, the late lamented Professor Surendra Nath Dasgupta, that I got an idea of planning my researches. It was in the year 1951 at Lucknow that I happened to meet the late Professor Dasgupta in connection with the XVI Session of the All-India Oriental Conference. That was my first and last meeting with such an intellectual giant. In the short time that I had this rare opportunity to meet him, he advised me to study the original texts of any School of Vedānta of Śaṅkara's following and bring out a logical treatment of the problems and theories. That was all that I gathered at this meeting, but that was like a flash of light in my obscure path of research. When I came to Calcutta I planned that I should undertake the study of at least the *Pañcapādikā* and the *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* as far as I could, and then write a thesis on this School. I started my studies under Professor Satkari Mookerjee, M.A., Ph.D., the then Asutosh Professor of Sanskrit at the Calcutta University and now Director of Nalanda Pali Institute. My revered teacher approved of my plan and chalked out my line of studies. I cannot adequately express in words my gratitude to him for his help, advice, guidance and interest in my studies. It has been mainly for him that I have been able to present the following pages before the learned world. My work was all along planned by him and has been executed by myself with his approval.

My studies as embodied in the following pages are substantially a thesis submitted to the University of Calcutta for

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D.Phil. degree in the Faculty of Arts. The thesis was unanimously accepted and recommended for the conferment of the degree in 1956. The monograph is mainly a study of two classics of post-Śaṅkara development of Advaita Vedānta, referred to above. But as a first attempt to systematic study of the School, formulated in the two classics, I had, out of an academic compulsion, to be more faithful and concentrated to some of the fundamental theories of the School. The first *Varṇaka* of the *Pañcapādikā* and the *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa* is practically the pillar and fountain of Advaita metaphysic and epistemology. The deepest recesses of Advaita are adumbrated and elucidated therein. All the later Advaitist dialectics, polemics, logic and epistemology hover round the interpretations of this chief current of Śaṅkara's tradition. In this respect, it is undeniable that the first *Varṇaka* gives us the different crucial problems and their answers. It is also true that the subsequent *Varṇakas* give us some of the confirmed tenets of Śaṅkara's Vedānta in an elaborate manner. But when once this attempt of the study of the fundamentals of Advaita has borne some success in faithful and conscientious presentation that the other aspects in the School can be taken up. I have in view such a future attempt to complete my studies, which I hope to execute in not very distant future. It is worthwhile here to remember that this study has also, whenever occasion has demanded it, presented the interpretations of later commentators like Akhaṇḍānanda, Viṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāya and Vidyāraṇya, Citsukha, Prakāṣārthavivaraṇakāra and Madhusūdana. Thus it has been somewhat, within limited precincts, a comprehensive and comparative evaluation of the Advaitist theories in the light of these commentators, each having some kind of peculiar light to throw to interpret the theories. I submit that I have been faithful to Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati but I also claim to have tried in my humble way to *interpret* them. My central theme has been pinned to the cardinal doctrine of Advaita, viz. *Brahman* as Pure Consciousness is the primus of our Being, Knowledge, and even Bliss, which I have followed up, as faithfully as possible.

There have been some translations and expositions of some works or authors of this School. Dr. Saileswar Sen and Prof. Suryanarayana Sastri have jointly published a full

excellent English translation of Vidyāraṇya's *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha*, which I have consulted freely with profit. Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan's recent revised edition of the work *The Philosophy of Advaita with special reference to Bhārati-tīrtha-Vidyāraṇya* has also been consulted. Moreover, as by every researcher on Indian Philosophy, the monumental *Histories of Indian Philosophy* of Professor Radhakrishnan and Professor Dasgupta have been freely consulted by me. Wherever I have accepted, with or without qualification, other works, I have appropriately quoted from, or referred to them.


Lastly, it should be a travesty if I do not acknowledge that the great Sanskrit scholar, Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Jogendra Nath Tarka-Sankhya-Vedanta-tīrtha obliged me by allowing me to sit at his feet to clear many a passage on any occasion I sought the help of his mature and versatile erudition.

I must, in fine, admit that the printing of the work has left much to be desired and improved. But I may assure the scholarly reading circle that the work had to be hurried through and I was an inexperienced proof-reader. Moreover, the highly technical matter of the diacritical marks was a problem in proof-reading in this my first venture. Besides, some unforeseen circumstances in the tampering with the stacked books have taken away, at places, from the quality of the get-up of the work. Hence, in spite of all my good intentions, what with my limited technical knowledge and what with natural phenomena sometimes not predictable, the perfection in printing and get-up has been incomplete. To make up for the printing lapses, I would crave the indulgence of the scholarly world to refer to the rather copious *Errata* at the end, correcting the lapses in the body beforehand for felicity in correct reading. I admit that it will be something to tax their patience and time, but I trust in their goodwill towards an imperfect fellow-scholar. If in future a Second Edition is required, I am assured that the failures in the technical side in this Edition will be like the pillars of success in that side in the next. Considering all these preliminary imperfections in printing and get-up, the work, even for the merit it is worth, could not be priced higher.

Gauhati University, India,


BRATINDRA KUMAR SENGUPTA

October, 1959.



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CHAPTER I

A Rational Approach Towards the Study of Vedānta: The Logical Path & its Background.

To give a summary of the main conclusions and arguments establishing on most solid grounds the interpretations of Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* as put forward in the Vivaraṇa School, it is worthwhile to try to begin with the end (*viśaya*) of Vedantic studies. Padmapādācārya at the outset of his work, *Pañcapādikā*, notes with precision what ought to be the end and object of commencing the study of Vedānta, and how far Śaṅkara in his Introduction to the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (*adhyāśabhāṣya*) has hinted at them. It is customary in Indian tradition to begin the study of a work or system being informed of its object (*viśaya*), end (*prayojana*), competent subject (*adhiḥkārī*) and the relation (*sambandha*) between the work and its object. These four have come to be known as the *anubandhacatuṣṭaya* or the four necessary pre-conditions of the study of a work. Hence Padmapāda very rightly hints at the more essential pre-requisites, viz., object (*viśaya*) and end (*prayojana*) of the study of Vedānta through the *Brahmasūtras* and Śaṅkara's commentary thereon. He is rather cryptic, for he says that Śaṅkara has hinted at the object and end of Vedantic studies in his *adhyāśabhāṣya* by taking the cue from the first *sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa (*athāto Brahmajijñāsā*; *Br. Sūl.* 1/1/1). But it is Prakāśātmayati, the author of the *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa*, who has taken pains to bring out the full implications of Śaṅkara's *adhyāśabhāṣya vis-à-vis* the *Brahmasūtra*. He has shown with masterly analysis that the first *Brahmasūtra* referred to above unmistakably points to a logical discursion (*vicāra*) of the highest truth of *Vedānta*, i.e., *Brahman*, for, he says, to infuse into the matter-of-fact *sūtra* the property of an injunction we have to add a word with an injunctive suffix and that should be in his opinion '*kartavyā*' (ought to be done). Now with regard to the knowledge (*jñāna*) or will (*icchā*) there cannot be any injunction. Knowledge takes its own course without any injunctive co-ercion,

for the conditions of knowledge being fulfilled it must arise. Will for knowledge, too, cannot be extraneously commanded by any injunction, for it is purely a psychological phenomenon which arises when we have knowledge of something that stimulates our curiosity as something valued on its own account or as an instrument of some valued end. Will for an unknown object is not valid will, but a 'dream' or a 'wish' which has no *locus standi*. Hence the two parts of the word *jijñāsā*, viz., *jñāna* (knowledge) and *icchā* (will) cannot be the desired object of injunction as pre-supposed in the word *kartavyā* (ought to be done). Hence Prakāśātmayati says that the word refers logically to *vicāra* (discursion) which is related as an intermediary process with the above two meanings, just like pincers, because it is the outcome (*sādhya*) of will but the progenitor (*janaka*) of knowledge. Thus the first *Brahmasūtra* logically refers to the injunction of *vicāra* and hence naturally to that of the Vedānta doctrines for which the *sūtras* are composed. But it does not stop there, for the *vicāra* it advocates is for the true knowledge of *Brahman* (*Brahmajñāna*) as the means of complete Liberation (*mokṣasādhana*) to the sincere seeker after Truth endowed with all the qualities (*sādhanacatuṣṭaya-sampannasya*), who is the competent subject (*adhikārī*). This in fact is the implied but logical meaning of the first *Brahmasūtra* and the *adhyāsabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara hints at the end (*prayojana*—viz., *Mokṣa*)¹, for, both these, i.e., object, viz., Unity and end, viz., Liberation may be plausible and true if our whole empirical life is shown to be the result of a false, illusory, super-imposed knowledge (*adhyāsa*). Śaṅkara has shown this unmistakably in his *adhyāsabhāṣya* by pointing to the life of bondage (the empirical life) as false, illusory, and as due to super-imposed knowledge of the empirical upon the transcendental Reality (*adhyāsa* due to *avidyā*)². This fact of the super-imposed nature or illusory character of the life of bondage has been logically established by showing its

¹ *mokṣasādhana-brahmajñānāya*—(*Pañcapādikāvivaraṇam*—Cal. Sans Series No. 1, P. 23.—Henceforth will be shortened as *Vivaraṇa* and will refer to the same Edition).

² *śāstrasyārambhanimittaviṣayaprayojanavattvapatrayanikasya bandha-
vyāvidyātmakatvaṁ nirdīśat bhāṣyadvayaṁ viṣayaprayojane pratipādayatīti*
—(*Vivaraṇa*, Pp. 26-27).

lakṣaṇa (definition), *sambhāvanā* (possibility), *sadbhāva* (existence) and *pramāṇa* (proofs) in the *adhyāsabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara.

As to the first *Brahmasūtra* which gives the cue to the determination of the object and end of Vedantic studies, *Prakāśātmayati* traces the origin of this *sūtra* to the Upanisadic injunction of *saravaṇa* (*Ātmā vā're draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ* etc. in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4/5/6) to one who has completed Vedic studies as enjoined in the Vedic dictum *svādhyāyo'dhyetavyaḥ*. (*Taitt. Ār.* 2/15), and realized apparently the import of the *śrutis* referring to *Ātma darśana* (cf. *Ātmani vijñāte sarvamidaṁ vijñātam—Bṛhad. Up.* 4/5/6 *etāvadare khalvamṛtatvam* etc.—*Bṛhad. Up.* 4/5/15), but his discursive faculty does not stop there, as he tries to unearth the true implications involved in such knowledge, viz., the competent subject, the true object and the real end. These three *anubandhas*, i.e., *adhikārin*, *viśaya* and *prayojana* are hinted at in the *śrutis* themselves, but the logical thinker seeks the *raison d'être* of these Vedic truths in a dialectical form for which Bādarāyaṇa initiated the logical method, viz., *nyāyaprasthāna* in his *Brahmasūtras* by the first aphorism, *athāto Brahmajijñāsā*.

The next question which is basal to the study of Vedānta is the discussion regarding the nature of injunction in the Upanisadic passage: "*Ātmā vā're draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*" (*Bṛhad. Up.* 4/5/6). The dialectical process of Vedantic studies take their origin in the injunctive precept, viz., *śrotavya*. *Prakāśātmayati* has taken great pains to show that the necessity of commencing Vedantic studies lies in the fact that the *summum bonum* of life appears in the true Realization of Self (*Ātma darśana*) and hence the ways and means towards that goal are worth-knowing. Thus though the perpetual injunction (*nityavidhi*) as envisaged in the Vedic precept *svādhyāyo'dhyetavyaḥ* (*Taitt. Ār.* 2/15) is at the root of studying and understanding the Vedas (on the part of the twice-born), still *Prakāśātmayati* holds that knowledge or Realization of the Self (*Ātma darśana*) as the *summum bonum* of life is possible, only through the injunction noted above. As to the ways and means indicated in the three steps or stages, viz., *śrotavyaḥ*, *mantavyaḥ* and *nididhyāsitavyaḥ* he takes *śravaṇa* as the principal one, the two others as auxiliary.

Here Prakāśātmayati strikes a new note by showing that the origin of Vedāntic studies is in the injunction of *śravaṇa*, though the perpetual *adhyayanavidhi* gives the cue to Vedic studies in general. To him *śravaṇa* is the principal incentive towards *Ātmaadarśana*, and *manana* and *nididhyāsana* are subservient to it (*phalopakāryaṅge*). The School of *Bhāmātī* initiated by Vācaspati Miśra (9th. Cent A.D.) who wrote the *ṭīkā*, viz., *Bhāmātī* on the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, however, traces Vedāntic studies on the logical and dialectical plane to the *adhyayanavidhi* as the studies of *Mīmāṃsā* have also the same injunction at their origin. *Śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* are not the fountain-heads of the Vedāntic dialectical studies by way of injunctions. Nor even is *śravaṇa* the principal means towards *Ātmaadarśana*. These pertain to the ken of *jñāna* or knowledge, pure and simple, where no injunctive force can exist. Knowledge arises as soon as the conditions of it are fulfilled. Hence what these three stages can do is only to show the way towards the Realization of the Self only indirectly by focussing our attention on several indirect methods. *Śravaṇa* is responsible, according to the *Bhāmātī* School, for an indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge of Self, as the means of knowledge is mediate; *manana* is also responsible for such knowledge that is indirect; but by *nididhyāsana* which engenders constant concentration upon the indirectly realized Self, there arises an immediate (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge of it. Hence *nididhyāsana* is the principal organ of the knowledge of the Self where *śravaṇa* and *manana* are secondary. But all these three are never the object of any injunction, but are only objects of factual statement (*vihitānuvādaka*).

Prakāśātmayati has taken enormous pains to establish his view of the whole matter by way of a solid defence of the injunctive character of the Upanisadic precept *śrotavya*. His masterly analysis of the nature of *vidhi* and whether any *vidhi* is plausible in the matter of *Brahmajñāna* leaves one in no doubt about the immensity of the task. He faces his opponents' cogent arguments very logically and establishes his view that here in *śravaṇa* there is the stamp of a distinct *vidhi* even though it is meant for *Brahmajñāna*.

Before entering into an examination of this question it is worthwhile to discuss in a nutshell the implications of *vidhi*.

and its different varieties. The Mīmāṃsakas say that *vidhi* or injunction makes it obligatory upon man to perform an act which is not otherwise required to be performed. The nature of *vidhi* is to make known that which is beyond any other means of knowledge as being conducive to a specific effect (*aprāptaprāpako vidhiḥ*). There are three such *vidhis*, viz., *apūrva*, *niyama* and *parisaṅkhyā*. *Apūrvavidhi* enjoins an act for a specific purpose for which no other means of knowledge is ever capable of doing so. As an example they cite the injunctive precept—*agnihotraṁ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*. Here by enjoining upon the person desirous of heaven the sacrifice of *agnihotra*, the *śruti* becomes the sole means of knowing this cause-and-effect relation between the sacrifice and its effect, heaven. By *niyamavidhi* it is suggested that out of several alternative means to get a desired result, only one is enjoined at the cost of others. Example: *vṛhīṇavahanti*. Here to get the result of the separation of husks from rice in order to prepare sacrificial cakes, pounding (*avaghāta*) of paddy is enjoined. Here other methods such as separation by nails having been the good alternative means to get the same result, only *avaghāta* is enjoined. In *parisaṅkhyāvidhi* we get an injunctive precept by which other probable alternative means of performance for a specific purpose are discarded, so that one such alternative may stand. Example: *pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ*. Here the precept enjoins the eating of the flesh of only five five-nailed animals like the hare, by entirely prohibiting by implication the eating of the flesh of others like the monkey, so that in the matter of the eating of the flesh of five-nailed animals, some alternative animals are prohibited as being unfit for consumption.

Niyama or Restrictive Injunction has got primarily a positive significance either for empirical knowledge or scriptural instructions. A positive injunction to have recourse to one alternative facilitates the achievement of the task. The exclusion of the other alternatives follows by implication, as they are mutually incompatible. The adoption of one course of action naturally precludes that of the others from the nature of the case, e.g., pounding is exclusive of other operations. But *parisaṅkhyā* has only a privative significance. Here the alternatives are neither mutually exclusive nor

incapable of satisfying the end, severally or jointly. The very fact that there is an express injunction regarding a course of action which naturally presents itself and for the adoption of which an express injunction need not be necessary, is such that, it makes obligatory that the other alternative courses are to be relinquished. In the example cited above, man has a natural tendency to satisfy hunger by consuming food. The express injunction that animal-food should be selected from these five types implies the prohibition of others. The positive performance is not determined by this injunction but either by natural inclination or another precept. It only puts its seal of approval on select kinds and its purpose is only to ban the other kinds.

Prakāśātmayati in his *Vivaraṇa* and Vidyāraṇya in his *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha* have discussed at length whether at all any *vidhi* or injunction is plausible in the matter of *Brahmajñāna*, and if so, what kind of injunction it ought to be. As to the first question it is doubted whether any *adṛṣṭaphala* or unforeseen merit is possible in *Brahmajñāna*. The question rises from the fact that the nature of the *vidhis* is to engender some *adṛṣṭa* or *apūrva* in the specific act it enjoins so that the sum-total of *apūrva* in the whole act (like sacrifice) may be realised. Without reference to any such *adṛṣṭaphala* the *vidhis* lose all their injunctive force. Hence here in the matter of *Ātma darśana* or *Brahmajñāna* there should be recognised the presence of some such *adṛṣṭa* in the injunctive precept (*vidhi*) of *śravaṇa*. But it is evident that no amount of *adṛṣṭaphala* is required in the present case where only known causes (like *śravaṇa*) are sufficient. But Prakāśātmayati says that in *Brahmajñāna* also there is immense scope for *adṛṣṭaphala*, for it is to be achieved through the *adṛṣṭa* of all works merging into knowledge. These pieces of *adṛṣṭa* conduce to the destruction of evils antagonistic to *Brahmajñāna* as is indicated in the Upanisadic texts like *avidyayā mṛtyuṃ tīrtvā, tapasā kalmaṣam hanti*. Even in the Vedic injunction, *svādhyāyo' dhyetavyaḥ* (Taitt. Ār. 2/15) the Mīmāṃsakas recognise the presence of *adṛṣṭaphala* for the knowledge of *dharma* which otherwise would not accrue if it were not known to be the result of sacrificial acts known through the study of the Vedas by which an *adṛṣṭa* accrues to the *dharma*. Hence all

such sacrificial acts pre-suppose the *niyamādṛṣṭa* in the study of the Vedas. Vidyāraṇya in his *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha* points his finger well on this point and refers to the passage in the *Gītā* in which the *pāda*, viz., *sarvaṁ karmākṣiṇaṁ Pārtha jñāne paśisamāpyate* (*Gītā* 4/33) occurs, and shows that the word *akṣiṇaṁ* over and above *sarvaṁ* refers to acts like *śravaṇa* etc., over and above sacrifices etc. Hence all acts enjoined in the Vedas including *śravaṇa* are conducive through their respective *adrṣṭa* to the generation of the sum-total of the knowledge of the Self (*Ātma darśana*) which is the highest aim of Vedantic studies.

More serious objections to the recognition of *vidhi* in the context of *Brahmajñāna* or *Ātma darśana* have been skilfully met by Prakāśātmayati and Vidyāraṇya. To start with the objections, firstly, to recognise the existence of any *vidhi* in the context in which the injunctive formula *Ātmā vā're draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ* has been read, it will be going antagonistic to what the Upaniṣads speak of *Brahman* or *Ātman* as being the Independent Principle of Vedantic knowledge; for, *Brahman* or *Ātman* becomes dependent upon what is the primary meaning of the injunctive precept, i.e., *draṣṭavyaḥ*. The Mīmāṃsakas regard the suffix (*pratyaya*) to be of the primary import while the *prakṛti* or the root becomes secondary in significance. *Brahman*, too, becomes secondary and not Independent, for here *darśana* (the meaning of the *prakṛti*) is of the secondary significance while the meaning of the *vidhi* (*pratyaya*) is of primary significance. Śaṅkara himself has refuted the presence of any *vidhi* in the context of *Ātma darśana* in *Br. Sūt.* 1/1/4: *kimarthāni tarhi vidhicchāyāsparśīni vākyaṇi?* This charge does not stand, for in recognising the presence of *vidhi* in the precept *draṣṭavyaḥ* it is indeed true that *Brahman* becomes secondary in significance while the *vidhi* itself becomes primary. But when we consider that *Brahman* does not become subject to the import of *vidhi* in *śrotavyaḥ* we can very well recognise the *vidhi* in that precept. *Brahman* is always the Self-dependent Principle of Knowledge (*darśana*) [cf. *svapradhānaphalabhūta-darśanaviśeṣaṇam—Vivaraṇa* P. 35] to which It becomes a Self-realized Goal. Hence in recognising *vidhi* in *śravaṇa* by regarding *darśana* as the goal of Brahma-hood where *Brahman* stands

as the most Primary Principle, we do not fall into any pitfall of Mīmāṃsā dialectics. Prakāśātmayati and Vidyāranya have thus met the objection of contradiction with the *Bhāṣya* of Saṅkara on *Brahmasūtra* 1/1/4.

Certain other objections crop up when we recognise *vidhi* in the Upanisadic context. This is a serious objection, as the defect of *vākyabheda* in the same context (*prakaraṇa*) is antagonistic to the real implication of the whole context. There are two kinds of *ekavākyatā*—*padaihavākyatā* and *vākyaihavākyatā*. As to the problem of *ekavākyatā*, the Mīmāṃsakas have discussed whether we can reasonably attribute two meanings or imports to a single *prakaraṇa* or subject of discourse. The problem arises from the examination in the *arthavāda adhikaraṇa* (*Mīm. Sūl.* 1/2/1-18) wherein a detailed analysis as to the import of the *arthavādas* or sentences of eulogy or calumny are read along with the *vidhis* or the Vedic injunctions. After prolonged discussion the Mīmāṃsakas have arrived at the conclusion that such *arthavādas* have no independent imports of their own, nor can they be reasonably said to have them; for that would imply splitting up of the import of the *vidhi* which primarily attaches itself to it in any *prakaraṇa*. The general Mimamsist standpoint as to the *vidhi* (injunction) is that it has a *śābdī bhāvanā*, viz., a three-fold reference to the explicit injunctive connotation in any particular formula, such as, the object (the which-*kim*), the man (the doer-*kena*) and the means (the how-*katham*). The *arthavādas* only express the praise-worthiness or not of a particular injunction—be it positive or negative, and there the third element (the how-*katham*) is only related to it as being eulogised or calumnised. Thus Pārthasārathimīśra, in his *Śāstradīpikā*, very forcefully shows that the *arthavādas* are secondarily (*lakṣaṇayā*) to be related with the *vidhis* so as to make them valid in so far as they come within the import of the *vidhis* to enjoin or prohibit any act. If the *arthavādas* were regarded primarily to have been full of independent imports, that would surely have made them responsible for the splitting up of the import of the *vidhi*. But they are secondarily (*lakṣaṇayā*) in unison with the *vidhis* and are therefore not redundant or unnecessary. They only add eulogy or calumny

(*stutyarthavāda* or *nindāarthavāda*) to the import of the object of *vidhi*, such as *devatā*, *dravya*, *yajamāna* etc. This explanation of Pārthasārathi is based upon the *Mīm Sū.* 1/2/7—*vidhinā tvekāvakyaivāt stutyarthena vidhānām syuḥ* [cf. *svādhyāyavidhireva ca prayojanavadārdhaparyavasānaṁ bodhayān prāśastiyaparatayā vinā tadānupapattestātparyameṣāṁ bodhayati—tātparyācca lakṣaṇasiddhiḥ tataścaikavākyatvam yattu dr̥ṣṭo'rthaḥ svādhyāyādhyāyanavidhinā'nusartavyo na tadvaśenārthakalpanetyuktaṁ tat satyam, lakṣaṇiko'pyartho dr̥ṣṭa eva.* (*Śāstradīpikā* Pp. 6-7; *Nirnaya Sagar* Edn.)]. The problem of *ekavākyatā* or having one primary import in a *vidhi prakaraṇa* (a chapter on a Vedic injunction) has been more clearly shown by Khaṇḍadeva in his *Bhāṭṭarahasya*. He has shown that in such a Vedic sentence as *Vāyurvai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā* (Wind is the most swift-moving Deity), the *arthavāda* or eulogy shows that the result of the *vidhi* to worship Him, viz., gift of any desired end, takes such an eulogy as coming within this primary import. What the *arthavāda* does, as here, is to express that *Vāyu* makes a gift of the desired end most quickly. (cf. *sa ca vākya'rthaḥ kṣepiṣṭhatvādiguṇako Vāyuḥ svadevatākakarmajanyaṁ phalaṁ śighraṁ prayacchati'tyevāh'rūpaḥ—Bhāṭṭarahasya*, P. 23, Conjeeveram Edn.). Khaṇḍadeva further shows that there is another pertinent instance of *arthavāda* as in *yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ* (the sacrificer is a handful of *darbha*-grass. He says that we have to admit here a secondary import (*lakṣaṇā*) in *prastara* (*darbha*-grass) to make a uniform import in the whole sentence. This *lakṣaṇā* makes the primary import of the sacrificer augmented by the import of the grass by which the former is praised as defying all obstacles (*valavadanīṣṭānanubandhitvarūpastutilakṣaṇā*). Thus the two imports are related with a verb (*ākhyāta*—'as' or 'to be') in order to indicate their real meaning in the injunction, which is always achieving the desired end (*iṣṭasādhanatvam*). Khaṇḍadeva, however, takes this stand as a hypothesis, for he shows later on that there is no need to admit a *lakṣaṇā* or secondary import in the sentences like this: *yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ*. On the contrary, there should be an *ekavākyatā* by admitting two *ākhyātas* or verbs in such sentences. Thus by splitting the sentences into twain by the admission of two verbs, we can nevertheless relate them into a single

sentence, and this is what is known as *vākyaikavākyatā* (cf. *vastutastu ākhyāta-dvayayasattve vākyaabhedasyādoṣatvena vākyaalakṣaṇāyām pramāṇābhāvaḥ tena 'yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ' ityādau vākyaikavākyatevpi na kācithṣatīḥ*—Ibid, P. 25). Unlike this kind of *ekavākyatā*, viz., *vākyaikavākyatā*, there is another instance of *ekavākyatā*, viz., *padaihavākyatā*. Here there is no need of splitting up of the sentence due to two verbs accompanying two substantives, but there is merely a *lakṣaṇā* in the whole sentence wherein the *padārthas* (imports of words) are related to *vidhi* accompanied by the *ākhyāta*. (cf. *tena yatraikasmin pade prāśastyalakṣaṇamaṅgīkṛtya tasyetarapadārthānuvayamaṅgīkṛtya vākyaṛthaparyavasānam, tatpārthavādavidhyorvākyaikavākyatā, yatra tu na tathā sarvatra vākya eva prāśastyalakṣaṇamaṅgīkṛtya padārthavidhayopasthitasya vidhyākhyātārtha evānuvayāt vidhyarṥhavādayoḥ padaihavākyateti yuktamutpāśyāmaḥ*—Ibid, P. 25.). It comes out from these subtle Mimamsist analyses that when there is a uniformity in the real meaning of any injunctive formula, which as has been already indicated above, is always *iṣṭasā-dhanatva* (achieving the desired end), even after the separate imports of the injunctive and the euphemistic sentences have been expressed, there is a *vākyaikavākyatā*. But if there is somehow the import of the euphemistic sentence prominent and is not separately to be expressed by any separate verb in a sentence but is somehow related with the verb of the injunctive sentence, there is *padaihavākyatā*.

Prakāśātmayati and *Vidyāraṇya* have shown that this defect of *vākyaabhedā* has been accepted under special circumstances by some Vedantins and *Bhāṭṭas* and *Prābhākaras* alike. The primary implication (*parama-tātparya*) of the whole context and the secondary implication of the *vidhi* (*avāntara-tātparya*) which is nothing but the generation of *adṛṣṭa*, have been recognised and there the *vākyaabhedadoṣa* has perforce been held at bay. A particular School of Vedantins has recognised the implication of *Brahmajñāna* in the passage (*tametam Brāhmaṇā vedānuvacanena vividīṣanti yajñena*—*Bṛhad. Up.* 4/42) which is the primary implication, and also its secondary implication of *yajña* (sacrifice) etc., as being enjoined (*vihita*) in the Vedas has been recognised. Thus there is a twofold implication even in the primary

import or *Brahmajñāna* here and as such no *vākyabhedadoṣa* is present. Similarly, the Bhāṭṭas have recognised *vidhi* in holding the *samidh* (sacrificial stick) over the sacrificial pot, viz., *śrūv* (*adhastāt samidham dhārayannanudravet upari hi devebhyo dhārayati*; *Āpastamba Śrauta-sūtra: Pitrmedha-sūtra*). Here the holding of the *samidh* over the *śrūv* has been accepted in the case of *agnihotra* sacrifice consecrated to gods (*daivāgnihotra*) though it is read in the context of *pretāgnihotra* where one should hold the *samidh* under the *śrūv*. Thus by the dictum *vidhistu dhāraṇe'pūrvatvāt* (*Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 3/4/5) there is a distinct *vidhi* in the *upari-dhāraṇa* (holding above) of the *samidh*. (cf. *Brahmasūtra* 3/4/20 and Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on it). Prābhākaras, too, have recognised separate *vidhi* in the same context (*tisro-rātrīrurataṁ caret. añjalīnā vā pīvet. malavadvāsasā na samvadet*—*Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 2/5/1). Here in the context of *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice there is a distinct *vidhi* in the performance of *vrata*s by a woman in her menstrual course. This is indicated by the dictum *prāgaparodhānmalavadvāsasah* (*Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* : 3/4). So there is a clear case for the Advaitins to recognise the implications of *vidhi* in *śravaṇa*, although there is the apprehension of *vākyabhedadoṣa* in the context of *Brahmajñāna*, for such recognition of the secondary import of *vidhi* in the primary import of a particular context is accepted in other systems, specially in both schools of *Mīmāṃsā*. The long and short of the whole argument boils down to the fact that *vidhi* can be recognised in a particular sentence (*vākya*) which is of secondary (*avāntara*) import although it is read in the context of a particular section bearing the primary import (*paramatātparya*). The defect of *vākyabheda* does not stand in the way of understanding the full implication, if we train our eyes to fix on what is primary and what is secondary in a particular context. Other *vākyas* (*vākyaiḥavākyas*) may be appended to the primary *vākyas* of a particular section, yet separate *vidhi* and separate implication of a secondary nature may be recognised in the former without least violence to the primary implication of the whole section.

Prakāśātmayati has hinted at the injunctive character of *śravaṇa* by referring to a different *śruti*-passage avoiding the

clear one upon which our discussion started, viz., *śrotavya* etc. He has referred us to the following passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*: *tasmād Brāhmaṇaḥ pāṇḍityam nirvidya bālyena tiṣṭhāset, bālyāṇca pāṇḍityāṇca nirvidyātha muniḥ, amaunaṇca maunaṇca nirvidyātha Brāhmaṇaḥ* (*Bṛhad. Up.* 3/5/1). Here the four words as shown below are of special significance which has been accepted by Śaṅkara himself. *Pāṇḍityam*, *bālyam* and *maunam* (*muniḥ*) refer respectively to *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* and they have been described as the means to become *Brāhmaṇa*, i.e., Self-realized or *Ātmadarśī*. Thus understood. *Prakāśātmayati* has shown us that even if we do not regard the commonly accepted passage, i.e., *śrotavya* etc., as being the source of the *vidhi*, we may well accept this passage as such. But *Prakāśātmayati* has apparently shown no reason as to this switching-off and Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadīpana* has also remained reticent. But the real situation has been brought home to us by Viṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāya in his commentary, viz., *Rjuvivaraṇa*, and Vidyāraṇya in his *Vivaraṇaprameya-saṃgraha* has perhaps supplied the cue. Viṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāya has said that in the precept *śrotavya* we can very well connect the suffix (*pratyaya*) to *Brahmajñāna* even without any injunction (*vidhi*) in it, for in the matter of *Brahmajñāna*, *śravaṇa* can be regarded as a means fit (*arha*) for it. Hence no necessity will arise as to making a *vākyabheda* in recognising an injunction (*vidhi*) in the precept, *śrotavya*. Vidyāraṇya too has upheld such an explanation for adducing a reason as to the switching-off of the injunctive formula (*vidhyāyaka vākya*) with reference to *śravaṇa*. Here, therefore, we cannot escape the clear character of an injunction in forms like *nirvidya*, *tiṣṭhāset* etc. *Prakāśātmayati* and Vidyāraṇya have shown that Bādarāyaṇa has accepted the *vidhi* in *śravaṇa* and Śaṅkara has explained the terms *pāṇḍitya*, *bālyā* and *mauna* (*muni*) as referring respectively to *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*.³ Vidyāraṇya has moreover substantiated this position by showing that the repetition of the *vidhyāyaka*

³ Cf. *Brahmasūtra*, 3/4/47—*sahakāryantaravidhiḥ pakṣeṇa tṛtīyam tadratnā vidhyādivat*; Śaṅkarabhāṣya on it: *vidyāsahakāriṇo maunaṣya bālyapāṇḍityarod vidhīrevāśrayitavyaḥ*.

vākya with regard to *śravaṇa*, as *śrotavya* etc., and *tasmād Brāhmaṇah paṇḍityam nirvidya bālyena tiṣṭhāset* etc., in the same branch (*śākhā*) of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* is meant for giving the force of validity to the injunctive character of *śravaṇa*. Repetition for substantiating what has been previously recommended is not an error of prolixity but is a source of validity. Thus the injunctive character of *śravaṇa* is not to be regarded as a mere imagination.

Vidyāraṇya has brought in a very fruitful discussion about the possibility of *niyama vidhi* in the Vedic precept *Ātmā vā're draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*. This discussion brings out the nature of *vidhi* in *śrotavya* and the logical possibility of such *vidhi*. It has been admitted by Prakāśātmayati that the *vidhi* here is restrictive or *niyama*, though not in so many clear terms. The restrictive character of the *śravaṇavidhi* is evident from the fact that the alternative means to *Brahmajñāna*, viz., *śravaṇa*, restricts only itself for the realization of the end, and hence the other alternative methods are excluded by implication. This is the true significance of Prakāśātmayati's analysis of the possible unforeseen merit (*adṛṣṭa*) attaching itself to *śravaṇa* in order to be able to restrict itself as the sole means towards the goal of *Brahmajñāna*. This discussion has been elaborately made above, and it has been shown that in the matter of *Brahmajñāna* too there is the scope for such *adṛṣṭaphala* helping an alternative means to restrict itself only towards that goal.* Vidyāraṇya in his *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha* has tried to show from the opponents' point of view that there is the impossibility of recognising a *niyama vidhi* in *śravaṇa*, for he points out that in the matter of *Brahmajñāna* there is never any possibility of other alternative methods than those enunciated in the *śruti*, viz., *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsaṇa*. The knowledge of Unqualified Brahman dawns upon the aspirant through an intuitive realization made possible by these Vedic injunctive processes. To this apparently strong charge of the opponents Vidyāraṇya adduces the arguments from the Advaitist standpoint to prove that the possibility of

* *ātmatattvāparokṣasya sarvādṛṣṭasādhyatasya vākṣyamānatvād-avagātādivadubhayārthatayā vidhānopapattēḥ.*—(Vivaraṇa, P. 34).

niyama vidhi is in no wise impaired by such a charge; for he shows that though there is no possibility of other alternative means for the knowledge of Unqualified *Brahman* (*nirviśeṣāt-majñāna*), yet those alternative means are possible in the matter of *Brahmajñāna* as such (*sādhāraṇākāreṇa*) and therefore are excluded by implication from the field by the restrictive character of *śravaṇa*. He shows that even in ordinary cases of *niyamavidhi*, as the pounding of paddy (*vṛhīnavahanti*), there is also from the view-point of real *sastric* injunction no possibility of other alternative means for the fact that pounding alone is accompanied by the unforeseen merit (*adr̥ṣṭa*) which makes the paddy capable of being used in the sacrifice, and such paddy, to be a part and parcel of the sacrifice, should therefore be the object of pounding and of no other means. Hence other alternative means too are not logically possible in the case of such paddy, the husks of which are desired to be separated. Hence Vidyāranya concludes that even so in *nirviśeṣāt-majñāna* the alternative means are either unnecessary for the establishment of the *niyamavidhi* in *śravaṇa* or are to be regarded as possible in *Brahmajñāna* as such (as known by mind etc.), as the alternative means to separate husks of the paddy consecrated to some sacrifice are possible only generally in paddy as such. This analysis of Vidyāranya, therefore, brings out that the Advaitist admission of *niyamavidhi* in *śravaṇa* is justifiable. But he seems to have supplied the cue of such analysis from the Advaitist standpoint to Akhaṇḍānanda and Viṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāya, for the latter have also discussed this problem in their works, the *Tattvadīpana* and the *R̥juvivaraṇa* respectively. Akhaṇḍānanda has shown us that in *saviśeṣāt-majñāna* or the knowledge of *Ātman* or *Brahman* as qualified and not as Pure Unqualified, there are alternative means other than *śravaṇa*, such as perception (*pratyakṣa*), and hence in the matter of *Brahmajñāna* as such, these alternative means are well plausible. But as to the question whether in the knowledge of Unqualified *Brahman* (*nirviśeṣāt-majñāna*) these alternative means are possible, he says that from the fact that they are plausible in *Brahmajñāna* as such, they are to be taken as such here also⁵.

⁵ *kimātmajñānamātre sādhanāntarāprāptiḥ, uta nirviśeṣāt-majñāne?*

Viṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāya too in his *Rjuvivarāṇa* has said that the possibility of the alternative means is from the viewpoint of a general act and this is equally true in the case of pounding and *Brahmajñāna*.⁶

Padmapāda in his *Pañcapādikā* has referred to the necessity of the *Adhyāsabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara with reference to *Brahmajñāna*. We have shown above the propriety of this Introductory *Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara and have said that it is necessary as illustrating the object (*viśaya*) and end (*prayojana*) of Vedantic studies. That object and that end are the necessary corollaries of the very first *Brahmasūtra* (*athāto Brahmajijñāsā*), which, by the word *atha*, expresses the competent subject (*adhiḥkārī*) in such inquiry. Padmapāda now shows that the whole of the *Adhyāsabhāṣya* and not any part thereof can suffice to bring out these, i.e., object and end. Knowledge of the unity of the Universal and the Individual Self (*ātmaikatva*) being the object and annihilation of the false knowledge of duality responsible for the eternal cycle of births and deaths (*anarthahetoḥ prahāṇam*) being the end, of Vedantic studies, we cannot stop short of showing that these two are not possible until all our empirical life of an active nature is shown to be due to *adhyāsa*, i.e., a false, super-imposed knowledge of the not-Self due to its false identity with the Self. If our empirical life were not shown to be a life of duality of the subject and object as implied in action (*kartṛva*) and enjoyment (*bhokṛtvā*), which is false and illusory as being super-imposed on the knowledge of unity of Consciousness, we could not have shown that there is any necessity of commencing Vedantic studies having for its object *ātmaikatvajñāna* and end *anarthahetoḥ prahāṇam*. If our empirical life were all real, if the duality of the subject and the object were as true as the unity, then Supreme Knowledge as envisaged in

nādyah, saviśeṣātmañāne pratyakṣādīprasārāt, dvitīye'pūrvvīyeṣu vrihiṣu dalanādyapṛāptāvapi vrihimātre dalanādīpṛāpterniyamavannirviśeṣātmañāne sādhanāntarāpṛāptāvapi anyatra sādhanāntarapṛāpterniyama iti tulyam (*Tattvadīpana*, Cal. Sans. Series No. 1., P. 34.).

* *nanu nirviśeṣātmañāne na teṣāṃ pṛāptiḥ ataḥ katham niyamaḥ? maivam. apūrvvīyavrihiṣu dalanādyapṛāptāvapi niyamadarśanāt, atha sādhanāntarāpṛāptimapekṣya tatra niyamaḥ tadatrāpi samānam* (*Rjuvivarāṇa*, Cal. Sans. Series No. 1., P. 34.).

the Vedantic studies would never have found it possible to flash out negating all empirical life as false and illusory, for, knowledge, however perfect, can never negate a real object. Hence Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati have harped on this tune pretty long to establish that *adhyāsa* or false knowledge of the Self due to the superimposition of the not-Self on it is the starting-point in Vedantic studies which aim at the annihilation of all false knowledge for the flashing out of the Supreme Knowledge of Unity. Prakāśātmayati has also shown at length that knowledge cannot negate any object really present by way of its association with it either as *viṣaya* (object) or *āśrita* (dependent). For, true knowledge can negate the false, superimposed knowledge of an illusory nature covering up the real knowledge. He adduces *śrutopapatti* or *śrutārthāpatti* as the valid means of knowing the eternal co-existence of true knowledge and removal of false knowledge, as envisaged in determining the falsity of our empirical life as the effect of such false knowledge. Thus the necessity of the *Adhyāsabhāṣya* lies in the fact that it serves as the *upodghāta* or introductory basis for the determination of the true meaning of the *tantra* or the thesis of the whole *Bhāṣya* as originating from the first *Brahmasūtra*, as it makes Vedantic studies possible at all by founding on solid grounds the object and end of such studies through the logical establishment of *adhyāsa*.

CHAPTER II

AN EXAMINATION INTO THE SUPER-IMPOSED KNOWLEDGE (ADHYĀSA)—ITS TENABILITY & MATERIAL CAUSE OF NESCIENCE (AJÑĀNA).

The next important question discussed by Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati is regarding the nature of conflict (*virodha*) between the Self (*asmāt*) and the not-Self (*yuṣmat*). Śaṅkara has shown that these two objects are in eternal conflict like darkness and light; hence he has endeavoured hard to establish that these two objects nevertheless become illusorily mixed up and therefore arises all our empirical life of false knowledge of the not-Self as the Self. This is his thesis in the Introduction (*adhyāśabhāṣya*) and hence the necessity of Vedantic studies. But he seems to have erred at the very outset by bringing in the analogy of darkness and light in this context. Padmapāda has hinted at this apparent error of judgment and Prakāśātmayati has elaborately discussed the problem. Darkness has been hailed as the absence of light or of visual perception of colours due to it. Hence they are naturally in eternal conflict and therefore one cannot assume the nature of the other (*itaretarābhāvavat*). One is positive (light) and the other is negative (darkness), and therefore it is quite in the fitness of things that one should exclude the other from the same field of existence (*avasthāna*) and connotation (*parasparātmatā*). But the Self and the not-Self are both positive existents and hence there is no logical necessity, on the analogy of light and darkness, that one should always so exclude the other. Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvādīpana* has shown that in the case of light and darkness there is this natural conflict of a positive and a negative object (*bhāvābhāvarūpa-virodha*) and hence they can mutually exclude each other. But in the case of the Self and the not-Self, two positive entities, there may not be any logical necessity to infer that they necessarily should always exclude each other because of their conflicting nature, for here the conflict is

not mutually-exclusive due to their positive and negative character like light and darkness, but is due to their own intrinsic nature (*bhāsaka-bhāsyavirodha*). Such different natures, without mutually-exclusive characters, can very well overlap in existence, and therefore Śaṅkara's contention that it is not ordinarily possible without the recognition of *adhyāsa* for such overlapping to take place, becomes feeble. Therefore Padmapāda, Prakāśātmayati, Vidyāranya and others have taken up their pens to establish that darkness is a positive entity like light and is not the negation of it. Hence Padmapāda has hinted at the impossibility of the contention that darkness is a negative entity by saying that in their case there is not the *sahānavasthānalakṣaṇavirodha*, but there is *parasparānātmatālakṣaṇavirodha*. Prakāśātmayati has shown elaborately that darkness is a positive, not a negative, entity, and it can remain at the same field of existence along with light. Thus the discussion regarding the nature of darkness in such polemical works of Advaita Vedānta having apparently scanty significance, assumes gigantic importance as Śaṅkara has connected this question with the fundamental problem of *adhyāsa*.

Padmapāda has hinted at this question of the nature of darkness when he says that there is no *sahānavasthānavirodha* or conflict of *non-co-existence* between light and darkness, but there is the more deep-rooted conflict of *mutual exclusiveness* (*parasparānātmatālakṣaṇavirodha*). His intention is that darkness and light co-exist as in a faintly-lighted room, as heat and shade under a tree, and hence darkness is not the negative of light. But there is a conflict more deep-rooted as of two independent entities and hence one *implies* the absence of the other. Darkness is a positive entity like light, but these two are in eternal conflict and hence one excludes the other. Similarly the Self and the not-Self, two positive entities, have this kind of conflict; hence these seem to be outside the ken of illusory knowledge of one (not-Self) superimposed on the other (Self) and *vice versa*. This apparent absence of any *adhyāsa* has been postulated by Śaṅkara in his *Adhyāsabhāṣya* of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* on the analogy of light and darkness as the view of the opponents (*pūrvapakṣa* or *śaṅkāpakṣa*). In fact, Śaṅkara starts from here and admits

that *adhyāsa* is not apparently postulated when there are two positive objects of eternal conflict.

The arguments of Padmapāda, Prakāśātmayati, Akhaṇḍānanda and Vidyāraṇya as to the positive nature of darkness may be summed up very briefly. Padmapāda has shown that light and darkness may co-exist and hence they have no *sahānavasthāna-virodha*. But it is Prakāśātmayati who is very analytic in counteracting the view that the *parasparā nātmatālakṣaṇa-virodha* as envisaged by Padmapāda between the Self and the not-Self may well be possible without the analogy of light and darkness in which the latter is the negative of the former. Akhaṇḍānanda also elucidates this point in his *Tattvadīpana*. The conflict between two objects arising from their mutual exclusiveness (*sahānavasthāna-lakṣaṇa* or *parasparānātmatālakṣaṇa*) due to the positive-negative character (*bhāvābhavātmata*) of them is not the conflict between the Self and the not-Self; for here we look forward to a conflict of anti-thesis due to their own intrinsic nature as between two positive entities.⁷ That conflict (*parasparānātmatālakṣaṇa-virodha*) as suggested by Padmapāda touches the core of the problem of *adhyāsa*. This, therefore, is the true note sounded by Padmapāda, and Prakāśātmayati, Akhaṇḍānanda, Vidyāraṇya and others have harped on its tune to show that darkness and light have conflict not due to their negative-positive-character, but due to their intrinsic nature, as these two are positive entities like the Self and the not-Self. Thus the analogy of light and darkness, in explaining the possibility of *adhyāsa* between the Self and the not-Self where ordinarily no such *adhyāsa* would be possible due to their intrinsic divergent nature, has been apt, the former being of the same nature of having no conflict in co-existence as being both of a positive nature.

⁷ In this conflict of two positive entities there may very well be co-existence (*sahānavasthāna*) but there cannot be any partaking of the character of another entity (*parasparātmata*). But in the conflict of one positive and another negative entity, there cannot be also the first possibility. Here the Advaitist writers from Padmapāda have therefore shown that in the case of light and darkness there is only the latter impossibility but not the former, for these two are positive entities. Hence in the *adhyāsa* between not-Self and Self there is only the indication of the second impossibility, but not the former.

Prakāśātmayati has shown that darkness is not a negative entity, because it has form (*rūpa*) and volume (*avasthāna-bheda*) which are directly perceived by us. A negative entity cannot have these two characteristics. The form (*rūpa*) of darkness again does not necessarily pre-suppose the tactile characteristic (*sparsa*), as air (*vāyu*), though formless, has the other characteristic of touch. Again, if darkness were the negative of light, then it could be the negative of either some particular light or the totality of light in the universe. But while the second alternative is impossible on the very face of it, the first alternative cannot suggest that there will be darkness when a lamp is put out or is not lighted in a brightly-lighted place, for here also there is the absence of light (a particular lamp) but no darkness. Here the opponents may say that the opposite of darkness, i.e., bright light, being present cannot account for darkness; hence darkness should pre-suppose the complete absence of its opposite. Such a view has been controverted completely by Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadīpana* where he points out the fact that the complete absence of the opposite may be said to accompany the *prāgabhāva* (absence at the time of non-origination) of darkness before a single lamp is lighted, but cannot then be said to accompany *pradhvaṃsābhāva* (absence at the time of destruction) and *vice versa*; to say that *itaretarābhāva* (mutual exclusion) is accompanied by the complete absence of the opposite is absurd, for even if there is enough light there is *naturally* the mutual exclusion between it and darkness which inevitably should be known. Thus have Prakāśātmayati, Akhaṇḍānanda and Vidyāraṇya established the argumentative side of the positive nature of darkness.

Vidyāraṇya in his *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha* has, however, gone a little further in discussing the validity of any inference in establishing the *adhyāsa* between the Self and the not-Self. Śaṅkara has, by way of the admission of an apparent impossibility, at the outset has shown that like light and darkness, two opposite entities, there cannot apparently appear any *adhyāsa* or false knowledge of the not-Self as the Self and *vice versa*. But this is admission of an apparent anomaly and he has taken great pains to establish the fundamental issue he has in view in his system, viz., *adhyāsa*.

Padmapāda, Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda have interpreted Śaṅkara's *adhyāsa* and its possibility between the Self and the not-Self, though seeming to be impossible, in support of the grounds of such admission. The seeming improbability of *adhyāsa* has been only admitted on the analogy of light and darkness, two opposite entities, by these authors and they concentrated more on the establishment of the possibility of *adhyāsa*. But Vidyāraṇya has shown by inference the impossibility of *adhyāsa* in face of the view of the opponents who have logically argued the fallacies in such an inference. Vidyāraṇya has tried to prove the proposition: "Self and not-Self are devoid of any mutual super-imposition of their respective natures (*tādātmyādhyāsarahitau*) like light and darkness." He has, moreover, shown that this inference is possible because of the fact that Self and not-Self are of quite opposite nature, being designated by two different terms like *asmāt* and *yuṣmat*. But opponents have argued that such an inference is invalid, for the Self and the not-Self as envisaged here cannot be proved by inference as having the characteristic of *tādātmyādhyāsarahitatva*, if by these terms the common or Mimamsist or even Vedantic conceptions are meant. Self and not-Self as commonly understood refer to the body and the external object respectively, but these are not the objects of any *adhyāsa* and consequently of *adhyāsābhāva*. Even the Mimamsist conception of Self as the enjoyer of all fruits of actions and not-Self as the body and organs does not envisage any *adhyāsābhāva* between them, for both are of the same (*jaḍa*) nature. Even the Vedantic conception of Self as Pure, Unqualified Consciousness and not-Self as anything superimposed on It, cannot logically make the former as being designated by any specific term of reference like *asmāt* and hence cannot envisage *adhyāsābhāva* between these on the ground of their different specific designations.

Herein Vidyāraṇya's logical analysis of the impossibility of *adhyāsa* (*tādātmyādhyāsarahitatva*) reaches a stage where any postulation of *adhyāsa* becomes unnecessary. Impossibility of *adhyāsa* has been regarded as the pre-conditional postulation for establishing *adhyāsa*, but the former seems to be a question of irrelevant postulation for the fact that Self and not-Self, in whatever way conceived, cannot be regarded

as ever coming within the purview of absence of *adhyāsa* as tried to be proved by inference. But Vidyāraṇya shows that in the Vedantic conception there is the possibility of absence of *adhyāsa* due to their different nature, for Self, as conceived here, though cannot be designated by any specific term, is regarded as such due to its reflected existence on the Ego. Vidyāraṇya has shown that the Self and the not-Self are designated by different terms for the fact that the former alone is the determinant (*viśayin*) of the latter (*viśaya*).

Herein is the clue to the whole philosophy of *adhyāsa* as advocated by Śaṅkara. Vidyāraṇya has tacitly followed in the footprints of his original predecessor Prakāśātmayati in exposing the irrelevancy of *adhyāsa* between the Self and the not-Self as the opponents' very solid ground of argument only to prepare their own grounds of establishing that *adhyāsa* is a fact based on very cogent logic and metaphysics. Prakāśātmayati also exposed that *adhyāsa* between Self and not-Self is not possible on the ground of their avowed dissimilarity. This dissimilitude (*sādṛśyābhāva*) and consequent absence of *adhyāsa* (*adhyāsābhāva*) were, however, not seriously objected to on the logical ground of the opponents' exposure of fallacies to such inferences, leading to an almost impossible postulation of any *adhyāsābhāva* also, leaving the two entities merely on their mutually-incompatible natures, as has been done by Vidyāraṇya. But Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati have admitted simply that *adhyāsābhāva* is a necessary postulation on the ground that neither the Self nor the not-Self has any possibility of similarity which is a pre-condition to *adhyāsa*. Such being the acceptance of even Vidyāraṇya who has very creditably met opponents' arguments seeking to make the two entities—Self and not-Self—as merely two independent incompatible entities without any necessity to postulate their initial *adhyāsābhāva*, it was imperative for Padmapāda and his followers to strike at the very clue to *adhyāsa* which is the foundational doctrine of their system. Padmapāda has said that although the not-Self as the Ego etc., is always designated as though the Self (*aham*) and the Self is beyond any such spatio-temporal designation, still the not-Self is designated as the not-Self (*yuṣmat*) on the logical concept that the Self (*asmat*) is reflected on and thus enlightens, as it were, the

not-Self (*yuṣmat*) wherefrom flows the super-imposed knowledge. The Self and the not-Self, though appearing as different on the face of them, are really always appearing as identified due to an *adhyāsa* between them. The clue to the problem of *adhyāsa* is thus enlightened by Padmapāda and a whole host of his followers has explained this phenomenon in their own masterly ways. Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati have tried to establish that there is the possibility of super-imposed knowledge (*adhyāsa*) between the Self and the not-Self, although it is to be an impossible proposition due to their different nature. They have shown that in *adhyāsa* there is no necessity of similarity to be an indispensable factor for it. Now in *sopādhika bhrama* (illusion due to an adjunct), there is no need of any similarity, for here the *bhramajñāna* is a purely borrowed one (as in *lohitaḥ sphaṭikaḥ* = the crystal-stone is reddish). But in the *nirupādhika bhrama* (illusion as due to no adjunct) there is not the indispensability of this factor as some imaginary similarity as between two-similar smells (where there is no real similarity, for smells have no parts) can rather serve as the desired cause, or even no such similarity is at all necessary as in the false knowledge of "this conchshell is yellowish" (*pītaḥ śaṅkhaḥ*). Thus they have shown that even the Self being reflected on the Ego can be falsely identified with the not-Self as the enjoyer, mind-body etc., for the fact that the Self as the only Reality can be the object of false knowledge due to its reflected existence on the Ego. This false knowledge between the Self and the not-Self is an eternal truth and is the cause of all spatio-temporal life of actions of human beings. There is a vicious cycle of the Self as falsely identified with successive aspects of the not-Self and it is *anādi lokavyavahāranimittam* according to Śaṅkara (as *ahaṁ manuṣyaḥ*—I am a man). Here there is no necessity of similarity between the Self and the not-Self, for here is no indispensability of this factor. Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati have definitely opined that false knowledge (*adhyāsa*) is due to ignorance or nescience between the real and the unreal, and does not necessarily presuppose similarity between them. It is the nature of a *positive* ignorance to make possible this super-imposed knowledge even without any similarity. Similarity or non-similarity

is not the *sine qua non* to *adhyāsa* but only a positive ignorance of the real and the unreal, the transcendental and the phenomenal.*

Vidyāraṇya has elaborated this interpretation by showing that *adhyāsa*, though logically an indeterminate phenomenon as admitted by the Advaitists themselves inasmuch as it is held to be outside any logically analytic determination (*anirvacanīya*), is possible and is a phenomenon of our empirical life. Here, therefore, he has come out in full force of his arguments that *adhyāsa* cannot be denied between the Self and the not-Self on the basis of non-similarity between them. He has ably analysed the place of similarity as a necessary factor for false knowledge both in *sopādhika bhrama* and *nirupādhika bhrama*, and has shown that not only in the former, but also in the latter, similarity is an adventitious condition of *adhyāsa*, for the real spring for it lies in its material cause which is, according to the Advaitists, *ajñāna* or ignorance.

Herein comes up the very vital problem of Advaita Vedānta for which its masters have produced volumes of arguments for its valid establishment. Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati have very ably taken up their pens for the same purpose and have handed down a rich legacy of their discursive analysis to later writers of Advaita dialectics. The problem concerns itself with the nature of the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of *adhyāsa* which has been held to be an eternal nescience (*ajñāna*) covering up the individual self's (*jīva*'s) consciousness (*jñāna*) as the real essence of all experience of multiplicity and plurality. This postulation of the presence of *ajñāna* as the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of all false knowledge of multiplicity has been supported by arguments of valid proofs by Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati. But the more vital issue raised and solved by them is about the nature of *ajñāna* which they postulate. The issue becomes

* *na viśayatvaṁ sādṛśyaṁ vā dhyāsaśetuḥ, kintranayaṛyatiṛekavāda-jñānam, tathā ca prayogaḥ—vimataṁ mithyājñānopādānaṁ kāryatrādāna-nyathāsiddhatadanayaṛyatiṛekavatrādvā, vipakṣabādhekoṇapagṛhitatre sati kāryatrādvā; na yaderam na tadevam yathā sammatam vastu. (Prakāṣārtharivarāṇa—Ed. T. R. Chintamani, Vol. I; P. 6.) Cf. also Saṁskṛpa-Sāriraḥ, 1/27-30.*

a perplexing one when one goes on to analyse the grammatical meaning of the word which makes it a negative entity (*jñānābhāvarūpam*). In the Advaita metaphysic, it is not such an entity, but, a positive (*bhāva-rūpam*) one, for it does not subscribe to the theory of causality of the negative like the Mādhvamikas and the Nyaiyāyikas.

Thus understood Advaita Vedānta preaches vehemently the *positive* existence of *ajñāna* as the *principia eterna* of all knowledge of multiplicity and never as a negative entity which is only the absence of true knowledge. Padmapāda has hinted at the positive character of *ajñāna* by showing that it is a blind principle (*śakti*) of *avidyā* or nescience of the individual self, which is false (*mithyā*) through and through. Prakāśātmayati elaborately discusses the subject and first establishes that it is the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of *adhyāsa*. He meets the objections regarding it only as the absence of true knowledge (*tattvajñānābhāva*) as equivalent to the absence of the conflicting power of true knowledge (*pratibandhakābhāva*) towards *adhyāsa*. He rejects the view of the Nyaiyāyikas that *pratibandhaka* or hindrance is merely the absence of cause of the origination of something, but sides with the Mīmāṃsakas that in *pratibandhaka* the cause of non-origination is simultaneous with the conditions of origination (*puṣkalakāraṇe hi sati kāryotpādavirodhi pratibandhakam*—*Vivaraṇa* P. 89). But true knowledge is not the cause of non-origination (*pratibandhaka*) of *adhyāsa* in the sense that it cannot be simultaneous with the conditions of origination of *adhyāsa*, such as, imperfections of the body or mind. Prakāśātmayati thus sows the seeds of the positive character of *ajñāna* for the fact that he repudiates the view that it is the condition of *adhyāsa* as the *negative* entity like the absence of true knowledge. His analysis of the causality (*kāraṇatva*) of *ajñāna* towards *adhyāsa* leaves one in no doubt in establishing that it is really the *positive* cause and not a negative condition. This view of causality, as accepted by all Schools of Indian Philosophy, revolves round the distinction of 'cause' and 'condition.' The cause is always the self-established (*anyathāsiddhiḥ*) *sine qua non* precedent to the effect; the 'condition' is precedent to the effect as being possible by the negation of some other object antagonistic to its origination,

or as the remote antecedent determined by another antecedent. Again, Prakāśātmayati has tried to repudiate the causality of *adhyāsa* in other objects like the Self (*Ātmā*), Ego (*antaḥkaraṇa*) or the physico-mental imperfections (*doṣas*) with equal vigour by showing that *adhyāsa* is not the transformation (*pariṇāma*) of any of these objects, but a false creation having its foundation in the positive *ajñāna* and is therefore an appearance of the Reality thus appearing.

Vidyāraṇya has taken great pains to elaborate this theory by showing that *ajñāna* is a positive entity responsible for all false, super-imposed knowledge of our empirical life. He has shown that this *ajñāna* is in no wise a negative entity as the absence of hindrance (*pratibandhakābhāva*) or as the absence of an opposite entity (*virodhisamsargābhāva*), but is the positive material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of all *adhyāsa*. Vidyāraṇya has ably elaborated the cue of Prakāśātmayati that the Self (*Ātmā*) or the Ego (*antaḥkaraṇa*) cannot be the transforming cause (*pariṇāmikāraṇa*) of *adhyāsa* by saying that though the Nyaiyāyikas and Sāṅkhyas respectively take these as the source of knowledge, yet the Self cannot be a transforming entity nor can the Ego have any contact with the object which is false through and through. Vidyāraṇya shows that these opponents urge that the false cognition of the two pieces of knowledge (*jñānādhyāsa*) is due to the transformation of the Self or the Ego, as these are the seat of all knowledge. The false knowledge of these two objects (*viśayādhyāsa*) may postulate a principle like *ajñāna* for the fact that here after the super-imposition the knowledge arises in the Self and for the matter of such super-imposition a principle of *ajñāna* may be necessary; but in the *jñānādhyāsa* the super-imposition between the objects having been accomplished by *ajñāna*, the false cognition of the two pieces of knowledge arises due to the transformation of the Self or the Ego, the seat of all other knowledge. Vidyāraṇya like Prakāśātmayati says that these are absurd propositions for the simple fact that false knowledge having been assigned to the Ego, the Self could never have attained true knowledge for which purpose the Self, not as a transforming cause, but as the seat of *ajñāna*, the *principia eterna* of all false knowledge, should be accepted to explain *adhyāsa*.

Vidyāraṇya has moreover ably met the antagonists' view that *ajñāna* or absence of knowledge as is indicated in phrases like 'I am ignorant' (*aḥamajñāḥ*) is the negation of knowledge as such (*jñānaśāmānyābhāva*) as directly known and realized in such experiences. He has shown that the thesis of Advaita Vedānta that it is a positive entity and never a negative one is justified by cogent dialectics. The problem becomes keener when we consider that *abhāva* or absence of something has been explained variously, epistemologically and ontologically, by different Schools of Indian Philosophy. Vidyāraṇya has harped on a very lively tune to repudiate the views of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas. While *abhāva* is admitted as a separate category by both these Schools, yet there is a wide epistemological chasm between their views. The former uphold that *jñānābhāva* (absence of knowledge) is the object of direct perceptual cognition, and hence there is never any positive *jñāna* as is indicated in experiences like 'I am ignorant'. The latter, however, advocate that *abhāva* is never an object of perceptual knowledge, but is known through an indirect and separate means of knowledge, viz., *anupalabdhi*. Hence they also have to admit that such experiences as 'I am ignorant' being directly realized as matters of perceptual cognition should point to a positive entity and not a negative one, for on their own showing an *abhāvavastu* (negative entity) cannot be directly realized (*pratyakṣa*). However, they may hold that in such cases the *jñānābhāva* is only inferred and not directly realised. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas cannot be forced to this admission, for they can very well explain the direct realization (*pratyakṣa*) of negative entities as of positive ones. Such being the bone of contention as to the epistemological and ontological implications of *abhāva*, Vidyāraṇya has tried to establish the view of Advaita Vedānta that *ajñāna* as a positive entity is not the object of any or other of the *pramāṇas*. Herein is the true note of Advaita metaphysics that has been sounded by Vidyāraṇya. He has tried to bring out the Advaita theory that the nature of *ajñāna* is never to be judged by reference to the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), but should be taken as the *principia eterna* of all our false knowledge of the empirical multiplicity and as revealed only by the Witness-Consciousness (*Sākṣicaitanya*); hence it is said:

by the Advaitist that *ajñāna* is only *sākṣivedya*. This is the pedestal of attack of Advaita writers and Vidyāraṇya has elaborately shown the points of attack from this pedestal. He has repudiated the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view by showing that in experiences like 'I am ignorant', there cannot be any absence of knowledge as such (*jñānasāmānyābhāva*) for the simple fact that the knowledge of 'I' (*dharmīn*) at least is present there. Even such knowledge is not an inferential one, as some hold, by the admission of the absence of any pragmatic action in deep slumber—for the fact that in such a state the Self as possessing any function is unrevealed and hence no inferential knowledge of such state is possible. The Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas also uphold that an indirect knowledge of *jñānābhāva* (through *anupalabdhi*) is possible, hence the absence of knowledge as such (*jñānasāmānyābhāva*) also is such. But to the Advaitist who upholds that no external means of valid knowledge, direct or indirect, is necessary to account for *ajñāna*, but who goes on to advocate a Consciousness which is Witness to all epistemological behaviour (*Sākṣin*) as the sole revealer of it, such logical quibblings die out. Vidyāraṇya has, therefore, ably borne the traditional thesis of his School and has taken cues from his predecessors' writings—those of Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati. Prakāśātmayati has shown, as we have discussed above, that all objects, whether known or unknown, are revealed by *Sākṣin* (*sarvaṁ vastu jñātatayā vā ajñātatayā vā Sākṣicaitanyasya viśaya eva*). This cue had been the main thesis of all the later developments, as in Vidyāraṇya's writings. The nature of *ajñāna*, too, is such a development. It is not to be negatively described as being subject to this or that *pramāṇa*. To determine it that way is to determine the indeterminate. Hence *ajñāna* as *jñānābhāva* becomes an endless mess of unmeaning determinations within which it is not to be included; for it is an indeterminate principle whose positive nature can only be revealed by the *Sākṣicaitanya*. Vidyāraṇya has again been elaborate in showing that the object, substratum and *ajñāna* are all revealed by the same *Sākṣicaitanya* in experience like 'I am ignorant'. The *Sākṣicaitanya* reveals 'I' as the substratum and the whole range of objects (*sarvaviśaya*) as the object of such ignorance (*ajñāna*). Hence in such places *ajñāna* as a positive category is revealed

as existing in a substratum regarding an object. But all these revelations are the work of the *Sākṣin*. This *Sākṣicaitanya* is, however, not the remover of *ajñāna* for which the *ṛttijñāna* of the *antaḥkaraṇa* is required. In *ajñāna* there is no such *ṛttijñāna* but the only *ṛtti* of the *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind is with regard to the *avidyā* itself. Thus all objects, whether known by the *ṛttijñāna* or unknown as such, are revealed by the *Sākṣicaitanya* whence it follows that *ajñāna* like the *ṛttijñāna* is a positive, but unlike it, an indeterminate, entity revealed by and only by the *Sākṣicaitanya*. The *avidyāṛtti* is not antagonistic to *avidyā*.

Prakāśātmayati has admirably established *ajñāna* by an inferential proof which makes it a positive entity existing in the same locus as *jñāna* or knowledge. His syllogism tries to establish that all means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇajñānam*), being the means of the knowledge of a previously unknown object must needs presuppose a positive entity existing before them as the cause of such previous ignorance; such a positive entity which is *ajñāna* is a necessary pre-condition of valid knowledge of an object—the object being veiled by this previous entity which is dispelled at the first touch of *jñāna* being founded in the same locus, viz., Self; it is never a negative entity as the previous non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) of knowledge but a positive one having a separate existence in the same locus, viz., Self. The middle term (*hetu*) which is postulated here as 'being the means of knowing a previously unknown object' is supposed to make the inference valid by the known example of a flicker of lamp first seen in darkness (*andhakāre prathamotpannaṇapradīpabrahāvat*).

This inference of *Prakāśātmayati* which takes light and darkness as two positive entities, each existing separately and not due to negation of the other, establishes on solid foundations the positive and separate character of *ajñāna*. This is a principle always in conflict with *jñāna*, but is nevertheless the principle of all false knowledge of multiplicity in the empirical world. Hence *Prakāśātmayati* establishes on valid inferential grounds the existence of such a positive principle, having for its locus the same Self which is the locus of knowledge, but acting as the veil (*āvaraṇa*) of the object of valid knowledge to be dispelled by the latter. Here one aspect of

ajñāna, viz., *āvaraṇaśakti*, has been shown by *Prakāśātmayati*'s inference. But the other aspect, viz., *vikṣepaśakti*, by which a false projection is created for illusory knowledge of the Real, has not been hinted at in the inference. We can, however, take it to refer to this aspect of *ajñāna* as well for the fact that valid knowledge of an object, like the first flicker of a lamp, not only dispels the unknowability of the object but also the false projections upon it due to ignorance as due to darkness. This inferential proof, however, hinges upon the positive character of darkness which is disputed by some Schools of Indian Philosophy. But *Avaita Vedānta* does not dispute that; on the contrary, it establishes with great labour this view. The metaphysical necessity of the positive character of darkness and ignorance is the more deep-rooted problem in *Advaita Vedānta*. The whole ontology of the *māyā*-doctrine revolves round this central point. These questions have been discussed in a nut-shell above in connection with the examination of the nature of darkness.

The nature of ignorance as the positive but false *principia eterna* of all false knowledge has been established by the proof of postulation (*arthāpatti*) by *Prakāśātmayati*. This postulation is with regard to the nature of *ajñāna* based upon the admission of false empirical knowledge, be it of silver upon shell or of mind-body-ego-complex upon *Brahman*. These false cognitions necessarily presuppose an equally false material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*); otherwise they would have appeared as true as due to a real cause or due to a manifestation of a real cause. Herein *Prakāśātmayati*'s mind has been trained into a kind of maturity where he does not have to seek explanation of the causality of *ajñāna* as in perceptual or inferential proofs cited above. He now exposes the avowed causality of *ajñāna* of all the empirical falsity, and strengthens his hands by the added proof of postulation (*arthāpatti*) that this *ajñāna* as such a cause is itself a false, but eternal, principle having its locus upon the Self which is also the locus of knowledge.

Prakāśātmayati's arguments as to the existence and nature of *ajñāna* are cogent and logical. But there is a very great problem as indicated in these arguments which is basal to the *Advaita* concept of *avidyā*. The question suggests itself

when Prakāśātmayati in his inferential proof says that *ajñāna* is the veil (*āvaraṇa*) of the object of knowledge (*svaviśayāvaraṇa*). *Ajñāna* is never the veil of any external object, but of the consciousness (*caitanya*) revealing such object. The assertion of Prakāśātmayati, therefore, seems to be a gross challenge to Advaita metaphysic. But this question has been met by Prakāśātmayati himself who has shown that *ajñāna* can never be the veil of any external object which is never the recipient of any effect or consequence (*atiśaya*) of it. The above anomaly has been pointed out and resolved by Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadīpana* where he has shown that the real object on which *ajñāna* acts as the veil (*āvaraṇa*) is not the external object as such but the consciousness delimited by such an object. Hence Prakāśātmayati's contention that *ajñāna* acts as the veil (*āvaraṇa*) of the object of knowledge stands the scrutiny of logic. The knowledge of the external object likewise is the revelation of this consciousness through the consciousness delimited by *ṛttijñāna*. Thus Prakāśātmayati's assertion need not be taken at its face value. The object is known or unknown due to the revelation or non-revelation of this consciousness. The object itself is never known without such previous non-revelation. Thus *ajñāna* or *avidyā* has its *locus standi* only upon consciousness and its object is merely the object of empirical determination (*vyavahāra*) as due to this consciousness. This has been very well indicated by Padmapāda who says that *ajñāna* is due only to the real principle of all external (*bāhya*) and internal (*ādhyātmika*) objects, viz., Consciousness or Self (*Ātman*), which is the determinant of it, and is revealed by the *Sākṣicaitanya* when the external object is empirically designated as unknown.⁹

This question has been raised by Prakāśātmayati himself as had been clearly indicated by Padmapāda who contended that *avidyā* or *ajñāna* cannot act as a veil upon the blind object, for the fact that such an object is itself not a fit object of being covered by ignorance which can cover only consciousness (*sā ca na jaḍesu vastuṣu tatsvarūpābhāsaṁ pratibadhnāti*

⁹ *avaśyameṣā'vidyāśaktirbāhyādhyātmikeṣu vastuṣu tatsvarūpasattā-mātrānubandīnyabhyupagantavyā, anyathā mithyārthābhāsanupapattē.* (Pañcapādikā, Pp. 96-102).

—*Pañcapādikā*; P. 106). Prakāśātmayati and Vidyāraṇya have discussed this one of the most vital problems of Advaita metaphysic to show that the external object is never the object of the covering by ignorance. They have tried hard to justify that the veiling of *viśaya* (external object) is due to the veiling of consciousness and never directly so. The common language dupes us in these cases as when we say *ghaṭaḥ ajñātaḥ* (the jar is unknown), for what passes as the object of ignorance is taken as the external jar. This dialectal anomaly is sought to be dissolved by a very deep dialectical analysis of the nature of the external object and the influence of *ajñāna* on it. This deeper epistemology of Advaita Vedānta is revived masterfully by Prakāśātmayati and Vidyāraṇya.

Prakāśātmayati shows first of all that *ajñāna* never creates any effect or consequence (*atiśaya*) upon the external object, whence it follows that it is not the real object of ignorance. The external object being known or unknown cannot be the object of the veil (*āvaraṇa*) created by ignorance. His thesis is that previous ignorance of the object can in no wise be established from its present knowledge, for it involves mutual dependence (*parasparāśraya*) and absence of a universal rule for such postulation. In the ever-revealed Self (*Ātmā*), the present recollection of its past knowledge (in *pratyabhijñā-jñāna* as in *so'ham*) cannot logically postulate any previous or intermediate absence of knowledge or memory (*jñānasmytyabhāva*). Herein therefore there cannot be any logical necessity of previous absence of knowledge and the present knowledge of the Self. Vidyāraṇya has practically analysed these arguments and has shown that the dialectal usage like 'the jar is unknown' can be explained in consonance with the ontological standpoint of Advaita Vedānta. Prakāśātmayati had shown that the usage of common parlance as *ghaṭaḥ ajñātaḥ* can be explained even without the recognition of any veil upon the *ghaṭa*. The *viśaya* and *ajñāna* are both revealed by the *Sākṣicaitanya*, and hence both appear to be revealed in *adhyāsa* or false super-imposition. This relation of *viśaya* and *ajñāna* is not due to any intrinsic nature of the former for the fact that the latter can only be related with the Self (*Ātmā*) [Cf. *ātmāśrayam ātmaviśayam ajñānam*.] Vidyāraṇya has also shown that the unknownness of the object is dispelled by

pramāṇajñāna and never made an object of it. Thus the (unknown) object cannot postulate any veil for the fact that it is never revealed by itself but revealed due to its superimposition upon *caitanya*; whence it follows that the veil (*āvaraṇa*) of *ajñāna* can only take the latter as its *locus standi*.

How then to explain the unknowability of the external object? *Prakāśātmayati* had said that *ajñāna* along with its (external) object appears as super-imposed on *Sākṣin*. Hence it has no effect upon the object which is designated as unknown. But there is a false projection (*vikṣepaśakti*) of *ajñāna* which creates, as it were, an effect, though false, upon the external object which therefore is said to be unknown as such, but known as another object. This false projection, created by *ajñāna* which covers up the consciousness delimited by the external object, thus makes the object unknown due to the veiling of the consciousness. Hence though the external object is not the object of the veil of ignorance, it is not on that account always revealed; for the *pramāṇajñāna* arises when the ignorance is dispelled and the false projection vanishes. The false projection makes the object appear as unknown by the non-cognition of the object as such, and the real cognition of the object is the function of *pramāṇajñāna*.

Vidyāraṇya has rightly pointed out, as we indicated at the outset of this discussion, that *Prakāśātmayati*'s inference regarding the positive existence of *ajñāna* appears on the face of it untenable for the fact that he had used in his *sādhya* (major term) the expression *svaviśayāvaraṇa*; but after what *Prakāśātmayati* has himself said and *Vidyāraṇya* has so ably established, it is clear that the *āvaraṇa* as referred to by *Prakāśātmayati* does not directly refer to the external object, but only indirectly. The false projections (*vikṣepa*) created by *ajñāna* have their *locus* in Consciousness which is thus veiled and made to appear as the *viśaya*. The external object, being the creation of *ajñāna* out of the false projection by which only the Consciousness delimited by it is veiled, therefore, appears as being the object of the veil of ignorance, which, in fact, it is not¹⁰.

¹⁰ śuktyādiḥaḍaṇiṣaye tu rajatādhyupādānamajñānāvasthāviśeṣaṇam caitanyaryavādhāyakatvena phalataḥ āvaraṇatvaṁ na tu sākṣādityavirodhaḥ—

Prakāśātmayati has exposed the opponents' charges that even if *ajñāna* be recognised as being responsible for the false projection (*vikṣepa*) of external objects though it really acts as a veil upon Consciousness (*caitanya*), the further complications of the non-cessation of the material cause (viz. *ajñāna*) in spite of the cessation of the knowledge of false projection, and consequential corollary of its not being a material cause of *adhyāsa* force themselves upon us. Prakāśātmayati has therefore not only shown the false projections out of *ajñāna* by which it makes them the objects of false knowledge, but has also taken great pains to establish that when the false projections cease due to true knowledge, there is also the cessation of the material cause (*ajñāna*) also which is responsible for such false projections. Vidyāranya too has likewise analysed the problem of *ajñāna* as the material cause (*upādāna*) of *adhyāsa* and has shown that true knowledge puts a stop to the *vikṣepa* (false projection) as well as the material cause (*upādāna*) itself. Vidyāranya is more analytical in considering the problem, for he shows that there come about the horns of a dilemma to the Advaitist who recognises *ajñāna* as the material cause of *adhyāsa*. If he does not recognise the cessation of the material cause itself along with its false projections (*vikṣepas*) by true knowledge, then the question of Salvation which is the complete cessation of *ajñāna* according to the Advaitist becomes a meaningless hypothesis; on the other hand, even if he recognises its cessation, yet he has to postulate infinite pieces of *ajñāna* to explain fresh false cognitions even after the cessation of one for the fact that the cessation of one piece of *ajñāna* cannot account for the ultimate Salvation. Thus by postulating an endless series of *ajñānas* or by postulating that *ajñāna* is not the material cause of *adhyāsa*, the Advaitist becomes a topsy-turvy dogmatist. Prakāśātmayati has met such arguments and Vidyāranya has ably analysed the chain of arguments of his predecessor. To meet these charges Prakāśātmayati has shown that even if the *vikṣepas* are said to be exterminated due to the true knowledge and lose themselves into their cause (*ajñāna*), there

is no legitimate ground for thinking that the cause remains even after the true knowledge has appeared. This argument of Prakāśātmayati has been elaborated by Vidyāranya by an inference in which he has shown that the true knowledge, when appears as a posterior category, exterminates all previous false categories—the basal as well as the consequential. Thus false projections as well as their basic material cause, viz., *ajñāna*, are negated by true knowledge. This has been proved from the empirical process of false knowledge as in shell-silver (*śukti-rūpya*). The true knowledge of the shell appearing as silver does not only negate the silver but also along with it the absence of true knowledge (*svapṛāgabdhāva*) which is the *ajñāna* of the shell. Here however Vidyāranya seems to have made a technical error in putting in the syllogism—one of whose members he designates as *svapṛāgabdhāva*, for after all the laborious endeavours to prove that *ajñāna* as the material cause is a positive and never a negative entity, and after his analysis that it is something other than *svapṛāgabdhāva* (*svapṛāgabdhāvavyatirikta*), Vidyāranya seems here to have committed an error which may be brushed aside as technical without impairing the general metaphysic he has tried to support. Secondly, Prakāśātmayati and Vidyāranya have tried to show that to explain the re-appearance of *ajñāna* after the destruction of one manifestation of it, it does not do any harm to the Advaitist position if we recognise different empirical manifestations of *ajñāna* for different pieces of false cognition which we have as springing from one fundamental *ajñāna* (*mūlājñāna*)¹¹.

Prakāśātmayati has moreover met the charges of opponents that *ajñāna* cannot act as a veil (*āvaraṇa*) to Self (*Ātmā*) or Consciousness (*caitanya*) for the fact that the latter is a Self-luminous Principle and can never have any lessening of Consciousness. Consciousness according to the Advaitist being the self-evident, self-luminous and self-existing Eternal Principle cannot have any lessening due to a veil; hence it cannot have any necessity of dependence upon auxiliary conditions which can take away from its revelation. Thus

¹¹ *mūlājñānasyaivāsthābhedaḥ rajatādyupādānāni śuktikādījñānaisaḥādhyāseṇa nicartanta iti kalpyatām—(Vivaraṇa, P. 109.)*

Consciousness as the revealer of all objects by itself is never fit to be the object of any veil due to *ajñāna*. Vidyāraṇya has also analysed that Consciousness cannot have any veil either due to its intrinsic nature or due to any extrinsic factor on which it has to depend; for it is itself evershining and is self-luminous. Thus by a consistent perusal of the Advaita standpoint it becomes a paradox to say that *ajñāna* creates a veil (*āvaraṇa*) upon Consciousness which is the witness (*Sākṣin*) to all empirical phenomenon. But such charges cannot stand the scrutiny of a logical analysis which Padmapāda had hinted at and which has been elaborated by Prakāśātmayati and Vidyāraṇya. Padmapāda had said that the presence of the veil of *ajñāna* upon self-shining and self-evident Consciousness is justified by the fact that the temporal and spatial non-revelation of the Self, the seat of Consciousness, is due to the power of *avidyā*, the *principia eterna* of a positive nature that is undeniable, which creates such a veil (*āvaraṇa*) upon it; Prakāśātmayati and following him Vidyāraṇya have proved its existence upon Consciousness by deductive reasoning. Prakāśātmayati has characterised his reasoning as *anumāna* (inference) or *arthāpatti* (postulation). Thus he has argued that the Self being pre-possessed of the collocation of all factors for its revelation is sometimes the object of non-revelation. Hence such empirical non-revelation must needs posit the presence of some veil acting (though falsely) upon the self-shining Self; whence it follows that the veil is due to a positive principle of ignorance which covers the Self. This kind of deductive reasoning, according to Prakāśātmayati, may be either inference or postulation, but Vidyāraṇya has designated it as inferential argument only (*anumānasiddhatvāt*). It does not make much difference dialectically if we can prove that the *vyatirekyanumāna* (inference by a negative analogy) resorted to by Vidyāraṇya is on the acceptance of the Nyāiyāyika's view and not the Vedantic view which discredits such inference; but Prakāśātmayati's arguments are more in the nature of postulation (*arthāpatti*) which is the Vedantic substitute for *vyatirekyanumāna*, which is the second choice of Prakāśātmayati on the acceptance of his opponents' view. Be that as it may, this much becomes crystal-clear that Padmapāda's postulation of the possibility of an

action of hindrance due to a positive ignorance (*ajñāna*) of the Self has been logically established by Prakāśātmayati and Vidyāraṇya by deductive reasoning.

Prakāśātmayati has again brought in charges against the Vedantic theory of the positive nature (*bhāvarūpatvam*) of *ajñāna*, although he had laid securely the ground of such a theory. These charges have been raised by opponents who have tried to justify that the derivative meanings of the negative particle (*nañ*) can make *ajñāna* something other than what the Vedantist has established. This kind of after-charges and their answers by Prakāśātmayati is necessary for the fact that it makes the position more sound. This is technically known as the *sthūṇānikhanananyāya* or 'the process of fixing a pole in the ground'. Vidyāraṇya, too, has analysed these charges and as is usual with him more analytically. *Ajñāna* has been described by the opponents as the absence of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*), antagonism to knowledge (*jñānavirodha*) which is *mithyājñāna* or false knowledge, or something other than knowledge, such as the impressions (*saṁskāra*) of false knowledge. Prakāśātmayati and Vidyāraṇya have replied that none of these alternatives is included in the concept of *ajñāna* inasmuch as the instances of such alternatives cannot explain satisfactorily the non-revelation of *Brahmasvarūpa* which is the effect of *ajñāna*. In deep slumber (*susupti*), for example, the non-revelation of *Brahmasvarūpa* cannot postulate that it is due to any of these alternatives, for such non-revelation of *Brahmasvarūpa* is neither due to the intrinsic nature of *Brahman* which is self-luminous nor due to Its distinction from *jīva* which is contrary to the Upanisadic teaching of unity. Again it cannot be due to any *pratibandha* or hindrance of false knowledge (*mithyājñāna*) which is absent in deep slumber, or of its impressions which are incapable of being hindrances or of absence of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*) that is accidental in ever-present revelation of *Brahman* or any action (*karma*), or its impressions. The last point of the hindrance of action (*karmapratibandha*) is developed by Prakāśātmayati and more so by Vidyāraṇya who show that the *karmic* hindrance as envisaged here will either make the infinitesimal Self (*Brahman*) always non-revealed as a result whereof *karmas* themselves will not be revealed or

will make that part of the Self revealed by which they themselves are illumined and the other part unrevealed as a result whereof a mermaid-like hypothesis will have to be accepted. Prakāśātmayati has more fully analysed the absence of any *karmic* hindrance to the Self when he has shown that the *karmas* according to the opponents (*Mīmāṃsakas*) are not revealed by the Self or according to the Vedantists do not act as such a hindrance to the Self. Hence Prakāśātmayati and Vidyāraṇya have repudiated ably all other alternatives to positive *ajñāna* as being possible ones to explain the non-revelation of *Brahmasvarūpa*. They have further shown that this positive *ajñāna* is free from all such charges, for the fact that it is of immediate experience as being revealed by the Witness-Consciousness (*Sākṣin*) but acting as a veil upon the revelation of the other aspects of Consciousness, viz., delimitation by the object etc. This positive *ajñāna* as being revealed by *Sākṣin* is a fact of immediate experience, whereas the *karmic* hindrance is either indirectly experienced if it is at all a hindrance which it is not, because of the nature of the *karmas* which are all impressions (*saṃskāras*) in the last analysis.

Prakāśātmayati has still further weighed the charges of some opponents who postulate both difference and non-difference (*bhedābheda* *vādin*) in all kinds of existents and who therefore do not recognise such a positive *ajñāna* as the creator of all empirical life and not negated till such life exists. On the other hand, they hold that false knowledge (*bhrāntijñāna*) or absence of knowledge (*jñānābhāva*) or their impressions are sufficient reason for the false cognitions of our empirical life and do not make it unreal, for the fact that there is not only non-distinction from *Brahman* but also distinction from It which is also true. The dualistic philosophy of *bhedābheda* as referred to here by Prakāśātmayati refers to Bhagavat Bhāskara's philosophy as distinct from the Bhāṭṭa School of Mīmāṃsā which is dualism in specific relations and not in all relations. This distinction has been made clear by Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadīpana*. However, Prakāśātmayati and following him Vidyāraṇya have very ably refuted these charges and have shown that the dualistic realism negating *ajñāna* and admitting a kind of *mithyājñāna*

fails to establish its own issue, for the fact that such *mithyājñāna* between the *anātmā* (not-Self) and *Ātmā* (Self) turns out to be a true knowledge due to the metaphysical position of dualistic realism; this kind of *mithyājñāna* is not false for making the distinct as non-distinct because of the fact that distinction and non-distinction are both true. *Prakāśātmayati* has refuted such *mithyājñāna* of the *bhedābhedavādins* by taking a familiar example of two species of cow viz., *khaṇḍa* and *muṇḍa* (names attributed to different varieties of cow on their physical attributes of broken and ungenerated horns). He has shown that even in the negating judgments like 'this is not a *khaṇḍa*-cow but a *muṇḍa*-cow,' there is invariably mutual reality of both distinction and non-distinction (*bhedābheda*) of the genus 'cow' from both these species. Even the negation of one (*khaṇḍa*) in the genus (cow) by another species (*muṇḍa*) cannot account for falsity inasmuch as the character of the genus (*gotva*) as modified by one species (*khaṇḍavyaktyavaśchinā*) is not the ground of such negation but such character as modified by the other species. This argument of dualistic realist applies equally to the other side, that is, the absence of falsity in the *jīva* which is the ground of both kinds of revelation—as the not-Self as well as the Self. Thus the ground of negation of one, say the not-Self, is not *jīva* appearing as such, but as the other (Self). But such negation is impossible here, for *jīva* is the ground of both the (real) revelations of the not-Self and the Self. Thus false knowledge (*bhrāntijñāna*) of the Self and the not-Self becomes unjustifiable in the tenets of the *bhedābhedavādin*.

Thus have *Prakāśātmayati* and *Vidyāranya* taken great pains to establish the Advaita concept of positive *ajñāna* as the material of all illusory empirical behaviour (*adhyāsa*). *Padmapāda*'s faint suggestions have been worked by them in every detail and they have discussed the problem from all aspects meeting all possible charges. The next question about *adhyāsa* as introduced by *Padmapāda* is with regard to the presence of *adhyāsa* upon *Brahman* and proofs for establishing such presence. *Padmapāda* has hinted that the empirical life appears as distinctly experienced than the illusory world, for in the former there is apparently no

experience of negation as in the latter. Hence the former not being the object of any negation *seems* to have no grounding in *ajñāna*. This suggestion of Padmapāda, however, is faintly hinted at and Prakāśātmayati elaborates its real implications. He says that though it is a fact that our empirical life can be proved to be due to a super-imposed knowledge (*adhyāsa*) between the Self and the not-Self and therefore is negated by the real knowledge of the Self, still such knowledge being of an indirect (*parokṣa*) nature as testified to only by the *śrutis* cannot have any direct bearing upon the negation of the direct experience of such existence. The negating knowledge should be as direct (*pratyakṣa* or *aparokṣa*) as the negated knowledge (*adhyāsa*) is, and hence Padmapāda's suggestion that there can logically on the face of it be no negating knowledge and hence no possibility of the empirical life, being due to *adhyāsa*, stands to reason. This being the charges of the opponents (*pūrvapakṣa*), Padmapāda has undertaken the task of adducing proofs to *adhyāsa* in the empirical life and Prakāśātmayati has elaborated them. The former has just mentioned that there being the necessity of adducing proofs to *adhyāsa*, the Bhāṣyakāra Śaṅkara has laid down the *lakṣaṇa* or the definition of *adhyāsa* in order to show its possibility. Prakāśātmayati has taken the cue from such suggestions of his predecessor and has analysed how *adhyāsa* is supported by proofs and how it is a fact in our empirical life. He says that the empirical life is based on the super-imposed knowledge of the not-Self upon the Self which fact is attested to by perception, inference, postulation (*anupapatti*) and testimony of Scriptures. The testimony of Scriptures is not the sole guide in the determination of such knowledge. Perception such as of the body as the Self (*aham manuṣyaḥ*), inference from the empirical behaviour which is due to the knowledge of duality, and postulation of it from the fact that it is much below the transcendental Reality which alone is unnegated and therefore it cannot but be false as it is negated, are the proofs for the existence of *adhyāsa* in the empirical life.

But, as it has been hinted at above, Prakāśātmayati still further analyses the question of the possibility of *adhyāsa* to meet the opponents on their own ground. He says that so

long as the nature of *adhyāsa* is not clearly brought out, no amount of dialectical arguments will be able to make a complete negation of it as being false for which a correct analysis of the nature of *adhyāsa* is a pre-requisite (*avidyāvaspaṣṭī karaṇāya lakṣaṇameva vaktavyam—Viraraṇa*, Pp. 141-142). *Akhaṇḍānanda* in his *Tattvadīpana* has further clarified the position by saying that such a correct analysis will go to prove the thesis that our empirical life is due to *adhyāsa* when such nature of it will be obvious and finally the possibility of the negating knowledge will be an added testimony to the existence of such *adhyāsa*. The whole argument therefore comes to this that the analysis of the nature (*lakṣaṇa*) of *adhyāsa* is the first pre-requisite to show that it is a fact (*sadbhāva*) and the dialectical proofs follow from such showing of the fact and are indirect but are added testimony to strengthen the thesis. From the faint suggestion of *Padmapāda* who said that the empirical life seems to be unnegated unlike the illusory world and hence the necessity of the analysis of the nature (*lakṣaṇa*) of *adhyāsa* arises, we can construct a legitimate structure where *lakṣaṇa* is the foremost pre-requisite whence follow all necessary proofs to the existence of *adhyāsa*.

Padmapāda has moreover brought out the implications of the possibility (*sambhava*) of *adhyāsa* over and above its nature (*lakṣaṇa*) and existence (*sadbhāva*). He has said that the separate enunciation of *sambhava* seems to be redundant for the fact that it is implied whenever there is *sadbhāva*. But his analysis that the direct experience of facts is sometimes seen to seem impossible by more powerful evidences experienced before, is ably elaborated by *Prakāśātmayatī* who shows that the separate enunciation of *sambhava* is necessitated by such facts. *Padmapāda*'s contention is that in the matter of *adhyāsa* the ground of falsity, i.e., *Brahman* that is Pure Unqualified Existence, cannot be properly said to be such ground whence it follows that there should not be any falsity in the empirical world. But *Śaṅkara* himself has shown that this contention is not tenable for the fact that *adhyāsa* is not only a matter of empirical proof but also of metaphysical possibility, whence it is to be admitted that the ground of *adhyāsa*, i.e., *Brahman* is regarded as such without doing any violence to its metaphysical nature. *Padmapāda* has also, shown that the

view, that there cannot be any falsity in our empirical life because of the ground of super-imposition being Unqualified Existence, is not legitimate and hence the possibility (*sambhava*) of *adhyāsa* is also to be separately stated. Prakāśātmayati's contention which follows Padmapāda's that such apprehension of the absence of possibility (*asambhāvanābuddhi*) of *adhyāsa* is *prima facie* untenable for the fact that *Brahman*, the ground of such super-imposition, being known fully, there cannot be any super-impositions at all, not to speak of its possibility or impossibility, and secondly, It being not known as distinct from the not-Self, there cannot be an apprehension of impossibility of *adhyāsa*. Prakāśātmayati hits upon the right nail to bring out the opponents' charges (*pūrvapakṣa*) as indicated by his predecessor. But Padmapāda's contention that the apprehension of impossibility is legitimately claimed by the opponents is elaborated by Prakāśātmayati who says that the *prima facie* case as established above can be side-tracked by saying that indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge of *Brahman*, and not direct (*aparokṣa*) knowledge of It, as being distinct from the not-Self, can be a ground of the opponents' charge of the impossibility of *adhyāsa*. Thus understood Prakāśātmayati's analysis of the *pūrvapakṣa* is more accurate than his predecessor's for the former shows the real contention of the opponents upon which also is based the reply of the Advaitists. For, *adhyāsa* seems to be untenable according to the opponent's view on the admission of the indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge of *Brahman*, and the Advaitists also reply by the admission of such knowledge to prove the possibility and actual existence of *adhyāsa* in our empirical life. Padmapāda says that such a charge is voiced by the Bhāṣyakāra himself when he introduces the topic of *adhyāsa* by saying : *āha ko'yamadhyāso nāmeli?* He says that the interrogative sentence used by Śaṅkara refers to both a question as to the nature (*lakṣaṇapraśna*) as also a denial of the possibility (*sambhāvanākṣepa*) of *adhyāsa*. This therefore is the substance of the controversy as to whether *adhyāsa* is possible or no, from the points of view of the Advaitists and their opponents.

Vidyāraṇya has also closely followed these discussions and has shown that *lakṣaṇa*, *sambhāvanā* and *pramāṇa* (*sadbhāva*)

are all necessary pre-requisites and hence have to be separately stated to prove *adhyāsa*. His arguments have been on the lines indicated by his predecessors and he has expressed them in verse to prove the thesis of his School.¹² Moreover, he has brought out the logical necessity of *lakṣaṇa* and *sambhāvanā* by referring to their rôle in establishing a position in relation to the *pramāṇa* which is capable to do it. He has referred us to a verse whereby he has shown that *lakṣaṇa* and *sambhāvanā* are necessary not only to meet possible charges but also to establish the position which can be arrived at only by the *pramāṇas* but only with their co-operation¹³.

¹² *guruśiṣyau vādinau vā śāstre tattvaricārakau tatra śiṣysaṁ prati guruḥ pūrramadhyāsamuktavān. vivadante'tra ye'dhyāse tānuddiśyātha lakṣaṇam sambhāvanāpramāṇāṁca kathyate'dhyāsasiddhaye. (Vivaraṇa-prameyasamgraha. P. 170.)*

¹³ *mānādhinā meyasiddhirmānasiddhiśca lakṣaṇāt taccādhyakṣamāṇeṣu gīrvāṇairapi durbhaṇam. sambhāvitāḥ pratijñāyām pakṣaḥ sādhyeta hetunā na tasya hetubhistrāṇam utpatameva yo hataḥ (cf. Oitsukha, Nirṇaya Sagar Ed., P. 217.)*

CHAPTER III

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF ADHYĀSA & ITS PROCESS, WITH A DETAILED ADVAITA THEORY OF ERROR AS CHALLENGING OTHER THEORIES (KHYĀTIVĀDAS)

Now we enter into the real field of the very important problem of *adhyāsa* which is sought to be analysed in its nature (*lakṣaṇa*) by Śaṅkara when he defines it as *smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*. This definition of *adhyāsa* has been analysed by hair-split discussions by the later dialecticians of Advaita Philosophy, and Padmapāda and his followers have very ably clarified this *lakṣaṇa*. As to the first expression *smṛtirūpaḥ*, Padmapāda says that the first member, i.e., *smṛti* refers to the object of recollection (*karmani kṛtin*). But the grammatical justification of such interpretation as given by Padmapāda himself has been elaborated by Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda. They have shown that this *karmani kṛtin* is justified by Pāṇini's very rule *akartari ca kārake saṁjñāyām* (Pāṇini, 3/3/19), for though there is the express condition of *saṁjñā* for such *pratyayas* (as *ghaṇ*) to be used in cases other than the nominative (*akartari*), still the conjunction 'ca' can make them to be used in places other than *saṁjñā* in all cases other than the nominative. Thus the grammatical irregularity is avoided by Padmapāda and his followers¹⁴. The compound, however, is analysed by Padmapāda as *smāyamāṇarūpamiva rūpamasya* (*Uṣamāna-garbha bahuvrīhi*) which means that the super-imposed object (like silver on shell) is *similar* to an object of recollection but not merely recollected as such. The second alternative is untenable for the fact that the object is not merely an object of recollection but of direct experience (*spaṣṭam̐puro'vasthitatvāvabhāsanāt—Pañcapādikā*. P. 160). It can be said in this

¹⁴ 'bhāve' 'kartari ca kārake saṁjñāyām' itī sūtradvayamadhikṛtya 'striyām kṛtin' itī sūtreṇa bhāve kartṛvyatirikte ca kārake saṁjñāyāmivā-kartari ceti caśabḍātsaṁjñāyāmivāsaṁjñāyāmapi ghaṇādirvidhīyata itī na sūtravirodha ityarthah. (Tattvadīpana Pp. 158-159.)

connection that Vācaspatimiśra in his well-known commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, viz., *Bhāmātī*, has recognised the act of superimposition as similar to recollection (*smṛtirūpa*), for according to him, the knowledge of super-imposition is false owing to the falsity of the super-imposed, and is, therefore, similar to *smṛti* (recollection) but not pure recollection. But Prakāśātmayati points out the opponents' charges and meets them very ably to defend his predecessor's interpretation. He points out, from the opponent's side, that the super-imposed object cannot be logically said to be similar to an object of recollection for the fact that it is the object of one direct experience along with the substratum of illusion, as in true knowledge the generic term is the object of one direct experience along with the specific attribute. Hence the opponents urge that there need not be any question of similarity with an object of recollection in the present case and hence any knowledge of a relation with such recollected object is out of place. But this view is shown to be untenable on the face of it by Prakāśātmayati who points out that without a relation with the previous true knowledge (as 'this is silver'), no false appearance of silver on a shell is apprehended, for true knowledge and false knowledge are both due to a relation established between the different attributes of an object. Prakāśātmayati seems to suggest that false knowledge like 'this is silver' pre-supposes the previous experience of true knowledge as established by a relation of the object and its specific attribute, but later on the relation of the specific attribute (*rajatam*) is revealed as clinging on, by way of similarity with the recollected silver, to the substratum but *falsely through and through*. This seems to be the logic of Prakāśātmayati when he says that the super-imposed object is similar to a recollected object (real) and there is a knowledge or relation with the substratum of illusion (*saṃsargasaṃvit*).¹⁵

Prakāśātmayati further analyses the knowledge of relation as existing in illusory cognition and raises the objections of the opponents to such knowledge only to meet them logically. The opponents urge that though this knowledge of relation

¹⁵ *nāhi paramārthedamrajatasamivedanākārāvabhāsanyūnatamāntareṇa; saṃsargasaṃvidamśābhāvaḥ śakyate vaktum. (Vivaraṇa, P. 159).*

is sought to be proved as existing between the substratum and the (super-imposed) object of illusion (by way of analogy with real knowledge of an object and its attributes), yet the super-imposed object seems to have no part to play inasmuch as it turns out to be a non-entity and hence in its absence such knowledge of relation falls to the ground. But Prakāśātmayati shows that this suggestion is not a very sound one even to the opponents' position, for instead of denying knowledge of relation by the denial of one object (the super-imposed) they try to establish that this object is rather the factor which makes the determination of any knowledge possible. This view of the opponents is put to severe criticism by Prakāśātmayati who exposes that the knowledge of relation does not depend on the superimposed object but is self-revealed and reveals the object in its turn. The position of Advaita Vedānta is brought out in the cryptic sentence as follows by Prakāśātmayati : *yathāsaṁvidavabhāsādhīnatvād arthasattānīścayasya* (*Vivaraṇa*, P. 159). The opponents may urge that the determined knowledge of the existence of the object of super-imposition (*arthasattānīścayaḥ*) is the determinant of the knowledge of relation (*saṁvitsattānīścayaḥ*), but Prakāśātmayati shows the fallacy of infinite regress (*anavasthā*) in such a position ; for, the determination of *arthasattā* (existence of the object) cannot be due to the object itself which is inert (*jaḍa*) and incapable of revealing anything, and also it cannot be due to another determination (*nīścayānāram*) which lands one into *regressus ad infinitum*. Thus the opponents' view is shown to be wholly untenable without the recognition of the knowledge of relation as a self-revealed fact by which the object is revealed, which is the Vedantic position. But further Prakāśātmayati raises the possible objection that the knowledge of relation depends upon the existence of the super-imposed object, as is proved by the fact that negating knowledge (as 'this is not silver') is possible because of the negation of the object (*rajatasya niṣidhyamānatvāt*—Akhaṇḍānanda). But he himself shows the untenable character of such a position by bringing out that the previous knowledge of super-imposition (as 'this is silver') is independently originated without the least dependence on anything extraneous and hence the contention that the negating knowledge pre-

supposes for its (negative) relation with the object of super-imposition the motor-action generated by the object of negation (*rajaṭābhāvajñānaprayukto vyavahārah*—Akhaṇḍānanda) is also unsound. The motor-action generated by the object of negation can in no wise prove the self-revealed character of knowledge and makes it inferentially proved over and above landing us in the fallacy of infinite regress. Hence Prakāśātmayati's admirable analysis leaves one in no doubt that the knowledge of relation as established in the case of illusion is not an impossible hypothesis but is to be logically recognised as the self-revealed and independent entity for the possibility of the experience of the object of super-imposition which is revealed by it, but can never originate the former. Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadīpana* lucidly summarises these arguments as follows: *pūrvāsiddhau (pūrva=pūrvasamvit) ullarottarasid dherna vyavahārādisiddhiriti svata eva samvinnīṣṭya iti vaktavyam, tathāca tadbalād arthasattvaṁ vaktavyamiti nārthābhāvasiddhirityarthaḥ* (*Tattvadīpana*. P. 160).

The nature of the negation as explained by Prakāśātmayati is due to the knowledge of two kinds of which one points to the illusory existence of the object of super-imposition whose existence is negated, while the other to the tri-temporal (*traikālika*) negation of that object. Hence the object of super-imposition, though illusorily perceived, is tri-temporally negated. Akhaṇḍānanda shows that of these two kinds of knowledge (*nāstyatra rajatam and mithyaiva rajatamabhāt*), the first refers to the tri-temporal negation which is negation of the phenomenal silver (*kālatrayaṇiṣedhasya laukikaviśayatvam*—*Tattvadīpana*, P. 161) and the second to the negation of the very existence of the object of super-imposition which is illusory out-and-out (*māyāvivartarūpyaviśayatvam*—*Ibid.*).

Prakāśātmayati has moreover shown that the object of super-imposition cannot be explained as existing there by any other process than the contact of a very positive nature (*spṣṭa*) with the object which bears resemblance as being known by the negating knowledge which shows that the object of super-imposition is due to a clear relation established between it and the substratum of super-imposition, and he brings out the fact that the conative action flowing from such know-

ledge unmistakably proves such a knowledge by contact with the object of super-imposition. Prakāśātmayati has explained that the definition of *adhyāsa* as given by Śaṅkara and as elaborated by his disciple and follower, Padmapāda, refers to two kinds of *adhyāsa*, to both of which the definition equally applies. This twofold *adhyāsa* as explained by Prakāśātmayati refers to *arthā-dhyāsa* (super-imposition of the object upon a substratum) and *jñānādhyāsa* (super-imposition of the knowledge of the former upon the knowledge of the latter). He says that both these kinds of *adhyāsa* should be explained by one *lakṣaṇa* as given by Śaṅkara, for in *adhyāsa* there is not only the super-imposition of the object upon the substratum but also the super-imposition of its knowledge upon the knowledge of the latter which is more fundamental. The object being super-imposed upon the substratum generates the false knowledge of super-imposition which is the nature of *adhyāsa*. Thus Prakāśātmayati's analysis is very consistent in so far as the definition of *adhyāsa* is concerned, for all definitions should be as precise as possible. Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvādīpana* has brought out the implication of this explanation of Prakāśātmayati by saying that the super-imposition of the knowledge may be excluded if only the super-imposition of the object is sought to be defined.¹⁶ Prakāśātmayati explains that in the case of the super-imposition of the object upon the substratum the definition refers to the object similar to an object of recollection appearing on the substratum whence it follows that the object is false, though having a contact with the sense which sees,—under the strokes of pre-cognitive impression of a similar object of recollection that is real,—the present object that is false. In the case of the super-imposition of knowledge, however, Prakāśātmayati explains that the knowledge of the superimposed object is similar to the recollection (of the object) appearing on the knowledge of the substratum and hence is false as being the knowledge of an object which has a false contact with the sense duped under the spell of *avidyā* with a clear succumbing to the pre-cognitive impression (*pūrvānubhavaśaṁskāra*).

¹⁶ *yadyapyarthajñānādhyāsayoranyataraṇivedeśe'nyatarasiddhiḥ, tathāpyarthādhyāśalakṣaṇasya jñānādhyāse'sambhavenāvṛtyāptiḥ syāt tadarthaṁ prthag nirdeśatayamityarthah—Tattvādīpana. P. 162.)*

This two-fold explanation of the definition of *adhyāsa* by *Prakāśātmayati* in which he has fully brought out the significance of the process of super-imposition is, however, open to a common charge and *Prakāśātmayati* clearly avoids it. *Adhyāsa* either of the object or of its knowledge upon a locus where false contact with what is presented makes it possible, may be said to have no actual recollection of the object (which is real) but only a similarity with such recollection and its object (whence it is false); but the objection may be that except in the case of actual recollection, there should not be any scope for the object of super-imposition to be due to any previous knowledge or any *saṁskāra* (that which rakes up the previous knowledge), for only in the case of actual recollection this is admitted. But *Prakāśātmayati* ably answers to this objection by showing that in every case of cognition except that is born of pure sense-contact, there is inevitably a part played by the previous knowledge. Thus even though in the case of *adhyāsa* there is no actual recollection, there is unmistakably no knowledge born of pure sense-contact but of a false sense-contact with the object that bears a similarity with the object of recollection that is due to a previous knowledge, and hence not purely contactual nor really pre-cognitive but somewhat of a half-way house between the two. Thus *Prakāśātmayati*'s analysis and explanation of the nature of *adhyāsa* leave one in no doubt about the falsity of it which is born of no epistemologically valid process but of a process beyond valid epistemology.

Prakāśātmayati has brought out more serious objections to *adhyāsa* as upheld by the Advaitist from the viewpoint of other Schools of Indian Philosophy. Illusory knowledge has been a very knotty problem in Indian Philosophy and every School has discussed it from its own peculiar point of view. Hence there have grown up subtle dialectical controversies with regard to this problem. *Prakāśātmayati* has brought out these opposite viewpoints and has step by step eliminated them as inadequate for the explanation of illusory knowledge. Thus the very first viewpoint discussed by *Prakāśātmayati* is of *Prabhākara*, the *Mīmāṃsist*, who does not recognise any false knowledge (*akhyātivādin*). *Prabhākara* holds that knowledge may be of two kinds—that which is born of valid means

(*pramāṇajñānam*) and that which is born of recollection (*smṛtiḥ*). The first is due to some mediate processes which separate the origination of valid knowledge from the sense-contact (as the knowledge of an invariable concomitance between the probans and probandum—*vyāptijñānam*—in the case of inference), but the second is originated upon an object by an immediate process of *saṃskāra* (impression of a previous object) by the sense-contact. Hence Prabhākara's contention is that knowledge can never be false, there is no such knowledge as *mithyājñāna*, but is always true, either recollective or contactual. He seems to suggest that in recollective knowledge, too, where there is recollection of one object upon another (*anyasamprayukte cakṣuṣi yadanantaramanyaviṣayaṃ jñānamutpadyate*) there is no non-validity in the knowledge which by itself is true as due to a *saṃskāra* (*yadanantaram*) which is raked up (*udbuddha*). Thus Prabhākara's recollective knowledge has its validity in the *saṃskāra*, no matter whether it is false or no. Similarly, contactual knowledge is always true as due to some mediate epistemological processes. Prabhākara's analysis, therefore, excludes false knowledge altogether and rehabilitates in its stead a two-fold distinction of knowledge which in itself is always true. Even recollective knowledge which is ordinarily excluded by the major Schools of Indian Philosophy as not giving us valid knowledge (*pramā*) except by the Jainas and the Mādhyas is recognised by Prabhākara as not antagonising with valid knowledge but rather as hanging on to it as one of its aspects, for recollective knowledge has, if no validity, a veridical content. Thus Prabhākara's contention that *ayathārthajñāna* is a *non-être* is based upon his two-fold classification of knowledge that is all true.

Prabhākara's contention that recollective knowledge can very well substitute false knowledge (*ayathārthajñāna*) in so far as it is due to a *saṃskāra* (pre-cognitive impression) and hence an object may appear upon another by way of recollection by the obliteration of any distinction (*bhedāgraha*) of the recollected and the perceived, is sought to be established on the ground that the posterior negation is only of the *smaraṇābhimāna* or the conative corollaries of recollection (such as *vyavahāra* or action). Prabhākara suggests that the *doṣas*

(subjective or objective drawbacks) are responsible for calling up the similarity which makes the *saṁskāra* of recollection at all effective in producing a specific object on another. Hence there seems to be a continuity of experience between the recollection and the perception through the agency of the similarity-impression (*sādrśya-saṁskāra*) of a particular object, and as long as *doṣas* stay, they keep up this continuity which in fact is never a fact but appears as such due to very successive presentations of the two psychological processes. Prabhākara's analysis applies to all kinds of so-called false knowledge where he upholds the view of reality of all knowledge, and the apparent unreality (as in illusion) of knowledge is explained away as due to extraneous circumstances like *doṣas* and *saṁskāra* which produce only wrong actions and never false knowledge. This knowledge of recollection or *smṛti* is as veridical as the knowledge born of other valid means (*pramāṇas*) and even in the origination of one object upon another (like silver upon shell) which is due to such recollection (as he says), there is no falsity in knowledge as is proved by the negating knowledge of only conative corollaries such as actions (*vyavahāra*).

Prakāśātmayati replies to such a position by showing that *akhyāti* (absence of illusion) is never a logical concept, for this term cannot logically establish anything which can explain cognitions like *this is silver* (where there is a shell). Absence of *khyāti* (*khyātyabhāva*) is a too wide term to include experiences in dreamless sleep (*suṣupti*) into the category of such cognitions. Knowledge of conative actions upon a different object (*anyatra pravṛttiheturjñānam*) is also a too narrow term, for such actions are not universal. Knowledge of many things whose difference is lost, (*aviviktānekākārajñānam*) cannot also be said to be the cause of such true knowledge for the fact that there is a difference between the *shell* and *silver* which are denoted by two terms. There is a cognition of duality in such knowledge as is evident from the two terms of different connotations. Thus the evidence of perception itself cannot establish an absence of difference to explain such a knowledge of one appearing as the other.

Prakāśātmayati analyses more elaborately the view of the *akhyātivādī* Prabhākara and shows that on no account can

there be a logical possibility of the knowledge of many objects whose difference is lost (*aviviktānekapaḍārthajñānam*) by eliminating the possible alternatives to such a view. He shows that the knowledge of different objects whose difference is lost cannot account for error in knowledge for the fact that it becomes a dubious hypothesis. Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvādīpana* clarifies the view by showing that such a view to account for error is untenable, for it cannot prove the origination of error universally and even consistently. The knowledge of two different objects as one unified cognition as in those cases of genus-species relation where there is both difference as well as non-difference (*bhedābheda-vādin's* knowledge as *khaṇḍo gauḥ*—a *khaṇḍa-cow*) is not error, nor even the knowledge of perception and memory giving a unified judgment is alone an explanation of error, for a unified judgment of two perceptions as in the judgment *aham manuṣyaḥ* can very well account for the falsity of the knowledge. Nor also the judgment regarding a generic and a specific object (*sāmānyaviśeṣajñānam*) can be said to have a relational knowledge and hence excluded from the category of error; for here also there is a knowledge of different objects whose difference is lost, the relational knowledge (*samsarga-jñānam*) being a *non-être* to the Prābhākaras who advocate a clear-cut difference of various knowledge-processes in the case of their explanation of error and no other factor such as the quality-object relation (*guṇaguni-sambandhaḥ*) can account for such knowledge. Moreover, there is a clear recognition of difference between the generic and specific objects which is capable of negating the unified judgment and there is therefore no possibility as the Prābhākara holds that such unified judgments are outside the category of error. The Prābhākara contention of error is further vitiated by the fact that there should at the time of perception of *this (idam)* be always a clear-cut distinction with the recollection (*silver*), or else to explain the distinction a third knowledge has to be admitted, whence it should follow that all knowledge as having lost the distinction (*aviviktapaḍārthajñānam*) is false. Hence Prābhākara's absence of distinction is always with regard to a unified judgment and hence that judgment has a unifiedly related object

(as 'this—silver') without any distinction, and thus their whole psychology falls to the ground for the fact that their recognition of a unified object without distinction will tantamount to the recognition of a relational judgment which in fact has been shown to be not possible in their theory. Moreover, the object of recollection as advocated by the Prābhākaras as having an obliterated proportion (*smṛtipramoṣa*) is not easily understood, for the fact that *smaraṇābhimāna* (the quality of being recollected) which they try to establish and which in their opinion is obliterated remains inexplicable. It is not included in pure recollection (*smṛti*), for when *smṛti* remains *smaraṇābhimāna* cannot be obliterated. Nor can the *vice versa* be correct, for *smaraṇābhimāna* being gone, *smṛti* will not be debarred from originating its effects. Nor can a totally different thing as *smaraṇābhimāna* be conceived.

"If it be argued by the Prābhākaras that previous experiences of space, time etc., along with the perception of the object are *smaraṇābhimāna*, and these are obliterated afterwards, then it can be said that even in true cognition, as remembrance of a previously cognised person (*pratyabhijñā*) as 'This is he (whom I saw)', previously experienced space, time etc., are also perceived and not obliterated. Here also there is non-recognition of difference between 'this' and 'he'. So there ceases to be any clear-cut distinction between the two kinds of cognition, in both of which *smaraṇābhimāna* in the nature of previously cognised space, time etc., is present. Hence the Advaitists conclude that in recollection (*smṛti*) where an object is revealed, no other knowledge of any other thing exists except that the particular object remains revealed as it was perceived. The knowledge of other things (as space, time etc.) is due to inference born out of the previous perception of the object of remembrance, for when the object was perceived previously, those things were also perceived and they are inferred in the recollection of the former afterwards. The knowledge of other things being mixed up afterwards with the pure recollection of the object accounts for false cognition of the object along with those other things; truly speaking, in recollection (*smṛti*) the pure object is recalled. This is the reply given by the Advaita Vedantists to the Prābhākaras in

respect of the nature of *smṛti*.”¹⁷ (Author's article on “The Problem of Nacre-Silver in Indian Philosophy”—*Indian Historical Quarterly*, June, 1952, Pp. 169-170).

Prakāśātmayati's analysis of *smṛti* and its object from the Advaita point of view has been more elaborated by himself with reference to the verbal recollection of an object (*padāt padārthasṁṛti*). Padmapāda had hinted at this aspect of recollection and tried to show that here also there is a pure object without any other auxiliary object perceived along with it. Prakāśātmayati has shown by way of elaboration that both in *abhihitānvayavāda** and *anvitābhīdhānavāda** there is the verbal recollection of successive words till the last and a clear link among such bits of recollection is responsible for the verbal knowledge. This link is established by the words in the successive recollection of their meanings by the impressions of a relation among such words and their meanings which are roused by the words themselves. Thus in verbal recollection, too, there is a clear recognition by the Vedantists, as in all other views, that the objects of recollection (viz., the successive meanings) are pure objects raked up by the impressions obtaining between them and the words, and there is no scope for any other knowledge such as that of words related with their meanings, for the fact that such knowledge will end in a *regressus ad infinitum* by depending on another knowledge and also in obliterating the functions of words altogether. Thus the verbal recollection is due to the impressions of a relation obtaining

¹⁷ “*tasmādarthamātraviśayaññānājanāyā smṛtirarthamātrameva viśayīkaroti, na pūrvajñānenāvīśayīkṛtaṁ jñānamapi anyathā nilajñānāt pite'pi smṛtiḥ syāt*” (*Vivaraṇa*, P. 180).

* *abhihitānvayavāda*—The Bhāṭṭa Mimamsists regard a judgmental connection between words and their meanings in a sentence as issuing out of meanings as expressed by words (*padābhihitārtha*). Such meanings or connotations are coalesced together due to capability (*yogyatā*), necessity (*ākāṅkṣā*), proximity (*āsatti*) etc., in a judgment. This knowledge of coalescence as born out of the expression of the meanings by words in a judgment is neither perceptual or immediately known nor is it representational as in memory or indirectly cognised but is a third variety of knowledge. It is opposed to the Nyāya view which regards the knowledge of a judgment as born out of pure words which without expressing the meanings rake up their memory. Some, however, erroneously regard the Nyāyāyikas as belonging to this school, but Jayantabhaṭṭa in his

between successive meanings of words.¹⁸ Padmapāda has moreover pointed out the possibility of *smaraṇābhīmāna* from the view-point of the Prābhākara who seek to justify error by its obliteration. Prakāśātmayati has worked upon the charges against any such possibility as hinted at by Padmapāda. He first shows that this *smaraṇābhīmāna* cannot be established by itself or by any external fact, for it is not determined by itself nor by any *pramāṇa* nor by any *pramāṇaphala*. Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadvīpana* has clarified this position by saying that there is no difference of objects of *smṛti* and *pramāṇa* either by way of recollection of auxiliary objects such as space, time etc., or by different cognitions of different objects. Thus there is no possibility of *smaraṇābhīmāna* and no obliteration of it is conceivable. Prakāśātmayati has moreover shown that the recognition of the triad of the subject, the object and the act pre-supposes its difference from the perceptions of them before any actual memory is born, either by way of inference or pure recollection. Thus there is a logical difference between recollection and perception before memory.

Padmapāda has very ably pointed out that the view of the Prābhākara that error can be explained by the supposition of

Nyāyamajjarī has rejected this view like the other view of *anvitābhīdhāna*. (Cf. *matadvayamapīdantu nāsmabhyāṇ rocatetarām. kuto'nvitābhīdhānam vā kuto vā'bhīhitānvayaḥ*).

anvitābhīdhānavāda—The Prābhākara Mimamsists hold that every meaning that is expressed by a word (*padārtha*) is inevitably connected with another meaning of another word (*padārthāntara*). There is no *padārtha* or connotation that can stand independent of any relation or connection in a judgment. Even where there are no other *relata*, they would hold the verb 'to be' (*asti*) etc. which may be related with any connotation. The words expressing such related connotations in a sentence are as much a means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), as the judgment itself. No word without being related in a judgment can give any meaning by standing apart; in other words, every word should be *related* with its connotation to any other word with its connotation in a judgment so that we can know each connotation in a judgment as a related or synthetic one. Thus the Prābhākara do away with the Bhāṭṭa and the Nyāyāyika views of the validity of the judgment only, which coalesces together the connotations expressed by words.

¹⁸ "tasmāt padebhyaḥ padārthamātreṣu buddhisāmarthyasambandhāt smṛtaya iti siddham"—(Vivaraṇa, P. 184).

a recollected knowledge (*smṛti*) that is valid, is untenable for the fact that there is some kind of knowledge that is neither purely perceptual nor purely recollective but purely illusory and hence false *in itself*. Padmapāda has worked out in detail this conclusion by showing that the obliteration (*pramoṣa*) of what the Prābhākaraś accept, viz., of previously cognised aspects of the objects, is wholly untenable on the ground that this *smaraṇābhimāna-pramoṣa* is not responsible for error as is evident from the fact that inference (*anumāna*) presupposes previously cognised (*parokṣa*) space, time etc., or at least the previous cognition (*pūrvānubhava*) of these and they remain in the shape of impressions (*saṃskāras*) only but which are not found to be so present in *smṛti* where these *saṃskāras* do not present themselves as really calling up such previous knowledge of the different aspects of the recollected object. Thus there is a clear-cut distinction between inference of cognition (*jñānānumāna*) and recollection (*smṛti*) in which the latter is unadulterated with the previous knowledge of the different aspects of the object for which the Prābhākara supposes and advocates an obliteration (*pramoṣa*). Thus *smṛti* being with regard to the pure object (*suddham vastu*) should be a different category of valid knowledge altogether and cannot in any way generate false (*mithyā*) knowledge (such as, of actions) by the obliteration of some parts. This is the greatest rejoinder to the Prābhākara theory and Prakāśātmayati following Padmapāda has brought this out quite ably.¹⁹

Vidyāraṇya has very clearly shown that the Prābhākara contention of *smaraṇābhimāna* or the quality of being recollected as previously cognised, remains inexplicable. He has suggested eight alternatives to mean *smaraṇābhimāna* and has shown that none is tenable. These are—(1) *smṛti* (recollection), (2) *smṛteranya* (something other than recollection),

¹⁹ *tasmāt pūrvapramāṇasaṃskārasamutthataḥ tadviśayābavabhāsitva-mātram smṛtiḥ, na punaḥ pratitito'rthato vā'dhikomaṃśo'sti yasya doṣunimittatḥ pramoṣaḥ parikalpyate. * * * * ato nānyasaṃprayoge'nyaviśayajñānam smṛtiḥ kintu rādhyāsaḥ—(Pañcapādikā, Pp. 186-188.)*

ato na pramāṇasamṛtidvairākyameva jñānasya kintu tṛtīyaṃ bhṛānti-jñānamapi—(Vivaraṇa, P. 188.)

(3) *smṛtigatadharmā* (some quality of recollection), (4) *pūrvānubhava-viśiṣṭatvenārthagrahaṇam* (the recollection of some aspects of the previously cognised object), (5) *svagata eva kaścit smṛtiviśeṣaḥ* (some mode of recollection of its own), (6) *pūrvānubhavagocarād viśiṣṭajñeyanimitto viśeṣaḥ* (some special object of recollection distinct from that of previous cognition) (7) *phalabheda janakatvam* (the quality of producing different effects in recognition), (8) *smarāmītyanubhavaḥ* (the perception such as 'I remember'). Vidyāraṇya's analysis is more analytic than Prakāśātmanayati's, though the former has taken the cue from his predecessor and his analysis has brought out more ably the nature of *smṛti* as opposed to the view of the Prābhākara, —that is to say, that *smṛti* is never with regard to the auxiliary aspects of the object but always with regard to the pure object. Vidyāraṇya has shown that there should be a difference between the *vyavasāyajanyā smṛti* and *anuvyavasāyajanyā smṛti* by way of bringing out this conclusion from the Advaitist standpoint. He says that in *vyavasāyajanyā smṛti* there is recollection of the pure object (*ghaṭamātram*) but in *anuvyavasāyajanyā smṛti* there is recollection of the object as previously known (by which the auxiliary aspects are implied). Hence Vidyāraṇya has concluded that *smṛti*, to be pure, can never rake up along with the auxiliary aspects of an object their *anuvyavasāya* or a recollective knowledge that as vouchsafing for their knowledge should be presupposed, and hence is always with regard to the object as such or an object bereft of any relation with *anuvyavasāya* or recollective knowledge, but having relation with *vyavasāya* or pure cognition that is *a priori* to *anuvyavasāya*.²⁰

Vidyāraṇya's analysis of the Prābhākara view has been more to unravel the incompatibilities and to bring out the Advaita view. He has shown that the Prābhākara contention

²⁰ *anuvyavasāyendājñānagocurānumānena vā janyeyam smṛtirvyavasāyajanyāyāḥ ghaṭamātragocarāyāḥ smṛteranyā. na cānyā'pi svajana'nuvyavasāyāḥkhyāḥ pūrvānubhavo viśayikriyate, kiṁ tarhi, anuvyavasāyendānubhūto vyavasāyaviśiṣṭo ghaṭa eva. ata etat siddham—vimatā smṛtirna svamūlajñāna-viśiṣṭamarthaṁ grhaṇāti, smṛtivrāt padārtha-smṛtividiti. padāni hi svasambandhesvartheṣu smṛtiṁ janayanti—(Vivaraṇa-prameyasamgraha—Pp. 195-196).*

is untenable for the fact that here is no logical ground to suppose that the object of super-imposition (*silver*) is not the object of perception as the substratum is (as according to them there is no knowledge of relation—*samsargasaṃvit*—between them but there is only a continuity of experience—*nairantaryeṇa pratibhāsaḥ*); hence an illusory silver (*mithyā rajat*) has to be accepted as the object of direct experience.²¹ Vidyāraṇya has carried his analysis a bit further by showing that the object of negation (*niṣedhaviṣaya*) is with regard to the phenomenal silver (upon shell) and not the illusory silver, for then the illusory silver (*prātibhāsikam rajatam*) being there as the object of illusory knowledge is never the object of tri-temporal negation (*traikālika niṣedha*) which all negation implies. Thus the Advaitist view, as brought out by Vidyāraṇya, is that the silver is the phenomenal (*vyavahārika*) one which being falsely taken into knowledge when one sees a shell before him is negated tri-temporally and is the object of negation. But the object of super-imposition being the illusory (*prātibhāsika*) silver, there is the direct experience of such silver in illusory knowledge. This dual rôle of the silver wherein it is illusory (*prātibhāsika*) at the time of false knowledge and phenomenal (*vyavahārika*) at the time of negation, has to be accepted to explain the knowledge and negation of it logically. The charge of ungrounded negation in so far as the phenomenal silver is never the object of false knowledge (*aprasakta-pratiṣedha*) is ably refuted by Vidyāraṇya who shows that the phenomenal silver, though never the object of illusory knowledge, is *falsely* taken into the knowledge of the substratum (shell) as it generally appears (*sāmānyopādhai prasaktiḥ*) and never into the knowledge of it as it is. Hence even the negation of an object (say, a jar) on the ground is with regard to the jar as it is capable of being known (though not actually known—in which case no negation of it would be possible) on the general aspects of space, time etc., of the substratum (ground). Thus the Advaitist theory as brought out by Vidyāraṇya is unchallengeable and Vidyāraṇya's analysis has

²¹ *yathāpratibhāsameva mithyārajatasya kṛtījñānena nirasana-yogya-syāsmābhirabhyupagāmāt*—(*Vivaraṇa-prameyasaṅgraha*, P. 175).

been more accurate and thorough-going than what his predecessors suggested. We have shown above that Akhaṇḍānanda has just hinted at these two kinds of the silver in his *Tattvadīpana*. Vidyāraṇya has supported what his predecessors, Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati, have said with regard to the nature of the object of illusion. The object of illusion, according to his predecessors, is similar to the recollected object (*smāryamūṇasadṛśam*) and never recollected as such (*na smāryamūṇam*). He also harps on the same tune and shows that this similitude with the recollected object pre-supposes the previous cognition of the silver (which was true) but which becomes false in illusory knowledge being related to the substratum by a through-and-through false relation. He only hints at the impossibility of *adhyāsa* without such previous cognition and seems to bring out his predecessors' logical analysis to the forefront by saying very clearly what is hidden in it.²²

Vidyāraṇya's analysis of what his predecessor Prakāśātmayati hinted at is very clearly done and it leaves one in no doubt about the *epistemology of adhyāsa*. He shows that the object of illusion being born of impressions (of previous cognition) is never to be seriously challenged on the ground that it is not recollective knowledge, pure and simple, (*smṛtibhinnajñānatvāt*), for he says that contactual knowledge, pure and simple, becomes *upādhi* (the hindrance to any valid inference) to any such inference. We have shown above that Prakāśātmayati has said that except in such contactual knowledge, there is a rôle of *saṁskāra* (impressions) in every kind of knowledge, and illusory knowledge being not born of pure sense-contact has to admit *saṁskāras* for its origination. But Vidyāraṇya puts it more logically and shows that this *upādhi* of pure contactual knowledge is co-eval with the probandum (*sādhya*) in the example (*dṛṣṭānta*, viz., "as in perceptual knowledge") [the probandum being *saṁskārajanyatvābhāvavāt*], but not so with the probans (*hetu*) in the minor term (*pakṣa*, viz., *adhyāsaḥ*) [the probans being *smṛtibhinnajñānatvāt*]. Vidyāraṇya's logical

²² *na hyānanubhūtarajatasya rajatabhīrāntirāśīyate*—(*Vivaraṇaprameya-saṁgraha*—P. 181).

analysis comes to this that in *adhyāsajñāna* there is never pure contactual knowledge as co-eval with the difference from pure recollective knowledge (that recollective knowledge being a fact), whence it follows that the probandum, viz., *saṁskārajanya-tvābhāvavāt* is never proveable in the *pakṣa*, viz., *adhyāsajñāna*. This logical analysis of Vidyāraṇya proves, therefore, that *adhyāsa* has to admit *saṁskāras* as well as some sort of sense-contact, though false, and is therefore neither born of pure contactual knowledge nor of pure recollective knowledge.²³

Prakāśātmayati has thereafter brought in the Nyaiyāyika view that the silver (object of super-imposition) is present elsewhere as a real entity but is brought forth upon the shell with which the sense is in contact, being associated with any *doṣa* (defect) and is thus taken into knowledge upon the shell which is present before. The recalling of silver upon shell is, according to them, due to the similitude between them and hence the Nyaiyāyikas conclude that the knowledge of silver is purely perceptual (*grahaṇātmakam*). "The Nyaiyāyikas conclude that in mistaking a piece of nacre as a piece of silver, there are not two pieces of knowledge as the Prābhākaras hold, but there is a third variety of knowledge where the piece of nacre is cognised as being qualified by the knowledge of the piece of silver. This erroneous knowledge arises, according to the Nyaiyāyikas, due to an abnormal contact of the sense-organ (viz., the eye) with the object (viz., silver which is absent in the present case but present elsewhere). This abnormal psychosis is what is known as *jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa* or connection of the sense-organ with the object due to the pre-occupied knowledge of that object in the mind, though the object be not really present." (Author's article: "The Problem of Nacre-

²³ Vidyāraṇya's logical analysis can be understood if we understand the nature of *upādhi* which is defined in Indian logic as *sādhyaśya vyāpakavyastu hetoravyāpakastathā sa upādhiḥ*, viz., that which is co-eval with *sādhya* or probandum but not so with *hetu* or probans is the *upādhi*. In valid inference if any factor is shown to be such as not existing co-extensively with the *hetu* by which the *sādhya* is sought to be established in the *pakṣa*, while so existing with the *sādhya* in the known cases (*dṛṣṭāntā*), then the whole inference seeking to establish the *sādhya* in any *pakṣa* (minor term) becomes fallacious for the absence of such co-extensive *sādhya* on the strength of a weaker *hetu* in the *pakṣa*.

Silver in Indian Philosophy"—*Indian Historical Quarterly*, June, 1952; Pp. 164-165).

Padmapāda hints upon this view when he exposes the incompatibilities and Prakāśātmayati works upon this elaborately. This view which is known as *anyathākhyātivāda* cannot stand the scrutiny of logic, as Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda expose it to it. Prakāśātmayati says that the alternative interpretations to *anyathākhyāti* may be: (1) Knowledge of a different form with regard to a different substratum (*anyākāraṇa jñānam anyālambanam*), (2) Knowledge of an object appearing as a different object (*vastuno vastvantarālmanā avabhāsaḥ*), (3) Knowledge of an object transformed differently (*anyathā pariṇāte vastuni jñānam*). The first interpretation is untenable on the face of it, for the Nyāiyāyikas cannot admit the object and the revelation of knowledge as different when they have to oppose the direct apprehension of an object as it exists. The object cannot assume a different form when it is in contact with the sense for the fact that it cannot produce a different form (*ākāra*) in knowledge which is contradictory. Nor can the object be said to be the object of actions flowing from such knowledge (of taking one thing as the other) for the fact that neither by way of intervention (*vyavadhāna*) nor by way of immediacy (*avyavadhāna*) can the object be said to be the object of such motor-actions. When, for example, from the knowledge of a tiger, a cudgel is brought in, the cudgel, being the object of motor-actions flowing from the knowledge of the tiger, cannot be said to be the object of the knowledge of the tiger. Hence Prakāśātmayati concludes that such difference in the object due to the motor-actions produced by the sense-contact cannot be logically established.²⁴ Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvādīpanā* has shown that over and above these two alternatives in the first interpretation, two others are also untenable. Firstly, the object cannot appear as different due to any benefit accruing from the knowledge of the substratum (*sarṇvijjanitātīśayāśratvām*), for when the object is destroyed (*pradhvasta*) it ceases

²⁴ *tasmāt tadākāra evālambanamiti nānyākāraṇa jñānamanyālambanamanyathākhyātiriti*—(*Vivaraṇa*, P. 189).

to have ever been wrongly perceived; secondly, appearing as a different object is never possible if the object be a future one, where the objectivity of appearance (*bhānakarmatvam*) is never possible till it will be produced, or even if the object is said to be revealed by way of motor-actions (*vyavahāra-viṣayatvam*) due to the appearance, then many ancillary properties of an object will have to be admitted as coming within the sphere of such appearance.²⁵ Prakāśātmayati has moreover repudiated the other two alternatives of the *anyathākhyātivādin* with regard to the meaning of *anyathākhyāti*. The second interpretation referred to above, viz., knowledge of an object appearing as a different object, is not plausible for the fact that unless the Nyaiyāyikas admit an illusory (*mithyā* = *anirvacanīya*) relation between the knowledge and the object of appearance as the Advaitists do, no knowledge of such appearance is ever to be contemplated. This impossibility is due to the metaphysical stand of this School where there is complete difference between the generic object and its specific attributes, and hence no real relation can be effected between them; nor is there any unreal relation as they do not admit it. Thus a void relation (*śūnyaḥ saṁsargaḥ*) can never come into the knowledge in such cases. Even the recognition of difference and non-difference (*bhedābheda*) cannot account for error, for then valid cognitions like 'this is a *khaṇḍa*-cow' will be erroneous. Hence the Nyaiyāyika being impelled on the horns of a dilemma, would rather prefer a real relation (*saṁsargasatyatā*) to an unreal (*anirvacanīya*) one, but that would make his theory of error a precarious hypothesis inasmuch as the relation being real, no negating knowledge would ever be possible, or, there would be no distinction between real and erroneous knowledge, and thus error

²⁵ *kim-ākārārpakatvamāmbanatvam? uta saṁvitprayuktavyavahāra-viṣayatvam? āho saṁvijjanitātiśayāśrayatvam? athavā bhāsamānatvam? na tritīyaḥ, pradhvastāderaviṣayatvaprasaṅgāt. nāpi caturthaḥ. bhāsamānatvam bhānakarmatvam uta tatprayuktavyavahāra-viṣayatvam? nānyaḥ, bhaviṣyadāderaviṣayatvāpatteḥ. na dvitīyaḥ. nāntarīyikatayā vyavahāra-viṣayasya kaladhautamolāderapi kaladhautajñānaviṣayatvāpatteḥ. tasmāt tadākārārpakasya viṣayatvam vaktavyam tacca nātreti śukteranāmbanatvamityabhiprāyeṇopasaṁharati-tasmāt tadākāra iti.—(Tattvadīpana, P. 189).*

and negation would indiscriminately appear in every piece of valid and invalid knowledge. The Nyāyīyika might suggest that his *anyathākhyāti* refers to the knowledge or revelation of an object transformed differently (*anyathā pariṇate vastuni jñānam*), and it is the shell that is transformed as the silver. But it is Padmapāda who has shown clearly that such a view is untenable, on the face of it, for the transformation having been real like that of milk into curd, there would never appear any negating knowledge (*bādhajñāna*) afterwards. Hence to admit any such transformation is to admit the reality of knowledge in such cases of error. This alternative of real transformation of the substratum into the illusory object is the very old view of *anyathākhyāti* as advocated by Bhagavad Bhāskara, who admits both difference and non-difference (*bhedābheda*) in every relational knowledge. This view is, therefore, not the Nyāyīyika's own, but borrowed from Bhāskara.

Prakāśātmayati says that it is the Prābhākaras who are epistemological realists and who never admit falsity in knowledge, that have brought out the views of the opponents, viz., the Nyāyīyikas and others who recognise error in knowledge (*bhramavādins*) by way of showing the fallacies in their systems. Hence the above account of the Nyāyīyika view of *anyathākhyātivāda* is from the viewpoint of the Prābhākaras who, says Prakāśātmayati, are out to demolish any theory of error in knowledge, and hence who next attack the Buddhist theory of *ātmakhyātivāda*. It is well-known that except the Mādhyamikas, all other Schools of Buddhism subscribe to this *ātmakhyāti* theory of error which explains it from the angle of an epistemological idealism. Hence these Schools argue that it is the consciousness (*viññāna*) that is the sole cause of the appearance of all the empirical phenomena, and it is, therefore, the ground of all the appearances. "Now the advocates of *ātmakhyātivāda* are all subjectivists in so far as they recognise nothing outside of knowledge. The object of knowledge is only a form of knowledge which alone is true. Knowledge and its objects are inseparably connected and invariably present; hence there is, so to say, identity in them. * * * *

They hold that the piece of nacre is existent only in knowledge and the error arises only when we falsely suppose it to be present outside of knowledge. Their argument starts with their recognition of the fact that whatever form is perceived is, without another perception to the contrary, true, real; but its negation is possible only when such another stronger perception to the contrary arises. Hence they hold that when we negate the knowledge of silver on a piece of nacre, what we have to do is to admit only the negation of external manifestation of silver which is internal and not of the piece of silver itself. It is better and wiser, they hold, to acknowledge such a standpoint, for in doing so, we are logically precise being at the same time concise." (Author's article : "The Problem of Nacre-Silver in Indian Philosophy"—*Indian Historical Quarterly*—June, 1952, P. 160). This external manifestation of silver which according to this theory is the object of negation is raked up by an impression which had been imprinted, so to say, upon the series of momentary bits of knowledge (*jñānasantati* or *viññānasantati*) and this impression though separated by a gulf of such momentary bits of knowledge, can call up the silver by way of similitude. They go even to the extreme of admitting an eternal chain of impressions regarding an external object carried down through the momentary bits of knowledge and the calling up of the object by the maturity (*paripāka*) of this impression-series (*vāsanā*).²⁶

Prakāśātmayati brings out the fallacies to such a view of the Buddhists from the viewpoint of the Prābhākaras who attack the *ātmakhyāti* doctrine. The Prābhākaras according to Prakāśātmayati point out that the silver which is held by the Buddhists as the objective projection of the subjective existence is never capable of being accounted for in error. If it is not born there, it can have no appearance, and if it is held to be born, it fails to be subjective, for an objective basis of such appearance (say, an external object perceived before) has to be admitted. But the Buddhist argument being that the subjective silver is only projected as external under the influence of

²⁶ *tajjanyajñānasantāna eva saṁskāraḥ, sa ca tathāvidhajñānāntarādīyaṇādīvaśanāprāpitāṁ rajataṁ buddhyākāro bahīravadarabhāsate*—(*Vivaraṇa*, P. 192).

imperfections (*doṣas*) adhering to the knowledge (or, say, silver) which is subjective in itself, Prābhākaras charge them with non-origination of any externally projected silver; for, they point out that the causal knowledge of the externally projected silver being prior to the object has not the capacity to reveal it, and any other knowledge devoid of imperfections attached to it can never be said to be the cause of the calling up of the external silver for the simple fact that there ceases to be any causal nexus between a particular piece of knowledge and a particular appearance (which is possible only under the influence of the *doṣas* calling up the external projections through *vāsanās* or impressions according to the Buddhists). Finally if the knowledge being under the influence of these *doṣas* can call up the external projection, then the latter being born of the knowledge of silver which is subjective should be admitted as a real (*sat*) category like the subjective silver, or else, the external projection of silver should cease to have for its cause the subjective knowledge of silver which makes the former appear. This admission of the reality of the projected entity is from the view of the theory of knowledge in and through forms (*sākārajñānavāda*) of the Buddhist. These are, according to Padmapāda's analysis, some of the serious charges put forward by the Prābhākaras against the Buddhists (*ātmahyātivādins*) whose doctrine seems to collapse under them, and the Prābhākaras' stand to defend their own is given a further lease of examination. This has been done by Prakāśātmayati who has shown that the Prābhākaras have exposed the fallacies to the *ātmahyātivāda* only to give themselves up as upholding a theory which is to be put to further considerations by the Advaitists.

The Prābhākara contention that in error there are two pieces of knowledge—one of the nature of perception and the other of the nature of memory—both of which are true in themselves, is next sought to be examined critically by Prakāśātmayati. Hence he has brought in the Advaitist position that there is a unified knowledge in error which is designated as illusory as being born of ignorance (*avidyā*) of the substratum. The Advaita position relating to error or illusory knowledge is consistent with its metaphysical stand where the Witness-Self (*Sākṣicaitanya*) is conceived as the background of

all knowing. In empirical knowledge, however, there are empirical limitations of the *Sākṣi-caitanya* through the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*), its urges (*vyrttis*) and the object (*viśaya*), but the *Sākṣi-caitanya* is always the sole revealer of everything involved in epistemological processes. This metaphysical position has been taken in by Prakāśātmayati here in explaining the Advaita theory of illusory knowledge. In fact, here had been initiated a masterly analysis of the theory which has been elaborated by a host of later dialecticians of Advaita Philosophy. Padmapāda has hinted at this explanation, though in a cryptic way, and Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda have elaborated it.

The Advaitist argue that the recollection of which the Prābhākaras hold obliteration (*pramoṣa*) of some aspects is a non-entity and in its place, a third variety of knowledge arises which can explain the origination of the illusory silver as being called upon the shell. Thus the category of illusion is an entirely different one arising out of the co-operation of several factors, viz., the contact (*saṁyoga*) between the sense and the substratum, imperfections (*doṣa*) in the sense and an ignorance (*avidyā*) pertaining to the Consciousness of the substratum. All these factors are coalesced together as a result of which there appears the illusory silver upon the shell, the silver being the transformation of *avidyā* pertaining to its Consciousness raked up by the imperfections (*doṣas*) which not only retard the origination of the knowledge of the substratum but help to call up the object of illusion through the *avidyā*. Thus the Advaitists hold that there is one complex whole of knowledge in illusion into which the impression (*saṁskāra*) and imperfect cause (*duṣṭa-kāraṇa*) pertaining to the calling up of the object of illusion play their part unitedly²⁷. This shows that the Prābhākara contention of the admission of two pieces of knowledge of which one, viz., recollection, foregoes some aspects (*smṛti-pramoṣa*) is untenable for the fact that the Advaitist contention that error is a complex psychosis where many a factor plays its part to account for it is more logical and more conforming to the nature of error. The Advaitist interpretation

²⁷ *kāraṇadoṣaḥ kāryaviśeṣe tasya śaktiḥ nirundhannerā saṁskāra-viśeṣamapyudbodhayati, kāryagamyatvāt kāraṇa-doṣaśakteḥ. ataḥ saṁskāra-duṣṭakāraṇasaṁvalitaikā sāmāgrī—(Pañcapādikā, P. 195).*

of error, when more elaborately discussed, would come upto this that error is due to the transformation of the *avidyā* or ignorance pertaining to the consciousness of the substratum, and it is this *avidyā* which being aided by the extraneous imperfections of the sense-organ, rakes up, through similarity, the illusory silver, that is along with the knowledge of the silver known directly by the *Sākṣi-caitanya* or the Witness-Consciousness. Hence the object and knowledge of illusion being both directly revealed to the *Sākṣi-caitanya*, the *avidyāvṛtti* or the urge of *avidyā* which is responsible for the calling up of the object of illusion has also a part to play, though it has along with the object of illusion to be directly revealed by the *Sākṣi-caitanya* (it being inert); but then the critics of the Advaitist contention would point out that this theory where there is a complex whole of knowledge falls down, for here there are two knowledges, one of the *avidyāvṛtti* and the other of *Sākṣi-caitanya* as revealing the former. The Advaitist answer to such a charge is clearly brought out by Prakāśātmayati who says that the result of knowledge is to be inferred from the object and not from the knowledge itself, so that the nature of knowledge as to unity or variety is the result of knowledge inferred from a unified or a varied object and never from the knowledge itself which may be one or many without any strings attached to it to determine its own nature as such. Here Prakāśātmayati's analysis is in conformity with the Advaitist position of the relation between knowledge and its objects, that is to say, of the self-luminous character of knowledge which reveals the object, whether it be one, many or falsely regarded as one. The unity or variety of knowledge does not depend on knowledge which is self-revealed and uniform, but the objects being different (as one, many or falsely recognised as one) lend the colour (*ākāra*) to knowledge as such. Thus empirically speaking, knowledge, though a unified and self-revealed entity, takes the shape of the object it reveals. Hence Prakāśātmayati says that though the opponents urge that there are two knowledge-processes here in illusion, yet the object being a unified whole does not bifurcate knowledge which turns out to be a unified whole. Had there been two separate objects revealed by two separate knowledge-processes, there would have been a diver-

sity in knowledge. But here the two knowledge-processes being with regard to the (real) substratum (i.e., shell) and the unreal object (i.e., silver), both of which lose their difference in error, there *appears* to be a unified knowledge, though there are different knowledge-processes. The duality of the knowledge-situation here could not have of itself been responsible for the variety of the knowledge-situation but for the variety of the objects it revealed. But when once in illusion that variety of objects is gone by super-imposing one (the silver) upon another (the shell) where a unified object seems to be born out of such false super-imposition due to *avidyā* backed up by impression and similarity, the variety of knowledge-situation also goes away, and a unified, complex whole of knowledge has to be admitted in *adhyāsa*. This is the Advaitist position of the nature of knowledge in illusion which has been masterfully brought to light by Prakāśātmayati²⁸.

Prakāśātmayati further analyses the Prābhākara view that the two pieces of knowledge in error are born without any intervening time (*nirantarotpanna*) and hence there need not be any unity of knowledge as supposed by the Advaita Vedantists. The Prābhākara view is that the two pieces of knowledge (one of the nature of perception and the other of the nature of memory) are presented successively and without any intervening time in the mind, as a result of which false action (*vyavahāra*) and false designation (*vyapadeśa*) flow. Hence they hold that there is hardly any ground for holding that there arises a complex whole of knowledge in error, as the Advaitists hold. This view is examined clearly by Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda who show that uninterrupted bits of knowledge cannot always account for action and designation, true or false. Prakāśātmayati brings out the nature of verbal knowledge from the standpoint of the Bhāṭṭa Mimamsists and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas to show that here there being an uninterrupted series of word-knowledge, every bit of such knowledge being momentary cannot coalesce to give the desired unity of meaning which is possible only when the impressions of

²⁸ *viṣayāvacchinnaṁ hi phalamavabhāsate, na jñānāvacchinnaṁ. viṣayaśca satyamithyāvarastunoranyonyātmatayaikatāmūpannaḥ, tenaikaviṣayāvacchinnaṁ phalaikatropādhan satyamithyājñānad vayanāpyekamityupacaryata iti bhāvaḥ*—(Vivaraṇa, Pp. 198-199).

the momentary bits of knowledge stay upto the last word which alone is thus capable to do so. Prakāśātmayati thereafter draws an analogy from inferential knowledge where also the knowledge of the probans (*liṅgajñāna*) and the knowledge arising out of impressions (*saṁskāra*) merge together to give the knowledge of the probandum. This view has to be accepted in order to account for a unity of causal cognitions which are not isolated bits of knowledge arising out of a variety of causes. Prakāśātmayati has ably shown that in inferential and erroneous cognitions and in recalling of recollection (*pratyabhijñā*), there is invariably such concomitance in the causal cognitions which coalesce to produce their effect, e.g., a unified knowledge. As to the nature of inferential knowledge specially, it is to be admitted that the knowledge of the impressions (*saṁskāra*) is a necessary factor which calls up the recollection of concomitance (between the probans and the probandum) through the knowledge of the probans (*liṅgajñāna*), impressions (*saṁskāra*) and the consequential recollective knowledge of concomitance (*vyūptismṛti*) so that the knowledge of the probandum ensues. This view being accepted by the Mimamsists to account for inferential knowledge (as opposed to the view of the Naiyāyikas who hold the knowledge of concomitance associated with the knowledge of the minor term as having such concomitance between the probans and the probandum, Prakāśātmayati shows that in illusion, too, there is a unitary knowledge born out of several factors, viz., contact of the sense-organ (*saṁprayoga*), impressions (*saṁskāra*), imperfections (*doṣa*) and ignorance (*avidyā*), and not two pieces of knowledge, as advocated by the Prābhākaras. Padmapāda, too, has shown that in illusion, there operates the same law as in other forms of knowledge, such as, inferential or re-representational, but the difference lies in the fact that in the latter forms of knowledge there is no imperfection or ignorance at the origin and hence they are true, while in the former there is the defect of ignorance at the bottom whence it is untrue²⁹. Here it must be noted that Padmapāda strikes

²⁹ *tasmāliṅgadarśanamero sambandhajñānasamskāramudbodhya tatsa-
hitam liṅgijñānam janayatiti raktavyam*—(*Pañcapādikā*, P. 202.) *liṅgadarś-
anasya saṁskārod bodhakatayā nyathāśidāhatvāt saṁskāra eva liṅgi-
bodhakāḥ, tataḥ upasamharāmanupapannamityūśaṅkya saṁskārasy-*

a new note in the origination of inferential knowledge, for he does not side either with the Mimamsists or with Naiyāyikas, but says that *impression* of the knowledge of concomitance alone is capable to generate inferential knowledge (without recollection of the concomitance or without knowledge of association of such concomitance with the minor term).

Prakāśātmayati has summed up very logically the Advaitist position of illusory knowledge which is known as *anirvaca-nīyakhyaativāda* by showing the logical and psychological anomalies in other views. For example, he has shown that in the Prābhākara theory of *akhyāti* there is a bundle of uncalled-for assumptions, viz., the recollection of the presented, the obliteration of some aspects of recollection, recognition of two pieces of knowledge where a unitary knowledge arises, etc. Similarly in the Naiyāyika view there is the psychological inconsistency in making the silver directly perceived as present elsewhere and the logical inconsistency of the absence of any relation between the silver and the shell inasmuch as without a relation obtaining there between the super-imposed and the locus of super-imposition revealed in a unitary piece of knowledge, the Naiyāyikas theory of super-sensuous relation (*alaukikasannikarṣa*) cannot be logically established; and in the Buddhist theory there is the uncalled-for assumption of the externally perceived as the internally present. In the Advaitist theory, however, there is an illusory object, viz., the silver, which is perceived on the shell *falsely* but the silver is never real in the phenomenal world. Hence Prakāśātmayati shows that the Advaitist conception of three grades of reality,—illusory, phenomenal and transcendental, is consistent with the logic and psychology of illusion, inasmuch as the illusory silver has a reality (illusory) which is negated in the phenomenal plane. Thus the existence (*sattā*) of silver is there so long as we perceive it and hence the silver is, so to say, born then and

ānubhūtamātraviṣayatvenānadhigataviṣayatvasambhavāt saṃskārasahitam liṅ-gadarśanam bodhakam—(Tattvadīpana, P. 202). ayam eva ca nyūyāḥ pratyabhijñāne'pi. na punarjñānadvaye pramāṇamasti. tathā bhinnajāti-jajñāna hetubhyo nilādibhyaḥ ekaṃ citrajñānam nidarśanīyam tatra laiṅgi-ka-jñāna-pratyabhijñā- citrajñānānām aduṣṭakāraṇārabdhātād yathārtham evā-vaśhāsaḥ iha tu kāraṇadoṣād atathā bhūtārthāvaśhāsaḥ —Pañcapādikā, Pp. 203-204).

there.³⁰ The position of the Advaita Vedantists as brought out by Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati regarding the nature of illusion comes to this that the object of illusion should be regarded as such that its false character becomes apparent while it is put to logical test. This falsity (*mithyātva*) is according to them *anirvacanīyatva* and logically establishes the object of illusion as the creation of ignorance (*avidyā*) covering up the consciousness of the locus, as supported by method of agreement and difference (*anvayavyatirekasiddha*). The object of illusion, therefore, is different from the phenomenal object and is negated by the knowledge of this object. Hence the object of illusion and its knowledge are both created by *māyā* or nescience covering up consciousness of the locus that are directly revealed by *Sākṣicaitanya* or the Witness-Consciousness. This creation of *māyā* and the consequential illusory knowledge are what is preached by Advaita Vedānta whose logic rests upon the fact that whenever there is a false object, there is the mixing-up of the objects of two grades of reality,—be it phenomenal and illusory or transcendental and phenomenal. The whole logic of illusion hinges upon this contention which speaks volumes in support of the Advaitist position that illusion is the false creation of *māyā* or nescience that is itself an unreal entity. All our false knowledge is born out of the creation of a false object on a locus that is falsely got mixed up with it. This is known as the *anirvacanīyakhyāti* of the Advaita Vedantists who bring out clearly the object of knowledge of illusion from the standpoint of a logical analysis of the possibility of such an abnormal psychosis. "They hold that as Consciousness is the only real source of revelation of a thing, the consciousness of the knower (*pramāṭṛcāitanyā*) revealed through the *vṛtti* gets identified with the Consciousness on which the thing is super-imposed (*viśayacāitanyā*), and then the ignorance covering up the nacre creates the silver. Everything of the universe, according to the Advaita Vedantists, is the creation of ignorance in the sense that it is super-imposed on Consciousness and has no independent existence. This piece of silver is also the creation of ignorance as it has

³⁰ *ādantāsamsargavadrajatasya śuklikāsamsargo'yam avabhāṣate, na rajatasypāparasattvam—(Vivaraṇa, P. 204).*

no separate existence apart from the Consciousness (of nacre) on which it is falsely cognised. * * * *

The silver is, therefore, according to them, the external creation of the same value of internal ignorance, because it is as untrue as ignorance itself. This is known as *pariṇāma* of ignorance into the form of silver." (Author's article: "The Problem of Nacre-Silver in Indian Philosophy"—*Indian Historical Quarterly*—June, 1952; P. 167).

CHAPTER IV

THE STATUS OF SUPERIMPOSED OBJECT : ITS NEGATION AND CREATION, WITH A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ADVAITA VIEW OF THE SUBSTRATUM

Prakāśātmayatī has introduced an interesting discussion on the nature of *māyā* which Padmapāda had equated with *avidyā* when he said that the silver is the creation of *māyā* (*alo māyāmayaṁ rajatam—Pañcapādikā*, P. 205). These two concepts have a difference according to some Vedantists in so far as *māyā* is said to be the cosmic principle of ignorance that depends on the creator (*kartā*) and does not affect him in any way, while *avidyā* has quite the opposite characteristics. But Prakāśātmayatī does not recognise this difference inasmuch as the real characteristic (*svatūpalakṣaṇa*) is the same in both, veiling of the real nature of objects and projecting of a different nature in its place (*tattvāvabhāsapratibandha-viparyayāvabhāsalakṣaṇasya—Vivaraṇa*, P. 208) are the common attributes of both. Hence Prakāśātmayatī brings out the fact that *māyā* and *avidyā* have the same attributes and hence the same false (*anirvacanīya*) nature, inasmuch as the efficient causes like the sense-diseases or incantations (*mantras*) calling up the *āvidyaka* or the *māyika* object are due to the same fundamental principle of eternal nescience (*anādyajñāna*). Even in the *śruti* there is clearly no distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā* as is evident from the passage: *māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt* (*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*), for, as Prakāśātmayatī points out, here *māyā* and *avidyā* as the two fundamental principles are said to be of identical nature along with their effects of superimposition (*adhyāsa*) and projection (*vikṣepa*). Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadiṇa* clarifies the point further that as *māyā* is the fundamental principle of cosmic evolution (which is a projection upon the Absolute Consciousness or *Brahman*), there is, therefore, a logical necessity to regard *avidyā* as not a different principle from it but identical with it. The common distinction drawn between them is based on the distinction of *jīva*

and *Īśvara* who are respectively regarded as the ground (*āśraya*) of them. (Cf. the view of *Prakaṣāṛthavivaraṇakāra* in his *Prakaṣāṛthavivaraṇa* discussed in *The Doctrine of Māyā*—by Dr. A. K. Raychaudhuri, P. 104). But *Prakāśātmayati* seems to suggest that this distinction is neither logical nor warranted by scriptural evidence for the fact that they have an identical nature of false super-imposition and false projection in the matter of producing false creation (*lativāvabhāsapratibandha-viparyayāvabhāsalakṣaṇasya—Vivaraṇa*, P. 208), and Akhaṇḍānanda sums up their identity from the viewpoint of one fundamental principle governing the cosmic evolution.³¹ *Prakāśātmayati* has moreover shown that the distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā* on the basis of affectation on the ground or locus of them is also untenable, for in both cases there is the absence of affectation due to the knowledge of negation and knowledge of overcoming of the false appearance (*bādhaniścayapratīkāra-jñānābhyām—Vivaraṇa*, P. 209). Thus the distinction on this ground is an illogical one inasmuch as both have the same principles at the bottom which make them operative or not. Moreover, the distinction drawn on the ground of their production which in the case of *māyā* is dependent on the producer (*kartā*) but not so dependent in the case of *avidyā*, is also not tenable logically; for *Prakāśātmayati* shows that *māyā* is not dependent on the producer (*kartā*) of it, but its efficient causes cannot be stopped by the producer of *māyā*.³² Even *avidyā* can be so produced by the application of its efficient cause, such as, the appearance of two moons by the pressing of the eye-ball by the finger. Here in *sopādhika bhrama* there is equally the dependence of *avidyā* like *māyā* on its efficient cause, and *nirupādhika bhrama* like the dream-appearance created by the efficient cause of *māyā* (like incantations) seems to persist even when real knowledge dawns and, therefore, is equally dependent on the percipient conscious individual who goes on creating it by the application of the efficient cause, as in *āvidyaka* appearance (*nirupādhika*) of

³¹ *jagatprakṛtau śrutyaṁ māyā-sabdasya prayuktatvāt tasya eva rajatādibhramopādānatrasambhava upādānāntaraparikalpanamayuktam, tat-āśāvidyāmadāyāsabdotramityarthaḥ—(Tattvadiṇa, P. 208).*

³² *mantrādīkoḥhane sañjāte na māyāprasaraṇirodhaḥ śakyah—(Tattvadiṇa, P. 209).*

reflections (*pratibimba*) even where there is no locus of reflection by the application of such causes.

It comes to this then that *Prakāśātmayati*, following *Padmapāda*, does not admit any logical distinction between *māyā* and *avidyā*, though conceptually there are two such terms. He elaborately brings out the fact that these two terms have the same cause, same effect and same means of destruction; hence there is logically no necessity to draw a line of distinction between them. They are of similar nature in the matter of the production of effects (such as, illusions of sense, hallucinations of magic etc.) by depending on their efficient cause (and not to speak of the material cause which is *ajñāna*). Thus *Prakāśātmayati* defends his predecessor's analysis that the silver (of illusory perception) is created by *māyā* (*ato māyāmayaṁ rajatam—Pañcapādikā*). His conclusion is strengthened by *śruti*, *smṛti*, *sūtra* and *Bhāṣya* of the Vedānta School where these two terms are used in identical universe of discourse. Thus *Prakāśātmayati* refers to the *śruti*-passage: *tasyābhidhyānādyojanāttattvabhāvād bhūyaścānte viśvamāyā-nivṛtliḥ* (*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*), to the *smṛti*-passage: *taratyavidyāṁ vītatāṁ hṛdi yasmin nveṣite, yogī māyāmameyāya tasmai vidyātmane namaḥ* (*Purāṇa*), to the *Brahmasūtra* (3/2/3): *māyāmātraṁ tu kārtsnyenānabhivṛtyaktasvarūpatvāt*, to the *Bhāṣya*-passages where *avidyā*, *māyā*, *avidyāśakti*, *māyāśakti* have been used,³³ and to the *Pañcapādikā*-passage: *avidyā māyākṣaram*; even he refers to Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*: *evameveyamavidyā māyā mithyāpratyayaḥ*. From all these sources he draws the conclusion that *māyā* and *avidyā* are of identical nature, but are designated differently due to their effects which are in the case of *māyā* predominantly projective (*vikṣepa*) and in the case of *avidyā* predominantly veiling (*ācchādana*).³⁴

Prakāśātmayati brings in a logical discussion of the problem of falsity (*mithyātva*) from the viewpoint of direct experi-

³³ *tasmādaavidyāradīṣayānyera pratyakṣānī prapñānī śāstrāṇi ca* (*adhyāśabhāṣya* of *Brahma-sūtras*); also cf. Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on *Br. Sū.* 1/1/17, 3/2/3.

³⁴ *tasmāllakṣaṇaikyād vṛddharyavahāre caikatvāvagamād ekasminnapi vastuni vikṣepaprādhānyena māyā ācchādana-prādhānyenāvidyetyi vyavahārabhedah.* (*Tīroṇa*, P. 211).

ence of the illusory object as well as the negating knowledge of it. He shows that the illusory object like silver cannot be real because of the direct experience of it, for then it would be directly experienced by many at the same time; for the object of real knowledge is a universal object and never a private one as the object of false knowledge. Hence false knowledge presupposes the existence of imperfections or drawbacks (*doṣas*) which help the fundamental principle of *ajñāna* to create false objects, but real objects are never so created. Hence illusory objects are privately experienced while the real ones are universally experienced, so that the silver cannot be said to be real, but is false through and through being directly known by the *Sākṣicaitanya* or Witness-Consciousness as being super-imposed on the consciousness delimited by the shell through *ajñāna*. *Prakāśātmayati* shows therefore that the direct experience by the *Sākṣicaitanya* of the silver as the creation of ignorance makes it illusory and false.

Vidyāraṇya in his *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha* logically defends his predecessor's stand when he syllogistically refutes the view that there is no difference between the real silver and the illusory silver, both being universally perceived. He shows that there is a fundamental difference between the two, as the latter is due to *not only* its existence on the 'this'-aspect, i.e., the substratum (shell), but also due to a greater collocation of factors, such as, the defects (*doṣas*) and ignorance (*ajñāna*). [Cf. *vimataṁ sarvairgrāhyaṁ śukṭīdamamśagatatvūcchauklyādivadīti cet na. idamamśamātragatatvasyopādhitvāt. māyārajataṁ tu doṣajanyabuddhyabhivṛyakte śukṭīdamamśāvaccchinne caitanye'dhyastam tato nirdoṣairna grhyate—Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha, (Vasumati Edn. Pt. II.)*]. *Prakāśātmayati* goes further and analyses the nature of negating knowledge to show that the silver is such. He defines *mithyātva* or falsity as: *pratipannopādhāvabhāvanapratīyogītvameva mithyātvaṁ nāma—(Vivaraṇa, P. 213)*. An object is false when it is proved to be non-existent on the substratum on which it appears. The nature of negation proves it, for the silver is known to be non-existent on shell. Hence that which is negated on the substratum is false (*bādhaviṣayo mithyātvaṁ—Vivaraṇa, P. 213*).

Prakāśātmayati has shown that the negated silver cannot

but be the creation of ignorance (*ajñāna*) and can never be present elsewhere (*anyathākhyāti*) of the Naiyāyikas or in the consciousness (*ātmakhyāti* of the Buddhists), nor can it even be a really recalled silver, the difference with which is obliterated (*akhhyāti* of the Prābhākaras), for he shows that all these alternatives cannot explain the nature of negation. These views can at best establish that the negation of silver means that it is known as such distant or mental silver or as a purely recollected silver without any possibility of the loss of difference with the perceived substratum. Hence the conclusion is inevitable that the silver is false through and through, as the negating knowledge is of wholly cancelling the presence of any silver on the substratum (the silver being illusory or *prātibhāsika* exists so long as it is perceived and is cancelled as soon as the knowledge of the substratum dawns). Such negation, therefore, makes the silver perceived on the shell as illusory or having its existence so long as it is perceived *falsely* on the shell.

This nature of negation is, however, put to several criticisms by opponents who attack the Advaitist view of illusion and the negation of the false object. They hold that negation may mean any of the following alternatives, but none of these can stand the scrutiny of logic, and hence negation (*bādha*) of the Advaitists is never possible. Of the alternatives, the first one suggested is the hindrance to any one seeking an object but running after a different one (*anyārthino anyatṛa pravṛttinirodhaḥ*); this is not a universal rule for the fact that false knowledge does not necessarily engender an incentive to run after the object (of false knowledge) as is proved by completely detached individuals like *sannyāsins* not to be so involved. Hence they having false knowledge and the negation of it cannot be said to have been hindered in their tendency to get the object. Moreover, even if there be such a tendency, that cannot be said to be hindered by an intervening hindrance coming on the way; as from the knowledge of water on a desert, a man may run after it but may be stopped on the way by the sight of robbers or serpents; but such an intervening hindrance to his tendency is not capable to engender his negating knowledge. Hence the second alternative suggested is that the capability of such tendency is retarded, though

actual tendency cannot be so (*pravṛttiyogyatā-vicchedaḥ*) but this also is untenable for the fact that even if such a retardation of the capacity of running after the object is admitted, that retardation once originated should efface any further illusion of the same nature in the same person; but that is far from the case, for the person may very well be affected on a different occasion by the same kind of illusion. The third alternative that the knowledge of difference of objects that are perceived as non-different is negation (*avivikṭatayā pratīpannasyāviveko bādhaḥ*) is also logically inconsistent; for, if the knowledge of difference is to be established as different from the knowledge of the objects (*padārthajñānādirikṭaṁ vivekagrahaṇam—Tattvadvīpana*, P. 215), then in all knowledge where the objects are first known as non-different and then as mutually different (as the opponents argue from the nature of their case that the knowledge of difference is born later than the knowledge of objects), there should always be a negating knowledge preceding the knowledge of the object but this is psychologically not true. Hence the opponents may revert to the position that the knowledge of the objects in itself is responsible for the knowledge of the difference between them, but that would kill their own theory of a knowledge of non-difference as that would be never possible. The fourth alternative is that negation implies the knowledge of mutual exclusiveness of objects known as of the same nature (*anyātmanā pratīpannasyetaretarābhāvaḥpratīpat-tirbādhaḥ*), but this would involve negation in cases of valid knowledge as of an object and its qualities (such as *śuklo ghaṭaḥ*—the jar is white) for the fact that the object (jar) and its quality (whiteness) are later discriminated as such; that is to say, the previous knowledge of the jar being white is later analysed into distinct cognitions of the object and its quality. But this is not a knowledge of negation but a valid knowledge of the object-quality-relation. The Jaina theory, moreover, advocates that all objects are composed of difference-non-difference (*bhedābheda*) for the fact that non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*) is the basis of the phenomenal world; hence this theory, accepting as it does the knowledge of non-difference preceding knowledge of difference, would render all knowledge including valid knowledge false. The fifth alternative is that the

destruction of knowledge (*jñānasya pradhvaṁsah*) or the destruction of the object of knowledge (*arthatya ca saṁvidviṣayasya*) is negation; but this is logically impossible, for knowledge being momentary (according to the Buddhists) cannot be the object of destruction of a subsequent moment. The object too is incapable of being destroyed by the knowledge of it when it is known as such (*pratipannatve'pi kim tadviṣayeṇa bādhaḥ—Tattvadīpana*, P. 215) or when it is not known as such but known as of a different knowledge (*partipannatve anyaviṣayeṇa—Ibid*), for the first knowledge strengthens the knowledge of the object and does not negate it, and the second knowledge cannot negate the object of a different knowledge. The object being not known as such is never the object of negation by the knowledge of it (*apratipannatvena tasyāprasaktirna niśedhaḥ—Tattvadīpana*, P. 215). Hence the conclusion of the opponents is inevitable that the theory of negation as advocated by the Advaitists is in no wise possible, psychologically or logically.

Prakāśātmayati takes up his pen very creditably to establish the Advaitist theory of negation by controverting the charges levelled by the opponents. He shows that negation is not impossible, as the opponents argue, from the Advaitist point of view which explains it quite satisfactorily. Negation, according to the Advaitist, means that *ajñāna* or positive ignorance which is the material cause of all illusion is destroyed by *jñāna* or true knowledge along with the object created falsely by the former. Now this object, being the effect of illusion, is out-and-out false and is negated along with its material cause (*ajñāna*) by the dawning of true knowledge and the object falsely created by it is also obliterated whenever there is the actual presentation of it through *ajñāna*²⁵. (*kāryākāreṇa pariṇatājñānananivṛttirbādha ityanugataṁ lakṣaṇam—Tattvadīpana*, P. 215).

The definition of *adhyāsa* as *smṛtirūpa* by Śaṅkara has been sought to be explained by Padmapāda and more elaborately by Prakāśātmayati as referring to the nature of *adhyāsa* which is false. Prakāśātmayati analyses that in

²⁵ *ajñānasya svakāryeṇa vartamāneṇa pravṛttena vā saha jñāneṇa nivṛttirbādhaḥ—(Vivaraṇa*, P. 215).

adhyāsa there are three factors as suggested by this word *smṛtirūpa*. Firstly, there is a contact (*saṁprayoga*) between the sense and the object; secondly, there is the impression (*saṁskāra*) of previous knowledge, and thirdly, there are the imperfections, such as diseases of the eye (*indriyadoṣa*). These three factors conjointly contribute to the origination of *adhyāsa* which is materially due to *ajñāna*. It has been elaborately discussed by us above that *adhyāsa* is unified knowledge born out of the three factors which are the sluiceways, so to say, of the primal *ajñāna* to create it. Here, therefore, Prakāśātmayati tries to evaluate the significance of the word *smṛtirūpa* used by Śaṅkara in the definition of *adhyāsa* and shows that all cases of *adhyāsa* imply that they are unified cognitions and are different from recollection (*smṛti*) as much as from perception (*pratyakṣa*). This is the basic proposition of Prakāśātmayati's analysis which seeks to elaborate Padmapāda's issue that dream-experiences are not illusions, from the viewpoint of opponents who challenge the Advaitists on such an explanation offered for the understanding of the problem of *adhyāsa*. Padmapāda begins from the opponents' viewpoint that in dream-experiences there is no possibility of contact of the sense with the object and hence one of the factors responsible for illusion being absent, there are not illusions but are at best recollections (*smṛti*) as due to mere impressions (*vāsanā* or *saṁskāra*). But he ably shows that in dream-experiences there is no possibility of there being recollections inasmuch as these are directly experienced, and goes on to demonstrate that all the three factors stated above, that are responsible for illusion, are present here. It is Prakāśātmayati who more systematically and coherently exposes the Advaitist conception of illusion in general, taking the cue from his predecessor's analysis beginning with dream-experiences. Prakāśātmayati shows that dream-experiences as illusion cannot be explained away as either perceptual (*grahana*) or recollective (*smṛti*) for the fact that there is not the sense-object-contact or absence of direct experience respectively; hence he concludes, from the Advaitist position, that there is in such illusory experiences (within which dream-experiences are also included) a third variety of knowledge (*trītiyamidaṁ vijñānaṁ svaya-*

mevoktādhyāsalakṣaṇam—Tivaraṇa, P. 218) that is the cause of all false appearances. This knowledge is *mithyā ajñāna* or a *positive* ignorance and is not a negative one as the Advaitists hold. In dream-experiences, as Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati hold, there is the presence of the three factors responsible for illusion as backing up the creation of objects due to this *positive* principle of *ajñāna*. Thus the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) as the ground of a contact (*samprayoga*) with the falsely created objects by making the percipient capable of knowing these objects as though present combines itself with the defect (*doṣa*) due to sleep and impressions (*saṁskāra*) of previously cognised objects and thus makes dream-experiences illusory. From this analysis of the nature of dream-experiences Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati go on to strike at the cue to the Advaitist position of the nature of the production of illusion from the viewpoint of the consciousness as the locus of all kinds of *ajñāna*. This Advaitist position is clearly brought out by Prakāśātmayati who shows that the creation of illusory objects cannot be explained without reference to the locus of *ajñāna*, the material cause of all illusions (*adhyāsa*). It is admitted by the Advaitist that the creation of, say, the silver upon shell is due to the transformation (*pariṇāma*) of *avidyā* or primal nescience, but from his viewpoint that everything is super-imposed on Consciousness inasmuch as it is the only real source of revelation of an object, it should be granted that the silver created by ignorance is really super-imposed on the consciousness (of shell) on which it is falsely cognised. The Advaitist position as has been brought out above is that the illusory silver is the creation or transformation of ignorance only in the sense that the Consciousness (of shell) which is reflected on the peculiar *vṛtti* (knowledge-urge) born out of the imperfect sense-contact (due to diseases of the eye etc.) with the substratum of illusion, is the locus of the ignorance creating the silver. This is the basic conception of Advaita Vedānta and Prakāśātmayati hints at it very logically. The silver thus super-imposed on the consciousness (of shell) is directly perceived when the consciousness of the knower (*pramāṭṛcaitanya*) gets identified with the Consciousness of the substratum (*viśayacaitanya*) being revealed through the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*. Prakāśātmayati's analysis of Śaṅkara's definition of *adhyāsa*

where he says that something perceived before is super-imposed on another substratum (*paraṭra pūrvadyṣṭābhāsaḥ*) is based on these fundamental concepts of the Advaitist position. Padmapāda shows us that the consciousness (of shell) appears falsely (*vivartate*) as the shell created by ignorance having its locus in it.³⁶ Prakāśātmayati elaborates this by keeping his feet solidly on the above Advaitist conceptions of *adhyāsa*. He says that the triad of conditions mentioned above (contact, impression, imperfection) is the efficient cause of *adhyāsa*, for it helps the material cause of it which is *avidyā* or *ajñāna* (primal nescience) to create illusory objects. But at the bottom of such *adhyāsa* the consciousness of shell or the consciousness of knower is the locus of all *ajñāna* inasmuch as it is the only ground on which the external object is super-imposed and therefore has no independent existence. Thus the externally perceived silver is falsely super-imposed on consciousness and this is equivalent to its creation by ignorance. Thus ignorance does not create silver if the silver is not supposed to be super-imposed on Consciousness and this is in Advaitist view the *vivarta* of Consciousness, though there is the *pariṇāma* of ignorance. Hence the silver is false for only its super-imposition on Consciousness guarantees its origination at all. So Prakāśātmayati concludes that the false appearance of an object upon another substratum is possible because of the fact that Consciousness, the only Reality, serves as the basis of the false object so appearing, for super-imposition implies the appearance of the phenomenal on the transcendental. This Advaitist law is universal in dream-experiences and waking experiences alike. In dream-experiences the Consciousness of the knower directly perceives the falsely created objects and the consciousness of the substrata of illusion is not active there for the fact that they are non-existent. But in waking experiences the substratum is externally present and hence there is the possibility of the Consciousness of the knower (*pramāṭṛ-caitanya*) getting identified with the consciousness of the substratum (*viśayacaitanya*) and thus the *viśayacaitanya* may be said to be responsible for the appearance of the silver which

³⁶ *tasya ca tadavacchinnāparokṣacaitanyasthā'ridyā-śaktirāmbhanatayā vicartate* (*Pañcapādikā*, P. 216).

is falsely super-imposed on it. Thus Prakāśātmayati concludes that consciousness either as Witness (*Sākṣicaitanya*) without any limitations or as limited by the knowing mind (*antaḥkarāṇāvacchinna*) or the known object (*viśayāvacchinna*) is the ground of the appearance of the false object super-imposed on it. The *Sākṣicaitanya* in the last analysis is the Witness of all ignorance (*ajñāna*) and its effects (false objects) according to the Advaitist.³⁷

This is the true Advaitist position and Prakāśātmayati very ably voices the position of his School. The true note of Advaita metaphysics is also sounded here, for the fact that the Witness-Consciousness (*Sākṣicaitanya*) is regarded as the witness of all effects of ignorance. But Padmapāda has exposed the real Advaitist situation wherefrom Prakāśātmayati's analysis advanced more elaborately. Padmapāda has shown that in dream-experiences there is no doubt about the fact that the objects perceived are superimposed on the *Sākṣicaitanya* and hence internal. He does not stop there, for he goes on to show that not only in dream-experiences but also in waking experiences the *viśayacaitanya*, though the ground of the revelation of the external object is identified with the *pramāṇacaitanya* and the *pramāṇyacaitanya*, and hence all revelation of the external object is nothing apart from the internal realization of the conscious content of knowledge. Thus ontologically, Padmapāda shows that all experience, be it of dreams or of waking life, is with regard to objects that should strictly speaking be said to be primarily the result of this internal realization; the externality of objects is not present in dreams but is present in the waking life; yet the externality is possible only on the assumption of this internalization of the conscious content (*antaraparokṣānubhavaḥ*) of the objects which are revealed in the waking life³⁸.

³⁷ *sarcatra tu caitanyameva sākṣādrā anyāvacchinnaṭayā vā vibhramāmbanam*—(Vīraṇa, P. 219). also cf. *avidyāirā bhūyadoṣa-nimittakāraṇāpekṣayā rajatākāreṇa sākṣicaitanyasya rajatāvacchedajñānābhāṣākāreṇa ca pariṇamamānā śrakāryeṇa saha sākṣicaitanyasya viśaya-bhāvaḥ pratipadyate*—(Vīraṇa, Pp. 197-198).

³⁸ *jāgarāṇe'pi pramāṇajñānānyodantaraparokṣānubhavarāna viśaya-antā'parokṣatā bhidyate; ekarūpaprakāśanāt, ato'ntaraparokṣānubhavarā-guṇthitā eva jāgarāṇe'pyartha'nubhūyate. anyathā jadoṣa prakāśānu-papattoḥ*—(Pañcapādikā, P. 221).

Prakāśātmayati, Consciousness is without any transcendental division, without any real heterisation into the internal and the external, but is One Undivided. But all these divisions are due to the tinge (*uparāga*) of the known objects and the knowing mind on Consciousness (cf. the view *ciduparāgārthā vṛttih*). Thus Prakāśātmayati can fully establish the Advaitist position that the intermediate dimension (*madhyamaparīṇāma*) is also due to ignorance (*prātibhāsika*) or is borrowed from those objects upon which it is reflected. Otherwise it being devoid of parts (*niraiśa*) cannot have any real dimension; hence the intermediate dimension is as imaginary as the infinitesimal (*anu*) and largest (*mahat*) dimensions, which are other poles of attack from the Naiyāyika view where the partless object (like the atom or the sky) is of either of these two dimensions.

Padmapāda has brought in a very lively debate as to the real implication of the substratum of *adhyāsa*, that has been designated by Śaṅkara as *paratra* to avoid, as we have seen, superimposition on the absence of substratum (*niradhiṣṭhānabhrama*). This term, therefore, avoids the two extreme cases of non-designation (*avyāpti*) to that which it ought to have designated as also over-designation (*ativyāpti*) to that which it ought not to have designated. These two extreme cases have been established in Indian Philosophy as vitiating a logical definition by making it either too narrow or too wide. Padmapāda's endeavour on which his followers like Prakāśātmayati further elaborated the arguments shows that in all experiences, of dream-life or of waking life, there is a positive substratum of super-imposition, and that is, as we have discussed above at length, Consciousness delimited by the knowing mind or the known object though it is in the last analysis transcendental Witness-Consciousness (*Sākṣicaitanya*). Hence super-imposition on the absence of substratum (*niradhiṣṭhānabhramavāda*) as upheld by some Schools of Indian Philosophy like the Mādhyamikas is logically untenable. Thus Padmapāda's and his follower's analysis avoids the one extreme of narrowness (*avyāpti*) to dream-experiences which too have been shown to have a positive substratum like the waking-experiences of illusion. In fact, it is for this reason that a searching examination of the dream-experiences had been undertaken by Padma-

pāda and particularly, his followers, Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda. But now Padmapāda turns to the other extreme of wideness (*atīvyāpti*) to show that in those suspected cases of *adhyāsa* where there is a super-imposition of something upon some substratum there is really no *adhyāsa* and hence such a definition can include these cases of *adhyāsābhāva* (absence of *adhyāsa*). This is the argument from the opponents' point of view (*pūrvapakṣa*) and the typical case of such possibilities is also from the opponents' point of view. This case is of super-imposing *Brahman* upon external name and form (*nāmarūpa*), that is, external objects or phenomena. This super-imposition has been established in the Upaniṣads for facilitating devotion (*upāsana*) to *Brahman* (i.e., *mano-Brahmetyupāśīta*). But the opponents show that in such super-imposition there is no inherent defect in the efficient cause (*kāraṇadoṣa*) as in the case of the optical illusion there is a disease of the eye, nor the revelation of a false object as in the case of the optical illusion of snake on rope, there is a false snake; for here the object of imposition is *Brahman* itself and no defects are responsible for doing homage to it.

Such being the opponents' view, Padmapāda shows that this kind of super-imposition is really not false and therefore the apprehension of too wide a definition to include this case also is not tenable. Prakāśātmayati also harps on this tune to show that this kind of superimposition of *Brahman* is not really false for the fact that in *adhyāsa* there is the false knowledge of one upon another but here there is merely a mental function (*mānasī kriyā*) of conceiving of *Brahman* as imposed on the external phenomena. This distinction of *mental function* from *knowledge* is based upon a psychological and epistemological analysis by Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati. The mental function (*mānasī kriyā*) is due to a will born out of Vedic injunctions to perform certain acts of devotion. These acts spring from the will of the mind to obey the mandatory injunctions of Vedic precepts. Hence will to act towards a certain direction inspires the act in that direction, but this will is with regard to objects not fully known but known only by indirect means as testimony. Knowledge, however, is not the result of any psychological will but is born

whenever its conditions are fulfilled. Knowledge takes its own course whenever its conditions are present and no amount of will to know or unknow can be of any effect in its sphere. This is the true philosophy of knowledge as distinguished from action as sounded by Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati. Hence they show that such mental act of super-imposition of *Brahman* upon external phenomena can never come within the purview of knowledge, and hence cannot also come under the purview of *adhyāsa* where there is always a false knowledge. Thus the conclusion is that as such mental acts are enjoined, there is only a functional and no cognitional aspect of these super-impositions of *Brahman* upon external objects.⁴²

A very interesting interlude to this discussion has been introduced by Viṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāya in his *Rjītvivarāṇa* where he has brought out the true Advaitist philosophy of such *Brahmādhyāsa*s for the purpose of *upāsana*. He has shown that the answers of the Advaitist writers like Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati are based on the *pūrvapakṣin's* (opponent's) viewpoint, for the fact that such super-impositions have been sought to be explained, or rather explained away, as *real mental functions*. But the true view of the Advaita metaphysic denies these super-impositions as in any way real, for the fact that the mental functions flow from a pre-existent *adhyāsa* born of *ajñāna* of the real, transcendental *Brahman* that is without any name and form. Hence Viṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāya's analysis touches the core of the Advaita metaphysic by exposing that the mental functions of super-imposition of *Brahman* upon external objects or phenomena are real only tentatively so long as these are considered real having their spring in Vedic injunctions. But should not these mental functions be said to be all unreal effects of *ajñāna* veiling the real, transcendental, nameless, formless *Brahman*?⁴³

⁴² *ata eva codamūcasādicchāto'nuṣṭheyaatrān mūnasī kriyāniṣā, na jñānam; jñānasya hi duṣṭakāraṇajanyasya viśayo mithyārthaḥ, na hi jñānamicchāto janayitūn nirartayitūn vā śakyam; kāraṇaikāgattatvādicchānupapattēḥ*—(*Pañcapādikā*, P. 225). *vidhijanyapurusecchāprayatnanirapekṣamera sarratva jñānasya puṣkalakūraṇam anicchatopyaniṣṭojñānadarśanāt ato vidhānūnāmūnasī kriyēti bhāvaḥ*—(*Vivaraṇa*, P. 225).

⁴³ *ītaratra satyataramāṅgikṛtyāva prasiddhabhkrāntiḥ lakṣaṇamuktam, tathā satyativyāptiḥ, ata evoktān prasiddhyabhāve'piti. alhacā—Brahmadṛṣṭyā nāmna upāsanaṁvidhānād nāmni Brahmādhyasitāryamiti, tādṛśa-*

A very interesting study of the various views of illusion (*khyātivāda*) as set forth by Śaṅkara in his *Adhyāsabhāṣya* can be made from the explanations given by Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati. According to Padmapāda the various views of illusion are necessary for Śaṅkara to expound in his *Adhyāsabhāṣya*, only to bring out clearly his own view (cf. *adhyāsaśvarūpe matāntarānyupanyasyati-svamatapariśuddhaye—Pañcapādikā—P. 227*). Padmapāda has said that the first view of illusion set forth by Śaṅkara as *taṁ kecit—anyatrānyad-dharmādhyāsaḥ—iti vadanti* refers to either the *ātmakhyātivāda* of the Buddhists or the *anyathākhyātivāda* of the Naiyāyikas. Prakāśātmayati shows that the *ātmakhyātivāda* of the Buddhists can be very well designated by this view, and the *anyathākhyātivāda* of Naiyāyikas can also be included in it by pointing out that the object of super-imposition is the external (and not internal as the Buddhists hold) one, e.g., silver upon shell. The second view expressed by Śaṅkara (*kecittu—yatra yadadhyāsaḥ tadvivekāgrahanibandhano bhrama—iti*) is held by Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati as referring to the *akhyātivāda* of the Prābhākara School of Mīmāṃsā. The third view as expounded by Śaṅkara (*anye tu—yatra yadadhyāsaḥ, tasyaiva viparītadharmaiva kalpanāmācaksate—iti*) is taken by Padmapāda to refer to the *asakhyātivāda* of the *śūnyavādin* or the Mādhyamika School of Buddhists. But Prakāśātmayati goes on to show that this third view refers to a variety of the *anyathākhyātivāda* of the Naiyāyikas. Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvādīpana* shows that this view of Prakāśātmayati rests upon the assumption that the shell appears as the silver which is its negation, and therefore the negation of the substratum (i.e., silver) is what appears upon the substratum (i.e., shell) as the object (silver); thus a variety of *anyathākhyātivāda* or the view of appearance of an object existent elsewhere than the substratum is possible.

To make a comparative study of this problem, we can first say that Vācaspatiśrī in his *Bhāmāṭī* has given a different interpretation of these definitions of illusion made by

brahmābhīprāyepātīryāptiḥ. atharā—codyavādinā tatsatyatramāṅgikīryā-tīryāptīrūktā, siddhānta-rādisiddhamithyātaramāṅgikīryāptīryāptypāda-nāyogāt tuduhgikāreṇaiva ca parihāro'pi (Rjurarana, P. 224).

Śaṅkara in his *Adhyāsabhāṣya*. Vācaspati says that the first view refers to all the varieties of Buddhist *ātmakhyāti*, the second refers to the Prābhākara School of Mīmāṃsā and the third refers to the *anyathākhyātivāda* of the Naiyāyikas. The third view, according to Vācaspati, refers only to the *anyathākhyātivāda* of the Naiyāyikas for the fact that the substratum of illusion (i.e., shell) appears as *viparīta-dharma* or as an opposite object like silver that is present elsewhere than the substratum. Govindānanda in his *Ratna-prabhā* has however said that the first view is of the three Buddhist Schools—the Yogācāras, the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas,—and of the *anyathākhyātivāda* of the Naiyāyikas, the second is of the Prābhākaras and the third is of the *asatkhyātivāda* or of the *śūnyavādin* or the Mādhyamika School of Buddhists. Govindānanda's contention is that the *viparīta-dharma* means a *viruddhadharma* or an opposite nature of existence, i.e., *asat* or *śūnya* (non-existence) that appears (the silver according to the Mādhyamikas is non-existent through and through and it appears upon the shell that is also non-existent—*asadadhiṣṭhānam asat bhāsate*). It is interesting to note that Govindānanda's explanations approximate more to the view of the Vivaraṇa School. The first view of illusion according to both of these Schools refers to *ātmakhyātivāda* and *anyathākhyātivāda* equally. This view is possible because of the fact that both these *khyātivādas* are of the same class of *satkhyāti* where in the one, the internal object appears (*ātmakhyāti*), while in the other, the external object appears (*bāhyakhyāti*).

The next important question arises when we go to examine the definition of Śaṅkara as to the nature of *adhyāsa* from a study of the particular words of this definition. Padmapāda has shown that all the different views of illusion (*khyātivāda*), as illustrated by Bhāṣyakāra himself, have no other way out but to admit a common characteristic that the Advaitists drive at; and that makes all the different views practically boiling down to the *anirvacanīyakhyātivāda* of the Advaitists. This characteristic is the admission of the fact that there is an appearance of an object as another which it is not (*sarvathāpi tvanyasyānyadharmāvabhāsatām na vyabharati*—Śaṅkara's *adhyāsabhāṣya*). This appearance is of the false, illusory

(*mithyā* or *anirvacanīya*) that the Advaitists establish. Padmapāda has shown that in the first view (*taṁ kecit—anyatrānyadharmādhyāsa-iti vadanti—Śaṅkara's adhyāsabhāṣya*, the internal (*ātma-khyāti*) or the external (*anythā-khyāti*) object (as silver) appears on the shell and therefore the appearing object is false. Even in the second view (*kecittu—yatra yadadhyāsaḥ tadvivēkāgrahanibandhano bhrama-iti—Ibid*), Padmapāda has said that even the Prābhākaras (*akhyātivādins*) who do not recognise false knowledge have to admit the appearance of one as the other where both the objects are objects of distinct cognitions. Prakāśātmayati has shown that in *akhyātivāda* there is at least in the mind a knowledge of relation binding the two cognitions *as one*,—and that accounts for the unitary experience of illusion. Hence the Prābhākara view that there are two distinct cognitions the difference of which is merely lost in illusion cannot account for the unitary experience of illusory cognition.⁴¹ In the third view—*anye tu yatra yadadhyāsaḥ tasyaiva viparītadharmatva-kalpanāmācākṣata-iti—*(Śaṅkara's *adhyāsabhāṣya*), Padmapāda shows that there is an appearance of silver (either *asat* or non-existent or existent elsewhere than the substratum by way of the appearance of the negation of the substratum) upon the shell and that is false.

Padmapāda's analysis of the nature of illusion shows that the word *paratra* in the definition is necessary for the fact that without it the nature of illusion would have been without a locus (*niradhiṣṭhānādhyāsa*). But he has said that such a view is illogical and hence is the necessity of the word *paratra* in the definition to show that *adhyāsa* is possible only upon a locus (*sādhiṣṭhānādhyāsa*). He exposes the inconsistencies in *niradhiṣṭhānabhrama* and Prakāśātmayati elaborately discusses these. Prakāśātmayati says that the *Śūnyavādī* or Mādhyamika Buddhist argues that illusion may appear even without any *saṁyoga* or sense-contact for which only the defects due to *avidyā* (*avidyādidoṣa*) and impressions of previous false cognitions (*pūrvabhūtasamāskāra*) are sufficient; hence according to the Mādhyamika, the third factor which is held necessary by

⁴¹ *akhyātivādināpi mānasam saṁsargajñānam saṁsargābhīmanā-rā vaktārya ityabhiprāyaḥ—(Vivaraṇa. P. 238).*

the Vedantist, viz., a sense-contact with the locus, is unnecessary in illusion where no means of contactual knowledge (*pramāṇakāraṇam*) is at all necessary. But this view of the Mādhyamika to establish the *niradhiṣṭhānabhramarāda* is criticised vehemently by Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati. Prakāśātmayati says that, without the admission of knowledge of some object upon some locus which latter factor is also regarded as unnecessary by the Mādhyamikas, even cases of true knowledge can come within the purview of illusion. Hence the basic principle of illusion is violated by the *śūnyavādī* who does not recognise the locus of illusion. Padmapāda next brings out the argument from the example of the seed and sprout (*bījāṅkuradyṣṭānta*) given by the Mādhyamikas to show that there are mutually existing loci of the Consciousness (*saṃvit*) and the object (*rajatam*) and hence no third locus of illusion need be admitted, but the process of illusion should be explained by the origin of illusion which is nothing but the projection of the internal as the external. This is the fundamental admission of all the three Buddhist Schools, viz., Yogācāra, Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika, and the Mādhyamika contention is totally untenable for the fact that the analogy of the seed and sprout (*bījāṅkuradyṣṭānta*) cannot establish the mutuality of loci in the Consciousness (*saṃvit*) and the object (*rajatam*). There is a very great difference between these two sets of origination, viz., the set of seed and sprout and the set of Consciousness and object, psychologically and epistemologically. This is the basis of Prakāśātmayati's forceful arguments against the Mādhyamika contention. He shows that in the case of seed and sprout, there is no mutual dependence (*ilaretarāśrayatā*) but a *regressus ad infinitum* for the fact that the chain of seeds and sprouts pre-supposes different causal series, and hence no mutual dependence can arise, but only an infinite regress in the causal chain arises. In the other case viz., consciousness and object, however, there is at the foundation of origination the fallacy of mutual dependence and hence the question of *regressus ad infinitum* does not arise; so the Mādhyamika cannot say that there is no mutual dependence in the present case also as in the other case. Padmapāda shows that Consciousness (*saṃvit*) and the object (*rajatam*) being simultaneously born, there is the inevitable

fallacy of mutual dependence and not the absence of it.⁴⁵ Akhaṇḍānanda also strikes at this argument in his *Tattavādīpana*.⁴⁶ The Mādhyamika suggestion that there is a chain of the causal series of the consciousness and the object as being of prior and posterior dependence on each other cannot also stand the scrutiny of logic, for if the prior and posterior series of consciousness and object has a chain of existence (*pūrvapūrvamullarottarasyānvitatvenādhiṣṭhānam*) then the Buddhist tenet of flux (*kṣaṇikavāda*) which is the basal tenet in this philosophy will fall to the ground—for the fact that the prior conscious state will be carried on to the posterior object not in the stream-like manner as the Buddhists suppose, but in its own nature as such. Prakāśātmayati also shows that in the case of seed and sprout as well, there is a chain of existence as in the present case, even if their simultaneity in existence is not proved by experience. This chain of existence in the case of seed and sprout is a logical necessity for the fact that without such recognition the seed and the sprout will not have the causal series established, i.e., there will be no end to the question of their causality. Thus the seed and the sprout are causally established, if their co-existence is to be understood.⁴⁷ Hence the logical conclusion is that a chain of existence must be recognised even here and the seed and the sprout have an infinite series of the causal nexus. Even if it be argued that there is no such chain of existence between the consciousness and the object as between the seed and the sprout (thus denying the previous explanation), that argument cannot equate the sets of origination in the matter of absence of mutual dependence. For, as Padmapāda hints at it, and as Prakāśātmayati elaborates it, there is a far greater difference between the two sets of origination as is proved by experience. The cause-and-effect relation between the seed and the sprout is proved by experience in some cases and from such cases this relation is proved in unexperienced cases, and thus the

⁴⁵ *iha punaryasyām saṁvidi yadrajatamarabhāsate tayorevetaretarādhyāsah, tato durbhūtaṁetat*—(*Pañcapādikā*, PP. 240-241).

⁴⁶ *anayoḥ sahopalambhādītaretarayostathānupalambhādītyarthah*—(*Loc. cit.* P. 240).

⁴⁷ *anancitegu bijādīṣṭraurayikāraṇākāṅkṣyā anirīttatvādītyarthah*—(*Vivaraṇa*, P. 241).

fallacy of infinite regress does in no wise vitiate their cause-and-effect relation by making it dependent on the fallacy of mutual dependence, but in the case of the consciousness and the object, the very fundamental fact of the cause-and-effect relation has to be assumed even here without any other experienced place of its occurrence, and thus even at the origin there is the fallacy of mutual dependence which vitiates the whole system of origination unlike the case of the set of the seed and the sprout. Thus to equate the two cases is illogical and unsound, and thus the case of the Mādhyamika that there is the admission of the mutual loci of superimposition in the consciousness and the object on the analogy of the seed and the sprout falls to the ground without any valid proof to establish the case on such an analogy. Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadīpana* puts these arguments to show the difference of the two sets of origination in a syllogistic form to bring out the futility of the analogy brought in by the Mādhyamika.¹⁸

Padmapāda has unmistakably shown and Prakāśātmayati has elaborated upon it that all cases of illusion are with regard to a substratum that is present, and hence the negation of the false object makes a revelation of the substratum upon which the super-imposed object was falsely cognised. Hence any discussion of the nature of negation (*bādhakajñānaparyālocanayā*) brings out the fact that all errors are upon a substratum (*sādhiṣṭhāno bhramah*), and this an added proof to what the nature of perception reveals as a unified experience of the substratum (*idam*) and the object (*rajatam*). This nature of negation is shown by Prakāśātmayati following his predecessor as a universal law in all kinds of error, for even if the knowledge of negation of the objects is born mediately as through inferential or verbal proofs, yet the knowledge of negation always accompanies the knowledge of the substratum, and hence any consistent theory of error should admit this basic principle of *adhyāsa*. Thus Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati show that even in the Sāṅkhya theory there is the primal Matter (*prakṛti*) as the fundamental principle of the

¹⁸ *vimatām janyajanakātūrāt hijāṅkurajātīyatvāt sammatavadīti nānavasthā doṣāya, prastute tu saṁvidrajalayoradhiṣṭhānādhiṣṭheyabhāvasya kṛacidapyapramītatvāt nīmittanaimittikakalpānāndhaparamparetyarthah—(Tattvadīpana, P. 242).*

negation of all the primary elements (*triguṇas*) in It, for the Sāṅkhya view that *prakṛti* is the state of equilibrium (*sāmyāvasthā*) of all primary elements advocates the negation of all these elements in *prakṛti*, thus bringing out the fundamental principle of Matter as the ground of eternal negation of all cosmic elements. This metaphysical evaluation of the Sāṅkhya-theory of *prakṛti* is hinted at by Padmapāda in order to bring out the nature of It as the ground of eternal negation of all cosmic elements whence Prakāśātmayati's analysis makes this position still clearer by showing that *prakṛti* as the primal Matter is the fundamental ground of the cosmos, and hence negation of all the elements in It is feasible, but Its negation is never practicable, for there is no other ground more fundamental than *prakṛti* where it can be negated. Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati have moreover shown that from the Advaitist standpoint there is a very cogent argument to show that all *adhyāśas* that are due to *ajñāna* that is directly experienced by *Sākṣicaitanya* or the Witness-Consciousness along with the object falsely cognised, have this fundamental ground which makes all *adhyāśas* revealed till they are not negated by true knowledge. Thus the Advaitist position about the revelation of *adhyāśas* by *Sākṣicaitanya* which directly experiences their material cause or *ajñāna* is clearly focussed by Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati to bring out the ground (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of all errors. Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati, while bringing out this Advaita ontology in the sphere of error, have strongly repudiated that this *adhiṣṭhāna* or ground is also the object of negation inasmuch as along with the object of the external world, the Consciousness that is the only witness of the false object should also be regarded as being negated. But such a view, they say, is untenable for the fact that Consciousness is never an object of negation and hence it is the eternal ground where all false appearances are negated. Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvādīpana* elaborates this idea when he says that Consciousness as such is never negated but its relation with the external objects, (false or true) can be negated.⁴⁹ Padmapāda shows and Prakāśātmayati elaborates the point that the object

⁴⁹ *sambandharisīṣṭākāśasya bādhyatre'pi na kevalasya bādhyatetyarthah* —(*Tattvādīpana*, P. 243).

of super-imposition is also not a non-entity, for otherwise it could not have appeared in knowledge, and the nature of false knowledge should have no meaning if the object of super-imposition is supposed to be a non-entity. Prakāśātmayati then elaborates the point that the object of super-imposition, according to the Advaitists, is not void (*śūnya*) but is negated in *sat* or the existent (substratum) and hence is false (*sadvyāvṛttimātrāṇi bhramasyāsatvaṇi nāma—l'ivaraṇa*, P. 245). The object is not void for the fact that it is the object of negation, and hence it is different from *sat* as also from *asat*, and is therefore *anirvacanīya* or *mithyā* (false). If it were a complete void, it could not have appeared as such and hence would not have the necessity of being negated. The negated object being *anirvacanīya* or false at the time of appearance is, therefore, neither existent (*sat*) like the substratum nor non-existent (*asat*) like a void object, but is an appearance of the *sat* and is, therefore, negated by the knowledge of it. Thus Prakāśātmayati shows that the object falsely perceived is never an *asat* object while appearing but an *anirvacanīya* object, and may be accepted as *asat* when it is destroyed by true knowledge of the substratum as all objects become non-entities after their destruction (*pradhvaṁsābhāva*). This analysis of Prakāśātmayati brings out the fact that destruction (*pradhvaṁsa*) of the object, true or false, supposes its absence (*abhāva*) and from this point of view, the *anirvacanīya*-object may be said to be an *asat* after its negation and never before it. *Abhāva* as a separate category has been accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas as well as by the Advaita-Vedāntins, though there are epistemological differences in their views. Prakāśātmayati following Padmapāda brings out this fact that *abhāva* as a category can be accepted with regard to an object at the time of its destruction (*pradhvaṁsa*), and then the illusory object also comes within the purview of *pradhvaṁsābhāva* at the time of its destruction or negation by the knowledge of the substratum. Thus there is practically no *atyantābhāva* or complete absence of the illusory object while it is perceived, but only an absence in making when its perception is negated by a more real perception of the substratum.

This negation, however, does not make the *anyathākhyāti* position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas happier, for Prakāśātmayati shows that this negation can in no way prove that the object of super-imposition is present elsewhere. Padmapāda had hinted at the impossibility of such a contention from the point of view of either experience or postulation (*arthāpatti*). Prakāśātmayati shows that the capacity of speech never transcends the import (*abhidhāna*) of the sentence in question and hence the verbal knowledge (*śābdajñāna*) of negation cannot transcend the import it can convey and that is the negation of the illusory object as being related to a specific space and time,⁵⁰ not really related with it. Akhaṇḍānanda further clarifies this point by a very logical analysis in his *Tattvadīpana*. He says that the verbal knowledge always conforms to the import of the words (*padasāmarthyā*) when the sentence is used in the primary sense (*mukhyavṛtti*), but when it is used in the secondary sense (*amukhyavṛtti*) then it can transcend the sphere of import proper (*abhidhāna*) by suggesting (*lakṣaṇā*) something else than it. But as here in the case of negation of silver there is no scope for transcending the sphere of import proper, there is no question of its suggesting something else than it, e.g., 'presence at a different space.' Hence the case of *anyathākhyātivādin* Naiyāyika and that of the *ātma-khyātivādin* Buddhist are refuted by the proof of verbal knowledge (*śābdajñāna*).⁵¹

Prakāśātmayati shows that this negation cannot establish by postulation that the object of superimposition is present elsewhere because of the fact that the nature of negation would be an absurdity if it could not establish the presence of the object elsewhere than where it is negated; he says that even in the Naiyāyika-view of *anyathākhyāti*, the relation between the substratum (shell) and the object (silver—that is present

⁵⁰ *viśiṣṭadeśakūlasambadham rajatam vilopayati*—(*Pañcapādikā*, P. 245).

⁵¹ *yatra vākyam mukhyavṛttyarthapratipādakam, tatra padasāmarthyamanatīkramyārthan, bodhayat lakṣyate 'samidhamāhara' ityādau, yatra tramukhyavṛttyā bodhukam padasāmarthyātīkramenāpiti vyavasthā. tataścūtra padasāmarthyātīkramanimittābhāvādātatra sāmānyānurodhena vaktavyam. naca tasya deśāntaravartitrabodhajanānasāmarthatā, tasyānabhihitatvāt, abhihitapadārthasamāsargabodhanasāmarthatādvākyaśyetyartho.*—(*Tattvadīpana*, P. 246).

elsewhere) of super-imposition, when negated by true knowledge, is negated without postulating its presence anywhere else than the case of illusion in question; so also in the Buddhist view of *ātmakhyāti*, the external projection of silver that is internal, when negated, is not recognised as being present elsewhere than the case of illusion in question. He also shows that even in the Prābhākara-view of *akhhyāti* there is also no such recognition that the negation of a particular sacrifice postulates its presence elsewhere; for in the *jyotiṣoma*-sacrifice where the injunction for the order of exit of the different *ṛtviks* (priests) is laid down as: *advaryuṁ niṣkrāmantam prastotā samtanuyāt, tamudgātā, tam pratihartā, tam Brahmā, tam yajamānaḥ*, there the expiative sacrifices are also laid down if this order of exit by holding the *kaccha* (loin cloth) of respectively precedent priests is broken. For instance, if the *pratihartā*-priest breaks the order, the expiative sacrifice is *sarvasvadaḥṣiṇayāga* (sacrifice where the sacrificer has to pay everything as a *daḥṣiṇā* or gift); but if the *udgātā*-priest breaks the order, the expiative sacrifice is *adaḥṣiṇa-yāga* (a sacrifice where the sacrificer has to pay nothing as *daḥṣiṇā* or gift). The Mimamsists consider the implications of these different expiative sacrifices and arrive at some definite conclusions. For example, if there is a simultaneous break in the order by the *pratihartā*-priest and the *udgātā*-priest, they lay down the injunction (*vidhī*) of optional performance of any one of the above expiative sacrifices; but if there is a break of order in succession (i.e., if the *pratihartā*-priest first breaks the order and then the *udgātā*-priest does so) the first expiative sacrifice of *sarvasvadaḥṣiṇa-yāga* and the next one of *adaḥṣiṇa-yāga* tie with each other to claim performance. Here the Mimamsists conclude by the injunction—*paurvāparye pūrvadaurvalyam prakṛtivaditi* (*Jaiminisūtra*)—meaning thereby that the first alternative is weaker than the second for the fact that the second becomes unnecessary without having any scope. Hence here the first alternative of *sarvasvadaḥṣiṇa-yāga* is negated by the latter alternative of *adaḥṣiṇa-yāga*, but Prakāśātmayati shows that this negation of the former does not in any way make it present elsewhere than this particular place of its possibility along with another alternative. This Mimamsist analysis of negation of an

alternative by another is brought out by Prakāśātmayati to show that the *akhyātivādin* Mimamsist cannot also make negation as the basis of postulation (*arthāpatti*) of the presence of the negated at some other place than the place where it is negated. The *akhyātivādin*, though not recognising false knowledge, recognises negation as in such cases of two alternatives and hence the possibility of postulation (*arthāpatti*) to prove the existence of the negated elsewhere than in the place of negation is rejected altogether. The *akhyātivādin's* contention that in the negation of the alternative expiatory sacrifice, there is only the negation of the 'propensity to action' (*pravṛtti*) is also rejected by Prakāśātmayati who shows that such negation is not negation proper, for even if such propensity is accidentally retarded to one who is ready to sacrifice by the presence of a king or the raid of robbers, then the sacrifice is not said to be negated, for the accidental cause of retardation being gone, it will automatically again be in progress. This fact of the impossibility of the presence of the object somewhere else by its negation at a particular place is also challenged by Prakāśātmayati from the standpoint of the Naiyāyikas themselves. He shows that the Naiyāyikas who are *anyathākhyātivādins* cannot establish that the absence by way of destruction (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*) of an object, say a jar, at a particular place does in no way establish its presence elsewhere, for the destruction of the object means only a specific kind of absence (*abhāva*) and nothing else. Thus the *pratiyogin* (object) of negation (*niṣedha*) in illusion (*bhrama*) on the substratum (*anuyogin*) that may be a particular spatial or temporal adjunct of illusion can never be said to be present elsewhere on a different spatial or temporal adjunct by the fact of negation.⁵² This impossibility of proving the presence of the illusory object elsewhere which is the view of the *anyathākhyātivādin* Naiyāyika is shown by Padmapāda and more elaborately by Prakāśātmayati from the opponents' argument based on the proof of postulation (*arthāpatti*); but this proof of postulation is resorted to by the Naiyāyikas who do not recognise it as a proof, only from the

⁵² *yathā pratipannadeśe niṣiddhasya ghaṭasya na deśāntare sattvam, evaṃ pratipannadeśakālavastusarvopādhou niṣiddhasya na pratiyogitvena pratipannasarvopādhou sattvasiddhirityarthah—(Vivaraṇa, P. 247).*

standpoint of the Advaita Vedantists who along with the Bhāṭṭa-Mimamsists recognise it as such. Thus the dialectics of Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati here reveal the fact that even if the Naiyāyikas accept their view of postulation as a proof of valid knowledge, they cannot even by that proof establish their contention of *anyathākhyāti*. Thus the illusory object as silver is shown by them to be false through and through (*anirvacaniya*). The object of negation and the object of appearance in illusion, however, are regarded by them as of different status of reality. This fact has been well brought out by Prakāśātmayati, Akhaṇḍānanda and Vidyāranya, as has been shown above. The fact of negation does in no wise prove its previous existence that is negated afterwards at the time of negation; for the object of negation is always the empirical (*vyavahārika* or *laukika-pāramārthika*) silver that is always absent on the substratum (shell). The object of appearance, however, is illusory (*prātibhāsika*) that is experienced so long as it exists. Thus there is no suggestion in negation that the object is the previously existent one that is negated afterwards, but it is the eternally negated one that was *falsely* perceived before. This is the Advaita-view of *nirupādhika-niṣedha* or negation of the object that is not limited to any particular period of time, but is, as negated, beyond all temporal existence of illusory perception (*prātibhāsika-sattā*). Thus either by experience or by verbal testimony there is no chance of the *anyathākhyāti* contention to survive the test of reason.

As to the significance of the words in the definition of *adhyāsa*, Prakāśātmayati, following Padmapāda, shows that the word *smṛtirūpa* refers to the illusory nature of the silver because of the fact that it is raked up through impressions (*saṃskāras*) and is akin to the previously cognised silver (*pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsa*). This characteristic of being born of false and defective contactual knowledge is indicated by the word *smṛtirūpa*. Therefore the two characteristics of contactual but defective cognition and recollective cognition through impressions are complementary to each other and indicate the illusory nature of the silver⁵³. Prakāśātmayati

⁵³ *pūrvadṛṣṭapadena saṃskārajanyatvaṃ siddhamityetaṅgikaroti-*

shows that the proof of illusory perception lies in all cases of error in the appearance of the real as the unreal, but still there is the sanction of experience in every-day life as the common dual appearance of the moon. Viṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāya in his *Rjuvivaraṇa* brings out the implication of this kind of laying special emphasis on the empirical over and above the logical aspect of error by showing that the contention of *mithyātva* or falsity is supported by the empirical aspect over and above the logical aspect of proving this⁵⁴. The example *śuktikā hi rajatavadavabhāṣate* of the empirical aspects of falsity serves two purposes. The first purpose as shown by Prakāśātmayati lies in the designation of *adhyāsa* as the appearance of one (the shell) as the other (silver), but the second purpose is served by the suffix *vati* which shows that the designation (*lakṣaṇa*) of *adhyāsa* is associated with the designated (*lakṣya*) falsity of the *adhyāsa*. Thus there is a clear case of the establishment of *adhyāsa* along with its falsity or illusory character (*mithyātva*). The character of falsity (*mithyātva*) is such that it is not to be proved by the reality of the object at another place, for it is false by itself or illusory by origination. Padma-pāda shows that the contact of the false silver is due to the defects (*doṣas*) which adhere to the senses (*indriyas*), and the 'this-ness' (*idantā*) of silver is, therefore, not non-contactual but is due to the above contact. Prakāśātmayati deals with the problem by showing that the 'this-ness' of silver is not false for its being a characteristic of silver, for it is the ground of the contact of the sense with the false silver. Akhaṇḍānanda clarifies the position in his *Tattvadīpana* when he says that the direct perception of the false silver is due to the knowledge of the ground of *adhyāsa* due to sense-contact into which consciousness (*caitanya*) is reflected. Thus the direct

'satyamiti.' tarhilārasya vaiyarthyaṁ netyāha—'artheti.' saṁprayoga-doṣajanyatvasiddhyartham smṛtirūpaviśeṣanāmityarthah—(*Tattvadīpana*, P. 249).

⁵⁴ vyāptam pramāṇayuktibhīḥ lakṣaṇam lakṣyarūpakam avinābhāvasambandho lakṣyalakṣaṇayoriha. katham siddhyet pramāṇena vinā yuktīyanukūlaya. ityāha śaṅkāṁ vinirākarīṣṇurmūṇaṁ nirūpyaṁ sthita-yuktīyuktam. vyāptam hi lakṣye kṛtālakṣaṇasya tathā ca loka-matiribhāṇena—(*Rjuvivaraṇa*, P. 250).

perception of false silver is possible because of such superimposition on the Consciousness reflected on the yonder thing (*idam*) that is the ground of illusion.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ *indriyasamprayoge janitam yadadhiṣṭhānājñānam tasminnantaryat
pratibimbitacaitanyam tasminnadhyāsādaparokṣatā—(Tattvadiṇana, P. 254).*

CHAPTER V

THE IMPLICATIONS OF *ADHYĀSA* IN THE PURE SELF —THE ADVAITIST VIEWPOINTS ON ITS ROLE IN *ADHYĀSA* CULMINATING IN NO ALTERNATIVE STANDPOINT

Prakāśātmayati analyses the nature of *adhyāsa* between the Self and the not-Self, and following his predecessor shows that *asmāt* and *yusmat*, the two words used by Bhāṣyakāra Śaṅkara to refer to these two respectively, are amply borne out as such by the fact of their respective nature. The not-Self that is revealed by the Self is the *yusmat* and the Self is the Consciousness reflected on the Ego (*ahaṅkāra*). In illusory knowledge of the two, the Self as Consciousness reflected on the Ego serves as the basis of super-imposition of the not-Self on it. Consciousness, pure and simple, cannot be the ground of any *adhyāsa*, and hence Consciousness is delimited by the Ego to appear as the not-Self⁵⁵. This Self or *asmāt* not being the locus of any defect or *doṣa* pertaining to the *adhiṣṭhāna* or ground, *pramāṇa* or the valid means of knowledge and the *draṣṭṛ* or the mind, there cannot logically be any possibility of super-imposition of the not-Self. The Self or Consciousness being free from all defects cannot be the seat of the defects pertaining to these three factors indispensable in the origination of super-imposition, the factors being not different from the Self cannot also transfer their defects to the Pure Self. The Self, therefore, having no chance of being taken as Pure, for its reflection on these factors is always implied in any *adhyāsa*, and being, therefore, *never* a *distinct* seat of super-imposition, cannot be the ground of any *adhyāsa*. This being the charge of the opponent, Prakāśātmayati following Padmapāda shows that the Self as Consciousness is never dependent upon any

⁵⁵ *niraṅjanasya caitanyasyāsmadarthe'nidamanāsyānātmā tadava-
bhāsyatvena yusmadarthalakṣaṇāpanno'haṅkāro'dhyasta iti—(Pañcapādikā,
P. 255). asmadarthe—ahamiti pratibhāsa ityarthah—(Vivaraṇa, Pp.
254-255). asmacchubdasya yo'rtho'kaṅkāraḥ idamanidamātmakastasmīn.
(Tattvavādin, P. 254).*

of the factors on which it is reflected, for Pure Consciousness is self-luminous. Hence it is not to be confused with external loci of super-imposition which have their pure bases as the ground of *adhyāsa* for their being revealed by knowledge as *such and such* (their qualified existence), but Pure Consciousness is ever unalloyed and its reflection on the particular modes is not the criterion to make it equate with the former. It is either infinitesimal or infinite having no measurable shape and therefore it is not like the act of knowing (*saṃvedana*) that depends on the external factors, but is ever self-revealed and therefore ever Pure Consciousness. Prakāśātmayati answers the possible objection that the Self is not revealed in full, though it is partless, like the sky, by saying that it is self-revealed (*svayamjyotiḥ*) and is not revealed like the sky by another entity which is consciousness. Thus the Self is independent of any extraneous object for its revelation and is therefore never unrevealed. The Self is, however, not an object in which the quality of self-revelation adheres, for Prakāśātmayati says that it is the nature of the Self to be self-revealed without depending like other revealed objects upon the revelation by extraneous causes, and hence the Self is self-revealed not as an object having the quality of self-revelation but as the only Reality as such. The self-revelation is also not a produced process, but is the very nature of the Self and hence is not to be regarded as taking away from the Self's pure nature as such that is eternally unqualified. Prakāśātmayati further clarifies the point by showing that the self-revelation of Consciousness that is Self is the determinant of all other revelations that are dependent on it by various channels of expression (Cf. *jñānajanmaprayuktatvāt kārakāpekṣāyāḥ—Vivaraṇa*, P. 285). Self-revelation of Consciousness is not born for the fact that it does not depend on anything extraneous but its own revelation, and hence it is not to be confused with a produced process depending on Consciousness. Self-revelation of Consciousness, therefore, comes very near the mark : "Self-revelation is Consciousness". Prakāśātmayati brings in the analogy of the lamp to show that its revelation also is not born on its own locus, but Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadīpana* clarifies it by the proof of inference. He says that whatever has revelation by itself is not to be said as hav-

ing that revelation born on it, as the revelation of the lamp is.⁵⁷ In the self-revelation of Consciousness also there is no birth or production on it but there is only the natural form of its flash. Even it cannot be said that the mind or *antaḥkaraṇa* is the locus of its birth or production, for *Prakāśātmayati* emphatically declares that Consciousness as such is not produced anywhere except the revelation of its own nature that adheres to the Self and that nature is the revelation of the object to the mind by its innate power of a self-revelatory character. Hence the *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind is only a limiting adjunct of Consciousness that is reflected on it and hence a revelation of objects takes place; the modification (*vytti* or *pariṇāma*) of the *antaḥkaraṇa* is the locus of such revelation of Consciousness for the purpose of knowing the object and hence is secondarily designated as Consciousness (*antaḥkaraṇapariṇāme jñānatuopacārāt—Vivaraṇa*, P. 259). This reflected Consciousness that is carried on to the *vytti* or *pariṇāma* of the *antaḥkaraṇa* is the epistemological process of the production of consciousness or knowledge.

Prakāśātmayati further brings out that knowledge is not an object adhering to the Self, for then it will turn out to be a seat of revelation and then self-revelation will be jeopardised. Revelation even in the inert object is not produced, though such an object is revealed at a point of time by Consciousness, for production of revelation can take place in the conscious object, and hence the opponents' argument can very well be that the mental knowledge that is born in the inert mind cannot be said to be produced; but *Prakāśātmayati* answers that there is not any possibility of production of consciousness even on the inert mind or *antaḥkaraṇa*, for as has been well brought out above, Consciousness is never produced but is only limited through different channels. Thus Consciousness always refers to self-revelation and it is never a created or a destroyed object. The creation or destruction refers to the external objects, such as the objective flame by the revelation of the light of the lamp (*pradīpaprabhā*) or the solid objects due to dust etc., when the reflection on the mirror

⁵⁷ *vimataṁ svōśrayopādhan na jāyate, prakāśatvāt, pradīpaprakāśavat* —(*Tattvradīpana*, P. 259).

(*darpaṇapratibimba*) is polished out. These are not self-revealed but other-revealed. (Here Prakāśātmayati stresses upon the objectivity of the material illumination of the flame of the lamp, though he has maintained sufficiently that it can also be regarded as an analogy to prove self-luminosity of Consciousness. Cf. *undhakāre prathamotpānnapradīpaprabhāvat—Vivaraṇa*, P. 101). Consciousness is self-revealed as is expressed by the term *prajñānaghana* and hence is not to be equated with external objects otherwise revealed. (cf. *viññānamānandam*, *prajñānamānandam Brahma* etc., also refers to the quality of knowledge adhering to the knower and it is supported by the grammatical sanction. Hence, therefore, *jñāna* means *jñātyiva* or the quality of the knower and it is, therefore, sanctioned by Pāṇini's rule : *karaṇādadhikaraṇayośca* (Pāṇini, 3/3/117). The opponent, therefore, seems to say that it is a quality through which the knower knows the external object and therefore it adheres to the knower. 'The opponents' view seems to be that *jñāna* can be justified by *adhikaraṇe lyuṭ* and there is no necessity of *bhāve lyuṭ*. Prakāśātmayati seems to suggest that words have the primary significance in the meaning of the root (*dhātu*) and secondary significance in other meanings (such as *karaṇa*, *adhikaraṇa* etc.). Thus Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadīpana* says that the root-meaning is the primary one because it is generated first whence the meaning of the *karaṇa*, *adhikaraṇa* etc., are originated and hence the root-meaning has the first consideration. Hence *jñāna* should refer to the root-meaning, that is Consciousness, that is not produced. He also says that the root-meaning does not necessarily pre-suppose action, for even some roots have the meaning devoid of action.⁵⁸ Prakāśātmayati has said that the opponent cannot escape by saying that *jñāna* does not refer to *bhāve lyuṭ* but to *adhikaraṇe lyuṭ* and hence there is the possibility of the reference to the quality of knowledge adhering to the knower, for as words having scanty significance in *bhāva*

⁵⁸ *karaṇādadhikaraṇayordhātvarthapratipattisūpekṣatayā bilambitapratipattikatvād dhātvarthasya ca puraḥsphūrtikatvāttadāśrayaṇam yuktam*
 * * * * * *jñānasya kriyātmakatvaṃ cāśiddham, na ca dhātvarthatvāt kriyātmakatvaṃ, akriyātmakasyāpi dhātvarthasya 'gaḍi badanaikadeśe' ityādau prasiddhatvādityarthaḥ—(Tattvadīpana, Pp. 260-261).*

as well as having primary significance in the root-meaning, *jñāna* should always refer to an unproduced phenomenon that is born when we empirically attribute suffixes in *bhāva* or even in the *karāṇa* or *adhikarāṇa* as the opponent says. Prakāśātmayati takes little or no pains to refute the *karāṇa* or *adhikarāṇa* aspect of the suffix as the *bhāva* one, and it is Akhaṇḍānanda who clearly brings out the real situation of the primary import of a word. Prakāśātmayati further states that this Consciousness is a never-ending Reality and, therefore, not a series of revelations which are born and destroyed in an eternal chain of temporary bits, for such temporal originations are not the nature of Consciousness or Self. Here he looks askance at the Buddhist Yogācāra conception of a series of bits of Consciousness (*kṣaṇika-vijñāna-vādin*).

Prakāśātmayati examines whether it is possible for any *ajñāna* to stand on Eternal Consciousness that is *Brahman*. He first poses to show that the veil of ignorance cannot reside in *Jīva* or the individual Self as it rests on the Universal Self. Padmapāda first shows this aspect of ignorance and Prakāśātmayati harps on his tune more fully. Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati try to establish successfully that *ajñāna* may reside in *Brahman*, but before doing that they both show that the veil of ignorance automatically hangs on *Jīva* as well. Prakāśātmayati states that *Jīva* being not different in essence from *Brahman*, the veil and the projection created by *avidyā* hang on *Jīva* though they are referred to *Brahman*. Hence *Jīva* should be taken as the locus of the effects of *avidyā* for the fact that he is in essence of the same status as *Brahman*, though under the influence of ignorance, a false division is created. Thus the effects of *avidyā* that are said to be referred to *Brahman* automatically are referred to *Jīva* as well. This is the true significance of Prakāśātmayati's analysis of the effects of *avidyā* with reference to *Brahman* and *Jīva*, wherein he follows his predecessor's analysis but makes it more elaborate and clear. He says that the two things referring to the same locus but having no cause-and-effect relation, are not different in kind but only different in aspects of the same thing. Thus according to Prakāśātmayati's explanation, *Jīva* and *Brahman* are in essence non-different and hence the former being limited by ignorance is an aspect of *Brahman*. The reference to both *Jīva* and *Brahman* by the

same universe of discourse is substantiated by the examination of Upanisadic passages like *Tattvamasi* (*Chāndogya Up.* 6/8/7) where the two words *Tat* and *Tvam* refer to the same undifferentiated existence that is one but under the influence of ignorance they appear as differentiated as *Brahman* and *Jīva*. This elucidation is brought out in the *Tattvadīpana* by Akhaṇḍānanda⁵⁹. The second question that arises in this connection is analysed by Prakāśātmayati to show how *avidyā* can at all create effects on *Brahman*, the undifferentiated one Existence having no qualitative or quantitative distinctions. He follows his predecessor's analysis and brings out the logical possibility of this problem. He says that *avidyā* or *ajñāna* can rest in *Brahman* as it is supported by valid proofs, such as, testimony of Scripture (*śrutipramāṇa*) and postulation based on it (*śrutārthāpatti*). The scriptural testimony can be found in passages like *anṛtena hi pratyūḍhāḥ & anīśaya śocati muhyamānaḥ*. Prakāśātmayati shows that in dreamless sleep (*susupti*) there is the non-revelation of Consciousness which is never so; hence it follows that such non-revelation has a cause that acts as a hindrance to the self-revelation of Consciousness. Now this hindering phenomenon (*pratibandhaka*) of Consciousness cannot be false knowledge, for in such a state all knowledge dies out, nor also any impression (*saṁskāra*) of false knowledge for the fact that such an impression cannot be a *pratibandhaka* nor also any karmic hindrance is justifiable to veil Consciousness. Hence the *śruti* refers to a positive *ajñāna* by the word *anṛta* (*anṛtena hi pratyūḍhāḥ, ta ime satyāḥ kāmāḥ anṛtāpidhānāḥ*) as different from false knowledge, or its impression or the karmic hindrance. On this logical basis, Prakāśātmayati shows that there are other *śruti*-passages which all refer to a positive *ajñāna* veiling Consciousness, and creating all kinds of illusory behaviour. Thus the *śruti*-passage *anīśayā śocati muhyamānaḥ* refers to the illusory conduct of the *Jīva* that does not see his real nature. Again,

⁵⁹ nanu—kāryakāranabhāvahīnayordravyayoḥ sāmānādhikaranyameka-dravyaniṣṭham—so'yaṁ Devadatta itivat, ato dravyaikatvāt jīvagatāvevānavabhāsaḥ—viparyayāvṛiti codayati—nanu na Brahmano'nya iti—(*Vivaraṇa*, Pp. 261-262). * * * * * *Tattvamasāyādivākyam akhaṇḍārtha-niṣṭham akāryakāraṇadravyamātra-vṛttitve sati sāmānādhikṛtatvāt 'so' yaṁ Devadatta' itivat*—(*Tattvadīpana*, P. 261).

śruti-passages like *na taṁ vidātha ya imā yajānānyadyuṣ-
mākamantaram babhūva. nīhāreṇa prāvṛtā jalpyā cāsutṛpa
ukthāsaścārantī* and *avidyāyāmantare vartamānā nānyacchreyo
vedayante* refer to the *ajñāna* that creates a hindrance to the
real knowledge of *Brahman* or *Ātman* (cf. *nīhāra* = *ajñāna* =
avidyā) and the consequent illusory conduct of *Jīva* flowing out
of this *ajñāna* (cf. also *ajñānenāvṛtaṁ jñānam lena muhyanti
jantavaḥ*—*Bhagavadgītā*).

Prakāśātmayati following *Padmapāda* tries to establish
ajñāna on the proof of postulation or *arthāpatti*. But before
doing so, he sounds a very cautious note about such a method
adopted by them. He says that establishment of *ajñāna* on any
valid proof will tantamount to saying that *ajñāna* is a valid
concept and not a false and illusory (*anirvacanīya*) one that
the Advaitists are out to establish. Hence *Prakāśātmayati*
makes it clear that the valid proof of *arthāpatti* or *śruti* only
makes *ajñāna* to be a concept other than non-existent
(*asat*) and does not establish it as a valid concept; for the
nature of *ajñāna* is such that it is different from a non-exis-
tent entity as also from an existent one; it is different from
both and hence it is called *anirvacanīya* or *mithyā* (false or
illusory). The nature of *ajñāna* as such is only directly
revealed to the *Śākṣi-caitanya* or the Witness-Consciousness,
and is not revealed to the ordinary means of knowledge
(*pramāṇas*).⁶⁰ *Prakāśātmayati*'s proof of postulation in
ajñāna comes from the two-fold fact that is well-established
on scriptural evidence and that evidence being supplemented
by other proofs, such as perception and inference, postulation
or *arthāpatti* serves as an added proof. The two-fold fact is
with regard to the destruction of bondage, i.e., liberation from
bondage, at the dawn of the transcendental knowledge of
unity between *Brahman* and *Jīva* (*Brahmajñāna* or *Brahmāt-
maikyajñāna*), and the injunctive precepts of *śravaṇa* etc., for
the realization (*darśana*) of this truth. These two facts are
unchallenged being based on the *śruti*-evidence and suppor-
ted by cogent logic. Our life of bondage and the steps pres-
cribed toward Self-realization are all facts that cannot be

⁶⁰ *atra ca sākṣivedyasyājñānasya pramāṇairarthādvyaṁvṛttih pradarśyate
iti na tasya pramāṇavedyatvaprasaṅgaḥ iti*—(*Vivaraṇa*, P. 265).

denied; these facts only cease when real, transcendental knowledge dawns on the human mind. No bondage exists there and no path still plays its rôle; everything stops as if by the magic-wand of knowledge and all our hectic life of spiritual progress attains its culmination. On this two-fold fact, Prakāśātmayati builds up his proof of postulation in *ajñāna*, for he says that before real knowledge dawns, the life of bondage must needs pre-suppose an eternal nescience covering up the real knowledge, and secondly, the paths prescribed toward Self-realization (*darśana*) must also pre-suppose such a nescience that is active till the goal aimed at by the paths is not reached. The goal of *ātmadarśana* is not to be proved by the paths leading to it, it is a realized fact, self-evident and self-luminous; what the paths prescribed indicate is that the goal is not realized till the eternal nescience playing its part is not destroyed by the paths thus prescribed. Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadīpana* clearly and succinctly brings out this hint⁶¹. Prakāśātmayati examines at length and in a masterly way establishes the Advaita view of *ajñāna* and its locus and object. The problem is a complex one when judged from the vast and varied opinions growing round it. It is worthwhile to confine ourselves here to what the School of *Vivaraṇa* brings out regarding this problem. Prakāśātmayati, following his predecessor, says that the argument that *Jīva* being non-different from *Brahman* cannot be the locus of any ignorance as *Brahman* is not also the locus of it, does not stand the scrutiny of logic. This type of argument aims at dislodging the possibility of *ajñāna* on *Brahman* from three sides, but all the sides are exploded by Prakāśātmayati. He shows that the first possibility of this argument is that *ajñāna* is possible only on the admission of difference between the locus and the object, such identity of *Jīva* and *Brahman* acting as a hindrance to such a concept. Prakāśātmayati shows that *ajñāna* does not necessarily pre-suppose such a difference but can very well have as its locus (*āśraya*) and object (*viśaya* as the object of the veil or *āvaraṇa*) the same thing, and that is Unqualified Conscious-

⁶¹ *darśanoddeśena śravaṇādi vidhiyamānaṁ nivartyāvidyāmantaropānupapādyamānamavidyāṁ gamayati, na ca Brahmasvarūpabodhanārthaṁ śravaṇādi vidhiyate, Brahmanah svaprakāśatvenānyanirapekṣatvādityarthaḥ*—(*Tattvadīpana*, P. 265).

ness (cf. *nirvibhāgacitireva kevalā—Saṁskṣepaśārīraka*); darkness being the veil (*āvaraṇatvāt*) and different from action (*akriyātmakatvāt*) has the same thing as its locus (as the room where it exists) and object (the room that is covered).

Hence it is evident that *ajñāna* as an inert (*jaḍa*) principle like darkness has the same thing as its locus and object, and hence *ajñāna* need not necessarily pre-suppose a difference between them for its establishment. Darkness and ignorance have in this respect this same characteristic, though ignorance is often said to adhere to a locus different from the object (as we say, *ayaṁ janah etadviṣyakājñānavān*, i.e., this man=*the locus*, has ignorance, in this matter=*the object*); but Prakāśātmayati dismisses this argument by saying that this two-fold aspect of *ajñāna* is only a passing phase in the real background of it as having the same locus and object. The second possibility of the above argument is that *ajñāna* is not possible in Unqualified Self-revealed Consciousness that is *Brahman* that is antagonistic to the former. But Prakāśātmayati shows that the real antagonism between nescience and Consciousness lies not in Unqualified Consciousness as the locus, but in Consciousness as limited by the subject, the means etc., that being in true consilience with a falsely created object dispels nescience; hence *Sākṣi-caitanya* or the Witness-Consciousness being regarded as the locus of *ajñāna*, there is no antagonism as this Consciousness is only the Witness or revealer of *ajñāna* that is directly known by it and by no other *pramāṇa*.

Prakāśātmayati makes an elaborate analysis of the problem of *ajñāna* and its relation to the locus, i.e., *Brahman*. He shows that there is no contradiction in any relation obtaining between the two, for, after all, Unqualified Consciousness or *Nirviśeṣa Brahman* being the locus of any *ajñāna* does not lose its all-knowingness (*sarvajñatva*). He shows that there is no contradiction in *Brahman's* nature of all-revealing and all-knowing characters even though *ajñāna* hinges on it; for, as he analyses the fact, there may be three-fold apprehension of such contradiction, but none of these is real contradiction at all. The first apprehension is that revealedness (*bhāsamānatva*) entails such contradiction, but he shows that *ajñāna* in the tri-temporal existence of its pre-origination, existential and after-originating effects may exist in the revealed *Brahman*

that is the home of many aspects of limited Consciousness (*janyajñāna*); that is to say, that though there are many channels of the revelation of *Brahman*, still it does not lose its own nature even if *ajñāna* is held to adhere to it. Limited consciousness is only a phase of *Brahman* and it does not in any way make itself bound to the contradiction of such consciousness, for in its own nature it is all-knowing and all-pervasive, at the same time being the Witness of *ajñāna* that may falsely adhere to it. Even the revelation of *Brahman* is not antagonistic to the *ajñāna* which has its locus in *Brahman*, for, as Prakāśātmayati says, there is no contradiction in the revelation of the *ajñāna* itself. Now this revelation of *ajñāna* is due to the locus that is *Brahman* which as the Witness of it is not in conflict with it. Prakāśātmayati also points out that self-revelation of *Brahman* is not in conflict with *ajñāna* that adheres to it, for he says that only inert objects (*viśayas*) that are other-revealed are not the loci of *ajñāna* and hence cannot be at the same time revealed and the witness of *ajñāna* adhering to them; thus there is an inevitable conflict between them. It is only *samvedana qua sāmuit* that is not revealed through any channels or *vyttis* and is only the nature of *Brahman* that has no conflict with *ajñāna* of which it is merely a witness and not a dispeller by any means. Prakāśātmayati then analyses more fully how the all-knowing character of *Brahman* can accommodate itself with the *ajñāna* that adheres to it. He shows that the third possibility to deny the existence of any *ajñāna* in *Brahman* (the other two possibilities have been shown and examined above) is that the unity of *Brahman* and *Jīva* that is the main thesis of Advaita Vedānta is apprehended to antagonise with *ajñāna* adhering to *Brahman* inasmuch as its all-knowing nature will be impaired by it, but he dismisses such apprehension by bringing out the real truth. He shows that this unity does not in any way hamper *ajñāna* as adhering to *Brahman* for the fact that though there is unity, still that unity is divided as between the *bimba* and *pratibimba* (the Reality and its reflection); so there is no conflict of the characters adhering to *Brahman* and those adhering to *Jīva*—and hence *ajñāna* is possible even in unity. Hence Prakāśātmayati concludes that the presence of *ajñāna* in *Brahman* is not antagonistic to the all-

knowingness of *Brahman* for the fact that *Brahman* being the unity of all existence is the locus of *ajñāna* in the sense that its reflection (*pratibimba*) as a limited Entity shares the qualities of being such a locus, whereas in its transcendental Existence which is Unity (*aikya*) there is really all-knowingness (*sarvajñatva*) and ever-freeness (*sadāmuktatva*). But he says that the Consciousness *per se* is the real locus of *ajñāna* which abides in Consciousness *par excellence*, i.e., Absolute *Brahman* and not any *Jīva*. His paradoxical statements here (as *jīvāśrayatvopagamāt—Vivaraṇa*, P. 268 & *satyaṇyaikyē pratibimbātmanyadhyaśāyāmatvāderbimbe adarśanāt avadātātāyāścāvirodhadarśanāt—loc. cit.*) seem not to disturb the general standpoint he has taken, but only try to hush up the possible charge of there being no *sarvajñatva* (all-knowingness) in *Brahman*. He shows that *sarvajñatva* and *ajñānāśrayatva* do not antagonise in the same locus (*evam sarvajñatvāvidyāśrayatvayoh satyaṇyaikyē virodhāt—Vivaraṇa*, P. 268). Prakāśātmayati's analysis and view-points on the relation between *Brahman* and *Jīva* will be discussed below. Thus unity of *Brahman* and *Jīva* in one sense establishes *ajñāna* as adhering to the latter as the reflection of the former.⁶² Thus unity, self-revelation and all-knowingness of *Brahman* postulate *ajñāna* inasmuch as a veil is often seen on it, or otherwise no such positive *ajñāna* would have been possible but only the negative absence of knowledge if there were difference, other-revelation and little-knowingness in *Brahman*. Thus Prakāśātmayati adduces here an additional proof of postulation (*arthāpatti*) to establish the presence of *ajñāna* on the locus of *ajñāna*.

Prakāśātmayati introduces a very interesting discussion as to the difference between *Brahman* and *Jīva* though they are essentially the same. Here he says that there are various views as to this question. The first view is that it is due to the limitation of the *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind, the second view is that it is due to a characteristic called *atireka* that can bring about both difference and non-difference, the third view is that it

⁶² *tasmānnaikyamavidyāśrayatvena virudhyate, kintvavidyāmevopapādayati—(Vivaraṇa, P. 268).*

vādhmanata evārthādājīve Brahmasvarūpaprakāśacchādikāvidyā kalpyate
 * * * * * *ato'nādisiddhāvidyāvaccchinānantajīvanirbhāśaspadam ekarasañ*
Brahma—(Pañcapādikā, P. 269).

is due to their intrinsic natures. Prakāśātmayati entirely dismisses the alternatives by showing that it is only *ajñāna* that covers *Ātman* and hangs on *Ātman* (*Ātmāvaraṇam ātmājñānam—Vivaraṇa*, P. 269). But Prakāśātmayati seems to make here a departure from the standpoint of his School when he says that *ajñāna* is responsible for the *avaccheda* of *Brahman* that is *Jīva*, for his School advocates, as has been established in his *Vivaraṇa*, that *Jīva* is the *pratibimba* and not *avaccheda* of *Brahman*. But this seems not to conflict with his general philosophical background where he established *Jīva* as *pratibimba*; herein he only makes a slipshod term that is not his philosophy but is only an approach to understand his philosophy. Thus *Jīva* here becomes created out of nescience or *ajñāna* and that is what is meant by calling it an *avaccheda*; in reality, according to Prakāśātmayati, however, it is a *pratibimba*. This *Jīvahood* is due to *ajñāna* and this cause-and-effect series is beginningless (*anādi*) like *bījāṅkurapṛavāha* (the series of seeds and sprouts). This *anādi avidyāpṛavāha* is at the root of all the creative principles of *kartṛtva*, *bhokṛtva* etc., which also being beginningless and false constitute what is called *Jīvahood*.

Prakāśātmayati dismisses first of all the arguments of the opponents who hold that it is *antaḥkaraṇa* that is responsible for the difference of *Brahman* and *Jīva*. He analyses that the *antaḥkaraṇa* can in no wise be responsible as such for the fact that it is itself false and created by *ajñāna*. Hence no true *avaccheda* of *antaḥkaraṇa* can be postulated for such difference to be possible; and if the falsity of the *avaccheda* of *antaḥkaraṇa* be accepted, then the primal *ajñāna* itself becomes so responsible. Thus the dialectic of Prakāśātmayati centres round the fact that the *antaḥkaraṇa* itself is the offspring of *ajñāna* and in no wise capable by itself to account for the difference of *Brahman* and *Jīva*; hence *antaḥkaraṇa* being dispelled by true knowledge of Self cannot stand on its own merits to account for any difference between *Brahman* and *Jīva*; thus the alternative course of recognizing that *antaḥkaraṇa* along with *ajñāna* that creates it should be recognized as accounting for the difference between *Jīva* and *Brahman*, comes up for consideration, but that alternative, too, is untenable, as shown by Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda.

They show that as there is in this view the recognition of two principles whereas the one primal principle of *ajñāna* is sufficient, this view should be discarded and the views that *ajñāna* is the only principle to account for the difference between *Brahman* and *Jīva* should be accepted.⁶³ The *antaḥkaraṇa* cannot also be said to be a true emanation of *Brahman* on the authority of the *śruti* (cf. *tanmano'sṛjata*), for the fact that it being created by *avidyā* (*sādi* or *sotpattimattāka*) is the illusory transformation (*vivartamānāvidyādhiṣṭhānatvam—Tattvadīpana*, P. 270) of the *Brahmacaitanya* and hence is never true, though it is not the substratum of *anādi avidyā* or eternal nescience. Thus Akhaṇḍānanda hits upon the right nail of Advaita Philosophy by saying that though created, it is the *vivartamānāvidyādhiṣṭhāna* and hence necessarily false and illusory. Prakāśātmayati ably answers the alternatives of the delimitation (*avacchedakatva*) by *antaḥkaraṇa* and shows that none of these stands the scrutiny of reason. The *antaḥkaraṇa* in its subtle (*sūkṣma*) stage being regarded as the delimiting adjunct (*avacchedaka*), the subtlety comes to three things :—(1) partless state, (2) decrease in parts, (3) existence in the causal state. The first alternative is impossible for the fact that a composite substance cannot exist in partless state, or else it ceases to exist at all. The second alternative is also untenable for the fact that the parts being decreased, the whole cannot remain, or else it ceases to be composed of parts. The third alternative too becomes inconsistent for the fact that the *antaḥkaraṇa* being existent in the cause (*kāraṇamevāsthita*), in itself becomes non-existence and hence incapable of serving as the *avacchedaka* which it is sought to be ; again if it exists as the effect also (*kāryamaṇi*) then there is no question of subtlety. Hence Prakāśātmayati concludes that the only other alternative in favour of the case of *antaḥkaraṇa* being left and that being "existence in the cause along with the impressions of effect", we have to dismiss this one also on the ground that the causal existence necessarily implies that the cause is illusory and not

⁶³ *antaḥkaraṇasyāvacchedakatvamicchatā'jñānasyūpyavacchedakatvamiṣyata eva, antaḥkaraṇasyāropitatvenājñānātmakatvāt, tata ubhayoravacchedakatvakalpanāyām gauravānna tāvadantaḥkaraṇamevāvacchedakamityarthah—(Tattvadīpana, P. 270).*

real and hence that cause turns out to be nothing but *ajñāna* or nescience; otherwise destruction of the false knowledge of distinction would never come. Hence Prakāśātmayati solidly refuses the case for *antaḥkaraṇa* and along with it the case for *atireka* is also lost. *Atireka* being regarded as a property that can bring about difference and non-difference cannot be said to make the difference between *Brahman* and *Jīva* possible without the acceptance of *avidyā* that is really at the bottom of such differences. The argument that *avidyā* presupposes a difference between *Brahman* and *Jīva* and hence there arises a mutual dependence, is also neutralized by the counter-argument of Prakāśātmayati that it is all the same in the case of *atireka* also; and moreover mutual difference is not a strong argument in cases of eternal dependence as we find in the case of *bheda* (difference) on the one hand and the differentiated (*dharmin*) and the differentiator (*pratiyogin*) on the other. Hence all the arguments in favour of other adjuncts than *avidyā* fail, and the case of the Advaitist that it alone is responsible for the appearance of difference between *Brahman* and *Jīvā*, gains its own ground. Prakāśātmayati winds up the arguments and establishes this position by saying that this *avidyā*, though hinging on *Brahman*, not only obscures it but also creates an appearance of difference between *Brahman* and *Jīva*; this is the function of *avidyā* in the empirical plane where this appearance of difference is always obtruding upon the existence of *Jīva* till the transcendental truth of unity is not vouchsafed to him. Even the *bimba* of face that is reflected on the mirror is not merely obscured by it but also is made to appear as the *pratibimba* on the mirror and thus the difference of the two is created by *avidyā* or *ajñāna* hinging on the consciousness of the facial expression (*bimba*) that is reflected (*pratibimba*) on the mirror.

Prakāśātmayati brings out more fully and clearly the locus of *avidyā* that is Pure and Unqualified Consciousness by showing that the other alternatives cannot logically hold good. It cannot be held that Consciousness as qualified by the *avidyā* is the real locus of *avidyā* for the simple fact that there are no logical proofs in support of this

view. The empirical justification from feelings like 'I am ignorant' where the 'I' refers to the Self as reflected on the *antaḥkaraṇa* is very feeble in view of the fact that all empirical feelings centre round the experience of 'I', but are not on that account revealed by Consciousness limited by some adjunct or the other but by the Pure Consciousness or the Witness-Self (*Sākṣi-caitanya*). *Prakāśātmayati* pays back the opponents on their own coins by the same force of arguments which silence them in their view that *antaḥkaraṇa* on which the Self is reflected is the revealer of *avidyā* as well as of all empirical feelings of a direct nature, as these experiences and the *antaḥkaraṇa* itself jointly depend upon the Pure Self, as a lump of iron and the act of burning depend upon the only locus, i.e., fire, whence we say, 'the lump of iron burns'. *Prakāśātmayati* in one word dismisses the argument by showing that *avidyā* and *antaḥkaraṇa* are both dependent on Pure-Self whence it follows that we ascribe *wrongly* ignorance or nescience on the *antaḥkaraṇa* but not on the real locus upon which it is super-imposed. The *antaḥkaraṇa* itself being an effect of *avidyā* cannot be the locus of it.⁶⁴ The empirical justification of expressions like 'I am ignorant' is to be sought in the acceptance of Pure Self as the locus of ignorance and nowhere else; then also we can explain satisfactorily the presence of ignorance even in the dreamless state of sleep (*susupti*). *Prakāśātmayati* shows the evil effect of regarding the view that the Self reflected on the *antaḥkaraṇa* is the locus of *avidyā*, in that the explanation of ultimate liberation from bondage (*bandhanāśa*) becomes a myth; for if the inert (*jada*) *antaḥkaraṇa* be regarded as the locus of *avidyā* then it will also have to be regarded as the locus of illusion (*bhrānti*) as well as real knowledge (*samyagjñāna*), for these three things depend on the same locus. But then the inert *antaḥkaraṇa* having realized real knowledge, the Self will not be liberated from bondage, for it is that the Self that is in bondage and that has to be liberated from it. True it is that the Self as Pure *Brahman* is neither in bondage nor has to be liberated from it, yet to explain satisfactorily the phenomenon of

⁶⁴ *antaḥkaraṇasyājñānakāryatvānna tadāśrayatvakalpanā. naca prattītyanupapattih tasya anyathāsiddhatvāt—(Tattvadr̥ṣṭi, P. 272).*

bondage and liberation that are due to the play of *avidyā*, it is wiser to hold Pure Self and not the Self qualified by the *antaḥkaraṇa* as the locus of *avidyā* as well as its destruction, for otherwise a logically consistent theory of metaphysic cannot be constructed.⁶⁵

Prakāśātmayati here introduces a view that *ajñāna* has its locus not in the Self qualified by *antaḥkaraṇa* but in the *antaḥkaraṇa* itself. This view is grossly illogical, for it cuts at its own roots. If the Self is admitted by this School as the locus of limited knowledge (*kiñcijñātva*), as is necessarily done, then the Self becomes the locus of *ajñāna* because it has sometimes the absence of knowledge. But this School may argue that *ajñāna* as a positive entity belongs to the *antaḥkaraṇa* whilst absence of knowledge (*agrahaṇa*), false knowledge (*mithyājñāna*) etc., have their locus in the Self, hence the *antaḥkaraṇa* and not the Self becomes the locus of *ajñāna*. These arguments also lose their force when put to logical examination, for *ajñāna* to have the *antaḥkaraṇa* as its locus should be designated as either an entity different from knowledge (*jñānādanayāt*) or antagonistic to knowledge (*jñānabirodhi*). If the first alternative be accepted, then any psycho-physical defect, e.g., disease of the senses may come within the category of *ajñāna* and may very well be accepted as having its locus in the *antaḥkaraṇa* which is inert (*jada*). The second alternative also is untenable for the fact that if knowledge and its opposite stand on two different loci—the first on the Self (which is the only locus of knowledge and not the inert *antaḥkaraṇa*) and the second on the *antaḥkaraṇa*,—then the antagonism between knowledge and its opposite will have no useful purpose to serve, for, this kind of antagonism proceeding from two different loci will not be able to make knowledge the destroyer of its opposite. Even if the *antaḥkaraṇa* be accepted as the *karaṇa* or means of knowledge of the subject that is Self, and the *ajñāna* as the opposite of knowledge being seated on that means (*karaṇa*) there will be no logical evidence to show that

⁶⁵ *tataśca viśiṣṭasya muktāvananvayāccinmātrasya sarvatrānugamāt tasyaivājñātvamityarthah—(Tattvadīpana, P. 273).*

knowledge in the subject will necessarily destroy the opposite of knowledge in its means. Even the knowledge of the *antaḥkaraṇa* of a man gone to *suṣupti* (dreamless sleep) as devoid of any actions or functions (*līyamāna*) cannot suggest the cessation of the ignorance of the man, for he is said to have ignorance again when he wakes up. Thus the inference of the cessation of ignorance in a deeply-sleeping man by another man from the former's state of the *antaḥkaraṇa* as devoid of any actions, is not possible, because of the fact that such knowledge of the absence of any actions is due to the previous presence of actions and not due to the cessation of ignorance. Even as psycho-physical defects *ajñāna* cannot be said to have its locus in the *antaḥkaraṇa*, for then sense-organs may also become such loci. The argument that the *antaḥkaraṇa* is beginningless (*anādi*) while the sense-organs are created in time (*sādi*) and hence the latter cannot be the loci of *ajñāna* which is beginningless while the former can be so, is also a very weak one, for if we accept *satkāryavāda* or manifestation from an existent state in the cause, that will apply equally to the sense-organs as also the *antaḥkaraṇa*. From all these logical analyses it is clear that the positive *ajñāna* as spoken of in the *śruti*s as *anyta*, *nīhāra* etc., must necessarily have its locus in the conscious seat or seats which have knowledge, and hence it follows that no unconscious *antaḥkaraṇa* can be such a locus, but only Consciousness (*caitanya*). This *ajñāna* is a beginningless (*anādi*) entity that has its locus on *Brahman*, for, it is not generated in process of time. Padmapāda says this in clear terms when he brings out that *Brahman* appears as so many *Jīvas* under the influence of this beginningless principle⁶⁶. Prakāśātmayati clarifies this position by showing that not only is *Brahman* a beginningless Principle, but also the veil of ignorance (*ajñāna*) that rests on it is such. Not only is the ground of all illusion but also the principle of illusion is beginningless in point of time. This is borne out, as Padmapāda says, by the *Bhagavad-Gītā* which speaks of both *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* as *anādi*⁶⁷. Here *prakṛti* refers to the principle

⁶⁶ *ato'nādisiddhāvidyāvaccchinānantajīvanirbhāsūspadamekarasani Brahmeti—(Pañcapādikā, P. 269).*

⁶⁷ *prakṛtiṁ puruṣaṁcaiva biddhyanādi ubhāvapi (Bhagavad-Gītā : 13/20)*

of *māyā* as is borne out by the *śruti*: *māyām tu prakṛtim vidyāt*. As a matter of fact, in the Advaita School of Vedānta there are six beginningless principles (*śaḍa-nādayaḥ*)⁶⁸. (1) *Jīva* (the individual Self), (2) *Īśa* (the cosmic Self as Creator), (3) *viśuddhā cit* (Pure Consciousness), (4) *Jīveśayorbhidā* (the difference between the first two), (5) *avidyā* (nescience), (6) *taccitoryogaḥ* (relation, though false, of nescience with Pure Consciousness). Prakāśātmayati's analysis of *ajñāna* is consummate when he shows that it has not only the locus (*āśraya*) in *Brahman* but also the object (*viśaya*) in *Brahman*. *Brahman* as the object (*viśaya*) of ignorance is admitted in both the chief Schools of Advaita Vedānta, viz., the *Bhāmātī* as well as the *Vivaraṇa*, though there is divergence of opinion on the locus (*āśraya*) of ignorance between them. The *Bhāmātī* School does not recognise *Brahman* as the locus of ignorance, but regards *Jīva* as such.

However, Prakāśātmayati here shows clearly that there may be the charge of logical or metaphysical inconsistency in admitting that *Brahman* is the object (*viśaya*) of ignorance. The opponents, as Naiyāyikas, may urge against the Advaitins that ignorance (*ajñāna*) to have *Brahman* as its object (*viśaya*) cannot but be unrevealed (*anavabhāsamāna*). There is, therefore, no logical consistency in the Advaitist position which tries to show that *ajñāna* has as its object *Brahman* that is revealed while that *ajñāna* is also revealed (*avabhāsamāna*). But if the opposite view is to be accepted, *ajñāna* has to be regarded as unrevealed (*anavabhāsamāna*). The Advaitists press forward their arguments and show that this revelation of *ajñāna* does not conflict with the concept of *ajñāna* which as such is illusory and hence depends only on its illusory revelation (*pratibhāsa*); hence *ajñāna*, though having as its object *Brahman*, is illusorily presented to *Sākṣīcaitanya* and hence is revealed to it. This is also borne out in the revelation of *ajñāna* in such judgments as: "I do not know the meaning of your word" (*tvaduktamarthaṁ na jñāmi*) where the process of not-knowing is not unrevealed to the subjective consciousness. Thus the Advaitist position,

⁶⁸ *Jīva Īśo viśuddhā cit tathā jīveśayorbhidā avidyā taccitoryogaḥ śaḍasmākamānādayaḥ*—(*Saṁskṛtapa-śāstrirāka*).

as brought out by Prakāśatmayati, tallies well with the revelation of *ajñāna* to *Sākṣicaitanya* that is partless (*niraṁśa*); but to the *bhokṣṛcāitanya* where there is a limitation of the All-pervading Consciousness, *ajñāna* is not revealed as the false creator of the plurality of the empirical processes from which it (*bhokṣṛcāitanya*) is distinct. Such revelation is possible only to the *Sākṣicaitanya* which is self-revealed and as a result of relation wherewith all knowledge of duality and plurality is revealed; thus the distinctness of it from the mind-body complexes is dependent on the self-revelation of *Sākṣicaitanya*, and hence *ajñāna*, though having it as its object, is not inconsistent as being revealed as illusory, responsible for all false knowledge of duality and plurality. The *bhokṣṛcāitanya*, on the other hand, is not the real vouchsafer of *ajñāna* and hence not the object of it. This deep metaphysical significance is ably borne out by Prakāśatmayati.

This analysis of the logical consistency of the Advaitist conception of the nature of *Sākṣicaitanya*, apart from *bhokṣṛcāitanya*, as not antagonising with the concept of *ajñāna* as creating a veil upon Brahman that is its object in all kinds of dual, illusory knowledge is challenged by those who try to establish that the empirical Self as the *bhoktā* is not necessarily in consonance with the empirical falsity of its processes, for the processes might well be conceived of as sub-ordinated to the former.⁶⁹ The logic of this School lies in admitting that the *Sākṣicaitanya*, which is regarded by the Advaitists as the Witness of the illusory empirical processes from which it is distinct, cannot be said to be such a Witness of the distinction of the empirical processes; for they argue that this knowledge of distinction is possible by a third knowledge. But their argument is feeble inasmuch as if the knowledge of distinction is indeterminate with regard to the *dharmin* and the *dharma*s before the third knowledge which shows their determination as such, then the knowledge of distinction could never arise at all; for before the third knowledge, the knowledge of distinction is well-established even by the knowledge of the Self itself as 'I', the reason being that the knowledge of

⁶⁹ *manuṣya'hamiti mithyāivaikatābhimānāt. nanu—gauṇo'yaṁ na mithyā* —(*Pañcapādikā*, P. 276).

the object itself can produce the knowledge of its distinction from other objects.⁷⁰ Prakāśātmayati refutes this position by showing that the nature of *bhoktṛcāitanya* as sub-ordinating the empirical processes and not necessarily falsely owning them, is not logically tenable. He advances many arguments by taking the cue from his predecessor, Padmapāda, and shows that the view of sub-ordination of the empirical processes (*gauṇatva-pakṣa*), inspite of its arguments to establish its cause, is defeated by the admission of the view of the false appearance of those processes (*nithyātva-pakṣa*). The opposite School (*gauṇavādin*) argues that the empirical processes of the mind-body complex appear as related in the same substratum (*sāmānādhikaraṇyam*) with the Self and this relation is the relation of sub-ordination (*sāmānādhikaraṇyam gauṇāva-bhāsaḥ*—*Vivaraṇa*, P. 277), for the Self as distinction from this relation cannot exist. Even the scriptural and inferential proofs cannot be said to account for the falsity, and not sub-ordination, of those processes, for, they say, that the false appearance of the pre-existent (*jyeṣṭha*) proof of perception cannot hold good here, even though there are cases like the empirical illusion of the perceptual appearance of two moons in place of one where the former perceptual proof is negated by the latter perception of one moon. The logical argument for holding this view is in the analysis of the negation (*bādhā*) by the latter proof; for, according to this view, where no logical analysis of such negation takes place as in the case of the empirical appearance of two moons, there may easily be the negation of the former perceptual proof even by the latter inferential proof which establishes the falsity of the former appearance (though this negation of the former appearance of perception is based on the latter perception of the substratum, yet there is an inferential process denying the appearance of something on some other thing which is due to *adhyāsa*); but in the present case, this School argues, where there is the necessity of logical determination of negation by the latter proofs (scriptural or inferential) of the former perceptual appearance, such latter proofs cannot be logically established as doing so. For, if such latter proofs are to be logically established as negating former appearances based on the per-

⁷⁰ *padārthajñānameva bhedañānam*—(*Vivaraṇa*, P. 276).

ceptual proof, then there will invariably arise the fallacy of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśrayatva*) because of the fact that the latter proofs, being established, will determine falsity, and falsity being determined will make their processes valid.⁷¹ Thus this School concludes that the empirical processes pertaining to the Self are sub-ordinate (*gauṇa*) to it and are not false (*mīthyā*). This School does not, therefore, admit the Self as distinct from these processes (which are false); nor as undifferentiated from them, but admits it as the Self which is designated by 'I' (*ahaṅkāra*) and having the mind-body complexes as sub-ordinated to it. This, therefore, is an echo of the *bhedābheda* *vādin* who does not regard the empirical processes as distinct from the Self nor as undifferentiated from it, but as the *real* manifestations (of a subordinate nature) of the Self.

Prakāśātmayati further examines the view of the *gauṇa* *vādin* and shows that neither by way of implication nor by way of experience can it be said that the Self is distinct from the empirical processes which are sub-ordinate to it; for, if by implication the Self as *bhoktā* is said to be distinct from the mind-body complexes, yet that implication does not come up in actual experience where the latter are seen to be super-imposed (*adhyasta*) on the former; and the experience of distinction can only establish the sub-ordination (*gauṇatva*) and not super-imposition (*adhyastatva*) of the latter upon the former. Prakāśātmayati meets the possible charge against super-imposition by showing that although the Self is revealed in full (*viśeṣaṇa*) without any part being unrevealed, yet *adhyāsa* is possible on it, for it is possible for *adhyāsa* to take place even in those places where there is the revelation of the object without any exterior elements being specially differentiated from it as unrevealed; thus it is seen that the letter 'a', having no specially unrevealed differentiation of itself from its lengthening or shortening which are the qualities of the sound only, is made to be the substratum of super-imposition of these imaginary qualities, and so, the Self, though having no speci-

⁷¹ *āgamānumāṇayoḥ pravṛttau tanmīthyātvaṁ tanmīthyātve tayoḥ pravṛttili*—(*Pañcapādikā*, P. 278).

sarpādibhīkramanivartanena bādhakapratyayotpādāt tatra tathātvaṁ, atra yuktīto bādhyabādhakatā niścetavyā, na ca niścetum śakyate parasparāśrayatāpātādityarthah—(*Tattvavārtana*, P. 278).

ally unrevealed differentiation of itself from anything outside it, becomes the substratum of those imaginary qualities adhering to the mind-body complexes. Hence Prakāśātmayati concludes that *adhyāsa* of these qualities upon the Self, though it is fully revealed, is possible due to those qualities being wrongly attributed to the Self which is undifferentiated (here differentiation becomes really unrevealed) with the unconscious objects like the mind-body complexes, the real seat of those qualities. The view of the opponents (*gaṇṇavādins*) that the distinction of the Self from those unconscious objects is experienced and not merely implicated is also shown to be logically untenable; for, if such distinction is experienced, then the question of the qualities being sub-ordinated to the Self as the *distinct* knower does not require to be logically established, for it is well established in experience. But the *gaṇṇavādin* contends that although the Self is logically proved as distinct from the Ego-qualities (*ahampratyaya*), yet the question of sub-ordination in which the Self is distinct opens after seeing that the Self is known as the substratum of those qualities whence it is inferred that this knowledge is of sub-ordination and not super-imposition. Prakāśātmayati replies to this contention by showing that the knowledge of distinction is not vouchsafed by the logical analysis; hence the logical method cannot in any way establish the distinction of Self from the Ego-qualities, but can only merge into the exposition of the real nature of the Self. Thus the *gaṇṇavādin's* contention that those qualities are known as distinct from the Self to which they are sub-ordinated, loses all meaning to the *adhyāsavādin*; for, the latter (the Advaitist) is not satisfied that the distinction of those qualities has to be logically established in view of the fact that those qualities are always super-imposed on the Self. Hence what the logical analysis can do for the Advaitist is only an *indirect* knowledge of distinction that is established by indirect proofs as inference, but it cannot on that account take away from his position that the real nature of the Self as the *direct* knowledge is only capable of vouchsafing to us the super-imposed or false character of those distinct qualities. Hence even if those super-imposed objects are not *indirectly* known as distinct from the Self, the Advaitist contention of *adhyāsa* is not vitiated in any way. The *gaṇṇavādin* tries to know only

indirectly the distinction of those qualities from the Self and tries to explain that their experience along with the Self is maintainable on the assumption that those objects are subordinated to the Self and hence they are in some way to be related with the Self. But he forgets the fundamental problem in such knowledge of relation that is due to a false superimposition, and not true sub-ordination, of those objects upon the Self. Thus his analysis of the knowledge of distinction becomes an *indirect* weapon with which to crush the *direct* knowledge of false relation between the Self and those qualities. The Advaitist position is clearly brought out by Prakāśātmayati who shows that it is the only consistent position to explain the relation of the external objects and their qualities with the Self that shines in its pure light, and no amount of logical analysis can dispel the false super-imposition of these upon it: it is only possible by the most direct knowledge of the Self that is Pure Consciousness upon which everything else is a chimera. But the Advaitist on that account does not totally divorce the utility of the logical proofs from his system, for he says that the indirect knowledge established logically is also a necessity for revealing, though indirectly, the false superimposition⁷². The Advaitist contends that there is a case for *adhyāsa* of those qualities upon the Self, because when the indirect knowledge establishing distinction is not sought as such, the direct knowledge of the Self reveals the super-imposition of those qualities upon it. But when this contention is sought to be challenged by the *gaṇavādin* who tries to show that even in this explanation where the Advaitist recognises *adhyāsa*, there is sub-ordination (*gaṇatva*) of those qualities to the Self, Prakāśātmayati replies that this contention is not tenable; for the sub-ordination of the qualities is antagonistic to the direct

⁷² *vicāreṇāpi nāhaṇipratyayaśya vyatirikātmaṇiṣayatvamāpāditaṃ, kintu sarvadā svarūpamātraviṣayo'haṇipratyayaḥ. yauktikañjñānalabdhastu vyatirekaḥ atastasyānusandhāne pūrvavadadhyāsa eveti pariharati na yukta iti—(Vivaraṇa, P. 280).*

tarhyabhedaviṣayatvamiti śaṅkate—kintviti. abhedaviṣayatve vipratipatyabhāvāpātāt svarūpamātraviṣayatvamityāha sarvadeti. tarhi vyatirekabhāvah. prāptah—tatrahā—yauktiketī, tarhi—ahaṃ manuṣyaḥ ityasya gaṇatvam tatrahā—atā iti. yuktaḥ yudā'nusandhiyante tadāpi tarka-jñānasya paroḥṣatvānnāparokṣatvamiti—(Tattvadīpana, P. 280).

experience of the Self. Prakāśātmayati following his predecessor Padmapāda shows that even in the case of the letter 'a', there is super-imposition of the qualities of shortening or lengthening on it, because even though the sound 'a' is known to be distinct from those qualities, the latter qualities are not so known, and hence we cannot explain the shortening or lengthening of the letter 'a' but by a reference to the fact of super-imposition of those qualities upon the former. This knowledge of distinction that adheres to the letter 'a' and not to its qualities, however, makes the knowledge of distinction to adhere to both the objects even though distinction is not primarily cognized in one.⁷³

Prakāśātmayati further examines probable charges against the *adhyāsavādin* and shows that his position is in no way incompatible. He shows that the direct experience of the Self even after the knowledge of distinction does not conflict with *adhyāsa*, nor does the logical analysis of the Self as distinct clash with *adhyāsa*; for, either the direct experience or the logical analysis only shows the real nature of the Self and nothing more. But *adhyāsa* as a positive fact is shown to exist in the Self, even though the direct experience or the logical analysis of it reveals it as a distinct Entity. This is a reply to the *gaṇavādin* who tries to falsify *adhyāsa* on the ground of the distinct knowledge of the Self. But the Advaitist position, as brought out by Padmapāda, Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda, shows us clearly that *adhyāsa* is in no wise incompatible even in the distinct experience of the Self, for it is the nature of *avidyā* to create false super-imposition on it. Hence they conclude that even in the direct experience of the Self, the knowledge of distinction cannot do anything more than establishing the object of such experience, that is the Self, for it is the nature of the ancillary means (such as the knowledge of distinction that is indirect) not to over-step the limits of the original means, if latter means is not affected by the former. Hence the direct experience of the Self, being in no way affected by the knowledge of distinction, is revealed. Even the logical analysis of the Self as distinct cannot clash with *adhyāsa*, for such analysis being indirect cannot

⁷³ *akāśasya vyatireke'pi hrasvāderavyatirekādadhyāsaḥ iti vodayati—*

dispel direct *adhyāsa*. *Adhyāsa* as a positive fact has to be recognized in the Self, but it is not in any way in conflict with the knowledge of distinction, for it is the creation of the enigmatic *avidyā*⁷⁴; it is only in conflict with the real Knowledge of the Self that shines forth in its own light as one, undivided,—and that Knowledge can put a stop to all cognitions of duality and plurality created on the unitary Self⁷⁵. Thus Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda, following Padmapāda, refute clearly the view of the *gauṇavādin*, and show that without the assumption of *adhyāsa* upon the Self, there can be no consistent explanation of Pure Self, which is not only known as distinct but whose real Knowledge is in the inevitable conflict with distinction (of the empirical processes). This is the fundamental issue in the Advaitist conception which shows that such distinction in no way affects Pure Self, which shines forth in its own light, although he accepts the super-imposed *nanvanubhava* iti. *anyataravyatireke dvayorekatvād bhedasyetaretaravyatirekaḥ siddhyatityāha—tanneti*. (Vivaraṇa, P. 280).

*yuktiḥkojñānenākārasya hrasvād vyāvṛttyabhyupagame adhyāsānubhava iti kathamuktam? na ca—akārād hrasvasya vyāvṛttipratityabhāvād adhyāsānubhava ityapi śaṅkyaṃ. akārasya hrasvād vyāvṛttipratitisambhavād—ityatrāha—akārasyeti. * * * * * prthaktrasya bhedavyavahāra-kāraṇatvādekatra prthaktvajñāne anyatrāpi tajjñānaṃ syāt—(Tattvadiṇa, P. 280).*

⁷⁴ *indrajālamevaitat—avidyākṛtatvāt—(Pañcapādikā, P. 280).*

⁷⁵ *tathāhi—ahampratyayaśya svaṣayapratīṣṭhitasyaiva satataśchakapratīṣṭhitapratibandhakṛdānādyavidyākṛtaṃ dehādipratīṣṭhitatvamapi dṛṣṭam; ato dehādīvaṣayatrāvirodhi svaṣayapratīṣṭhatvamahampratyayaśya, ato yuktyā viṣayavivecane'pi svaṣayopadarśanena tatpratīṣṭhatvamātraṃ kṛtaṃ, nādhikamādarśitam. svaṣayapratīṣṭhatvaṇca dehādīvaḥsamamābhīmānena na virudhyata ityuktam—(Pañcapādikā, P. 281).*

nanu—pūramātmaviṣayo'pi yuktiḥkojñānasannidhānāt vyatiriktaviṣayo'hampratyayaḥ iti—netyāha ato yuktyā viṣayavivecane'piti. nahi—pratyakṣajñānāntarasannidhānāt-jñānaṃ—svaṣayādadhikaviṣayaṃ bhavatiti bhāvah—(Vivaraṇa, P. 281).

bhedabodhād adhyāśasya nirvṛttatvāt kathamadhyāsatvaṃ tato gauṇatvamiti? dvitīyakalpaṃ pratyāha—kiñceti? tathāhitasya ego'rthah—ahampratyayaśya dehādipratīṣṭhatvamapi dṛṣṭamiti sambandhaḥ. tarhi deha eva ātmā syāditi, tatrāha—svaṣayeti. vyatiriktātmapratīṣṭhasyetyarthaḥ. tarhyudbhayaṃ syāditi tatrāha tadakeṭi. apīśabdo'vadhāraṇārtho dṛṣṭapadenānuṣajjate. dehādipratīṣṭhatve hetumāha—anāditī. ahampratyayamātrasyādhyāśavirodhitve'pi saḥakāryānuvirodhād virodhiteti śaṅkate nanu pūrvamiti, saḥakārisannidhāvapi 'aham manusaḥ' nātirekārādhityaṃ, ityāha—netyāheti—(Tattvadiṇa, P. 281).

knowledge of distinction of the empirical processes which are revealed by it as such. The *gaṇavādin* fails to take note of this fundamental fact and just tries to establish that the Self which is affected by the knowledge of distinction of the mind-body complexes makes those sub-ordinated to it, but in that case the knowledge of the Self will ever continue with the sub-ordinated mind-body complexes, even though their distinction is known; for such distinction is *indirectly* known on logical analysis to exist in the Self which is not freed from such knowledge that only makes the distinct complexes as sub-ordinated to it. This position has been clearly brought out by Padmapāda, and following him by Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda⁷⁶.

Prakāśātmayati further shows that even the knowledge of distinction as is sought to be established even by the Advaitist, does not conflict with the direct knowledge of non-distinction (in *adhyāsa*); for, he says that even this direct knowledge of non-distinction which is created falsely by *avidyā* may be established as false by the logical (*vyuktisāhita*) proofs of inference and testimony of the *śrutis*. Thus the direct perception of *adhyāsa* in which there is a false non-distinction of the Self with the mind-body complexes is very well negated by the logical analysis of the real nature of it which brooks of nothing outside of it from which it is to be *abhinna* (non-distinct). The knowledge of distinction in itself is illusory in the Pure Self and hence it is not logical to show that the non-distinction (*aikya*) of it with those complexes which are the creation of *avidyā*, though directly perceived, is false, illusory; the knowledge of the Pure Self is the only real Knowledge. Thus Prakāśātmayati shows that distinction, in the Advaitist position, can be accepted only *tentatively*, for ultimately that knowledge of distinction, which is accepted by the *gaṇavādins* and hence in their opinion is in conflict with the *aikya* of the Self with the distinct empirical processes which are therefore sub-ordinate to it (with a real existence of their own), is not accepted by the Advaitist; for he shows that the real unity of the Self has nothing to do

⁷⁶ *tena na kadācidapi 'manuṣya' ham'iti pratyayo gaṇah—(Pañcapādikā, P. 282).*

with the knowledge of distinction which persists so long as there is *adhyāsa*; in *adhyāsa* there is only the logical necessity of distinction which makes the distinct unite *falsely*, but in the ultimate knowledge of unity, such knowledge of distinction is also shown to be false. This is the real Advaitist position of the knowledge of distinction as existent (only as a logical necessity in *adhyāsa*) and it is tacitly hinted at by Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati.

From this analysis Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati try to show that in Pure Self there is the possibility of *adhyāsa* which is the creation of false *avidyā*, the veil of the real unity of all existence that the Pure Self in its self-luminous character is; otherwise there would be no possibility of any *adhyāsa* upon such a Self for the reason that distinctions of the empirical processes would be absent ultimately in it which shines forth in its self-luminous character without any part being unrevealed. But *avidyā* makes it possible that it has non-revelation (though false) in its pure light, and hence distinct empirical processes are falsely super-imposed on it, though, actually speaking, to admit any distinct process outside it is to go against the reality of the Self as the negation of all distinctions. It follows, therefore, that Pure Self may thus become the substratum of *adhyāsa* as the necessary corollary of the existence of *avidyā*, the *creatrice* of all distinctions. Thus *adhyāsa* of the empirical existence does not go against the definition of it by Bhāṣyakara Śaṅkarācārya: *paratra parāvabhāsaḥ*; for here the Pure Self becomes the substratum (*paratra*) of *adhyāsa* of empirical existence (*parāvabhāsaḥ*).⁷⁷ Prakāśātmayati shows that the three-fold factor necessary for *adhyāsa*, viz., the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*), defective auxiliary condition (*doṣa*) and the persistence of such an auxiliary condition (*saṁskāra*), are all present in this *adhyāsa* upon Self: for, it has been established that Self becomes under the influence of *avidyā* the substratum, *avidyā* is the *karaṇadoṣa* (the defective auxiliary

⁷⁷ *Brahmātmaikatvāpyāpi tatsvarūpaśyānavabhāsanam pūrvakālakotīra-
hītaprakāśādechādātmanonmīttam īrutitadarthāpattisamarpitam, tannimit-
tāhaṅkāśādhyāsaśca sambhāvayate—(Pañcapādikā, Pp. 282-283).*

*svayamprakāśatvepyavidyayā gṛhyamāṇāviśeṣatvād ātmano'dhiṣṭhāna-
yogyatvakathanena 'paratra parāvabhāsaḥ' iti lakṣaṇānmo darśitah—
(Vivaraṇa, P. 282).*

condition) and the persistence (*saṃskāra*) of it is also evident from its eternality (*anāditvāt*). Thus Prakāśātmayati tries to establish that in Pure Self there are all the possibilities of *adhyāsa* of the empirical existence and hence it does not go against the definition enunciated by Śaṅkara. Padmapāda also brings out these possibilities being present in such *adhyāsa*, for he shows that Pure Self is the substratum (*atsvarūpasyānavabhāsanam*), that there is the defect of *avidyā* (*prakāśacchāditamonimittam*) and that there is the eternal persistence of it whence it also follows that *adhyāsa* is with regard to the previously cognised object (*pūrvadṛṣṭa*) that resembles a memory-image (*smṛti-rūpa*)⁷⁸. This previous cognition (*pūrvadṛṣṭatva*), however, indicates the projective potency (*vikṣepaśakti*) present in *avidyā* which not only eternally veils Self, but eternally projects objects (which are therefore pre-cognised) upon it. Prakāśātmayati following Padmapāda also shows that in such *adhyāsa* there is the possibility of a unitary knowledge of the super-imposed and the substratum, although the substratum (Self) is strictly speaking not an object like the substratum of ordinary illusions, as the rope (in the illusion of snake on it). It is quite possible to make it a substratum on the ground that something is possible to be super-imposed on it, and hence such knowledge of the substratum (Self) is possible and possible as born (*janya*) and not eternal or *nitya* due to its *adhyāsa* with the empirical processes. Thus though Pure Self is eternally known, it becomes the substratum of *adhyāsa* as the substratum of a knowledge born out of its false associations with such processes. Hence it is quite possible to admit *adhyāsa* on it following the definition laid down by Śaṅkara⁷⁹.

Still the question remains as to the psychological possibility of the Pure Self being the substratum of *adhyāsa*, for it is seen that the substratum and the super-imposed (in *adhyāsa*) are the objects of the same process of knowledge (as 'this is silver') where the same means of perception play their rôle. But in the case of the Pure Self it is quite outside the ken of

⁷⁸ *anāditvāt pūrvadṛṣṭatvaṃ smṛtirūpatvaṃ*—(*Pañcapādikā*, P. 283).

⁷⁹ *viśiṣṭaviśayoparaktākāreṇa janyate*—(*Viraraja*, P. 263).

Ātmano'viśayatve'pi āropyasphuraṇād anyajñānābhāravadaadhiṣṭhānatvam—(*Tattvadīpana*, P. 283).

any means of perception and hence the difficulty arises as to its possibility of being the substratum. This question is elaborately discussed by Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati who establish that Pure Self *can be* the substratum of illusion. Their arguments centre round the nature of the Pure Self in illusion and stop at the point of establishing its possibility of being an object of the means of perception and hence a substratum. The objectors to the Advaitist definition of *adhyāsa* point out that the Pure Self being always a non-object (*aviśaya*) of any means of knowledge cannot, logically and psychologically, be the substratum of illusion. The Buddhist *viññāna* or the Vedantic *suṣupti* is not, as the Vedantist may reply with equal force, substratum of illusion, though there is no objectivity of knowledge in either; for the opponents will argue that both *viññāna* and *suṣupti* can be the substrate of illusions—in the former case like illusion of the objective world and in the latter case like the illusory potency (*adhyāsa-saṁskāra*) of the cosmic world though there is no *karman* at that time and hence no particularised illusion, because in these states the superimposed and the states are revealed in the same process of knowledge. Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Taittvadīpana* brings out this fact clearly and thus suggests that in Advaita Vedānta there is no finality of the stage of *suṣupti* due to its absence of *harmans* (*karmatvābhāva*) as being regarded the groundless stage of all illusions, for although it is admitted by this system that this stage is *akin* to the realization of the Pure Self as bereft of all modifications, yet it has the potency of *avidyā* hidden in it and hence can be the object of the same process of knowledge with the *avidyā-saṁskāra*; thus it is clear that even the Pure Self as present in the *suṣupti*-stage is not completely outside any process of knowledge as being purely unmodified by other objects but is quite possible to be the object (*viśaya*) of knowledge in the same process with the *avidyā-saṁskāra*. Similar is also the case of the Buddhist *viññāna* which is not outside the process of any knowledge as the ground (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of illusion but can be the object (*viśaya*) of the same kind of knowledge with the external impositions like momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*).⁸⁰

⁸⁰ *aviśaye'pi saṁvedane kṣaṇikatvādvyūropo dṛṣṭa ityūśaṅkya dṛṣṭānto*—

The difficulties of the Advaitist still remain to be answered, for the opponents argue that the Pure Self cannot be both the *viśayin* (the Self as such) and the *viśaya* (the external illusory impositions). It goes against the fundamental grammatical conception to assert an object as both the subject (*viśayin*-Self) and the object (*viśaya*=not-Self). To answer this charge, Prakāśātmayati ably replies from the Advaitist point of view to show that Pure Self as such being not the ground of the impositions of the *viśayas* is made to be reflected (*pralībimbīla*) on the transparent *antaḥkaraṇa* by the force of *avidyā*, and hence becomes the ground of the illusory super-impositions of the qualities adhering to it as the object of the knowledge of *aham* (*ahampratyaya*—knowledge of 'I'); thus Pure Self is not to be taken as splitting up its own intrinsic partless (*niraṁśa*) nature for the purpose of the knowledge of the superimposed *viśayas*, but is the reflected object on the *antaḥkaraṇa* with which it gets contact for the purpose of its being known as the ground of all illusions. Hence the *antaḥkaraṇa*, the translucent substance, makes it possible for the Pure Self to be really known as the ground of the impositions of the *viśayas* and hence is the real initiator of the whole process of illusions; otherwise, if the Pure Self were not even reflected on it, no process of illusion on the Pure Self would have ever been possible. This self-identification with the *antaḥkaraṇa*,—the mirror of reflection, so to say, of the Pure Self,—is the real basis, background and businessman of all kinds of illusions upon the Pure Self. Prakāśātmayati analyses the nature of *adhyāsa* on Pure Self which by its reflection on the *antaḥkaraṇa* appears in a two-fold character which is the essential requisite of impositions; for, it is seen that the knowledge of both the superimposed and the substratum is revealed in an act of super-imposition. In the case of the imposition of the external objects and their qualities on the Self (that is reflected on *antaḥkaraṇa*), there is this two-fold revelation, for, as Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati clearly bring out, in

*saṃpratīpanna itī codayati—nahīti. * * * * ** *ekāntenāciśayo neti
radatā suṣuptiryaṛttimātramātmano'bhyupagatam. tatra karmatvābhāve
kathamadhiṣṭhānatvam ityāśaukya āha tatreti. adhiṣṭhānāropyayoreka-
buddhisphuraṇe sati karmatrābhārāparādhenādhyāsabhāvānupalabdheḥ
karmatramaprayojakamityarthaḥ—(Tattvadīpana, Pp. 292-301).*

this act of super-imposition, the Self gets identified, so to say, with the *antaḥkaraṇa* that reflects its consciousness and hence appears as both the Self and the *antaḥkaraṇa*, which, like a ball of iron being designated as burning (when the quality of burning really adheres to fire which rests on the red-hot iron-ball) makes it possible for the Self to partake of its character. Thus the Pure Self as the ground of *adhyāsa* does not conflict with partaking of the qualities of the *antaḥkaraṇa* which in its turn reflects its consciousness and makes possible for itself to make the Self appear in its two-fold character. The Self thus becomes the ground of *adhyāsa* which is only the imposition on itself of the *antaḥkaraṇa* and its qualities whence it follows that it (the Self) should appear as the real Witness of the changing states of the *antaḥkaraṇa* and also as the *antaḥkaraṇa* qualified by those qualities. In this process of imposition which is initiated by the *antaḥkaraṇa*, Pure Self being reflected on the *antaḥkaraṇa* appears as both the detached Witness and the attached Ego. This is the true interpretation of the nature of *adhyāsa* on Pure Self, as amply borne out by Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati. Unless this fact of the primary indispensability of the *antaḥkaraṇa* as the initiator of all the paraphernalia of *adhyāsa* on the Self is recognised, Self as Pure Self becomes eternally detached and never comes within the orbit of *adhyāsa*. Henceforth follows an unending process of *adhyāsa* like that of the body (*śarīrādhyāsa*), the senses (*indriyādhyāsa*) and the like. In the *adhyāsa* of the body-processes on the Self, we have a deep-strung imposition resting on the *antaḥkaraṇa* on which the Self is reflected and on the *indriyas* through which the impositions of the organs are first made for making the body-processes really known as superimposed on the Self. Prakāśātmayati further shows that even the *antaḥkaraṇa* may be the conscious seat of *adhyāsa* by the reflection of the Self upon it, and hence the Ego-consciousness (*ahaṁkāra*), though belonging to the category of the not-Self (*idam*), is said to be the seat of the conscious states in *adhyāsa*. The red-hot iron-ball becomes the seat of the quality of fire (i.e., burning), but fire has this quality independently of the iron-ball; the iron-ball only partakes of the quality of fire, though it has not that quality by itself. But the Conscious Self is always

reflected on the *antahkaraṇa* for Ego-consciousness (*ahaṁkāra*) and wherever any imposition on the Self takes place, the Ego-consciousness becomes the primary means for that; thus the Ego-consciousness becomes the seat of all conscious states in *adhyāsa* and does not appear as mixed with the quality of the not-Self (*idam*) but rather as the conscious basis of all *adhyāsa*.⁸¹

⁸¹ *ayo dahatīti dagdhītvacīṣṭasyāgnerayasasca dvairūpyāvabhāśavad*
—‘*ahamupalabhe*’ *ityupalabdhytvacīṣṭātmano’ntahkaraṇasya cāstyeva*
dvairūpyācabhāśaḥ, asādhāraṇa-kriyoparaktamātmādidravyameva castra-
natracīṣṭamarabhāśata iti bhāvaḥ. duḥkhi-premaśpadarūpeṇa pariṇāmi-
tadāgamāpāyadruṣṭrūpeṇāhaṁkārarūpāyādīśranusyūtacaitanyarūpeṇa, ahamiti
ca vyāvṛttirūpeṇa ca, sarvalokasākṣikaṁ dvairūpyamityāha—sarvaloka-
*sākṣika iti. * * * * ** *ayo dahatītyādārayaḥ-piṇḍādīvat akartṛtvepi*
darśanakriyāśrayakoṭinikṣiptatayā’haṁkārasyācabhāśaḥ sambhvatīti pūrva-
rādinam siddhānti codayati—kathamiti, ayaḥpiṇḍaryatirekeṇa bahnerdahana-
kriyāśrayatṛavadahaṁkāravatirekeṇātmani jīvanakriyādarśanāt ahamā evāt-
matramityuttareṇa granthena pratipādayati—(Vivaraṇa, Pp. 302-303).

CHAPTER—VI.

AN EXAMINATION INTO THE NATURE OF THE SELF—ITS OWN STATUS *VIS-A-VIS* THE OBJECT & CONSCIOUSNESS : AN ADVAITIST INQUIRY INTO DIFFERENT THEORIES.

Prakāśātmayati then takes up the pen to refute with all force the opposite viewpoints on the Self (*Ātman*). In doing so, he closely follows his predecessor, Padmāda, and brings out the full logical development of these views culminating in the Advaitist position. He shows the Sāṅkhya viewpoint which *infers* the Self as existing as an entity because it is reflected on the *antaḥkaraṇa* that is unconscious. This inference is based on the universal concomitance of the reflected and the substratum of reflection. The Sāṅkhya-view about reflection of the Self is that it is reflected through the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* on the *antaḥkaraṇa* and is, therefore, known to exist as the reflected entity. But, according to the Sāṅkhya-view, the Self which is pure consciousness is reflected on the *buddhi* or intellect, the first unconscious product of *Prakṛti*. Prakāśātmayati's analysis of the Sāṅkhya-inference, therefore, seems to suffer from a technical defect. The reflection of the Self on the unconscious *buddhi* which according to the Sāṅkhya-theory seems to be responsible for the sensing of the object is acted upon by the *manas* or the mind which makes the knowledge which is indeterminate a determinate one, and finally, the *ahaṅkāra* or the Ego (which is a *separate* principle in the Sāṅkhya-view being the second unconscious product of *Prakṛti*) makes that knowledge a thing inducing the Self to act differently as the *owner* of the knowledge-process. Thus the Sāṅkhya-epistemology gives us an analysis of knowledge where the *buddhi*, the first unconscious product, being a transparent entity reflects the consciousness that the Self is. Prakāśātmayati's presentation of the Sāṅkhya-inference is, therefore, a broad and somewhat loose one because of the fact that he speaks of the *antaḥkaraṇa* as the reflector of the light of the Self. In the Sāṅkhya-view, the *antaḥkaraṇa* is a generic term includ-

ing the three functional entities in the knowledge-situation, viz., the *buddhi* (intellect), the *manas* (mind-which again is a by-product of *ahaṅkāra*) and the *ahaṅkāra* (Ego). Thus while the generic entity, i.e., *antaḥkaraṇa*, is responsible for originating knowledge through various channels *Prakāśātmayati* takes it to prove, though loosely, that the Consciousness that is the nature of the Self according to the Sāṅkhya-view is reflected on this generic entity, though *buddhi*, one of the aspects of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, is the reflector of it. However, *Prakāśātmayati* seems to suggest the Advaitist view which accepts the *antaḥkaraṇa* as a specific term almost equivalent to the *manas* (mind) which reflects the light of the Self. Thus this analysis of *Prakāśātmayati* seems to suffer from the Advaitist predilection and is not antagonistic to the general Sāṅkhya epistemological standpoint which accepts a reflection of the Consciousness (nature of the Self) upon an unconscious entity.

The second target of criticism is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view which also infers that the Self is the seat of qualities (*guṇas*), such as, desire (*icchā*), hatred (*dveṣa*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), knowledge (*jñāna*) etc. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the Self (*Ātman*) is that it possesses some specific (*viśeṣa*) and apposite (*yogya*) qualities (*guṇas*) which inhere in it and in no other object (*dravya*). Thus they infer these qualities including *jñāna* (knowledge) on the Self which therefore is an object (*dravya*) having that specific quality *inhering* in it. *Prakāśātmayati*, therefore, gives us the syllogistic form of inference about the inherence of these qualities on the Self. He shows that these qualities like knowledge, desire etc., being specific qualities (*viśeṣaguṇas*) are known by single sense-organs (*ekendriyagrāhya*) but these being absent in the five *mahābhūtas* (gross physical elements) must inhere in one of the remaining four objects (*dravyas*) (the number of *dravyas*, according to them, is nine). But this inference will show that out of the remaining four objects, three—viz., *dik* (direction), *kāla* (time) and *manas* (mind) have no specific qualities for in them only generic qualities inhere. Hence he concludes that the ninth object, i.e., *Ātman* (Self) is the seat of these specific qualities like desire, knowledge etc. The example (*dṛṣṭānta*) given by *Prakāśātmayati* in establishing this inference is the case of smell (*gandha*) which being a specific quality of the element

of earth (*kṣiti*) is negatively shown to be excluded from the probans (*hetu*) of the inference (*sylogism*) where "not inhering in the remaining eight objects" is an aspect; thus *gandha* being a specific quality of *kṣiti* is not included in the probans-wing (it inhering in one object—i.e., *kṣiti*) and therefore cannot be included in the probandum-wing (it inhering in an object other than the *Ātman*). Thus this is a *vyatireki anumāna* as sought to be established by *Prakāśātmayati*⁸². Here the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) is a negative one owing to the absence of any other positive case of concomitance. But this example given by *Prakāśātmayati* should not be taken to refer only to *gandha*, but to other specific qualities like *rasa* (of water), *rūpa* (of light) etc., which inhere specifically in those elements, for he refers to four *bhūtas* or elements (*bhūtacatuṣṭaya*). This logical gap seems to be bridged over by *Akhaṇḍānanda* in his *Tattvadīpana* wherein the example is given as *gandhādi* (*yathā gandhādi—Tattvadīpana*, P. 304).

Prakāśātmayati's next analysis is with regard to the

⁸² It is interesting to read side by side *Prakāśātmayati*'s manner of analysing the logical syllogism to bring out the *Naiyāyika*-theory of the Self and *Citsukha*'s (along with that of his commentator, *Pratyagrūpa*). The latter's indebtedness to *Prakāśātmayati*'s way of analysing will be conspicuous.

Cf. *Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣikāśca—icchādayo guṇāḥ, pṛthivyādimahābhūta-dravyavyatirikṭasyaiva viśeṣaguṇāḥ teṣvadr̥ṣṭatve sati ekendriyagrāhyatayā viśeṣaguṇatvāt bhūtacatuṣṭaye adr̥ṣṭagandharat, dikkūlamanaśāṁ viśeṣaguṇahinatvāt pariśeṣādicchādiguṇavat dravyaṁ anyadevātmeti—anumimate* (*Vivaraṇa*, Pp. 303-304).

icchādinūmaṣṭadravyavyatirikṭadravyāśritatvaṁ Naiyāyikādayo'pi sādhaḥyeyuh—(Citsukha, P. 12).

*tathāhi—icchādayo guṇāḥ amityatve sati asmadādyacākṣuṣapratyakṣatvāt gandharadityādīnā guṇatve sthite, guṇatrāparajātimattayā niyataika-dravyavyavacchedakatayā viśeṣaguṇatve ca siddhe sati, icchādayaḥ kvacidāśritāḥ guṇatcādrūparaditi sāmānyato dṛṣṭānūmanānenānirdhārite kasmimīcidāśraye siddhe, na tāvat sparśavadviśeṣaguṇāḥ pratyakṣatve sati akāraṇaguṇapūrvakatvāt, pratyakṣatve sati ayāvaddravyabhāvitvād vā. nāpyākāśaviśeṣaguṇāḥ bāhyendriyapratyakṣatvāt, nāpi dikkāla-manasāṁ viśeṣaguṇatvādityādīnā'ṣṭadravyāśrayatvānvapattau siddhāyām—icchādayo'ṣṭadravyavyatirikṭadravyāśrayāḥ, teṣvanupapadyamāneṣu guṇatvāt, yannaivam tannaivam yathā gandhādi iti kevalavyatirekeṇaiva siddhiḥ—(Nayanaprasādīn—Pp. 12-13). [N.B. *Citsukhi* (*Tattvapradīpikā*) & *Nayanaprasādīn* published from Nirṇaya Sagar Press].*

Sautrāntika School of the Buddhists which tries to establish the inferability (*anumeyatva*) of the external objects. Prakāśātmayati following Padmapāda first gives us an idea of the opposite viewpoints which make either the Self or the external objects as being known to exist by some sort of an intellectual analysis. His method is to refute all such views to establish his own, i.e., Advaitist view, which is very significantly stressed by his predecessor, Padmapāda, in the cryptic sentence viz., *pramāṭṛ-prameya-pramīṭayastāvadaparokṣāḥ* — (*Pañcapādikā*, P. 304). This sentence is the fountain of all the refutations which Prakāśātmayati poses to perform, for all the opponents' viewpoints are based either on the inferability of one or the other of the three factors mentioned by Padmapāda (*pramāṭṛ*, *prameya* and *pramīṭi*). Thus Prakāśātmayati is perfectly within the limits of logic when he digresses from the opponents' viewpoints on the Self (as the Sāṅkhya and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika viewpoints) into the Buddhist view-points on the external objects. His business is to establish the Advaitist theory that in an act of knowledge the Self is the *direct* and *immediate sine qua non*, i.e., Consciousness, which, therefore, explains the *directness* of the means of knowledge (*pramīṭi*) but the external object is revealed *directly* as the object of Consciousness. Thus the Advaitist position of knowledge refers us to the directness of the ground of all knowledge, i.e., Consciousness, which being diversified into the *pramāṭṛ*, *prameya* and *pramīṭi* is *directly* known but by different kinds of directness. The subject, object and result of knowledge are all directly revealed for the fact that the ground-Consciousness being the ever-revealed Reality, its diversifications are all *directly revealed* without being dependent on any indirect method of knowing. This is the true significance of the Advaitist interpretation of the direct revelation of the *pramāṭṛ*, *prameya* and *pramīṭi* which is hinted at by Padmapāda. Without such direct and independent revelation of these three which are Consciousness circumscribed, the Advaitist cannot establish his position which recognises only the *directness* of Consciousness without any intervening method to establish that directness; the only conditions for such directness to be established are the different limitations of the ground-Consciousness which are known as the subject, object and result of knowledge, though

essentially directly revealed whenever the ground-Consciousness is in no way veiled by any ignorance. In the matter of the external object, it may be said that it is related to the subject as the object whenever the subject comes in contact with it through the mediator called the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Now this *antaḥkaraṇa* going through its *vyttis* makes the object revealed, and thus the former two (*antaḥkaraṇa* & *vytti*) being directly revealed by the ground-Consciousness, the latter becomes revealed by the light of that self-same Consciousness. In this context we quote below some significant lines from Dr. D. M. Datta's *The Six Ways of Knowing*: "Whatever be this theory of the Jīva or the individual Self, every Vedāntin holds that in all knowledge there is present the self-shining transcendent light of Consciousness which imparts to the object its character of immediacy. Consciousness in this aspect is called the *Sākṣi* or the witness. It is so called because it is conceived as the impartial spectator which takes no part in the ever-changing process of knowledge, but only lights it up or passively witnesses it. However individualized, finite, and determinate the self or consciousness may appear to be, it retains yet this aspect of transcendence. In consequence of this unanimous assertion of the existence of the witnessing light of consciousness, we also discover a common point of agreement among the different views as to the function of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, in perception. For the three different views referred to above, namely the theories of *abhedābhivyakti*, *ciduparāga* and *āvaraṇābhībhava*, are found when analysed to contain the common element that perception takes place only when the object is brought into connection with the self or the witnessing consciousness, either by the revelation of an identity between the two through a removal of the differentiating factors or by the tinging of the self with the form of the object, or by the removal of the veil of ignorance that hangs between the self and the object. The nature of the relation that is established between the witnessing consciousness or the self, as the passive observer (*sākṣi*), and the object perceived is admitted by all to be one of *adhyāsa*, i.e., erroneous identification of the one with the other."

However, *Prakāśātmayatī* has from this Advaitist standpoint brought out the status of the external object in its known state as revealed, and has given us a logical presentation of

the Buddhist theories of the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras. In doing so, he has tried to show that the two Buddhist Schools have, by very subtle reasoning, established that the external object is known to be present only indirectly in knowledge either as a purely inferred entity or as a purely subjective entity not in any way distinctly revealed. These Buddhist theories have tried to give an analysis of knowledge where external object is revealed not on its own account but on account of its indirect establishment as an inferable or subjective entity that is revealed as a contingent factor in knowledge. The Advaitist can accept such a view of the contingency of the object in knowledge for the fact that it is revealed when even the ground-Consciousness is brought in relation with it. Hence the object is revealed only through some mediation of the *antaḥkaraṇa* but not as an indirect contingent factor, because it is revealed unmistakably under the superintendence of the ground-Consciousness by its mediated relation with it; hence the Buddhist theories stand condemned before the court of the Advaita epistemology which is based on no ambiguous or half-hearted admission of the revelation of the object in its direct apprehension.

The Sautrāntika theory admits that the object is only an inferable entity and nothing else. The logic of the School springs from the admission that the object is only known by its reflection on the subjective consciousness (*samvedana*) on which it is imprinted, so to say, whence it follows that such a reflection (of the object) is due to some reflected entity which is the inferred object. The example of the reflection of the face on the mirror or of red tinge on the crystal-stone explains that the object is to be inferred from its existence (by reflection) on a substratum on which it ought not normally to be present. Thus the object becomes only a *secondary* entity in the sense that it is to be inferred, like the face, by its reflection on the subjective consciousness on which it ought not normally to appear. Thus the Sautrāntika lays stress on the object as it is *inferred* to be revealed in knowledge from its impress on the subjective consciousness which is purely the entity *per se* without any normal tinge of the object that is only accidentally revealed as an inferred existent after the flash of that consciousness. Thus the object according to the Sautrāntika turns out to be

always an inferred entity in the knowledge-process; there is no place for its *direct* apprehension in such a process. Prakāśātmayati criticises this view of the Sautrāntikas by showing that the inferred object to be apprehended in the inferential process in knowledge should at least be recognised as a *direct apprehension* without which no knowledge would be possible. The logic of the criticism lies in the fact that the object to be inferred by knowledge may have no independent *esse* but cannot on that account be said to be not directly apprehended; as a matter of fact, the directness of the apprehension of the object is too hard to deny when the object is the object of an immediate cognition which, on the admission of the Sautrāntika, is impressed with its tinge. Thus even though we know an object existing dependently on the reflected tinge it impresses upon the subjective consciousness (*ākārārpaka viṣaya*) on which normally no such tinge is present, yet when such an object be the object of my direct cognition, it must come directly without any further dependence on another reflected entity into my cognition; otherwise, the object not coming directly into my cognition for its necessity of dependence on a further reflected entity, the inferential proof to establish the inferable character of the object from its reflection will stand self-condemned. Hence Prakāśātmayati holds that the Sautrāntika should recognise that the object should be directly apprehended as the reflected entity (whose existence is, no doubt, established inferentially) in an act of direct cognition. This concession being made by the Sautrāntika will land him into the dilemma as to why the object is not directly revealed in cognition as perception without necessity of its inferability. Thus the Sautrāntika position comes to end in the recognition of the direct apprehension of the object even without any inferential process to establish its existence, thus leading to the threshold of the possibility of the revelation of the object directly in direct apprehension. The inferential proof to establish the existence of the object, if carried on to the extreme of further inferential justification for its knowing (as being dependent on a further reflected entity), will antagonise itself with the knowing of the object directly at any time. This point is brought out by Viṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāya in his

Rjuvivarāṇa in interpreting the criticism of the Sautrāntika theory by his predecessor, Prakāśātmayati²².

Prakāśātmayati refutes with equal zeal the Vijñānavādin's or Yogācāra's theory of external object which is regarded as the objective projection of the subjective consciousness (*vijñāna*) and is revealed not on its own merit but on the merit of the subjective consciousness with which its existence is identified. Thus the Yogācāra position does not recognise any objectivity in the knowledge-process but only the revelation of the subjective consciousness as the objective consciousness, though, in fact, *vijñāna* is the only Reality that is revealed in any knowledge-process. The Yogācāra theory, therefore, gives scanty or very askance look at the revelation of the external object which being projected out of the *ālayavijñāna* or subjective consciousness is only tinged with the objective hue (*pravṛttivijñāna*) and therefore is not in any way to be known directly except being revealed by virtue of its identity with consciousness. This extreme form of Idealism denying the *status quo* of the object in knowledge is seriously challenged by Prakāśātmayati. He shows that the external object is known directly as the object of knowledge and is therefore an object of direct revelation (*idaṃ paśyāmītyanubhavāt—Vivaraṇa*, P. 305). The Yogācāra contention that though the object is identical with consciousness (*vijñāna*), its externality (*bahiṣṭvam*) is distinctly perceived, and therefore in an act of error, the negating knowledge (*bādha-jñāna*) refers to only the negation of this externality that is presented outside and not of the internality of the object. This contention is severely criticised by Prakāśātmayati who shows that not only the externality is perceived as distinct from the

²² Sautrāntikusyāpi yadi viśayānumānajñāne śākṣādviśayā evārabhāseran, pratyakṣepyaavabhāsanāntām, kustatrāparādhaḥ ityanumānajñāne viśayasyaivārabhāsanād anekānto hetuḥ. na cēd anumānajñānēpi bimba-bhūtarīṣayārabhāsaḥ pratijñānārthasya bimbaapurassaratasyāpratibhāsanād anumānānudaya eva syāt. aparokṣaryavahārayogyavīṣayārabhāsariruddhaṃ cānumānamiti—(Viraraṇa, Pp. 304-305).

anumānānudaya ityanena sādhyapratītau palśadharma-trādapratīriti-tyuktaṃ. nanu—anumānajñāne bimba-bhūtarīṣayārabhāso'styeva, na cānāikāntikāṭā; tasyāpyanyāpekṣayāḥ pratibimbatrena bimbaapurassara-trāditīyāśaṅkyā dīṣṇāntaramāha—aparokṣaryavahāreti—(Rjuvivarāṇa, Pp. 304-305).

internal consciousness, but also the object itself which is sought to be established as identical with internal consciousness by the Yogācāra is perceived *distinctly as external* (*bahiṣṭhasyāpi rajatāderāparokṣyāt—Vivaraṇa, P. 305*). Even if the Yogācāra to save his solipsistic position regards the externality as identical with consciousness, then even that externality will have to be sacrificed in the situation of a negating knowledge where he regards this externality alone as being negated, for here the externality being internalised will remain un-negated like the internalised object. Hence the Yogācāra being impelled on the horns of the dilemma must needs recognise the direct apprehension of an external object as object of knowledge and never as the identically internalised entity with consciousness. Thus Prakāśātmayati concludes from the Advaitist point of view that the object is revealed as the adjunct (*upādhi* in knowledge) of an act of direct apprehension without any further mediate processes. Thus the object becomes directly revealed whenever its immediacy is unchallenged by any other thought-process. It is a necessary adjunct in direct revelation of knowledge and hence becomes an object of such direct revelation (*tasmādavavyavadhānena samvidupādhitā viśayasya—Vivaraṇa, P. 305*). Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvādīpana* says that the sense-organ like the eye being mediate in the direct apprehension of an object is not itself an object of direct apprehension; thus the mediate processes being not depended upon, the object is directly revealed. But even the Advaitist has recognised the modifications (*vr̥ttis*) of the *antaḥkaraṇa* in direct apprehension of an object which has to be brought into contact with the self-shining Witnessing-Consciousness and hence there is some recognition of the mediate process of the *vr̥tti*; how then to justify this position of Prakāśātmayati? Akhaṇḍānanda has tried to resolve the difficulty by saying that the consciousness of which the object is an adjunct in direct apprehension is necessarily channelled through the necessary modifications of the mind when it goes out through the senses to the object; thus the general Advaitist position being recognised, the mediacy in the direct apprehension of an object is *resolved* to this *necessary* and logical outlet of the Consciousness in which the object is directly revealed; otherwise in other cases of knowledge such as infer-

ence, the object becomes known through other mediate processes like *parāmarśa* or resemblance of the establishment of a *universal concomitance* (between the probans and the probandum) on the object to be inferred and hence is not directly apprehended⁸⁴.

Prakāśātmayati examines critically the views of the opponents—viz., the Naiyāyikas, Vārttikakāra, the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras—as to the nature of the Self and shows that in all these theories the Self becomes unexplained as the locus of knowledge which is sought to be established *ex hypothesi* in it. In all these theories the Self becomes the substratum of knowledge which somehow or other inheres in it by some extraneous processes and, therefore, adventitiously established on it; the Self is conscious not on its own merit but on the merit of the adventitious quality of consciousness adhering in it from without. If this hypothesis be accepted, then the Self as conceived by them to be a mere substratum of the quality of consciousness becomes known like any other object of which any knowledge accrues to it; or, in other words, the Self becomes somehow known by the knowledge-processes resting on it, and therefore not shining in its own light of Consciousness. The Advaitist position is clear in this respect for it establishes the Self not as a *knowable* entity but only as Consciousness as such. From this point of view, Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati have shown the masterly ways of criticism of the opposite Schools wherein the Self is explained by some sort of a connection established between it and consciousness. They show that such extraneous relation being sought to be established between them, the Self will either turn out to be unknown or rather cease to be the reality of direct apprehension. The Advaitist position is very clear-cut and logical in so far as he explains the Self as not different from Consciousness but Consciousness as such. This view of the Advaitist is hinted at by Padmapāda when he says that in a knowledge-situation every necessary and essential factor is directly revealed in so far as Consciousness is revealed in the most direct manner.

⁸⁴ *cakṣuṣotpannam cakṣuṣamityutpattirvaradhānena cakṣuṣo jñāna-
rīṣeṣaṇatvāt vyāpṭtirityarthaḥ. na cānumeyasyāpi saṁvīdriṣeṣaṇat-
venāparokṣyaprasaṅgaḥ; saṁvīchābdena indriyārthasaṁprayogajñānasya
virakṣitatvādityarthaḥ—(Tatradīpana, P. 305).*

Thus he has analysed that the object is directly revealed when it becomes the *object* of such direct revelation (*prameyam karmatvenāparokṣam*) for which a direct relation has to be established between the Witnessing-Consciousness and the object; and in that manner the *vṛttis* of the *antaḥkaraṇa* transformed into the form of the objects play the rôle of the mediator. Hence the object as a necessary factor in knowledge is held by the Advaitist to be directly revealed when the conditions for its direct revelation as an *object* are fulfilled; hence it is that the indirectly perceived object is not the object of direct revelation although there is a *vṛtti* connected with the *antaḥkaraṇa* and revealed by the Witnessing-Consciousness, for here the mediation of the *vṛtti* is only indirect in the sense that it only dispels the ignorance about the *existence* of the object (*asattāpādaka ajñāna*). Hence the object being known as merely existent is not known as the content of direct experience. Apart from the object, the resulting knowledge (*pramiti*) is also directly revealed in an act of cognition, as the Self being Consciousness *per se* is also directly revealed (*pramāṭṛ-pramitiḥ punara-parokṣe eva kevalam na karmatayā*). Thus Knowledge and Self being independent of any other mediating entity, unlike the object, are both revealed as they are, or in other words, directly apprehended as such. There are no solicitations on the part of these entities (which are essentially one in the Advaita theory) for any other mediating cognitional function to be directly revealed. Hence the Self stands in no need of self-vindication, but is eternally vindicated in its direct revelation; for consciousness is the very identical nature of the Self. Consciousness too is direct and immediate *as consciousness* even though there are objective obstructions on the way of its directness, for in indirect cognitions the object being indirectly revealed makes the conscious content of knowledge an indirect presentation. Here consciousness being revealed on its own merits only has an objective reference in indirectness which therefore is a necessary appendage to itself. But in directly revealed objects, consciousness is never called into question on the ground of its directness, for such a question becomes an anachronistic one in trying to prove indirectness by an after-process which has no existence when the consciousness is directly revealed with the object; consciousness here is direct

and immediate as it is free from any objective impediment by way of an indirectly revealed object due to the indirect *virtti* of the mere disappearance of the ignorance about its existence without any reference to the disappearance of the ignorance about its revelation (*abhānāpādaka ajñāna*). Above all, the Self is revealed directly in an act of cognition. Herein the Advaitist position is logically far more consistent than in other systems which advocate its *knowability*, some way or the other; for the Advaitist holds that the Self being in itself Consciousness is directly revealed whenever direct knowledge appears on the scene. The Self is the key-note of all our experiences and hence it is never to be made an objective content in knowledge. It is always the pure subject which is consciousness *per se* and hence does not for a moment solicit the direct revelation of itself to be established by knowledge. Its directness is self-established like consciousness and hence is always the pure subject *as consciousness* and never the subject *by consciousness*. Thus it is that the opponents' viewpoints are miserably wanting in the fundamentals of experience,—the viewpoints which try to prove that the Self is anything but Consciousness and is not directly revealed in a direct apprehension. To admit that position is to deny the Self either by committing it to the category of a further knowable substance or by making it never to be revealed in direct apprehension. Herein therefore the cryptic remark of Padmapāda has the most stupendous significance in Advaita epistemology as well as metaphysics, and Prakāśātmayati tightens up his belts to vindicate this position against all swords.

Prakāśātmayati shows that according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas following the Vārttikakāra, viz., Udyotakara, the Self is directly revealed only by an extraneous relation (*saṁyoga*) with the mind; that is to say, when in an act of cognition the Self has a relation established extraneously with the mind which is related with the objects through the sense-organs (cf. *indriyārthasannikarṣajanyaṁ jñānaṁ pratyakṣam*), then the Self becomes an object of direct apprehension as the most fundamentally related principle with the mind⁸⁵. The

⁸⁵ "Ātmā ātmanāḥsaṁyogajanyapratyakṣeṇāparokṣaḥ" iti Vārttikakāra-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikānusāriṇaḥ kalpayanti—(Vivaraṇa, P. 305).

resultant knowledge (*pramiti*), according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, is directly revealed only as being inherently related (*samaveśa*) with the Self through its relation with mind; here, therefore, the resultant knowledge which is directly revealed as the Self vouchsafes for its directness as being inane present (*samaveśa*) in itself. And this Self being directly revealed through some other relation (*ātmananāḥsaṃyogaḥ*) the resultant knowledge lying in it is also directly revealed, but only through an inane relation with it. But Udyotakara and his followers hold that this resultant knowledge of the object (*prameyagatā pramiti*) is due to an identical relation (*tādātmyasambandhāt*) established with another cognition which ultimately vouchsafes for the directness of the knowledge of the object⁸⁶. This view of the followers of Udyotakara lays stress upon the fact that in an act of cognition, not only is the resultant knowledge as being inherently present in the Self cognised, but also the knowledge of the object as being identically related with another cognition that is born of the contact between the sense-organ and the object is directly revealed. Hence in this view there is the direct revelation of the knowledge of the object (*prameyagatā pramiti*) only when an identical knowledge is born through the contact of the sense-organ with the object due to a relation of identity (*tādātmyasambandha*) between the cognition 'A' and the cognition 'B' (cf. the passage of *Tattvadīpana*, f.n. 86). Thus the resultant knowledge to be directly revealed should not only be known to inhere in the Self but also to be directly cognised through an identical relation between it and a second cognition. This is in keeping with the general position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas who admit an *anuvyavasāya* in every act of primary cognition (*vyavasāya*) which depends for its revelation upon the former. Hence Udyotakara's analysis of the direct revelation of the resultant knowledge (*pramiti*) recognises the general Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika standpoint according to which knowledge is no doubt inherent in the Self and hence known to exist in it in an inane relation, but, moreover, has to admit another tertiary cognition related with it in an identical relation (*tādātmya*)

⁸⁶ cakṣuṣā saṃyuktārthena tādātmyasambandhāt pramitirīṣayāṃ jñānāntaramupajāyate, tenāparokṣyam pramiterityarthaḥ—(*Tattvadīpana*, P. 305).

for its ultimate direct revelation. These Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories have been tersely criticised by Padmapāda when he says *pramāṇi-pramīti punarāparokṣe eva kevalam (Pañcapādikā)*. Prakāśātmayati says that Padmapāda's reply is against these Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories from the viewpoint of the Advaita Vedantist. He says that the Self is never the object of any mental cognition, for it is self-revealed without depending on any mental act simultaneously with the revelation of the object. The mental act has its justification elsewhere than in the revelation of the Self; for by it the mind only knows the object and the act becomes an auxiliary to the knowing of the object; hence it has nothing to do with the revelation of the Self that is itself revealed. Here is the keynote to the Advaitist theory of the Self that establishes it as a pure subject and never as the object of any other auxiliary process. The Self being self-revealed, the object is revealed by the mental act, if the mind has at all any status and function, but the revelation of the object is in no wise responsible for the revelation of the pure subject of cognition, for it is independent of any function and process necessary for knowing of the object. The object is revealed directly by the consciousness of the Self (*pramāṇīcaitanya*) no doubt; but it depends for its revelation on some extra-solipsistic entity and its process, viz., the mind or the *antaḥkaraṇa* (according to the Advaitist) and its function or *vṛtti*. The Self, however, does not so depend on any other extraneous entity which attempts to reveal it by consciousness limited, as in the case of the external objects. Thus the Advaitist position comes to this that the Self is no doubt revealed by a *vṛtti*, but does not on that account become other-revealed; for revelation by an other implies another limited consciousness that is in essence revelation *per se*, and the Self is revelation *per se*. Thus the Advaitist position is as clear as day-light that no amount of *vṛtti* or function pertaining to an extra-solipsistic entity is at all responsible for the revelation of the Self that is self-revealed by being in essence one with consciousness. The Self, therefore, being independent of any other process or principle extraneous to it is nonetheless amenable to the empiric mode of directness as when we say "my self", "thy self" etc., as particular conscious centres involv-

ing the knowledge of the external objects. This particular phenomenon in Advaita Vedānta is known as *aparokṣavyavahārayogyatva* or the capability of direct empiric denotation. Hence basing his arguments on the Advaitist standpoint, Prakāśātmayati says that the Self is not separately revealed by another process of cognition involving dependence on extraneous entities for being revealed through consciousness, as the external objects which so depend for being revealed by consciousness. Hence he concludes that the revelation of the Self being self-established, there is only an empiric necessity for it to be denoted as such when the knowledge of a particular object, so to say, is presented to it; in fact, the object is revealed in the light of the consciousness of the Self, but is nonetheless *known* by the Self, which under such empiric necessity, becomes particularised as being directly denoted (*aparokṣavyavahārayogya*). Hence there is only an empiric denotation of the Self under particular knowledge-situations, but it is on that account never revealed by any other extraneous cognitive process⁸⁷.

It will not be improper and out of place to quote a French scholar in Vedānta, Dr. Olivier Lacombe, who in his wonderful thesis *L'Absolu Selon le Vedānta* ("The Absolute according to the Vedānta") has made, in a very remarkable manner, the following observations. We quote these in original to which an English translation will be added :

"La connaissance est transparence à soi-même, conscience indépendamment de toute référence à un objet ou à un sujet et donc sans repli ni dualité internes (*loc. cit.* P. 118).

"La conscience est donc aussi pleine que l'être est plein, et l'être est la plénitude même; la plénitude infinie. Mais l'être, nous le savons, se détend et s'apaise dans la pure indetermination. La connaissance de l'être aussi bien que la connaissance, en tant qu'être doit suivre la même loi, pratiquer la même vertu, quasimorale de détachement dans la richesse" (*loc. cit.* P. 119).

"Knowledge is transparence to itself (i.e., self-revelation); it is Consciousness independent of all reference to an object

⁸⁷ *viśayānubhavasambandhādeva viśayavadātmasiddhārtmani jñānāntaram parikalpya manaso'nvayavyatirekakalpanā'yogāt; tasmād viśayatva-mantarenātmaparokṣa eva—(Vivaraṇa, P. 306).*

or to a subject and hence without either any fold (i.e., stratum) or any duality of the internal" (P. 118).

"Consciousness is therefore as full (*pūrṇa*) as Existence, and Existence is the same Fullness of Infinity. But as we understand, Existence relaxes and appeases (calms) itself down in pure indetermination. Knowledge of Existence is as good as Knowledge in so far as Existence should follow the same law, practise the same virtue—quasi-moral in the richness (i.e., Fullness of Consciousness)." (P. 119).

Prakāśātmayati now leads a tirade against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the direct revelation of the resultant knowledge (*pramiti*), either as inanently perceived along with the Self or as being identically revealed along with another cognition that vouchsafes for the directness of the objective knowledge. He shows the graves dug by the protagonists of such theories and lays bare that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas can never logically establish the directness of knowledge. The inane relation of knowledge with the Self that is extraneously related to the mind (*saṁyuktasamavāyāt*) or the identical relation with another knowledge in the objective knowledge seems to establish that the directness of the cognition is due to an objective reference it has to some other cognitive process or function. But this being contrary to the psychological theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas cannot stand the scrutiny of logic. The cognition 'A' depending on the cognition 'B' for direct revelation must needs recognise different psychological apparatuses, i.e., different contacts with the mind (which through the sense-organs is related with the object). But this being once recognised, when the cognition 'B' arises the cognition 'A' having disappeared will never be directly revealed. Hence successive states of cognition cannot hope to reveal any previous moment in the chain; and the cognition 'A' being regarded as not present at the time of the cognition 'B' will antagonise itself with the fundamental principle of immediate knowledge, i.e., the presence of the object at the time of cognition. The simultaneous origination of the two pieces of cognition is also untenable on the own admission of the Naiyāyikas, for when one cognition arises, the Naiyāyikas hold, the psychological activity continues for some time involving particular modes of the sense-object-contact. Thus they

hold that in the first instance there is a primary activity in the mind (*ādaṁ manasi kriyā*) after which there is dissociation of the mind from the previous, cognised object (*kriyāto vibhāgaḥ*); when this dissociation of the mind takes place, the previous, cognised object along with its cognition is totally destroyed (*vibhāgāt pūrvasaṁyogavināśaḥ*) so that the mind becomes psychologically capable to receive the sensations of the succeeding object; at this stage the mind becomes associated with the succeeding object (*pūrvasaṁyogavināśāt uttarasaṁyogaḥ*) as a result of which it receives through the senses the sensations of the object of which knowledge arises in the Self (*uttarasaṁyogāt jñānajanīḥ*). This being the psychological standpoint of the Naiyāyikas who admit the origination of knowledge in the Self when the mind has passed through several modes effecting a contact between the senses and the object, it becomes illogical on the part of the Naiyāyikas to admit the simultaneous origination of the two pieces of knowledge, for the simple fact that the succeeding piece of knowledge which is regarded as the guarantor of the directness of the previous one cannot hope to have it simultaneously along with the origination of itself which being separated from the preceding one by several moments in point of origination will never vouchsafe for the directness of the former *simultaneously*. This logically irreconcilable position of the Naiyāyikas is brought out fully by Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadīpana*⁸⁸. The view of the Naiyāyikas that the *directness* of the knowledge of the object is due to an iden-

⁸⁸ *pañcājnānasamaye manasi kriyā tato vibhāgaḥ tataḥ pūrvasaṁyogavināśaḥ tataḥ uttarasaṁyogāt jñānajanirityanekakṣaṇavilambena utpadyamānājñānāntarasamasamayaṁāśūtaravināśinaḥ pūrvajñānasyaāvasthānāsamañjasam. nara vinasāyadavināśyatoḥ sahāvasthānamīṣyata iti śaṅkyaṁ pūrvottaravedanayor-nirarttyanivartakabhārena bhāṣya-bhāṣakatānupapattēḥ* —(loc. cit. P. 306). cf. also *Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukha, Pp. 16-17. *kiñca—yena manaḥsaṁyogena ghaṭānubhūtirjanitā tenaivānuryavasāyasyāpi janma uta saṁyogāntareṇa. nādyah—anuryavasāyaṁ prati karmakārakatayā janakasya vyavasāyasya tajjanyānuryavasāyasya ca yaugapadyāyogāt, karaṇasya pratyayaparyūye sāmurthyānāṅgikārācca. * * * * * na dvitīyaḥ ghaṭājñānodayasamaye manasi kriyā, tato vibhāgaḥ, tataḥ pūrvasaṁyogavināśaḥ, tato jñānāntaramityanekakṣaṇavilambenotpadyamānasya jñānasyaūparokṣatayā pūrvajñānagrāhakatvānupapattēḥ.*

tical relation established with another cognition (*samyukta-tādātmyasambandhāt*) cannot also be accepted for the simple fact that when such a position is accepted, the cognition being directly revealed as belonging to the Self, the qualities of the Self such as its magnitude (*parimāṇa*) which is *aṇu* or atomic according to the Naiyāyikas, as well as of the object, such as its taste, have to be revealed in that same act of direct cognition. To this the Naiyāyikas reply that those qualities being incapable (*ayogya*) of direct revelation by the posterior cognition will not be directly revealed for they are the objects of direct revelation by other cognitions save this saving cognition, but the Advaitists reply with equal force that the former cognition itself is incapable (*ayogya*) of direct revelation by any further cognition. Herein has been initiated the fundamental position of the Advaita theory about the status of knowledge in the matter of direct revelation of it (*aparokṣaīryavahārayogyatva*), that is to say, the approach through the idealistic interpretation towards the self-evident status of knowledge. Prakāśātmayatī has here uncovered without any ambiguity the idealistic standpoint of Advaita Vedānta towards the problem of knowledge. Knowledge, according to the standpoint, is self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*), that is to say, is directly revealed without being subject to any further cognitional function (*avedya*). This Advaitist theory is the basis of Advaitist idealism, for in it Knowledge and Reality are inseparable, and hence Knowledge being equated with Being is not dependent on any other means for being directly revealed. (cf. "La conscience de l'être aussi bien que la connaissance en tant qu'être doit suivre la même loi"—Dr. Lacombe, *loc. cit.*, quoted above). Knowledge is the highest principle in Advaita metaphysics and hence there is no necessity of any other instrumental principle for its being revealed; it is self-luminous on its own merit. The Naiyāyika position reduces knowledge to a resultant product of psychological modes in which there are found activities of diverse kinds and degrees such as those of the mind, the sense-object-contact and relation with the Self. Hence the Naiyāyika is bound to be dragged into the enigma that confronts him, viz., how knowledge is revealed. He, therefore, tries to solve the enigma by resolving knowledge into epistemological division of 'known' and 'know-

ing' whence the known-ness of knowledge becomes an unavoidable hypothesis. But when knowledge is equated with Reality that is known on its own merits without any further process or mode to reveal itself, it becomes directly revealed without being *known* that it is so; that is to say, knowledge becomes a self-luminous principle independent of any further necessity of knowability like the external object. Hence, in Advaita idealism, Knowledge which is denoted as *Cit* or *Caitanya* (Consciousness *par excellence*) has always a self-evident directness, as Being or Reality has it. Thus Prakāśātmayati expresses the Advaitist point of view in the most unambiguous way, when he says that Knowledge is invariably revealed as soon as it arises, and hence is not the object of further epistemological process. Knowledge or Consciousness is unknowable by any other entity and hence is self-luminous; the inert matter is not capable to reveal the living spirit of Consciousness and, moreover, no other intelligent process is required for its revelation. Hence it being eternally "free" is outside the orbit of revelation by 'other' and within the limits of revelation on its own merits. This aspect is the cardinal principle of Advaita metaphysics, for herein we find that Consciousness or Knowledge is equated with Being or Reality, and one of the indispensable aspects associated with it is clearly brought out. That aspect is the aspect of its unknowability (*avedyatva*) on which hinges the whole philosophy of self-luminosity (*svaprakāśatva*). In fact, self-luminosity pre-supposes as one of its indispensable factors the quality of *avedyatva*, and hence Prakāśātmayati's masterly presentation of this aspect touches the very core of this Advaita theory. As a matter of fact, he had initiated here the faithful presentation of the Advaita theory which in course of centuries passed through enormous dialectic details. The vigorous dialectical method employed by Citsukhācārya (date—Circa 12th—13th Cent. A.D.) in his *Tattvaprādīpikā* on the problem of self-luminosity of knowledge has taken this aspect of unknowability or *avedyatva* as the most indispensable factor; in fact, his analysis of *svaprakāśatva* as *avedyatve sati aparokṣavyavahārayogyatva* (though unknowable by any other epistemological process yet capable of empirical usage) is based on the fundamental theory of *avedyatva*. This characteristic of self-lumi-

nous knowledge has been expressed by Prakāśātmayati by the logical argument as follows : Consciousness or Knowledge, whenever it exists, is never the negative receptacle of revelation ; hence it is not known by any other knowledge⁸⁹. But Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvādīpana* clearly brings out the syllogistic form and shows that the inference drawn by his predecessor is not vitiated by any fallacy. Thus he shows that the inference put in the syllogistic form would stand as follows: Consciousness or Knowledge is not to be known by any other knowledge, for whenever it exists, it is never the negative receptacle of revelation; whatever is not *such*, e.g., absence of negative receptacle (i.e., whatever is the negative receptacle of revelation whenever there is existence) is not *such*, e.g., presence of not-known-ness (i.e., is not not-known by any other knowledge), as for example, the jar⁹⁰. Here Akhaṇḍānanda shows that the inference of his predecessor must be a purely negative one (*kevalavyatireki*), for here the only case of the concomitance of the probandum and the probans can be found in that of *anubhava* or Consciousness, and nowhere else ; thus there being no other positive case of concomitance, the only course left to validate the inference is to show that the negative example proves the negative of concomitance between the probandum and the probans, and thus to conclude that the concomitance between them is not fallacious. Still, the doubt may linger in the mind of the opponent as to the existence of any unreal element in the probans. Hence Akhaṇḍānanda says that this possible doubt can be expugned by showing that if in the probans there is no possibility of *asiddhi* or unreality, the probans will be perfect and hence there will be no bar to prove the presence of the probandum with which it has a concomitance. Thus the possible unreal element (*asiddhi*) in the probans is with regard to non-revelation even in the case of existence, thus rendering the probans a doubtful one. Such cases of an unreal probans is known as *svarūpāsiddha hetu* (or unreality as

⁸⁹ *anubhavasya ca svasattāyām prakāśavyatirekādurśanācca jñānāntarāgamyatāsiddhiḥ*—(*Vicaraṇa*, P. 306).

⁹⁰ *anubhavaḥ na jñānāntarāgamyaḥ svasattāyām prakāśavyatirekavi-dhūrātvaṭ, na yadevaṃ, na tadevaṃ, yathā ghaṭa ityarthah*—(*Tattvādīpana*, P. 306).

to the very nature of the probans being related with the minor or *pakṣa*); *svarūpāsiddha* or unreal in itself is that type of reason which does not exist in the subject and therefore cannot afford the basis for any reasoning, as in the proposition, 'the lake is a substance because it has smoke'. "Unreality attributed to the middle vitiates the whole system of inferential argument. It affects the subject, and the relation of the middle term to the subject and the relation of the middle and the major terms" (*Post-Saṅkara Dialectics* by Dr. A. Sastri, P. 68). But Akhaṇḍānanda shows that this apprehended unreality on the probans cannot stay, for if it be accepted as true, there will be doubts etc., even when one has the knowledge of an object; for his knowledge being unrevealed (possibly), he will not be able to confirm his actual cognition even when it is born. But that will be going against the most fundamental epistemological facts and hence the possible unreality in the probans cannot be accepted. Even then the difficulty remains as to the status of pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*) etc., which also are never non-revealed whenever they arise; thus they too will turn out to be of the same status as Consciousness or Knowledge which on the basis of this principle has been established as self-luminous. But pleasure, pain etc., being qualities of the inert *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind, according to the Advaitists, cannot be equated with knowledge in the domain of self-luminosity. This problem has been posed by Akhaṇḍānanda, but he seems to have by-passed it by throwing an apparent solution to it. He has shown that these qualities being of the nature of *anubhava* are included in it and hence there is no difficulty in reconciling that they are at piece with *anubhava*. What he seems to suggest is that pleasure, pain etc., are always known to exist and therefore never severable from knowledge; they are qualities of which knowledge arises whenever they arise. This is the peculiarity of these qualities which, though belonging to inert material world, are different from other objects, as such objects are not such as necessarily entailing knowledge of their existence. Still the answer of Akhaṇḍānanda is not the final say in the Advaitist conception of self-luminosity. Pleasure, pain etc., being always revealed whenever they exist are not revealed on their own merits but by a knowledge-process; hence *svasattāyām*.

prakāśavyatirekādarśanam, though apparently relevant in their case, is not finally so, for there is not only no absence of revelation but also no absence of revealed-ness (by knowledge); revelation (*prakāśah*) and revealedness (*prakāśyatvam*) are the distinguishing marks of self-luminous knowledge and other-luminous qualities like pleasure, pain etc. This is the true answer to the problem posed by Akhaṇḍānanda as regards pleasure, pain etc., from the Advaitist point of view⁹¹.

Prakāśātmayati next examines the Bhātṭa theory of self-luminosity which according to them resides in the known-ness (*jñātatā*) adhering to the object (*viṣayaniṣṭhā*) and not in knowledge which is only inferred (*anumeya*) from such a quality of the object. This Bhātṭa-theory tries to prove, as against the Prābhākara-view, that knowledge or Consciousness (*saṃvit*) is not self-luminous, but only a quality known as *jñātatā* residing in the object that in every piece of knowledge is self-luminous and from it the knowledge (*jñāna*) is inferred. This self-luminous quality makes knowledge (*jñāna*) to be inferred in the Self and therefore knowledge as a product adhering to the Self is sought to be established by the Bhātṭas by the inferential proof. Now Prakāśātmayati challenges this Bhātṭa-theory to show that knowledge as sought to be inferred by it from the quality of known-ness (*jñātatā*) is impossible to originate, for if known-ness is shown to be present in the object as is done by the Bhātṭas, it will never make any knowledge to be inferred in the Self. If any activity of the Self is regarded as making such knowledge (of the object) possible, then the reply from the Advaitist point of view is that this activity is either of the nature of a modulation (*parispanda*) or of the nature of a transformation (*pariṇāma*) both of which are untenable in the Self. The first alternative (modulation) is impossible, for the Self according to this School being all-pervasive, cannot have any modulation or vibration as in an external instrumental cause, such as the axe (which can be wielded to produce an effect). The second alternative (transformation) also is untenable, for to accept it is to contradict the Bhātṭa-

⁹¹ *ādyaena cakāreṇa hetvasiddhimudilharati. svasottāyām prakāśavyatirektatve jñātsāyām sandehādi syāditīyarthah. dvitīyena cakāreṇa sukhādigu sādhanāryārṇvttisāṅkām nirasyati. sukhādīnāmapi jñānatmakatvena pakṣāntarbhāvādityarthah*—(Tattvādīpana, Pp. 306-307).

position. If any transformation of the Self is held to be the knowledge of the object, then knowledge being a transformed effect must be co-extensive with its material cause, as the jar is co-extensive with clay. But to accept this is to make knowledge originate in the Self independent of any known-ness adhering to the object, as is supposed by the Bhāṭṭas. The Bhāṭṭas may try to defend their position by saying that although it is admitted that a transformation of the Self with regard to an objectless (*akarmapariṇāmaphala*) knowledge-situation may very well make the transformation (which is knowledge) co-extensive with the Self yet in the case of a definite objective (*sakarmaka-kriyā-phala*) knowledge, the transformation as the result of a definite mental action (*kriyā*) must generate some uniqueness (*atiśaya*) in the object and hence it must be admitted that the transformation (knowledge produced by a mental action) in respect of a definite object adheres to the definite object and not to the Self⁹². This modification of the Bhāṭṭas seems to suggest that in knowledge where there is a definite objective content, the mental act generating some kind of transformation of the Self makes the object the seat of that transformation, that is to say, a quality known as known-ness which adheres to the object is self-luminous and knowledge as involving a subject-object reference is deduced or inferred from it in the Self. Thus though the Self knows the object, it knows it through a transforming psychosis which being purely objective in content in so far as it concerns only the quality of known-ness adhering to the object and not to the knowledge *as such*, makes knowledge a deduced phenomenon. In every piece of objective reference Bhāṭṭas admit this self-luminosity of known-ness adhering to the object; but what they seem to mean by an "objectless knowledge-situation" (*akarmakapariṇāmaphala*) perhaps refers to the Self's innate cognitions that are born out of pure *saṁskāras*, such as a just-born baby's knowledge of tastes. Prakāśātmayati criticises this modified Bhāṭṭa-position when he points out that even if the Bhāṭṭas thus try to prove *jñātātā* (known-ness) in the object, they make either the object itself as conscious or the Self as

⁹² *akarmakapariṇāmaphalasya pariṇāmisamānādhikaraṇatve'pi sakarmakakriyāphalasya viśayaniṣṭhatvam kriyāyāḥ karmaṇyatīśayajananasvābhāvyaṭ—(Tattvadīpana, P. 307).*

not necessarily conscious. Now these two alternatives are fatal to the empirical universe of knowledge and hence the Bhāṭṭas cannot propound any of these. If it is held by the Bhāṭṭas that to be the seat of consciousness is to be conscious, then the object on their own showing being such will turn out to be a conscious entity. If the Bhāṭṭas to save themselves from this awkward hypothesis say that to be conscious is not merely to be the seat of consciousness, but to be the seat of the generation of consciousness, then sense-organs and the mind also will equally become conscious as the generator of consciousness; if, however, to make the Self *only* as *necessarily* conscious, it is held by the Bhāṭṭas that the known-ness adhering to the object makes the Self conscious as it *alone* is capable of generating the necessarily transforming action (*jñāna*) for the origin of consciousness (which capacity is excluded from the other unconscious instruments of knowledge, such as, the mind and the senses), matters do not improve; for in that case, there will be no adequate ground for a necessary relation between the subject and the object. The object is the object of an act adhering to the Self and if in a knowledge-situation, the object pre-supposes a known-ness adhering to it, it will not necessarily make the act of the Self which reveals the object a *sine qua non*; nor will there be any inference of knowledge possible in the Self, for the act of transformation and the object of transformation are co-extensive in this supposition. That is to say, the act of transformation which is responsible for knowledge or *anubhava* having its aim fulfilled in the object which is the seat of known-ness or *jñātātā* will never call in any separate knowledge as being present in the Self, which phenomenon is sought to be inferentially proved by the Bhāṭṭas. These logical and epistemological anomalies in the Bhāṭṭa School have been very cogently brought out by Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadīpana*.⁹³ Hence Prakāśātmayati concludes that in the Bhāṭṭa-theory there is no room left for the directness of either consciousness (*samvit*) or the Self (*Ātmā*)

⁹³ *kiṁ saṁvidāśrayatvaṁ cetanatvaprayojakam? uta tajjananavyāpāravatvam? ūcye viśayasyaiva cetanatotpattiritiyāha saṁvidāśrayatva iti. dvitīye'pi kiṁ saṁviṣṭjananavyāpāravatvamātraṁ vivakṣitam? uta saṁviṣṭjanakajñānavyāpāravatvam? iti vikalpyādyaṁ dūṣayati—na ceti. dvitīyam pratyāha-viśayeti. 'mayā gato grāmaḥ' ityatra svagatagamikriyā-*

by way of an objective content in knowledge: (*tasmād dvayorna karmatayā'parokṣatā—Vivaraṇa*, P. 307).

To this awkward conclusion into which the Bhāṭṭas are placed, it is very difficult logically for them to establish the directness of consciousness. Their epistemological position becomes inadequate to explain, as they themselves try to do, how the Self as well as Consciousness are directly revealed; for, directness, according to them, comes to these two only by an objective reference (*karmatayā*) in a knowledge-situation. When it is proved that this 'objective reference' makes it impossible to establish a direct relation between the Self (knower) and the knowledge, either by making the Self not necessarily conscious or by failing to effect any justifiable relation in it, except the self-established quality of consciousness adhering to the object, then either the Self is never directly revealed or the consciousness having its locus in it is never required to be directly revealed; now both these hypotheses will go against the common epistemological experiences, nay, will even make all knowledge a myth and a mirage. Can the Bhāṭṭas succumb to these devils?

Herein, therefore, Prābhākaras come forward with a word of explanation of the epistemological problems. The Prābhākaras try to establish that at least one of the factors in *direct revelation* is self-luminous. By relegating the Self to the category of the knowable, they show that consciousness as the ground in all such acts is independent of any objective reference, and is self-revealed. *Pramiti* or *anubhava*, as they call it, is the resultant consciousness which is always the background of direct revelation of the subject and the object. In an act of direct cognition, the subject object and cognition are revealed (*tripuṭīpratyakṣa* of the Prābhākaras), but consciousness (which they designate as *saṃvit*, more coherently speaking) is always self-illuminated; the subject is the *substratum* of knowledge and the object is the *field* of knowledge; knowledge itself

karmatvaṃ grāhasyopalaḍḍham, tadrad mayedaṃ viditamityatrāpi sragataridikriyākarmatraṃ viśayaśyānubhūyate, tanna syādrīṣayaniṣṭhatra ityarthah. ātmasamanetajñānakriyājanyānubhav aryaṁpatrūt 'ghaṭo mayā viditah' ityanubhavo viruddha ityāśaṅkya—pariṇāmakriyātātphalayorai-kūḍhikaraṇanyaniyamānna jñānānumitirityūha svātmaniti—(Tattvadīpana, P. 307).

is self-illuminated. Thus the Prābhākaras try to establish the self-luminosity of consciousness which they designate as *saṃvit*, but all the same make a distinction between it as *pramiti* or *anubhava* and knowledge as *pramāṇa*. They hold that *saṃvit* or consciousness being the background of all our epistemological purposes, it is self-luminous unlike the subject and object of knowledge; still, our epistemological demands are not fully met for the fact that consciousness cannot arise of itself under particular situations when the aid of some instruments must be called in. These epistemological instruments they designate as *pramāṇa* or means of knowledge which are generated by the activity of the subject. Thus the Prābhākaras recognise the instrumentality of some channels for the revelation of consciousness and these being the four-fold relation subsisting between the outer and the inner world (*catuṣṭayasannikarṣa*) are what is required of the subject for the revelation of consciousness under particular situations. This four-fold relation is amongst the object (*artha*), sense-organ (*indriya*), mind (*manas*) and Self (*Ātman*). This subjective activity (*pramāṇavyāpāra*) as responsible for the revelation of consciousness, is, however, an epistemological desideratum in so far as it is the channel of consciousness, whose revelation is the result for all epistemological purposes. Hence the Prābhākaras make a distinction between *pramāṇaphala* or the end or result in an epistemological situation which is consciousness (*pramiti* or *anubhava*, but more coherently speaking, *saṃvit*) and the means which is the four-fold relation (*catuṣṭayasannikarṣa* known as *pramāṇa*). While the former is self-illuminated, the latter is always inferred (*anumeya*) from the resultant knowledge and hence is an inferred cognitive process. This *pramāṇa* or inferred cognitive process is not self-illuminated, but is *à posteriori* postulated in a knowledge-situation. Thus while the Prābhākaras make *saṃvit* as the final self-luminous consciousness, they also keep room for the inferability of the particular cognitive processes that partake of the resultant knowledge. The Prābhākaras here enunciate a theory as opposed to the Buddhist theory of the Yogācāra School which recognises that it is one consciousness that is the instrument (*vyāpāra*) and the resultant (*phala*) in an epistemological

situation. They hold that the momentary bit of consciousness (*kṣaṇikavijñāna*) is transformed into the objective form which is not extraneous something, but a mode of the inner consciousness which takes up the objective hue. Thus one and the same consciousness is known as both *ālayavijñāna* or the subjective consciousness as well as *pravṛttivijñāna* or the objective consciousness and is known differently under different universes of discourse. Hence the Yogācāra's *pramāṇa* and *pramiti* are but the two aspects of the same phenomenon of consciousness. Thus it is *saṃvedana* which is *pramāṇa* when it refers to an objective world which is the universe of discourse in a knowledge-situation, that is to say, when by an activity (*vyāpāra*) the objective world is known as a transformation of consciousness. Again, it is *pramiti* when it refers to the subjective world of consciousness on which the hue of the former world is seen to be existent. Thus there is but one principle to work through the subjective world of "knowing" and the objective world of "known", and not two principles which are admitted by the Prābhākaras to explain the epistemological phenomenon of the direct revelation of consciousness (*saṃvit*). But Prābhākaras reduce this solipsistic interpretation to the charge of the presence of the objective distinction of the two kinds of revelation—one of consciousness (*saṃvit* or *pramiti* or *pramāṇaphala*) which is directly self-luminous and the other of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa* or *pramāṇa-vyāpāra*) which is always inferred from the resultant knowledge. They show that the object is revealed as an object of consciousness through the cognitive activity of the subject (which has been proved to be always inferred from the resultant knowledge) and thus knowledge always implies that it has an object on which the subjective cognitional apparatus works; but not so with the subject or Self itself. For, the Prābhākaras show that the Self is never the object of any cognitive activity, but is revealed in an act of cognitive activity which reveals the object. This revelation of the Self, according to the Prābhākaras, is therefore not like the objective revelation of the outer world, nor like the self-luminous revelation of consciousness (*saṃvit*) but an "automatic revelation", so to say, whenever any cognitive activity has an object to reveal. Thus both in the resultant knowledge as well as the cognitive activity, the

Self is never objectified by any cognitive activity, but, though not self-luminous, is always "suggested" as being revealed⁹⁴. The position of the Prābhākaras will be more clear if we examine the nature of the Self as advocated by them and the direct revelation of this Self will be more intelligible. The Prābhākaras advocate that Self is the substratum of knowledge, for in an act of cognition it is revealed as never the object but as the subject. This subjective revelation makes it clear that the Self is revealed in a direct act of cognition as the mere locus (*āśraya*) of knowledge, in which act the object is revealed as the "known" entity and hence as the "objective" entity, and knowledge, speaking broadly in term of *saṁvit*, is revealed self-luminously. Thus the Self, in Prābhākara's contention is never "objectively" known but always becomes revealed by something of an "automatic suggestion" in every act of cognition. Knowledge itself is self-revealed or self-luminous and the Self is revealed as the subject of that knowledge. Hence to identify the Self with Consciousness (*saṁvit*) or with object (*viśaya*) is logically incompatible; it has a peculiar status in the epistemological world. The distinction in the epistemological world obtaining between the Self and the object is well brought out by Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadīpana* where he says that the object is always with reference to the knowledge of which it is the object, whereas the Self as subject has not to wait for a reference to any knowledge of which it is the object, for it is directly revealed in knowledge whenever the objective reference of knowledge is known.⁹⁵

Against this Prābhākara view the Bhāṭṭas hold a very different and unique view of the Self. They say that whichever is directly revealed is known as the object of knowledge; outside reference to the objective character in a knowledge-situation, there is nothing as revealed. Thus even consciousness according to the Bhāṭṭas is never self-luminous but is

⁹⁴ *pramīritirānubhavaḥ svayaṁprakāśaḥ pramāṇaphalam, tadbalanetarat prakāśate, pramāṇaṁ tu pramāṭṛvyāpāraḥ phalalīṅgo nityānumeyaḥ, tatra—'ahamidaṁ jñāmi' iti pramāṭurjñānavyāpāraḥ karmaviśayaḥ, nātma-viśayaḥ, ātmā tu viśayānubhāvādeva nimittāt 'ahamiti' phale viśāye cānu-sandhiyate—(Pañcapādikā, P. 308).*

⁹⁵ *anātmakarmakānubhāvāśrayatvenātmavyāpārasambhave prthag jñāna-kalpanā na yuktetyāha—netyāheti—(Tattvadīpana, P. 309).*

"known" with reference to the cognisedness (*jñānatā*) adhering to the object. Hence their epistemological stand is quite different from that of the Prābhākaras who hold that in a direct act of cognition, at least consciousness is self-luminous and the Self is revealed as the substrate of knowledge. Thus there is enough scope for the Prābhākaras to hold that in an act of cognition there is no hard and fast rule to hold that everything should be revealed as the "object" of cognition. But the Bhāṭṭas controvert this view by the logical argument that nothing is revealed without being known to be the object of cognition; thus they admit a concomitance between 'revelation' and 'objectivity' of anything that is revealed in cognition. Hence in their view, the Self also must be regarded as the "object" of a cognition and never without any reference to this objectivity can it be revealed. But the Bhāṭṭas by such an admission are involved into a very intricate logical and epistemological fallacy; for, the Self being "known" as an "object" in a cognition, it becomes difficult for the Bhāṭṭas to maintain the "subjectivity" of the Self in the same act of cognition. The object is the principal element in cognition, that is to say, it is that which is directly referred to in knowledge; the object is the object of knowledge and in knowledge, therefore, the objective reference is a *sine qua non* in so far as it is known. The subject, however, is the secondary element in a knowledge-situation, for it is referred to as the possessor of knowledge when the objective element in knowledge has been first established, and hence the subject becomes the term of reference afterwards. It is the universal rule not only in the epistemological sphere but also in every conative and active sphere of reference. The Vaiyākaraṇas (grammarians) lay down this universal rule about the subject and the object. The subject is secondary (*guṇabhūta*) because it is the substrate or the locus of action (*kriyā*); it is not the first term of reference in any action, though it is always the substrate of action. Its action *primarily* refers to the object which is sought to be acted upon by the action belonging to the subject; hence the object is always the primary (*pradhāna*) term of reference in any action which seeks to infuse into the object the meaning of action. Hence judging from this universal rule, the Prābhākaras are well justified to charge the Bhāṭṭas on their hypothesis

that the Self is both the subject and object in an act of cognition. This wilful bifurcation of the Self entails the logical inconsistency from the viewpoint of the cogent law of the diversified status of the subject and the object in an action. Here Prakāśātmayati from the viewpoint of the Prābhākaraś brings out this inconsistency against the Bhāṭṭas⁹⁶. But the Bhāṭṭas reply to this apparent inconsistency by showing that there is no logical defect in their view of the Self which is both of the nature of inertia and consciousness (*jaḍabodhāt-maka Ātmā*). The Bhāṭṭas say that the Self is of the nature of both an inert and conscious principle, that is to say, contains the preponderating qualities of inertia and consciousness under particular circumstances. Hence the same Self is conscious (*bodha*) of itself as the inert (*jaḍa*) entity being known as the object. This two-fold conception of the Self according to the Bhāṭṭas is not logically or epistemologically untenable, for as they say, the Self is not only conscious, but also conscious that it is conscious as an object of consciousness, though not always necessarily simultaneous with the object. This cognition of the Self as the conscious element in knowledge cannot be overlooked, for it is quite true, logically and epistemologically, that the Self is *known* in an act of cognition. Thus the analysis of the Bhāṭṭas regarding the nature of the Self takes note of, at least as they claim, the fact of the cognition of the Self as an object of thought. "According to Kumārila," as Dr. Radhakrishnan puts it, "the self is not manifested in every cognitive act. The object-consciousness is not always appropriated by the self. * * * * * While the self is not manifested as the subject or the object of the object-consciousness (*viśayavitti*) sometimes there occurs along with the object-consciousness another distinct consciousness, viz., self-consciousness (*ahampratyaya*), of which the self is the object." (*Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II., P. 411). The objectivity of the Self becomes clear with reference to the unconscious or inert (*jaḍa*) element in it and the conscious (*bodhāt-maka*) element in it plays the rôle of the subject of consciousness, or rather, self-consciousness. It is significant to observe here the subtle

⁹⁶ *tatra kathamekasyātmā bhīyāyāmekasyaiva kartṛtvena karmatvena ca vīruddharūpadvayānvayaḥ? kartṛtva guṇabhāvat karmatvaḥ prādhānyāt, ekasya rūpadvaye vairūpyaprasaṅgaceti—(Vivaraṇa, P. 309).*

difference between the Self participating in object-consciousness and in self-consciousness. Prābhākara would hold that every act of object-consciousness is at the same time self-consciousness; there is always the *tripuṣṭipratyakṣa* or perception of the triad, viz., the subject, the object and the cognition. Hence when in an act of cognition the triad is simultaneously revealed, the Self as the *unconscious* substrate of cognition is revealed along with the object which is the *known* element. Thus Prābhākara's self-consciousness is not a phenomenon of a different moment than object-consciousness. But Kumārila, out of the empirical experiences, makes a logical distinction between the two; and hence his epistemological presentation of the "objectivity" of the Self stands to reason. He suggests that object-consciousness does not necessarily imply *simultaneously* self-consciousness for these are of different moments of experience. Hence when the Self is conscious of an object, it is not *necessarily* conscious of itself, though on reflection, it becomes self-conscious. In this posterior moment of its consciousness the Self of Kumārila is an *object*—an object of mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*). Hence to know one's Self in an act of cognition, one has to "objectify" it in self-consciousness.

Padmapāda, Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda have well brought out these theories of the Bhāṭṭas in order to expose them only to the further investigations of the Prābhākaras.⁹⁷ Thus we find that the Bhāṭṭa conceptions of the Self and cognition have not been well received by the Prābhākaras and hence Padmapāda and his followers are preparing the ground for the Prābhākara theories to be expressed more fully but only in order to be met with from the Advaitist point of view. This task therefore is a *réchauffé* of the Prābhākara stand to be criticised from the Advaitist viewpoint. Now, the main

⁹⁷ *tasmimśca dravyarūpatvenātmanāḥ prameyatvaṁ, jñātṛtvena pramā-
tṛtvamiti, pramāṭṛprameyanirbhāsa-rūpatvādahaṁpratyayasya grāhyagrā-
hakarūpa ātmā. tasmādidamanidānrūpaḥ prameyāṁśasyedānrūpatvāt,
anidānrūpatvāt pramātramāśasya—(Pañcopādikā, P. 309).*

*ahaṁpratyayasyaṽpi bhinnakarmakartṛtve ghaṭādiṣṭipratyayatulṅgatvamityā-
śaṅkya, dravyabodhasvarūpasyātmāno dravyātmakabodhākāraprādhānyena
kartṛtvaṁ, bodhātmakadravyākāraprādhānyena karmatvaṁ, ato noktadoṣa
ityabhiprāyeṇoktaṁ—pramāṭṛprameyanirbhāsarūpatvāditi—(Tattvādīpana, P.
309).*

objection to the Bhāṭṭa theory of the Self from Prābhākara's point of view is that the Self conceived in its two-fold aspect entails a great logical inconsistency, and hence such a Self cannot be conceived at all. The Prābhākaras point out that the inert or unconscious aspect (*dravyātmakatā*) of the Self, as conceived by the Bhāṭṭas, cannot be regarded as the Self in its conscious aspect (*bodhātmakatā*), for the former aspect is common to both the Self and the not-self; hence it cannot be said to be the special characteristic of the Self. Then what remains to be called the true aspect of the Self is consciousness (*bodha*), but this consciousness being a principle which does not admit of any parts, it becomes difficult for the Bhāṭṭas to maintain that it should be transformed into the subjective as well as the objective aspects, as is held by the Bhāṭṭas. This becomes therefore a real problem for the Bhāṭṭas to hold consistently which of the aspects of the Self should be regarded as the real basis of it as both the subject and the object. Any one of the two aspects being unable to show the Bhāṭṭa position a tenable one, the Bhāṭṭa is forced to leave this illogical conception of the Self. Hence Padmapāda has concluded that this bifurcation of the Self from the Bhāṭṭa point of view is challenged by the Prābhākara on the ground that the Self, consistently speaking, cannot have any part or aspect (*ananyatvāt—Pañcapādikā*, P. 309); hence the Self in the Bhāṭṭa theory should be regarded as non-transforming (*aparīṇāmitvāt—Ibid*) to all intents and purposes to be conceived in the way the Bhāṭṭa conceives it to be. The Prābhākara advances the argument against the Bhāṭṭa as to the 'objectivity' of the Self as the latter takes it to be possessed of. The former argues that the conscious aspect (*bodhātmaka*) of the Self has to be admitted to be the object of knowledge by the Bhāṭṭa, for if he does not so admit, his own thesis suffers from inconsistency. The Bhāṭṭa regards the Self as both the subject and object in cognition, as has been indicated before. The objective element in the Self is due to the unconscious (*jada*) aspect of it that is objectively known by the conscious (*bodha*) element. The Self, however, is self-perceived in its entirety, for the mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*) of the Self reveals itself as the object. Hence though the Self is not self-luminous, it *knows itself* through the mental perception

that being a separate phenomenon objectifies the Self in that perception. Hence self-consciousness, according to the Bhāṭṭa, is due to a separate moment of intuition that helps the Self to perceive itself. This is possible due to the element of consciousness (*bodha*) inhering in it, for the Bhāṭṭa does not seek to stultify the Self as a mere unconscious entity (*jadapadārtha*) like his counter-part, the Prābhākara. The mental intuition of the Self makes its own nature shine forth in the consciousness of the 'I'—the conscious 'I' objectifying the unconscious 'I'—but the 'I'-consciousness is independent of being known by any cognizer. The mental intuition only helps this 'I'-consciousness to be revealed in the Bhāṭṭa view. "Kumārila, however," as Dr. S. N. Dasgupta puts it, "thinks that the soul which is distinct from the body is perceived by a mental perception (*mānasa pratyakṣa*) as the substratum of the notion of 'I' or in other words, the self perceives itself by mental perception, and the perception of its own nature shines forth in consciousness as the 'I.'" (*History of Indian Philosophy*—Vol. I. P. 400). Again, as he says, "The self is no doubt known as the substratum of 'I' but the knowledge of this self does not reveal itself necessarily with the cognition of objects, nor does the self show itself as the knower of all knowledge of objects but the self is apprehended by a separate mental intuition which we represent as the 'I'. The self does not reveal itself as the knower but as an object of a separate intuitive process of the mind. This is indeed different from Prābhākara's analysis." (*Ibid*, P. 401). Thus the conscious part of the Self, according to the Bhāṭṭa, must needs know itself as "consciousness as the 'I,'" or in other words, the mental intuition must needs reveal the Self to itself and to nothing else (cf. *svasaṁvedyaḥ sa bhavati*—*Śābarabhāṣya*). Hence when Prakāśātmayati by way of analysing the charge of the Prābhākara against the Bhāṭṭa says that if the Bhāṭṭa does not admit that the conscious aspect (*bodhātmaka*) of the Self should know itself as an "object" in cognition (at least, in the mental intuition), he commits a very great inconsistency, for his Self would not then become *svayaṁprakāśa* and *saṁvidāśraya*. Now, the sophisticated logician might very naturally object to Prakāśātmayati's unphilosophic usage of the term *svayaṁprakāśa* with regard to the Self of the Bhāṭṭa, for, in no

School of Mīmāṃsā is the Self regarded as *svayamprakāśa* (self-luminous). This rather loose usage of language is jarring to a strictly logical ear, but judging from our analysis above regarding the nature of the Self according to the Bhāṭṭa-theory, it can be said without any fear of being contradicted that here *svayamprakāśatva* of the Self does refer to the *svasamvedyatva* of it, as the Bhāṭṭas regard it to possess. The Prābhākara therefore advances the horns of the dilemma to his counterpart, viz., the Bhāṭṭa, that if the conscious aspect of the Self be not the object (*viśaya*) in cognition, its consciousness is called in question; for, its self-cognition (*svasamvedyatva*) cannot be established if it fails to be the object of such self-cognition, and also its conscious character (*samvidāśrayatva*) as the "knower" or "cognizer" of self-cognition is also jeopardised; on the other hand, if it is admitted as an "object" its conscious character cannot also be established, for the *prameya* or the objective element belongs to the realm of the not-self as the unconscious entity *per se*. Thus the Bhāṭṭa is caught between the two horns even on his own admission, that the Self cognises itself in its two-fold character of consciousness (*bodha*) and unconsciousness (*jaḍa*), for he fails to establish how the Self in its conscious aspect can know itself as an unconscious entity, inasmuch as consciousness cannot belong to the realm of the "object" or not-self, and unconsciousness cannot belong to the realm of the "subject" or Self. Thus the mental intuition of the Self, as held by the Bhāṭṭa, becomes a myth, for it fails to give an adequate explanation of the phenomenon of self-cognition or self-consciousness in the Self's conscious moment of reflection as a conscious entity. In every self-consciousness, the self not only knows itself but also knows it as a conscious entity, and if that conscious entity has to be relegated to the realm of the not-self in the Bhāṭṭa's over-emphasis to explain the phenomenon, his case cannot stand to strict logic⁹⁸. Hence the Prābhākara shows that his

⁹⁸ *grāhakarūpasyāpi viśayatayā siddhirasti vā na vā? na cet svayamprakāśatva-samvidāśrayatva-siddhyoranaḥpāpāgamaśāstisiddhiprasaṅgaḥ, karṇatayā siddhiścet tatrāha-prameyasya ceti—(Vivaraṇa, P. 310).*

anubhāvānśe svayamprakāśatvādyabhyupagame'pyahamkāraṇasya grāhyatvādidamaṇśatvam, tato "nēdamaṇśah" iti granthānupapattimāśmikyā, grāhyatvāsiddhimāha-tasmāditi—(Tattvadiṭṭhāna, P. 310).

explanation as to the phenomenon of self-consciousness can be logically established if the Self is regarded as the conscious substrate that is, however, known as such in every act of cognition including self-cognition. Thus the Prābhākara would say that in every act of consciousness (*saṃvit*) the Self is referred to as the subject (*grāhaka*), the external phenomena as the object (*grāhya*) and the four-fold contact (*catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣa*) as the means of knowledge (*grahaṇa*); hence the triad is always revealed in every act of cognition (*tripuṭi-pratyakṣa*) according to the Prābhākara theory of knowledge. Hence on the admission of the Prābhākara the Self is, no doubt, an inert entity, but is not on that account a *grāhya* or knowable entity like the external phenomena; for, the Self is *always* revealed as the substrate of knowledge in contradistinction with not-self which is the inert object of knowledge, through and through. Thus for the Prābhākara in every act of cognition, there is a self-revealed principle of consciousness which he designates as *saṃvit* which vouchsafes for the subject as the *substrate* and the object as the *field* and the means as the *instrument* of cognition. His object-cognition (*viśaya-prākāṣyam*), therefore, always necessarily implies the self-cognition (*ātma-prākāṣyam*), for there is no need for him to recognise a different moment of self-consciousness. The Self as the subject is ever conscious of itself as the substrate of knowledge, and hence in his view the Self as the conscious seat of cognitions is a sufficient hypothesis to establish self-consciousness. Prakāśātmayati suggests this aspect in the Prābhākara theory when he says that, according to the Prābhākara, the Self has a predilection towards the aspect of substrate of knowledge and hence cannot belong to the realm of not-Self⁹⁹. It is on this point of the Prābhākara that the Self is necessarily revealed when the object is known that, as we have seen, the Bhaṭṭa raised a strong note of protest and put forward his explanation of the Self in contradiction to the Prābhākara's, so that the phenomenon of self-consciousness could be adequately explained. He started with this theory of the Self as both 'conscious' and 'unconscious' and

⁹⁹ *saṃvidākṣrayapakṣapātītayā'hamat*
(Vivaraṇa, P. 310).

siddhersedamāṃso'hamkārah—

showed that when in an act of cognition the object is known, the Self is not necessarily known as the substrate of the cognition. It is self-perceived in its entirety as the unconscious aspect being known by the conscious *through a mental intuition* (*mānasa pratyakṣa*). The nature and function of the mental intuition through which the phenomenon of self-perception originates have been discussed at length above. After all has been said and done, it is to be admitted that the Bhāṭṭa has made the Self at the moment of self-perception a Janus-like entity that through the process of a mental intuition "shines forth in consciousness as the 'I'" (Dr. Dasgupta). But the Prābhākara's analysis of the entire Bhāṭṭa position reduced it to an illogical concept which the Bhāṭṭa tried to construct to explain the phenomenon of self-consciousness. Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati have shown that the Prābhākara has won the day from his rival, the Bhāṭṭa, by disregarding the illogical concept forced into the field by the Bhāṭṭa to explain adequately the phenomenon of self-consciousness. The Prābhākara's position of the revelation of the Self even along with the object, therefore, stands as the last *forté* of the Mimamsist interpretation of the Self. This interpretation, however, is sought to be controverted with all vigour by Padmapāda and specially his follower, Prakāśātmayati. They show that the Prābhākara's analysis of the Self is anything but satisfactory from the viewpoint of the Advaitist who regards the Self as self-luminous (*svayamprakāśa*), and therefore refutes vigorously the Prābhākara view that it is the subject as *ahaṅkāra* or the Ego; for the Ego is never self-luminous, but is lighted up by the self-luminous Self which will be shown as identical with Consciousness. This supreme task is undertaken by the illustrious commentators of the Advaita School.

To controvert the theory of the Prābhākara and to bring out the Advaitist position with regard to the problem of the Self and knowledge, Prakāśātmayati following Padmapāda shows that the Self cannot be equated with Ego, the not-self, an unconscious entity that has to be revealed in the light of the Self. Thus he adduces arguments to prove that the Self is not different from Consciousness and is self-luminous without depending on any further *process* of cognition. The

Prābhākara holds that the Self is revealed as the substratum of consciousness along with the revelation of the object. The Self, therefore, is according to the Prābhākara an unconscious locus of knowledge which being related to it makes it the cognizer in a knowledge-situation. Thus the Self is sharply divided from the self-luminous consciousness (*svayaṃprakāśa saṃvit*) in the Prābhākara's analysis of it. Padmapāda offers several alternatives to the Prābhākara to justify this bifurcation of the Self and consciousness in order to show that none of the alternatives can so justify and hence the Self as the unconscious Ego cannot be logically established. The Ego as such is at poles asunder from the Advaitist conception of Self as the self-luminous principle of Consciousness. Hence Akhaṇḍānanda's possible objection is justified by his own words when he says that though the Ego should be established as distinct from the Self, yet by establishing the self-luminosity of Self, Prakāśātmayati is perfectly within the limits of the Advaitist explanation of the not-self as not self-luminous and hence the Ego being an unconscious principle *per se* can never be equated with the self-luminous Self¹⁰⁰. The first alternative of Padmapāda is with regard to the Self as the consciously revealed principle and the knowledge as the originated result (*pramāṇaphalam*) being regarded as revealed unconsciously. That is to say, Padmapāda throws this alternative to show that it is just possible that the Prābhākara might mean that the Self is only revealed as the *seat of knowledge* and hence as a consciously revealed principle, though it is, in itself, unconscious; but the resultant knowledge as originated by the means (*pramāṇaphalam jñānam*) is revealed only as the *unconscious instrument* in the cognitive process. Thus it is that the Prābhākara might easily claim to have established that the Self is revealed not merely as the unconscious entity but as consciously expressed as the substratum of knowledge, while the instrumental knowledge, that self-luminous consciousness also illumines, becomes merely a channel in the cognitive process to remain unconscious in its function with regard to the originated result. Hence sounding as it

¹⁰⁰ *ahaṅkārasya yātmātre abhikite'nātmatvaṃ siddhāntinā sādhanīyam, kim svaprakāśatvasādhaneṇa ityāśaṅkyāha—ahaṅkārasyeti. ahaṅkāra iti ātmavānādāhāraḥ svaprakāśatvāt, ghaṭavat—(Tattvadīpana, P. 310).*

does very much against any logical consistency, this alternative suggested by Padmapāda (*kimātmā cailanyaparakāśo'nubhavo jaḍaparakāśaḥ—Pañcapādikā*. P. 310) does not go illogically against the general Prābhākara standpoint of the *tripuṭīpratyakṣa* in an act of cognition. For, Consciousness (*saṃvit*) as a self-luminous principle reveals the *pramāṇa* or the instrumental cause employed by the subject (*pramātṛvyāpāra*) which is always inferred in an act of cognition. Thus the self-luminous *saṃvit* is regarded as the real resultant in an act of cognition which pre-supposes the instrumental causes (*pramāṇa* or *pramātṛvyāpāra*). Hence strictly speaking, Padmapāda's alternative, though somehow reconcilable with this *pramāṇa*-aspect of cognition which can be said to be an unconscious mode, does not very cogently be thrown to the Prābhākara. For, the Prābhākara can very well object that the alternative suggested by Padmapāda is labouring under a morbid state of complacent challenge. The Prābhākara would never allow anybody to suggest that the resultant knowledge (*pramāṇaphalam*) is ever *jaḍaparakāśa*, as Padmapāda suggests. It is, on the contrary, the very opposite of being *jaḍaparakāśa*; it is self-luminous (*svayaṃprakāśa*) as the revealer of the subject, the object and the instruments in an act of cognition. In fact, while bringing out the position of the Prābhākara, Padmapāda has himself shown that the *anubhava* or *pramiti* of the Prābhākara is distinct from *pramāṇa* as being self-luminous.¹⁰¹ How is it at all reconcilable when Padmapāda himself makes a topsy-turvy suggestion to the Prābhākara? The suggestion seems to be due to Padmapāda's method of analysis in which he merely enumerates possible alternatives with regard to the nature of the Self and Consciousness, and hence seems to suggest that this first alternative is also a possible one in the Prābhākara theory, though actually it is not. Hence Padmapāda's suggestion, as elaborated by Prakāśātmayati, tries to establish the self-luminosity of Consciousness from the Advaitist point of view, discarding the possibility of making the *pramāṇaphala* of the Prābhākara to be ever regarded as reveal-

¹⁰¹ *pramitiranubhavaḥ svayaṃprakāśaḥ pramāṇaphalaṃ, tadbalenatarat prakāśate, pramāṇam tu pramātṛvyāpāraḥ phalaślingo nityānumeyaḥ—* (Pañcapādikā, P. 308).

nīlādījñānaphalaṃ—anubhavaḥ svayaṃprakāśamāno grāhyamidamtyā,

ing the subject and the object, itself remaining unrevealed. This possibility is finely suggested by Akhaṇḍānanda and also by Prakāśātmayati in examining this plausible alternative from a possible viewpoint of the Prābhākara.¹⁰²

grāhakaṁ cānīdantayā'vabhāsayati, grahaṇam cānumāpayatīti yuktam—
(*Pañcapādikā*, P. 310).

¹⁰² *anubhāvasya svaprakāśatayā'bhihitatvāt ātmanaśca grāhakatayā*
siddhasādhanaūt kathaṁ vikalpāvasara iti cet atra brūmaḥ yadyapyevaṁ
vibhāgo'bhyadhāyi, tathāpi yuktāyuktatva-nirūpaṇārthaṁ vimarśasambhava
ityarthaḥ—(*Tattvadīpana*, P. 310).

nanu—aprakāśamānameva pramāṇaphalaṁ cakṣurādīvaḥ viśayavadava-
bhāsayediti kuto viśvasyānavabhāsaḥ?—(*Vivaraṇa*, P. 311).

CHAPTER VII

AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE ADVAITIST CONSCIOUSNESS—ITS SELF-LUMINOUS AND UNITARY CHARACTER.

However, Prakāśātmayati analyses this *possible hypothesis* of the Prābhākara in order to show that *anubhava* or consciousness is not of the same status as the sense-organ like the eye which itself remaining unconscious or unrevealed can vouchsafe for the revelation of the objective world. He shows that the sense-organ belongs to an altogether different category from that of consciousness, for the former is not the revealer of objects *on its own merits* but on the merits borrowed from consciousness. Consciousness is always self-luminous and even if the Prābhākara stoops to accept this position, he accepts it with some reservations, for he tries to show that the *pramāṇa* is not self-luminous inasmuch as it is the instrumental cause of the resultant knowledge (*pramāṇaphala*) that is self-luminous. This reserved acceptance of the self-luminosity of consciousness by the Prābhākara is, as we have indicated fully above, the target of criticism, for if we strictly follow the Prābhākara epistemology we shall merely take the *possibility of the unrevealed 'pramāṇaphala'* but the actuality of the *pramāṇa* or *pramāṇavyāpāra*. Even if consciousness is ever to be unrevealed (as in the *pramāṇa*-stage according to the Prābhākara), it may be that in the stage of the *pramāṇaphala* also there may be such a possibility. But *unrevealed consciousness* as the revealer of the objective world is an epistemological myth. Thus even if the Prābhākara tries to show that the phenomenon of consciousness is possible as the sense-organ like the eye to remain unrevealed, Prakāśātmayati is out to controvert this faint suggestion with all the force at his command. He shows that consciousness is ever self-luminous and not due to any other conscious phenomenon. Hence the category of the sense-organ being unconscious and therefore dependent on consciousness for the revelation of objects and of itself is distinct from a self-luminous

entity. Here Prakāśātmayati brings in the example of 'the light of the lamp' (*pradīpālōka*) to prove the phenomenon of self-luminosity. But the opponent may object that as consciousness is regarded as self-luminous, so the light of the lamp cannot be regarded as such, and hence the light of the lamp (the example in any inference) becomes of the same category as the sense-organ. Hence the proof of inference being unestablished due to the failure of the example (*dr̥ṣṭāntāsiddhi*), it also fails to make the self-luminous category of consciousness a logically established one. Thus consciousness can very well be of the nature as the first alternative seemingly tries to make it, i.e., unrevealed in itself (*jadaprahāṣa*). To avoid any such logical conclusion, Prakāśātmayati clearly guards himself against the charge of the same nature of the unconscious sense-organ and the self-luminous light of the lamp. He shows that there are two varieties of self-luminosity—one of the type of consciousness and the other of the type of the light of the lamp. True it is that the light of the lamp is not of the same nature as Consciousness which being self-luminous is the generator of knowledge; the former is, however, far from being the generator of knowledge, for it only reveals the objective world when it is objectively veiled. Thus there is a fundamental difference between the two inasmuch as the light of the lamp reveals the objective world by dispelling the objective veil, while consciousness reveals the objective world by dispelling the epistemological veil. Still, Prakāśātmayati continues, there is a variety of self-luminosity even in the light of the lamp; for it dispels a veil on the objective world and *is not dependent on any other similar principle for this act*. Hence it cannot be included in the category of the sense-organ, as the logical conclusion was leading us towards it; for, the sense-organ is out-and-out unrevealed and is never *by itself* the dispeller of any veil on the objective world. Thus the sense-organ like the eye is never capable of *itself* to generate knowledge (as self-luminous consciousness) or to reveal the object by dispelling the veil of darkness (as self-luminous light of the lamp). So it is not very logical to conclude that self-luminosity of the light of the lamp cannot be established and hence self-luminosity of consciousness is also untenable. On the contrary, self-lumino-

sity of the light of the lamp and of consciousness is well established, by their nature of revelation of the objective world by *themselves*, whereas the sense-organs cannot reveal objects by themselves but by depending on other factors of knowledge.¹⁰³ Thus it is that Prakāśātmayati concludes that consciousness is self-luminous as it is independent of any other conscious principle of the same nature with it and hence can by its revelation make revelation of the objective world possible *directly* without any intervening moment, as the light of the lamp. This syllogistic approach towards the problem of self-luminosity of consciousness has been made here by Prakāśātmayati by taking the example of the light of the lamp. In fact, Prakāśātmayati has all along been discussing self-luminosity of consciousness from the viewpoint of the light of the lamp, that is to say, from the viewpoint of independence of similar *prakāśa* or revelation.¹⁰⁴ Thus the third alternative in Citsukha's analysis of the concept of *svaprakāśatva* seems to have been suggested by Prakāśātmayati.¹⁰⁵ Hence this syllogistic conclusion arrived at by Prakāśātmayati to establish self-luminosity of consciousness seems to include both material and intellectual illumination as being on the logical plane, at least, though not in the ultimate metaphysical plane, similar concepts, with regard to 'revelation independent of similar revelation' (*sajātīyaprakāśāprakāśyatvam*). Prakāśātmayati further elucidates his point by showing that the light of the lamp is not revealed due to a similar revelation like the sense-organ, the eye, for the eye does not reveal the light of the lamp which is *by itself* of the nature of revelation. The light of eye has no part to play in the revelation of the self-revealed light of the lamp,

¹⁰³ *tathāhi—jñānaprakāśyatvād ajñānavirodhino'nyadevālokaprakāśyatvam tamovirodhitayā prasiddham tadavyavādhānenālokena kriyate, na tadubhayaṃ karoti cakṣuḥ; ajñānatvādanālokatvācca—(Vivaraṇa, P. 311).*

ubhayaṃ—ajñānanivṛtti-tamonivṛttyākhyam—(Tattvādīpana, P. 312).

¹⁰⁴ *anubhavaśya ca svasattāyām prakāśavyatirekādarśanācca jñānāntarāgamyatāsiddhiḥ—(Vivaraṇa, P. 306).*

anubhavaḥ na jñānāntarāgamyaḥ svasattāyām prakāśavyatirekavidhuratvāt, na yadevaṃ na tadevaṃ, yathā ghaṭa ityarthah—(Tattvādīpana, P. 306).

¹⁰⁵ *sajātīyaprakāśāprakāśyatvam—(Tattvaprādīpika, P. 3. Nirṇaya Sagar Edn.).*

for the former is only necessary for the establishment of the contacts with the other-revealed (i.e., the light-revealed) objective world. Hence Prakāśātmayati concludes emphatically that consciousness is never other-revealed, that is to say, *is never unrevealed whenever it exists* (*svasattāyām prakāśav-yatīrekavidhuratvāt*), for, if the Prābhākara ever assumes that it is so as he does in the case of the *pramāṇa* or *pramāṭṛvyā-pūra* from which there may be a possible doubt with regard to *pramāṇaphala* also, there is no certainty of the validity of knowledge, for knowledge may be believed to arise without certifying that it is revealed whenever it arises and thus an epistemological uncertainty always attaches itself to knowledge at its existent stage. But this unwarranted uncertainty of knowledge when it arises will nullify all behaviour and action.¹⁰⁶ Prakāśātmayati further examines the possible arguments from the opposite side that seek to show that there need not be any such uncertainty for the fact that the consciousness as belonging to the subject (*pramāṭṛ*—that is consciously revealed) may vouchsafe for the existence of the subject and the object through a mediating unconscious revelation (*jadānubhavadabalāt*). He shows that this modified hypothesis of the Prābhākara cannot stand the scrutiny of reason inasmuch as the *unconscious mediating revelation* cannot directly (*sākṣāt*) be the cause of the revelation of the consciousness as belonging to the Self (though this position is controverted by the Advaitist, as Consciousness and Self are not different categories) for there is no need for such revelation *directly* through any mediating principle, because Consciousness *as such* is directly revealed; if it be said that this unconscious mediating revelation reveals the consciousness of the subject by effecting the relation with the object (*viśayoparāgahetutvāt*). Prakāśātmayati says that such a modification of the intellect (*buddhi*) or of the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) (as the Sāṅkhyas and the Advaitists respectively recognise) can be accepted by the Advaitist, for it only makes the subject (*jñāṭṛ* or *pramāṭṛ* as limited by the adjuncts like *buddhi* etc.) dependent on the modification. But when the Self or Consci-

¹⁰⁶ *tasmād vyavahitapradīpasyevānubhavasāpyāprakāśamānatve pradīpa-prakāśasyeva viśvayānarabhāsaprasaṅga iti—(Vivaraṇa, P. 312).*

ousness as equated with it is regarded as self-luminous, there is no logical relevance to admit dependence on the modification for its revelation.¹⁰⁷ Hence to establish their position, the Prābhākaras might attribute unconsciousness (*jaḍatva*) to the activity of consciousness or the unrevealed mediating process through which consciousness is revealed, but this position is also logically untenable. What Prakāśātmayati means to suggest by this alternative is that the activity through which there is a revelation of consciousness might be regarded as a necessary pre-requisite, and this activity being always present consciousness as a self-luminous principle can be established. Thus even though Prakāśātmayati had previously reduced that the Prābhākara position is untenable from the point of view of the *unconscious mediating revelation* (*pramāṇa* or *pramātṛvyāpāra*), yet if there is again any possibility from the Prābhākara's point of view that there is a *necessary activity* (*cetayatikriyā*) before the revelation of *saṃvit*, then that possibility is also illogical and ungrounded. For, this activity will entail an uncalled-for *regressus ad infinitum* and, therefore, will never be self-established. Thus the necessity for which its aid was called in will never materialise. Prakāśātmayati shows that this activity (*cetayatikriyā*) being unconscious in itself (for it is as unconscious as the previous unconscious mediating revelation),¹⁰⁸ will require a fresh activity for its revelation, and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus will never be any landing-ground for consciousness to be revealed. In fact, the Self being in unison with Consciousness from the Advaitist point of view, there will be a merely uncalled-for *regressus ad infinitum* to assume any *cetayatikriyā*, for the former is always self-luminous. Thus consciousness being never dependent on any activity must be self-revealed, and both Padma-pāda and Prakāśātmayati now indicate the Advaitist position by showing that the Self is not known through self-luminous.

¹⁰⁷ *cidātmaprakāśasya tu 'jaḍānubhavādhinatā' nūpapānnetyāha—tanna śrayampṛakāśacaitanyasrabhāro'pi saṃpīti*—(Vīcarāṇa, P. 313).

¹⁰⁸ Here again Prakāśātmayati hints at the possibility of the unconsciousness of the *anubhavaphala* (cf. *purvānubhavaphalavajjaḍarūpānubhavaphalam*—(Vīcarāṇa, P. 313), though in fact, there is no actuality of it. In fact, it proceeds from the assumption of the Prābhākaras as to the *pramāṇa*-stage remaining unrevealed.

consciousness, but is Consciousness *per se* and therefore self-luminous.¹⁰⁹ This prepares the ground for examination of the second alternative posed by Padmapāda to Prābhākara, for in this alternative there is the posing of the question, viz., are both the Self and Consciousness self-illuminated? This assumption is not accepted by the Advaitist on obvious grounds, for in his opinion there is no schism between the Self and Consciousness. Thus this alternative is shown to be illogical by Prakāśātmayati, following Padmapāda, for the fact that there cannot be any cogent theory of mutual dependence and an interrelation between two entities of equal status. Hence Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadīpana* shows that firstly, the Self and Consciousness, being both self-luminous, cannot be mutually dependent (as the Prābhākara will hold), like two equally conscious persons,¹¹⁰ and that secondly, there cannot be any relation of consciousness to Self for the fact that no such relation is possible *by itself* as that will entail the Self to be of the same category as the objective world and not self-luminous nor *through any other entity* as that will also necessarily entail the previous 'knowing' of the Self which will go against its self-luminosity. Thus the Prābhākara, being impelled on the horns of the dilemma, will not be able to establish relation between the Self and Consciousness logically.¹¹¹ Even if the Prābhākara tries to establish that even though the Self is related with consciousness as being conscious, yet is not revealed as such; just like the consciousness belonging to a different person is not revealed to *me* inspite of the fact that such consciousness is revealed to *the subject* of consciousness. Padmapāda and following him Prakāśātmayati controvert this hint. They

¹⁰⁹ *pramāṇaphaleṇa cet pradīpenere viśayamātmānaṁ cetayate, tadā cetayatikriyānavasthāprasaṅgaḥ—(Pañcapādikā, P. 313).*

cetansyāpi pradīpasthāniyatvāc cetayatikriyānavastheti dūṣayati—kiñca pramāṇaphāleneti—(Vivaraṇa, P. 313).

¹¹⁰ *ātmā'nubhavau, nānyonyādhīnasiddhikau, citavahārāt, puruṣadvayacādityarthaḥ—(Tattvadīpana, P. 313).*

¹¹¹ *kiṁ saṁvidātmāsambandhaḥ svena gṛhyate? utānyena? nānyaḥ; svagrahaṇāmantareṇa svapratīyogikasambandhagrahaṇāśambharāt, svagrahaṇe ca viśayatvaprasaṅgaḥ. nāpi dvitīyaḥ, ātmagrahaṇāmantareṇa tadviśeṣitasambandhagrahaṇādyogāt tadgrahaṇaṁ vācyaṁ—na ca tad yujyate svaprakāśātrairrodhāt—(Tattvadīpana, P. 313).*

show that there is no necessity that the Self should remain unrevealed although it is the seat of consciousness and is conscious, for the analogy of other-resting consciousness being unrevealed to *me* is not the logical basis for such assumption. For, as they make it clear, there is a fundamental difference between consciousness belonging to the subject and consciousness inferred in that subject, whence it should follow logically that former consciousness being *directly* revealed to the subject is never unrevealed, and the latter one remains unrevealed to the inferring subject. Thus the Self as conscious being related with consciousness should not be equated with the latter category of consciousness inferred to the individual, for it is to the individual always revealed as such. The Self that is conscious (at least in the Prābhākara contention of dualism) is not unrevealed to the conscious individual, which, on Vedantist interpretation, can be equated with *jīva*. Hence the *jīva* being unseparated from its Self as being related with consciousness always experiences it as revealed, as his consciousness is always revealed to him. Thus the Self which a particular individual *jīva* experiences within may be unrevealed to another individual, like his consciousness. But the Self or Consciousness does not on that account become unrevealed to the particular individual¹¹². This is the crucible of the Advaita dialectic of self-luminosity (*svaprakāśatva*) that is brought out by Padmapāda and Prakāśātmayati, and their exposition by way of controverting the Prābhākara view is leading us towards the Advaitist view of the Self, clearly but imperceptibly; for, as we see here, the Self being regarded as self-luminous like Consciousness in which there is complete exclusion of their being revealed to other individualized centres (*puruṣāntarasamvedana*) is surely an indication that there is no dualism between them, but they are one in *essence* of self-luminosity. There is therefore no room for their ever being regarded as unrelated, or, even though related, as unrevealed, for the Self as Consciousness is always revealed by itself¹¹³.

¹¹² *puruṣāntarasamvedanavadavyavahānāditi cet, ātmanyapi tat samānamiti bhāvaḥ*—(Vīraṇya, P. 314).

¹¹³ *parātmanastu vyavahitatvānna svaprakāśatvam, svātmanastu avyavahitatvāt svaprakāśatvam*—(Tattvādīpana, P. 314).

The third alternative put forward by Padmapāda and elaborated by Prakāśātmayati is that the Self is unconscious and consciousness as inhering in it makes it revealed¹¹⁴. But this alternative seems to go against the very fundamentals of the problem as it tries to make the Self revealed on the strength of the self-revealed consciousness. The alternative primarily aims to make the Self unconscious (*jaḍasvarūpa*) *per se* and the consciousness that is self-revealed vouchsafes for its revelation. How can it be consistently said that the Self is revealed on the strength of the self-revealed consciousness? Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadīpana* tries to bring out the real implications of such an alternative following in the foot-steps of Prakāśātmayati. He says that it is a logical question to ask what is the real implication of trying to establish the Self as a revealed entity when this alternative only makes Consciousness as self-revealed¹¹⁵. But he shows that Prakāśātmayati analyses this alternative of his predecessor, Padmapāda, to show that it is really untenable for the fact that consciousness being regarded as inhering in the Self to make it revealed is in no way a valid theory. The Self being relegated to the realm of the unconscious cannot be made conscious on the strength of consciousness in spite of the best endeavours of the Prābhākara. To make consciousness a completely detached principle from the Self will rather go against its revelation; hence it must be admitted that the Self is not unconscious *per se* but is necessarily conscious. That being admitted, the Advaitist position comes very near the mark; for the Self then becomes conscious *by itself* without its dependence on an extraneous principle like consciousness. To achieve this objective Prakāśātmayati analyses very cogently the real implications of this alternative. He shows that consciousness as a separate principle which is self-revealed should either be a quality (*guṇa*) or an object (*dravya*) or an act (*karma*), but none of these suppositions makes its nature established as the Prābhākaras want it to be. Akhaṇḍānanda shows that the Prābhākaras as the Naiyāyikas regard it as a *guṇa*, the Sāṅkh-

¹¹⁴ *sa eva caitanyaprakāśaḥ ātmā jaḍasvarūpaḥ*—(*Pañcapādikā*, Pp. 310-311).

¹¹⁵ *samvidāḥ svaprakāśatvena kathamātmanastadāpādanam? vaiyadhi-karaṇyāditi*—(*Tattvadīpana*, P. 314).

yas as a *dravya* and the Bhāttas as a *karma* (cf. *guṇa-iti Tārīka-Prābhākaradr̥ṣṭāntyoktam, dravyamiti Sāṅkhyamaṭa-manuṣṭya, karmeti Bhāttamatānusāreṇa—Tattvādīpana. P. 314*). Prakāśātmayati reduces the suppositions of *guṇa* and *dravya* to their untenable character, and tries to show that the supposition of *guṇa* necessarily leads us to the Advaitist theory of the self-luminosity of the Self. To do this, he shows that consciousness cannot be a *karma* or act, as the Bhāttas hold it to be, for, to make it a *karma* is to rob it of its nature of revelation (*prakāśātva*) and effect (*phalātva*) of the instruments of cognition. What Prakāśātmayati means is that the Bhāṭṭa recognises revelation (*prakāśātva*) as the characteristic of consciousness, but this characteristic being inferred from the quality of known-ness or *jñātalā* (as he does recognise consciousness as self-revealed) there is the possibility of revelation of consciousness as an inferred effect. Hence Prakāśātmayati's suggestion brings out these aspects of the Bhāṭṭa contention but shows that it is untenable. Revelation, even by the indirect method of inference, of consciousness is not tenable in the Bhāṭṭa contention of consciousness as an act (*karma*), for the Bhāṭṭa regards consciousness that is revealed as the effect inferred from the self-luminous known-ness (*jñātalā*). It has been said above that "this self-luminous quality makes knowledge (*jñāna*) to be inferred in the Self and therefore knowledge as a product adhering to the Self is sought to be established by the Bhāttas by the inferential proof." If consciousness is thus reduced to an effect by regarding it as a produced act, then it cannot be said to be revealed, for an act is not the resultant revelation. This aspect is clearly brought out by Akhaṇḍānanda when he says that an act does not make for the revelation of itself as the resultant of the act (*krīyāṭve gamyādivat samvedanasya prakāśātvaṃ na bhavati*). To save this unwarranted conclusion the Bhāṭṭa may seek to establish that revelation of the act is possible because of the fact that he recognises consciousness (the act) as the resultant product (*pramāṇaphalātva—Tattvādīpana. P. 314*), still his position is untenable. For, he thus makes the act the resultant itself which is untenable. The act is what is the process and the resultant is what is the effect and the two can never be equated. The resultant is the end of the process and is not

the process by itself. Akhaṇḍānanda brings out this position clearly when he says: *na ca—pramaṇaphalatvāt prakāśatvamityapi vācyaṃ; karmatve phalatvasyānupapatterityarthaḥ—Tattvadīpana. P. 314*). If knowledge is regarded strictly as an act, it must be regarded as the act that originates some result (*phala*) in the object; otherwise the subject and the object cannot be related in knowledge. Hence the Bhāṭṭa starts from this hypothesis, that *jñātatā* or knownness of the object being the resultant of the knowledge-situation makes the act of knowledge an inferred product or strictly the *processus* which adheres to the Self, and the resultant of knowledge is revelation that is the quality of self-luminous knownness adhering to the object. Thus it is clear that the Bhāṭṭa theory trying as it does to make knowledge adhering to the Self as an act cannot by any stress of the imagination make it revealed. This is the substance of the position maintained by Padmapāda, Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda against the Bhāṭṭa position of knowledge as an act (*kriyā*).

Prakāśātmayati next examines the Sāṅkhya view of knowledge which according to it is an object (*dravya*). The Sāṅkhya conception of knowledge regards *vṛtti* or the reflection of the *puruṣa* or Self that is consciousness *per se* on the unconscious principle of *buddhi* (intellect), the first product of inert matter (*prakṛti*). Thus Pure Consciousness being reflected on unconscious intellect makes for the origination of *empirical knowledge* through the *vṛtti* or psychosis or modification generated by *buddhi*. But this empirical *vṛttijñāna* is according to the Sāṅkhya an object, a product that is of the same status as the external object belonging to the *bhautika* or elemental world. To refute such a static theory of knowledge Prakāśātmayati shows that such a view will either make the Self as *not fully conscious of the object* or as *conscious of all the objects simultaneously* at the origination of one knowledge. Both these alternatives will do harm to the epistemological behaviour of mankind. If knowledge be regarded as an object, as the Sāṅkhya suggests, then it will be either of infinitesimal (*anu*), middle (*madhyama*) or infinite (*mahat*) dimension (*parimāṇa*). If it is infinitesimal or middle in dimension, then knowledge will reveal only a part of the object with which the Self through the *antahkaraṇa* is in contact. But

that will spell disaster for the full knowledge of an object as never being realized by the Self. Akhaṇḍānanda, suggesting as he does to defend this position, also shows that it is finally untenable. He says in favour of the position that even by contact with a fractional part of the body, sandal-paste can make the whole body fragrant; similarly knowledge, even though connected with a small portion of the object, can make possible for the Self to have full knowledge of it. But he shows that revelation of an object supposes a contact established between the subject and the object, but knowledge being of infinitesimal or middle dimension cannot establish such a contact *in full*. The analogy of the sandal-paste cannot stand, for knowledge is not a component (*sāvayava*) entity, for which reason it cannot also be conceived as extending (*viśaraṇaśīla*)¹¹⁶. The middle dimension of knowledge will, moreover, make it dependent on the *avayavas* or component parts, but it is not possible for knowledge, a partless entity. If knowledge is held to be of infinite dimension, then it will make the Self, the substratum of it, as possessing infinite knowledge at any particular moment of cognition. But *empirically*, the Self is never infinitely conscious when any knowledge arises in it. Thus in no wise can the Sāṅkhya hold that knowledge can ever be a component entity (*dravya*) which position jeopardises the empirical universe of the Self's knowledge. Hence Prakāśātmayati proceeds towards the analyses of the remaining alternatives as to the nature of knowledge as held by the Naiyāyikas and the Prābhākaras. He shows that according to this view, consciousness or knowledge is a quality (*guṇa*) adhering to the Self which is its substratum. Thus knowledge attaches to the Self which being inert according to these Schools becomes conscious of the objects whenever such attachment occurs. Thus the quality of consciousness makes the Self, otherwise unconscious, as conscious, Prakāśātmayati examines this view of consciousness as a quality adhering to the Self and making the latter revealed through it. He says that this view of the Naiyāyikas and the Prābhākaras unnecessarily supposes consciousness as a distinct quality belonging to

¹¹⁶ *haricandanabindostu sāravaratrenāvayavaprasarpaṇadrūrā vyāpikā-
rayahetutram yuktamityarthah—(Tattvadīpana, P. 314).*

the Self and making it revealed. If revelation be the mark of the Self, then it is better to admit, as the Advaitists do, that it is self-revealed or self-luminous. To postulate the Self as unconscious and then to establish it as possessing the quality of consciousness is a greater step in the epistemological and metaphysical conceptions of the Self; it makes an unnecessary schism between the Self and Consciousness by making the fallacy of postulating it as unconscious. To avoid these tendencies that lead to the essential nature of the Self being unrevealed by itself, the Advaitist holds that the Self is essentially Consciousness that is self-luminous, and not the seat of consciousness. Hence Prakāśātmayati following this Advaitist theory shows that Consciousness like the light of the lamp is not dependent on any other *similar entity* for its revelation. This Consciousness again is not born or originated in the Self which being *essentially Consciousness* does not wait for such Consciousness to originate. Thus the Self is nothing apart from Consciousness which being revelation in essence is never a created or originated entity, for such revelation is eternally present without any previous absence of it¹¹⁷. Hence the Self being eternally conscious is self-luminous and not dependent on any extraneous consciousness, as such extraneous consciousness is never originated in it, but is the eternal nature of it. Thus the Advaitist position as brought out by Prakāśātmayati following the slight hint of his predecessor, Padmapāda, (*trīṭīye'pi kalpe'nicchato'pyātmaiva citiprakāśa āpadyate: Pañcapādikā*, P. 315) brings out the full implications of the Advaitist conception of the Self and Consciousness. In doing so, he follows faithfully the characteristic of self-luminosity as expounded by him, viz., independence of any other *similar entity* for revelation (*sajātīyaparakāśāntaranairapeksyam*) as established on the analogy of the light of the lamp. Here also he brings out more elaborately that such self-luminosity is not the essential mark of Consciousness alone, but also of the Self as being in essence Consciousness, like the sun in essence being revelation and not anything apart from it. Thus herein also he brings in a material illumination, the revelation of the sun, as being

¹¹⁷ *prāgabhāvasūnyatvādapi na tasya janmetyarthaḥ—(Tattvadīpana, P. 314).*

the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) to establish self-luminosity of the Self as not being different in essence from self-luminous Consciousness. Hence Prakāśātmayati is driving at the thesis he has laid down—that of self-luminosity (*svaprakāśatva*)—and is showing that the Self is self-luminous as being in essence one with Consciousness.¹¹⁸

The discussion as to the nature of knowledge, as conceived in the Sāṅkhya view, is carried on for further examination by Prakāśātmayati following the hint of his predecessor, Padmapāda. The discussion centres round the view of the middle dimension (*madhyama-parimāṇatva*) of knowledge that is a possible alternative in the Sāṅkhya view of knowledge as an object (*dravya*). It has been already examined by them as to which hypothesis this view will lead to, and it has been shown that such a hypothesis cannot work well, for, it will make knowledge, a partless entity, dependent on its parts (*avayavas*)—a view which is an absurdity. Yet Padmapāda by a hint opens this possible alternative for further discussion, and Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda examine it fully. Padmapāda says that it is granted that knowledge is of middle dimension (*madhyama-parimāṇa*), an alternative making knowledge dependent on its parts. But this granting itself is vitiated by the fact that knowledge or consciousness is not dependent on any other entity or entities (like its parts) except the Pure Self (*Ātman*).¹¹⁹ From this faint suggestion Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda try to bring out the full implications of this possible alternative and after full scrutiny reject it as untenable. Prakāśātmayati shows that even if knowledge or consciousness be regarded as of middle dimension (*madhyama-parimāṇa*), there may not be any inconsistency in making it dependent on parts; for, it may be urged that though knowledge or consciousness is dependent on parts, it is all the same dependent on the Pure Self, as an earthen jar (*ghaṭa*), though dependent on its component parts (*kaṇṭhalas*), is dependent on the ground (*bhūṭala*) as its locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*). Hence knowledge

¹¹⁸ *guṇatve sati ātmaiva prakāśaguna itī pradiṣadātmanā svayamprakāśa syāt, sa ca guṇaḥ sr̥ṣṭrayopādhanā na jāyate; prakāśagunaṭvāt, ātmanyavyābhicārāt adityādi prakāśagunavadityātmaiva svayamprakāśa itī—tadeta-*
dāha—anicchato'pyātmaiva citiprakāśa itī—(Vīcarana, P. 314).

¹¹⁹ *na tathācidhaphalasadbhāve pramāṇamasti—(Pañcapādika, P. 315).*

may well be said to have as its locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*) the Pure Self (*Ātman*), even if it is of *middle composite dimension*. Prakāśātmayati himself refutes this view by showing that there is a gulf of difference between the earthen jar and pure consciousness or knowledge, both of which are sought to be dependent on an extraneous locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*) as composite entities. But as consciousness or knowledge is pure and indivisible for the fact that it is not something other than the Pure Self which it must pre-suppose as its locus, it cannot be said with any logical argument that there is no inconsistency in its being regarded as a composite entity, dependent on the Pure Self. The earthen jar pre-supposes an extraneous locus, like the ground, but pure consciousness is not different from its *supposed* locus, i.e., Pure Self. Thus there is a fundamental difference in their nature which cannot draw any analogy between them. Prakāśātmayati further shows that consciousness or knowledge shines in its own light and hence cannot be equated with the earthen jar that is revealed by an external light. The lamp reveals the jar as a distinct entity, but Pure Consciousness as revealing the external objects shines in its own light and makes itself as the ground of all revelation, i.e., Pure Self. Thus Prakāśātmayati's analysis of the Advaita view is in conformity with the nature of the Self as Pure Consciousness that shines in its own light and vouchsafes for the revelation of every other entity lying outside. He sticks to his previously-expounded view of self-luminosity that material illumination of the light of the lamp is the ground of analogy of intellectual illumination of consciousness—a view seemingly unorthodox in the Advaitist interpretation.¹²⁰ Yet as has been amply elaborated by us above, Prakāśātmayati's thesis of self-luminosity on these both categories of illumination is not inconsistent in the least. He only suggests the non-dependence of the self-luminous principle on any other factors outside itself and that may be regarded as quite Advaitist on epistemological and metaphysical interpretations. However, Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvādīpana* brings out Prakāśātmayati's attempt to adduce

¹²⁰ *pradīpena prakāśātmayatiṃ mayā cagatamityanubharād ātmaiva citiprakāśaḥ; anyathā kṣāptena prakāśātmayatiṃ upacāra-prasaṅgāditi bhāvaḥ*—(*Vivaraṇa*, P. 315).

further proofs (cf. *pramāṇāntarāpekṣayā pricchati—Vivaraṇa*, P. 315), as springing out of the opponents' (i.e., upholders like the Sāṅkhya of composite consciousness dependent on a locus) dissatisfaction on the Advaitist conception of the equation of Pure Consciousness and Pure Self. These opponents may urge, as Akhaṇḍānanda shows, that even consciousness, as the revealer of the objective world, may be regarded as separate from the Self; for, it is seen in the objective case, like the destination (say, village) of the act of 'going' (*gamikriyā*) that the former is separate from the act adhering to a different entity (i.e., the subject) than itself (cf. the grammatical dictum—*parasamaveta-kriyāphalaśālitvaṃ karmatvam*). Thus the expression '*mayā avagataḥ*' (known by myself) like the expression '*mayā gato grāmaḥ*' (village reached by myself) may well be consistently used, even if the 'act of knowing' as revealing the meaning of something is not strictly enforced as non-different from the subject, the Pure Self. For, it may very well be said that the meaning is discovered by the Self *through a consciousness* that is merely an instrument of, and, never identical with, the Self¹²¹. Thus it is clear from the analysis of Akhaṇḍānanda that the Advaitist contention of the non-difference of the Self and Consciousness has to be explained further, so that the opponents' viewpoint may not stand. This task of proving the Advaitist thesis is taken up by Prakāśātmayati following his predecessor, Padmapāda, and is ably elucidated by his follower, Akhaṇḍānanda. Prakāśātmayati shows that the Pure Self is non-different from Pure Consciousness on logical and epistemological grounds. The Pure Self as one, eternal entity (*ekalī sthāyyātmā*) is logically to be upheld as the abiding principle of all knowledge. Now, epistemologically speaking, this knowledge is an indivisible entity that is also eternally abiding in all our conscious moments; for, knowledge *itself* does not change from moment to moment as the objects or contents of knowledge do. Thus Knowledge or Consciousness having no internal fragmentation is not different from the Pure Self which is the ground of all our conscious moments. This knowledge or

¹²¹ '*mayā gato grāmaḥ*' ityukto svānyagamikriyāriṣayatvaṃ yathā grāmasya, tadradaragataḥ svātirikṭatve'pi '*mayāvagataḥ*' iti vyapadeśa vyūjyata iti pramāṇāntaraṃ vaktavyam iti codyārthaḥ—(*Tattvadrīpana*, P. 316).

Consciousness as Pure Spirit or Self is also supported by the fact that neither is a knowable entity like the external object. Either shines by its own light and lights up the whole knowable universe. Thus the one, indivisible principle of all our conscious moments is the Pure Self as Consciousness and not the Pure Self besides moments of consciousness; Akhaṇḍānanda finely brings out these arguments in a syllogistic form thus: *Ātmā anubhavānnātiricyate, saṁvidkarmatvānadhikaraṇatve satyaparokṣatvāt, saṁvidvadityarthaḥ*—(*Tattvadiṭṭhāna*. P. 315). This probans (*hetu*) viz., *saṁvidkarmatvānadhikaraṇatve satyapyarokṣatvāt* is the ground of self-luminosity as the Advaitists propound, and this probans here follows from Prakāśātmayati's similar analysis of Consciousness (*saṁvedana* or *saṁvit*) as not being the object of any knowing (*anubhavādāhīnasiddhikasya ca viśayavadanātmavāt*—*Vivaraṇa*. P. 315). Now, the thesis of the Advaitists that in Consciousness there is no internal fragmentation due to the changing states of knowledge is sought to be proved by Prakāśātmayati, following Padmapāda. Padmapāda shows that there would have been the necessity of a double assumption in the case of regarding Consciousness as the object of our knowing in different moments of knowledge; for, that position would first posit that there are inner fragmentary bits in Consciousness which are known differently on different occasions of our knowing the external objects. But that would again lead us to the conception of a universal consciousness (*sāmānyam saṁvittvam*) like the universal cowhood (*sāmānyam gotvam*). However, that would be going against the logical and epistemological accuracy that follows from the viewpoint of the Advaitists who advocate that the momentary bits of consciousness can never be posited as distinct from the Pure Consciousness, except by the admission of the variations of objective forms¹²². The epistemological and logical defects in the admission of a universal like Consciousness distinct from existent states of consciousness are nicely brought out by Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda. Prakāśātmayati shows that the defect of the admission of greater postulation (*kalpanāgauravadoṣa*) naturally ensues upon the

¹²² 'na ca nīlānubhavaḥ pīṭānubhavaḥ' iti viśayavibhāgaparāmarśasūnyaḥ śāogato rīṣeṣo lakṣyate—(*Pañcapādikā*, P. 316).

admission of such a view; for, he says that we have first to posit the existence of individual states (*viśeṣabheda*) that are then to be postulated as the fragmentations of the universal Consciousness (*sāmānyabheda*) and that will land us into unnecessary double postulation. Akhaṇḍānanda further clarifies the position by saying that the opponents' viewpoint leads us to the position of the double postulation from which the Advaitist can easily extricate himself. For, according to the Advaitist, Consciousness as pure and indivisible is the only Truth, whereas the differences in it are all apparent varying from occasion to occasion due to the objective forms. Hence he can easily posit one principle—the All-pervasive Consciousness, by ignoring the fragmentations altogether. But the opponent has, out of sheer bad logic, to posit both the Universal Consciousness and the fragmentary states; whereafter he can say that the fragmentations are the outcome of the Universal Consciousness. But he has all the same the position of both the Universal and the individuals, from which defect of unnecessary postulation (*kalpanāgaurava*) the Advaitist is immune.¹²³ The Advaitist position that Consciousness has no internal fragmentation (*svagatabhedābhāva*) is established by Prakāśātmayati by the argument that such internal fragmentation is untenable for the fact that Consciousness as Pure Spirit is not by itself fragmented even internally; but all the fragmentations are due to the objective variations. This argument introduced by Padmapāda with the examples of 'consciousness of blue' (*nīlasamvit*) and 'consciousness of yellow' (*pītasamvit*) to establish the Advaitist theory of indivisibility of Consciousness as such is, as is suggested by Akhaṇḍānanda, likely to be challenged by the opponents; for, as he says, they might argue that as Consciousness is the revealer like a lamp, it has internal changes from the changing modes as from the changing flickers. But Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda show that such an argument cannot stand for the fact that

¹²³ *anubharavyaktibhedābhīyogame'nugataryarahārahetutrenānubhāva-
ramāśrayanīyamiti gauravam, vyaktyaikye tu lāghavam, vyaktirāśīyān
bhedapratibhāsasyaupādhikatvamiti kalpanām tavāpi samānamiti cet, na;
sāmānyaviśeṣabhedaṁ parikalpya sāmānyabhedapratibhāsasyaupādhikā-
kālyatrāt tara kalpanā adhikā, tasmādeka evānubhāva ityarthah—
(Tattvādīpana, Pp. 315-316).*

Consciousness does not change due to its *modes which are really existent* but is unchanging *by itself* whereas its modes are mere reflections on different forms of the objective world.

Prakāśātmayati, following Padmapāda, further examines the viewpoint of the opponents who seek to establish fragmentations in Consciousness by the fact of the destruction and endurance (*vinaṣṭāvinaṣṭatva*) of the states of it. Padmapāda seems to suggest the opposite viewpoint by showing that destruction and endurance of the states of Consciousness are facts of experience; hence there must be fragmentations in Consciousness—states which are created and destroyed under particular circumstances of the knowing subject. Such a view, based as it is on solid psychological and epistemological grounds, is sought to be controverted from the Advaitist standpoint vehemently,—first by Padmapāda and then by Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda. Padmapāda's contention is that this destruction and this endurance (*vinaṣṭāvinaṣṭatva*) of Consciousness as its states, are themselves untenable hypotheses and hence they cannot be taken to bring about the supposed fact of fragmentation of Consciousness. He shows that there is a 'petitio principi' in this view which naturally becomes a bad logic to prove anything. Destruction and endurance of Consciousness, under particular situations of objective knowledge, pre-suppose that states of Consciousness under these situations are *born (janya)* to account for the knowledge of the particular moments; but as the concept of *birth* or *origination* of the states of Consciousness is valid only when a previous destruction and a previous endurance of some states of it have been established, the pre-supposition of such birth or origination is merely 'begging the question' or 'petitio principi'. This kind of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśrayatva*) is a defect (*doṣa*) in Indian Logic, for it vitiates the whole process of syllogism by trying to prove a proposition by an unestablished middle which by pre-supposing a condition has to wait for that condition to be established first by itself. Padmapāda hints at this form of bad logic by showing the untenability of the opponents' viewpoint of the fragmentations of Consciousness on the strength of the processes of destruction and endurance of some states of it, and Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda exemplify this position further.

Prakāśātmayati says that as in the case of the consciousness of colours, when there is the consciousness of, say, blue (*nīlasamvit*), there is no consciousness of any other colour, say, yellow (*pīṭāsāmvit*). Hence the opponents may argue that there is the endurance of the perception of one colour (blue) and the destruction of that of other (yellow), whence it follows that there is a division in Consciousness itself as of blue and yellow. Akhaṇḍānanda finely improves upon the clarifications of his predecessors by showing that there is no point in saying that a particular consciousness is absent at the time of another consciousness. For absence of a particular consciousness may mean either the absence of the attendant condition (*viśeṣaṇa-vyāvṛtyā*) or the absence of the entity itself (*viśeṣavyāvṛtyā*). But either case is untenable to prove the absence of consciousness, for, the first alternative merely denies the absence of the particular and not the absence of the entity itself; the second suggests an impossibility—for, absence of the entity itself is never possible by the absence of any of its particular modes. Thus Akhaṇḍānanda shows very logically that even on the opponents' theory of the destruction and endurance of particular states of consciousness, by the assumption of the empirical evidence of the perception of a particular colour when there is absence of any other colour, does not stand the dialectical tests. For, absence of consciousness can never be posited either with the denial of the particular mode or by the absence of the temporal states.¹²⁴ Even then the opponents' viewpoint may not be stayed, for, they may put in fresh arguments to prove their case. Prakāśātmayati seems to suggest these fresh arguments in order to controvert them finally. As Akhaṇḍānanda says—*vidhāntareṇa hetuḥ samarthayate* (*Tattvadīpana*, P. 316) (he i.e., Prakāśātmayati seems to justify the opponents' argument), it is worth Prakāśātmayati's endeavour to throw overboard completely the opponents' viewpoint. Thus the fresh arguments of the opponents seem to be that as, the following state of consciousness (say, of a particular colour like

¹²⁴ *naṣṭānaṣṭaribhūgusyaivāsiddherityāśaṅkyāha, nanu nīleti, pīṭasamvito'bhāvāditi ko'rthaḥ? kim—viśeṣaṇavyāvṛtyā viśiṣṭavyāvṛttiḥ? uta viśeṣavyāvṛttyeti, ādye na samvīdabhāvaḥ siddhīyati, dvitiye trasiddhiḥ—samvīdo'nyadāpi darśanāditi samādhānagranthārthaḥ—*(*Tattvadīpana*, P. 316).

'blue') is seen to be born, it must be admitted that it has separate ancillaries (conditions) of origination than the preceding one; for, there can never be the origination of two perceptions at the very same moment. Hence it cannot be denied that there is first the destruction of the previous perception (say, of a particular colour like 'yellow') and the birth of the following perception (say, of another particular colour like 'blue'). It is here that the above-mentioned charge of *anyonyāśrayatva* (mutual dependence and consequential 'petitio principii') is urged by the Advaitists. Padmapāda's argument starts from this inevitable fallacy of material logic to which the opponents' arguments necessarily boil down. In fact, there are no logical grounds for the opponents to stand on to defend their title that there must be divisions of Consciousness on the evidence of the destruction and endurance of the particular states or modes of consciousness. Thus the fallacy of 'mutual dependence' starts in order that the opponents cannot prove that there are any destruction and any endurance of conscious states that inevitably beg the question of their previous origination. Thus the hint of Padmapāda has been elaborated exhaustively by Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda who are trying to support their predecessor more fully. As a matter of fact, Prakāśātmayati has shown clearly that this 'petitio principii' is against the opponents' arguments to prove the fragmentation of Consciousness. He, moreover, shows that such a position of the opponents who seek to prove their thesis by the admission of the birth of conscious states will make their theory vitiated by the defect of unnecessary postulation (*kalpanā-gaurava-doṣa*); for, as he shows, origination of conscious states implies origination of the state of consciousness (*samvidah ulpatti*) and the origination of the objective coloration (*viśayoparaklāhārasya ca*)—thus implying unnecessary postulation of two originations. But in the Advaitist view there is merely the birth of the objective coloration in so far as consciousness is never and under no circumstances postulated as being born. Hence the Advaitist view is more consistent and coherent, both logically and epistemologically, than the view of the Sāṅkhyas etc. who hold that there must be internal heterisations of Consciousness through particular modes of expression and who therefore are involved in endless, unmean-

ing hypotheses challenged by the Advaitists, as has been shown here. From this rather elaborate examination of the opponents' view as to the possibility of *saṃvidbheda*, it is, as by the way, shown by these Advaitist teachers that even the Buddhist (i.e., *Vijñānavādin* or *Yogācāra*) theory cannot logically stand. This Idealistic School of Buddhism suggests that there are endless bits of momentary consciousness which arise in a particular perception (*kṣaṇikavijñānavāda*); but as these numerous states are very similar to one another, there is no knowledge of their actual difference owing to the defect of the very akinness itself. They compare consciousness to the light of a lamp which has numerous momentary flickers, all of the very same nature. Thus the *Vijñānavādin's* contention is that these actual fragmentations which we know as single units of knowledge may be taken as accounting for the actual *fact* of such fragmentations. But Padmapāda and, following him, his followers have shown clearly that such a view also is logically untenable. The argument from very fine similarity of conscious states is untenable, for, here also there is the fallacy of mutual dependence. Similarity which seeks to establish the division (*bheda*) in Consciousness must therefore beg the question of division in order that similarity between two divided states may be established. Thus the inevitable *anyonyāśrayatvadoṣa* vitiates the whole cycle of the syllogistic inference and hence nothing is proved. This is very aptly suggested by Akhaṇḍānanda thus: *bhede siddhe sādṛśyakalpanā, tasyām ca siddhāyām tato bhedādhigatau bhedasiddhiḥ itītaretarāśrayaprasaṅgānmaivam ityāha—tannirākarotīti—*(*Tattvadīpana*, P. 316). Hence the *Vijñānavādin's* or *Yogācāra's* theory of the existence of actual fragmentary states of Consciousness is shown to tumble down on the logical scrutiny of their case. Prakāśamayati further shows that the *Vijñānavādin's* contention that the difference between different kinds of Consciousness is not recognised on account of the close akinness amongst them stands a very simple charge even on his own theory; for, he shows that the *Vijñānavādin's* consciousness, even though fragmented, is, nevertheless, *self-revealed*; hence even on his own admission there must be very little difference with the admission of the self-luminous Absolute Consciousness from the viewpoint of epistemology. Thus the *Vijñānavādin's* self-revealed conscious-

ness should naturally reveal the difference subsisting amongst the various moments of consciousness, in the same way as those moments are themselves revealed. Thus the *Vijñānavādin* commits an epistemological suicide by not admitting the revelation of the difference as well. Vidyāraṇya in his *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha* has further substantiated this point by showing that even Sureśvarācārya in his *Bṛhadāranyaka-bhāṣya-vārttika* has referred to such a logical conclusion that the upholders of self-luminosity (including the theory of self-revelation of the Buddhist) must lead themselves to. Sureśvara's analysis, however, springs from the untenability of any fragmentation in the Absolute Consciousness, on the basis of the absence of any *prāgabdhāva* (absence due to the previous non-origination of an object). His argument shows that such *prāgabdhāva* alone can vouchsafe for the origination of an object, and naturally, Absolute Consciousness must also be regarded as being possessed of *prāgabdhāva*. Then and then only can we say that it admits of fragmentations (*bhedas*). But as that is untenable on the very face of it for the fact that this *prāgabdhāva* also is revealed to the *Sākṣin* of the Advaitist like all other objects, it cannot be presupposed of the Absolute Consciousness. Thus no *bheda* in it is logically tenable, as the *Vijñānavādī* Buddhist seem to suggest. Hence Consciousness *shining by itself*, as a principle, must not depend on any extraneous condition to be fragmented; if that is so, difference in fragmentations should also shine forth in the same light of Consciousness.¹²⁵ The contention is that the Advaitist also recognises such non-revelation in the case of the *Jīvas* who are in essence *Brahman*, as established by the *doṣa* (eternal hindrance) like *avidyā* (nescience). But as there has been no such ground established in the case of different moments of Consciousness, non-revelation of the difference amongst them is logically untenable.¹²⁶ *Prakāśātmayati fur-*

¹²⁵ *tasmādekaiva saṁvidanādiḥ. anūditvaṁ ca prāgabdhāvarahitatrat. taduktam Sureśvaravārttike—kāryam sarvairiyato dṛṣṭam prāgabdhāvacapura-ḥsaram tasyāpi saṁvitsākṣitvāt prāgabdhāvo no saṁvidah—(Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha, Pt. II., P. 72).*

¹²⁶ *jvālānāmanyavedyatvena tathātre'pi svaprakāśasaṁrinṣṭhabhedasyāvivhāvanāyogāt. na ca svaprakāśabrahmatatratvibhāvanam nidarśanīyam. tatratvidyāvāraṇasya pramāṇaiḥ sādhitatvāt—(Ibid, P. 72).*

ther analyses this point in order to substantiate fully the Advaitist view over against the opponents' view. Thus he tries to bring out, *from the opponents' viewpoint*, an inferential proof for the establishment of their theory that there may be the difference (as supposed) among the different moments of Consciousness. The syllogistic argument put forth by him is known as the *sāmānyatodsṛṣṭānumāna* (an inference based on facts of general assumption). This kind of syllogism suggests a conclusion which is arrived at by an assumption in which another similar *general fact* is taken as the ground. The inferential syllogism suggested by Prakāśātmayati is based on the assumption of the universal concomitance subsisting between the 'probans' (*hetu*) of 'being revealed by a permanent internal illuminative cognition' and the probandum (*sādhya*) of 'having differences among the similar bits of something. This *vyāpti* or concomitance is imposed on Consciousness by the opponents (i.e., *Vijñānavādī* Buddhist who admits of the existence of such probans through the assumption of a general fact and this general fact is the case of the light, say of the lamp. Now this abiding light of the lamp being revealed by *itself* (as Prakāśātmayati has taken it to be without the strict Advaitist conception of a difference between *material illumination* and *intellectual illumination*) admits of the difference in flames of every moment. Similarly, the intellectual illumination of Consciousness also admits of difference among its moments, being itself self-revealed as the one abiding principle.¹²⁷ Akhaṇḍānanda shows that this syllogism lays emphasis on the two aspects of the cognition (*buddhi*), viz., *sthāyī* (permanent) and *prakāśa* (illuminative), for the fact that there must be the recognition of the self-luminous cognition whether of material illumination like the light of the lamp or of the intellectual illumination like Consciousness, and these two entities must be abiding.¹²⁸

¹²⁷ *saṁvidāḥ sādṛśyapratibaddhabhedārabhāsau, sthāyīprakāśabuddhivedyatvāt, jñānāradityanumātum śakyate*—(Vivaraṇa, P. 217).

¹²⁸ *buddhivedyatvādityukte ghaṭāḍau vyavicārah, tadarthan 'prakāśeti' viśeṣaṇam. prakāśa iti buddhiḥ prakāśabuddhiḥ tadvedyatvādityarthāḥ. utpannamātravinaṣṭapradīpādīryāvṛttyartham—'sthāyīti' viśeṣaṇam. sthāyī-buddhivedyatvādityukte ghaṭāḍau vyavicārah—tadarthan 'prakāśeti'—(Tattvadīpana, P. 317).*

Prakāśātmayati, following his predecessor, Padmapāda, shows that this type of inference cannot be maintained to prove the proposed conclusion the opponents drive at; for, the inference itself is opposed to the experience and contrary to further reasoning. Now an inference based on the general assumption cannot be maintained if it antagonises with the direct experience of particular instances which are sought to be proved by inference as possessing a specific quality (like *bheda* here); moreover, opposite valid reasoning (*tarka*) can nullify an inference as proving the particular probandum. Here both these factors are present and, therefore, the inference is wrong at the very foundation. Prakāśātmayati shows that our experience of the so-called bits of Consciousness does not prove that there is a difference among them, but on the contrary, proves that those bits suppose an abiding Consciousness that is extended through all moments. This empirical proof cannot be doubted, for, without the recognition of such an abiding principle no moments of Consciousness can be satisfactorily explained as all the moments presuppose the existence of this permanent background in the origination of our empirical behaviour. The opposite valid reasoning (*tarka*) that arises against this inference of the opponents is with regard to the charge levelled by the Advaitists which has been brought out above, viz., that *bheda* or difference among bits of Consciousness should also shine forth in the self-same light of self-luminous Consciousness, had there been actually such a difference existent. Hence Padmapāda, Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda have given us enough grounds from the Advaitist standpoint to establish their viewpoint as being based upon very solid arguments, both empirical and logical, to triumph over the viewpoints of the opponents.

Padmapāda's analysis of the nature of Consciousness leads him on to the analysis of the Self as connoted by the former, whence he tries to explain how *empirical* moments of Consciousness can also be justified. This apparent division in the logical analysis of the Self as Consciousness, admitting of empirical moments, is explained as not unjustifiable by Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda. They say that the Advaitist interpretation of the Self as Consciousness must needs explain how the different *empirical* moments in our

daily existence arise from the standpoint of that interpretation. Hence Padmapāda is perfectly within the limits of logic when he seeks to explain this phenomenon. Padmapāda says that the different empirical moments are explained if we recognise the Self as the permanent principle of Consciousness, and not jeopardised; for, the Self as such (cf. *tasmāt citsvabhava evātmā—Pañcapādikā*. P. 317), is only manifested in particular moments through the particular psychoses taking place in the mental entity (*antaḥkaraṇa-vṛttis*); in fact the Self as Pure Consciousness, the abiding principle of all experience under these particular processes or psychoses, is delimited as such and such temporal and objective knowledge; the objective content of Consciousness makes for such objective determination of Consciousness.¹²⁹ Hence the Advaitist argues that there may be empirical moments of Consciousness, even though the Self as Pure Consciousness is the only Reality.

Herein, however, sets in a fresh and very serious problem that the opponents try to urge against the Advaitist. They point out that such a recognition by the Advaitist will make his position precarious by making the Pure Self the Ego (*ahaṅkāra*) or the "I'-consciousness as the experiencer of all the empirical cognitions of the objective world.¹³⁰ Thus the Advaitist finds himself in a very tight corner by admitting the empirical moments of Consciousness which is, however, non-different from the Pure Self, for, in such a position, his Pure Self no longer remains Pure, but becomes the Ego, the *ahaṅkāra*, as the experiencer of all such moments. Prakāśātmayati ably refutes this charge of the opponents by bringing out the real Advaitist view according to which the Pure Self is independent of all the empirical and psychological states or stages, but these states demand the delimitation of the Pure Self as Consciousness for the purpose of pragmatic behaviour. Hence when the subject of any knowledge is referred to, the

¹²⁹ *tena prameyabhedenopadhīyamāno'nubhavābhīdāhānīyakam labhate—(Pañcapādikā, P. 317).*

¹³⁰ *viśayānubhavameva nimittīkṛtya—'ahamiti' draṣṭṛparāmarśādātma-ivāhaṅkāraḥ saṁvṛttaḥ iti codayati—'bāḍhamata eveti'—(Vivaraṇa, Pp. 317-318).*

bāḍhamata eva—viśayānubhavanimitto'nidamātmako'haṅkāraḥ varṇyate—(Pañcapādikā, P. 318).

Pure Self is designated as 'T' (*draṣṭṛ*) and hence becomes referred to in an objective relation in the knowledge; otherwise the objective world would not have been brought in contact with the subjective consciousness, whence all our pragmatic life would cease.¹³¹

¹³¹ *draṣṭṛrūpeṇa parāmarśasya viśayānubhavo nimittam, anyathā draṣṭṛ-rādivibhāgaśūnyaścinmātrārabbhāsaḥ syāditi bhāvaḥ*—(*Vivaraṇa*, P. 318).

CHAPTER VIII

AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF DREAMLESS SLEEP (*SUṢUPTI*) FROM THE ADVAITIST VIEWPOINT— BRINGING OUT THE NATURE OF THE PURE SELF AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE EGO-CONSCIOUSNESS.

Prakāśātmayati's analysis of the nature of the Pure Self in our conscious life, based upon the suggestions put forward by his predecessor, Padmapāda, gives rise to a very vital and interesting study of the state of dreamless sleep (*suṣupti*). Padmapāda shows that the opponents' arguments of the revelation of the Ego (*ahankāra*) as the Advaitists' Pure Self, should also be carried out in the state of dreamless sleep, wherein his theory obviously fails. Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda further examine this analysis and come to the inevitable conclusion that the opponents' Ego cannot be said to shine as the Advaitists' Pure Self or Pure Consciousness does. The main argument against the opponents' viewpoint is that in dreamless sleep (*suṣupti*) where all the functions of the internal and external organs cease, the Ego (*ahankāra*) cannot shine at all, but the Self as Pure Consciousness still shines (cf. the *Śruti*: *atrāyaṁ puruṣaḥ svayaṁjyotiḥ*). In the dreamless sleep, then, Pure Consciousness cannot be said to have been brought to a cessation, for that would mean that Consciousness has left the body by making it, *consciousness-less*—an absurd proposition. In dreamless sleep, what then is actually the state according to the Advaitists. The functions of all the organs being stopped, Pure Consciousness or the Self shines forth in its own light, with the fullness of *avidyā* (*nescience*) lying passive on it. There is no creation or destruction of knowledge-situations, no rising and falling of the *āvidyaka* or illusory world; the Pure Self alone shines forth as the self-luminous principle as the *mere substratum* of the passive state of the all-engrossing *avidyā*. Thus when the Ego is no longer active in *suṣupti*, the Pure Self shines on; and hence in this state at least, the opponent loses all the force of his arguments.

This dialectical method is brought to a very fine logical conclusion with the help of a syllogism by Akhaṇḍānanda: (*tathā ca prayogaḥ—ahaṅkāraḥ, nātmā, asati praitbandhe tasmin bhāsamāne satyanavabhāsamānatvāt, ghaṭavadityarthaḥ* :— (*Tattvadīpana*, P. 318). [The Ego cannot be regarded as the Pure Self, for when the latter shines and *when there is no hindrance*, the former does not shine (as in *suṣupti*) ; as the pot (which does not shine in that state, though there is no hindrance to it when the Self shines out)]. As the pot does not shine out like the Self in *suṣupti* when merely the Pure Self *as such* endures and not as the *subject* to any *objective* reference, so it cannot be held, logically or epistemologically, that the subjective or objective reference in knowledge can be the Pure Self. Thus the Ego as the Pure Self is an untenable hypothesis, at least if this stage of the shining of the Pure Self is considered. The cessation of the organic functions in *suṣupti*, therefore, suggests that there is at least the necessity of these factors for the revelation of other references (e.g., subjective) in knowledge, while the Pure Self is independent of them. It endures as the Witness of the full, rarefied state of *avidyā*, but is not caught up within it as being dependent on other extraneous factors like the subjective or objective state in knowledge. This is what is suggested by Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda in their analysis of the stage of *suṣupti* and the nature of the Pure Self in it, as distinct from the nature of the Ego which is meaninglessly sought to be equated by the opponents with the Pure Self. Luminosity of the two in *suṣupti* is at poles asunder and this fact alone vouchsafes for the distinct nature of the Pure Self in *suṣupti*.

The opponent, however, may argue on by saying that the Ego does not shine in *suṣupti*, not because of the fact that it is distinct from the Pure Self (as the Advaitists contend), but because of the fact that there is no revelation of the Ego, as the subject must depend on the revelation of the object (cf. *viśayānubhavanimitto draṣṭṛ-rūpāvabhāso'hamullekhaḥ, tadraḥite suṣupte kathamasya prasaṅgaḥ—Vivaraṇa*, P. 318). Akhaṇḍānanda elucidates this point by showing that the knowledge of the object (*viśayānubhava*) must be regarded as the basis of the revelation of the object (*viśayāvabhāsaḥ*), as the object itself is unrevealed or inert (*jada*). Knowledge pre-

supposes an objective factor as much as the subjective, and hence there must be the revelation of the object when knowledge arises; but this epistemological necessity does in no wise pre-suppose that the Self as Pure Consciousness should remain unrevealed, when the objective or the subjective factor in knowledge is such. To do so is to commit an epistemological suicide by debarring the rise of the Consciousness at any stage of our life—waking or dreaming. The Ego-consciousness is, no doubt, co-eval with the objective consciousness, but in the *śuṣupti*-stage a higher Consciousness prevails, transcending both. Thus the opponents' arguments may have good logic in our waking or dreaming life, but not in the dreamless life. The Pure Consciousness is ever-revealed and self-luminous, be there any subjective or objective revelation or not. Hence to argue, from the absence of the revelation of the objective factor in dreamless life, that the Ego is naturally unrevealed, means that there is the self-shining Pure Consciousness and not what the opponents try to establish, viz., that the Ego is the Pure Consciousness, but unrevealed in that state. Such an argument makes their logic all the sadder in so far as their Consciousness becomes an unreliable master, himself falsely depending on so-called reliable servants. These facts have been very cryptically summed up by Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvādīpana* where he has shown that Pure Consciousness is not dependent on any other factors for its revelation and hence is quite distinct from such dependent entities like the Ego¹²². As to the question raised by the opponents that the Ego cannot be revealed in *śuṣupti* because of the absence of the object and its revelation, these Advaitist writers have further shown that the Ego as seer (*draṣṭā*) being dependent on the seen (*dṛśya*) (cf. *draṣṭṛvaṃ sapratyogirūpam—Vivaraṇa*, P. 319), cannot be regarded as independent of any such factor (*niṣpratyogirūpam*) as Pure Consciousness. The Ego, therefore, falls to the category of the unconscious, which however becomes the conscious seat in knowledge (cf. *sa cedamahamarthaḥ—Vivaraṇa*, P. 319). Thus it falls short of the nature of Pure Conscious-

¹²² *viśayānubhavasyaṭ mānākāratvānna tatsādhakatvam ātmanāḥ saṁvi-
drūpatvācca na tadāhinasiddhitramityarthaḥ—(Tattvādīpana, P. 318).*

ness and hence cannot stand revealed in *suṣupti* as the latter is in its own merits.¹³³

Prakāśātmayati, following his predecessor, Padmapāda, still elaborately examines the possible arguments of the opponents towards the nature of the state of *suṣupti viśā-viś the Ātman*. He first analyses that the probans of dependence on a counterpart (*sapratyogitva*), which the Advaitist urges against the admission of the Ego as the Self shining in *suṣupti*, is vitiated by the defect of *asiddhi* or untenability of its own nature; and hence the charge against the Ego as the Self in *suṣupti* is worth nothing. The opponents argue that the Ego, being conceived as distinct from the object on which it is said to depend, can very well be regarded as the Self in *suṣupti*. This Ego-consciousness is nevertheless the *bhoktṛ*-consciousness (consciousness of an enjoyer), but in *suṣupti* it is alienated from the *viśaya*-relation and hence is not difficult of admission as the Self. (cf. *parāgyāvṛttam draṣṭṛrūpaṁ bhoktṛtvameva, tadabhāve suṣuptāvanubhūyata iti codayati—nanvahaṁiti—Vivaraṇa, P. 319*). The force of these arguments rests on the assumption by the opponents that when in *suṣupti* there is no possibility of the apprehension of the objects, the Ego naturally *seems to be* unrevealed (cf. *tadabhāve katham tathā pratibhāsaḥ—Pañcapādikā, P. 319*). Akhaṇḍānanda brings out the full implication of this argument by showing that the opponents' analogy of the 'dependence on a counterpart' (*sapratyogitva*) in the case of the Ego, as not militating against its being regarded as the Self in *suṣupti* where it is naturally unrevealed, is provided by the articulation of sound (*śabda*) which, though not naturally revealed as qualified, appears to depend on some factors like shortness (*hrasvatva*) or length (*dīrghatva*) when we use it as 'short' or 'long'.¹³⁴ But Akhaṇḍānanda points out that if we judge from a deeper logical view-point (*gūḍhābhisandhi*),

¹³³ *anātmaivāhaṁkāra syāditi bhāvaḥ—(Vivaraṇa, P. 319).*

ahaṁkāraḥ nātmā, sapratyogikatvāt, vinasvaratvācca, ghaṭavat—(Tattvadīpana, P. 319).

¹³⁴ *viśayānubharābhāve suṣuptau nāhamullekhaśaktiḥ, tannimittatvādahamullekhasya, yathā pradeśamātraparimitāṁ pratiyoginirapekṣatayā pratiyamānaṁ hrasvasabdollekhitayā pratipattau pratiyoginamapekṣate, tadavadityarthaḥ—(Tattvadīpana, P. 320).*

the opponents are caught up in their own net of arguments and cannot therefore establish their point of view. This deeper logical analysis will show that what the opponents try to suggest here is vitiated by their own arguments previously held; for, when they hold that the Ego is *not* dependent on any counterpart in the *susupti*-state, it must be regarded that it is never dependent on such a counterpart. But that will be going against the fundamental position of the opponents who hold that the Ego is so dependent at other states of our life, viz., the waking and the dreaming. Even if the opponents admit the previous supposition, that admission will entail them in the difficulty that the Ego should be revealed at all states even without the objective counterpart. But that is never an epistemological fact. Hence the opponents are put into insurmountable difficulties by trying to hold that the Ego is not dependent in the *susupti*-state on any counterpart, while it is in other states, for that makes their position all the more precarious by the exposure of the unstable nature of the Ego. The argument from the analogy of the 'shortness' or 'length' of sound also cannot save the opponents from being dragged into such a position. True it is that the sound (say, of 'a') is not short or long as the particular spatio-temporal ethereal vibration, but is such *whenever we wish to articulate* it as short or long, then depending on the shortness or length of our mode of articulation; yet the Ego cannot be said to be naturally independent of any counterpart (*niṣpratiyogikam*) but becoming so dependent whenever the objective counterpart is brought into relation with it, so that the objective reference always determines its dependence on other factors (*saṁpratiyogikatvam*). Such an impossibility is not merely epistemological as trying to make the revelation of the Ego always present (which is not the case), but also logical. The difference in the nature of the Ego in different states only pre-supposes that in the *susupti*-state, it is not the Ego that is revealed but a distinct entity other than the Ego. This distinct entity is the Pure Self as Consciousness (as held by the Advaitists) which shines forth in its own light and is never dependent on anything for its revelation. This Pure Self or Pure Consciousness is not, like the Ego, to be conceived as being distinct from the other factors which are depended

upon (*parāgyāvṛtta*) for it is distinct from the not-Self which so depends; it is shining in its own light so that other objects are revealed in its light, and cannot reveal itself.¹³⁵ If, however, the opponents still argue that there is no harm if in the *suṣupti*-state the Ego-consciousness remains, the Advaitists answer that when a man gets up from this state he ought to remember (*smṛti*) that Ego-consciousness of *suṣupti*, as he remembers the previous day's experience of *himself*. But that is far from the case. Even if there is no universal rule of remembrance (*smṛti*) after experience (*anbhute*), yet the Ego as not distinct from the Self should also shine like the Self. But in no way is it a fact. The opponents cannot avoid this charge of absence of remembrance of the Ego, if it is experienced in *suṣupti*, by holding that the Consciousness of the Ego being permanent cannot rouse up any *smṛti* through any residual impression (*saṁskāra*), for even though the Ego is *experienced*, they cannot say that its experience is permanent. The Ego-consciousness rises and falls with every kind of our experience and thus the opponents must needs regard it as possessing some sort of *saṁskāra* to make for the rise of its remembrance. If they do not accept this position, they will never be able to account for the fact of remembrance from their standpoint; for, even the remembrance of the past day's experience of *oneself* must be regarded as a fact and they cannot account for it but by accepting that the Ego-consciousness is not permanent, but vacillating, and thus paves the way for its remembrance afterwards. These facts are very consistently and cryptically summed up by Akhaṇḍānanda: *anubhavāśrayatvasya prāg nirastatvāt parihāro bhavatyevetyarthah*—(*Tattvadīpaṇa*, P. 321), meaning thereby that the Ego does not belong to the category of the enduring Consciousness, but to that of the distinct not-Self, which is rising and

¹³⁵ *tataśca viśayoparaktaśopratiyogikasyabhāvasyāhaṁkāraśyātmatvaṁ suṣuptāvanubhavaviruddhamidamāpatyate ityāha*—*tataśca viśayoparāgeṭi. ātmanastu sarvātmakatvānna parāgyāvṛttatā, ahamuparāgādeva vyāvṛt-tyavabhāśaḥ ityarthah*—(*Vivaraṇa*, P. 321).

ahaṁkāraśya sāpekṣatvādātmanaścānapekṣatvāt kathamabheda ityāha- tataśceti. sapratyogikasyānātmatvaṁ cet, tarhi tvanmate'pyātmanāḥ parāgyāvṛttatvādenātmatvāpātāḥ ityāhaṁkāryātmanāḥ pūrṇatvāt vyāvṛt- tatvāsiddhirityāha—*ātmana iti. ahamityukte vyāvṛttatā prathate ityā- śaṅkya prathanamanyathayati*—*ahamiti*—(*Tattvadīpaṇa*, P. 321).

falling, coming and going, to the Witness of the Pure Consciousness.

The Advaitists, however, are not in any tight corner to explain their position of the remembrance of the Ego. Though they hold that the Absolute or Pure Consciousness is ever-enduring, they explain their theory of knowledge, including remembrance, with the help of *vṛttis* or mental modifications. They hold that the *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind being a translucent entity has the image of the object painted on it whenever it is in contact with the object, directly or indirectly, and this imprinting of the object is through the modification it undergoes towards apprehending that object. This modification of the translucent mind to apprehend directly or indirectly, any particular object is known as the *vṛtti*. Now, therefore, Prakāśātmayati explains the Advaita theory of remembrance of the Ego (*ahaṅkārasmyti*) with reference to this basic principle of knowledge. He says that there is a mental modification of the nature of Ego (*ahaṅkārahkāra antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) when the object is directly brought in contact with the subject. The I-consciousness as the possessor of the objective reference in knowledge is the *primus* of all reflective knowledge, and hence the mind is modified into the form of the Ego which owns the knowledge. In this way, the Ego being the reflector of consciousness (for, all *vṛttis* are the modes of Absolute Consciousness which expresses itself through the subjective and objective aspects of knowledge), becomes perceived in reflective knowledge along with the objective aspect. Thus there remains a trace (*saṁskāra*) of the Ego-consciousness whenever a particular knowledge subsides. This trace or impression of the Ego-consciousness like in all other cases of remembrance, becomes the instrument for the remembrance of the Ego in subsequent moments. Thus, in the re-reflective judgments on the Ego, the knowledge of the previous moment of Ego-consciousness as expressed through the *vṛtti* becomes roused up in remembrance through the trace or impression of that knowledge.¹³⁶

¹³⁶ *ahaṁvṛttyavacchinna merāntaḥkaraṇam. caitanyasya viśayabhāvamāpadyate, tad vṛtti-saṁskāra janyasmarāṇāvacchinna mantāḥkaraṇam punaḥ smṛtyanubhavatvācchādakamiti smaraṇopopattiḥ—(Vivaraṇa, Pp. 321-322). ahaṅkārahkāra kācidantaḥkaraṇavṛttirutpadyate, tasyām vṛttyāra-*

To defend the Advaitist position of the absence of any cognition of the Ego (*ahaṅkāra*) as the Self in the *suṣupti*-state, Prakāśātmayati following Padmapāda shows how in that state there is no cognition of happiness or pleasurableness (*sukha*) as pertaining to enjoyment of the objective phenomena) adhering to the Ego. The opponents argue that when one gets up from dreamless slumber, he is often seen to speak of his pleasing sleep (*sukhamahamasvāpsam*). This phenomenon, therefore, they argue, points to the cognition of the Self as a pleased (*sukhi*) entity and this pleased Self is designated as the 'I' or Ego when that state is remembered. But Prakāśātmayati dismisses this argument altogether by showing that there is no cognition of any pleasure (*sukha*) during deep slumber (*suṣupti*). This cognition of pleasure in *suṣupti* cannot be taken to postulate the Ego as the Self, the mere enjoyer or happy entity without any objective reference; for, the Ego is never perceived as the Self even as a mere happy entity. Happiness or pleasurableness is not a fact of the *suṣupti*-state as the absence of unhappiness or unpleasurableness is. In that state the Ego's functions are all stopped; the objective world also ceases to function as being known in any way. The Pure Self or Pure Consciousness alone shines in its own light with the fullness of *avidyā*-seeds lying embedded in it as being merely revealed. In such a state, therefore, happiness adhering to the Ego can hardly be postulated, for the Ego as happy is never cognized and hence never recognized. What is absent psychologically as being a blind-folded entity is also epistemologically non-existent. Thus the state of *suṣupti* merely postulates a state of the absence of unhappiness which characterizes the other states, viz., *jāgrat* and *svapna*. Even such an absence is negatively realized by the Self which is absorbed in its own unvacillating nature. Hence Prakāśātmayati says that there being merely a verbal reference (*śābdajñāna*) and no perceptual reference (*pratyakṣa-jñāna*), an implied meaning (*lakṣaṇā*) can very well be imposed on *sukha* as *duḥkhābhāva*.¹³⁷ Prakāśātmayati following Padma-

bhivoyaktaṁ caitanyaṁ vṛttivikṣāntaḥkaraṇasādhakam tasyāśca vṛtternāśe tatsuṁśkārādantaḥkaraṇākāraṁ smaraṇamupajāyate—(Tattvādīpana, P. 321).

¹³⁷ *mukhyasukhasamābhāvād duḥkhābhāvasya lakṣyasya sampratīpanatvāt—(Vivaraṇa, P. 322).*

pāda also shows that the Ego being perceived as happy should be happy with regard to an object ; but such a position is not and cannot be regarded as true even by the opponents. Hence it is a logical inconsistency to speak of the Ego as happy (in the *suṣupti*-state) with no object of happiness. On the contrary, the Advaitist is strictly logical by saying that there is merely the *negative feeling* of the absence of any unhappiness with no subjective or objective reference, for such an absence of unhappiness is, in the negative way, our own experience in recognition.¹³⁸ Even physiological phenomena like lightness of the body are incapable to postulate any *sukha* in the Ego, for such phenomena are purely dependent on the soundness or unsoundness of the physiological organs produced after the slumber. The fatigued limbs of the waking state depend on the slumber for being refreshed and rejuvenated, and that cause being variant with different persons and circumstances, physiological easiness (like lightness of the body) or uneasiness ensues. Hence these phenomena have nothing to do with the feeling of any happiness *during the slumber*. Such being the position from the Advaitist standpoint, Prakāśātmayati has very well contended that the Ego is never remembered as 'enjoyer' (*bhoktṛ*) in deep slumber (*suṣupti*), but merely the Pure Consciousness of that state stands as the present Ego-consciousness of being associated with the remembrance of a state. This remembrance in no wise makes the Ego as having been happy previously, but only the previous state of pure negativity (the absence of any unhappiness) is now associated in the experience of the Ego.¹³⁹

The crucial and final position of the Advaitists is, however, brought out by Prakāśātmayati who explains more elaborately the phenomenon of *duḥkḥābhāva* as being remembered from their standpoint. The Advaitists urge that the

*rimataḥ duḥkḥasāmbandhi muktivilakṣaṇāvasthāsāmbandhitvāt sammat-
avadityāśaṅkyāha—tadabhāva iti. savikalpakasya śabdollikhitatvāttatra
lakṣaṇa yuktetyarthaḥ—(Tattvadīpana, P. 322).*

¹³⁸ *vyapadeśopi 'sukhaṁ sūptaḥ, na kiñcinmayā cetitamiti' hi drśyate
—(Pañcapādikā, P. 322).*

¹³⁹ *tasmānna suṣuptau bhoktrīyā'pi ahamullekha'nusmaryata iti.
nana—anuḥhāte'pi na smṛtiniyamaḥ—satyam—ātmanyānusmaryamāne tāvan-
mātrasyāhañkārasya ahamityeva smṛtiniyamaḥ syādityuktaṁ—(Vivaraṇa,
P. 323).*

fact of the experience of *duḥkḥābhāva* is not possible to postulate even in the *suṣupti*-state for the fact that there is neither the knowledge of the counterpart (*pratiyogin*—i.e., *duḥkḥa*) nor can such a negative feeling adequately explain the self-shining Pure Consciousness lying unvacillating in its own nature (*svarūpānandānubhavaḥ*). Hence the Advaitists urge that the real state of the Self in *suṣupti* is the intrinsic blissful state and, therefore, on the one hand, the limited happy Ego is repudiated, and on the other, experience of any negative feeling (like *duḥkḥābhāva*) is excluded as being the real intention. The Witness-Consciousness that is ever unveiled becomes established in the intrinsic blissful nature, whence it is merely inferred that a negative feeling of *duḥkḥābhāva* is present there. As a matter of fact, such blissful nature being the real nature of the Witness (*Sākṣin*) is not veiled by any *ajñāna* which is not destroyed by it; but is rather itself revealed. Thus in waking life there is a faint realization of bliss as manifested in love, but is not fully manifested as in this state because of the working of *avidyā*. The Advaitist, therefore, declares with firm conviction that the *duḥkḥābhāva*, like *jñānābhāva*, in the *suṣupti*-state is merely postulated (*arthāpattiyā gamyate*) and not realized as the *real state*, for, the happiness or knowledge of the Ego is only the goal of exclusion by such negative ways of knowledge. In fact, the real blissful or conscious nature of Pure Self is fully manifested. The *ajñāna* being manifested by *Sākṣin* in the *suṣupti*-state merely postulates the absence of knowledge of the Ego as being connected with the objective world. In fact, the Pure Self is that Witness-Consciousness of all *avidyā* at that state and cannot be said to be the seat of the absence of knowledge as the Ego is.

Prakāśātmayati judges the Advaitist thesis that knowledge or *jñāna* is antagonistic to nescience or *ajñāna* in particular modes (*vyttis*) of the former and shows that in the *suṣupti*-state there is no destruction of *ajñāna* for the fact that *jñāna* is not roused with any particular mode. The state of *suṣupti* is the state of *ajñāna* in the *unproductive* form, i.e., when it has nothing particular to create to which any particular subject has to be referred. But in the waking or even dreaming state, there is always particular modes of knowledge, and the

ajñāna creating the objective circumstances in such particular modes is destroyed whenever a particular mode of knowledge rends the veil lying on objective consciousness. The *Sākṣin* or Witness-Consciousness is here related to the objective world through subjective modes (*vyrttis*) in order to have effect of the unity of the inner and the outer world (*abhedābhivyakti*). This is undoubtedly the *primus* in all epistemological processes, but in the *suṣupti*-state the epistemological processes themselves being stopped, the objective and the subjective worlds are not necessarily to be brought into any unity. This is the true philosophical approach of the Advaitists in regard to the *suṣupti*-state. Hence Prakāśātmayati says that the *avidyā* or *ajñāna*, when lying in its primal state of *avyākṛta* in *suṣupti*, is not antagonised by Consciousness which as the Witness only reveals it. But in other states like the waking, there is inevitably an antagonism between particular *jñāna* or mode of knowledge and particular *ajñāna* or mode of veiling between the objective and the subjective worlds. Hence the state of *suṣupti* is at poles asunder from the two other states with regard to the destruction of *ajñāna*.¹⁴⁰ Prakāśātmayati follows up the Advaitist thesis, as elaborated by him, that in the *suṣupti*-state there is no *duḥkḥābhāva* or *jñānābhāva*, but pure bliss or pure consciousness reigns there as the very nature of the Self. The state of *jñānābhāva*, like *duḥkḥābhāva*, cannot be supported by the Advaitists on the ground of the absence of remembrance of the Self as being connected with the objective world. This kind of argument cannot save the situation, which is sought to be revived, that there may be the inference of *jñānābhāva* from the absence of the objective reference in *suṣupti*; for, as Akhaṇḍānanda points out, such inference suffers from the fallacy of *vyabhicāra*. There is no universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the absence of the knowledge-

¹⁴⁰ *nanu-jāgarāṇe'pi anubhūyamānamajñānam katham jñānavirodhi syāt? na—avasthāviśeṣarīṣiṣṭasyājñānasya suṣupte'nubhavāt, tasya ca jāgarāṇe'pi ghaṭādijñānavirodhitūdarśanāt paṭāvagamasaṁmaye—(Īraraṇa, P. 324).*

Viṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāya in his *Īrurivaraṇa* has very aptly brought out the implications of the expression: *avasthāviśeṣarīṣiṣṭasyājñānasya*. cf. *sarvājñatvam nāmāvasthāviśeṣaḥ, tena viśiṣṭasyetyarthaḥ*. He also says: *ekāśrayatre sati yadvīṣayamajñānam, tadviṣayajñānena virudhyate*.

of the Self as being related to the objective world and its absence of remembrance as such; for, it is well seen that even when the Self has full knowledge of the objective world, it is often not remembered as such, thus making the inference of the previous absence of the knowledge of the Self in a particular way in the *suṣupti*-state from the probands of the absence of remembrance as such, a *vyabhiçāri* inference. Hence what the Advaitists can say with regard to any such inference of proving the absence of knowledge or of happiness is that in the *suṣupti*-state there is only the *unparticularised* realization of consciousness and *unparticularised* enjoyment of bliss whence it follows that a postulation (*arthāpatti*) of the *particularised* opposites is only possible, but no solid inferential proofs of such conditions can be adduced, for such proofs are fallacious being grounded in the defect of *vyabhiçāra*.

These analyses of the *suṣupti*-state from the Advaitist standpoint give rise to further problems which are posed and replied by Prakāśātmayati. One of such problems which confronts the Advaitist is that in the *suṣupti*-state, the Witness-Consciousness or *Sākṣicaitanya* being the revealer of the primal *ajñāna* and being in the permanent blissful state, how could there be any remembrance of such pure states of consciousness and bliss with no *ajñānakārya* remaining at that state? For, such pure states (or, rather state) of the *Sākṣicaitanya* are eternal (*avināśin*) and hence no impressions (*saṁskāras*) can be postulated in it as giving rise to the posterior remembrance of such states. The reply of the Advaitists as given by Prakāśātmayati is that the *Sākṣicaitanya* being eternal in its *real* state is not so as being qualified even in the *suṣupti*-state; how is it that there is qualification in that state? Prakāśātmayati gives a very pertinent reply. He says that the state, not being the state of *mokṣa* or liberation, has yet the play of *ajñāna* to qualify the *Sākṣin*. This play is not like that in our waking or dreaming states, yet there is some internal qualifications of the *Sākṣin* as *Sākṣin*, as the revealer of *ajñāna* and as the blissful. In other words, there is, (as he explains a threefold modification of the *ajñāna* or *avidyā* lying in the unruffled state; for, the *vikṣepaśakti* or the projective power of it is totally absent for the absence of any objective experience. The *āvaraṇaśakti* is, however, futile on the *Sākṣicaitanya*

for such a veiling power does not operate upon the latter which reveals it. Such power is operative when the Absolute Consciousness or *Brahmacaitanya* is veiled due to its non-revelation as such but as something other of the unconscious realm. The eternal nescience hinges upon *Brahmacaitanya* so that its real nature is veiled and its false nature is revealed. This nescience is rent into nothing by the realization of that real nature with the rise of the transcendental knowledge in the shape of an *akhaṇḍākārā vṛtti* or an undifferentiated pure consciousness of such real nature. Nescience is antagonistic to such a rise of any *vṛtti*, but it is not on that account impossible on *Brahmacaitanya* which is veiled by it till the rise of that *vṛtti*. It hinges upon such *caitanya* for its own possibility, otherwise it could not have been postulated, as *jaḍa* or unconscious entities are not veiled for they are never revealed by themselves. What has no revelation by itself is not veiled, and *Brahmacaitanya* does not mean that any *avidyā* will not come to its precincts, for it does not antagonise with it, but rather makes impossible, by the fact of its own real nature to be veiled and superimposed upon. It is only when that slumber of nescience cannot exist any moment when the transcendental knowledge in the shape of an *akhaṇḍākārā vṛtti* arises that *Brahmacaitanya* becomes a confirmed antagonist to the former as light is to darkness. But *Sākṣicaitanya* being the Witness of all our moments of life through which objects are known, unknown and faintly known, is never the locus of any *ajñāna*, for it is ever in its *real* nature without caring for the possibility or impossibility of *avidyā*. It is the mere passive Witness of the whole of our life—be it of the *vyavahārika* or *prātibhāsika* stages, for, it merely reveals every kind of experience of life, from that of mistaking a rope for a snake to perceiving an object as 'mine' or 'me'. It is only in the transcendental or *pāramārthika* stage that that *Brahmacaitanya* as undifferentiated Pure Consciousness alone is realized with all the necessity for the Witness and the witnessed being reduced to nullity. This being the state of *suṣupti* where the *Sākṣicaitanya* is alone revealed as the blissful and as the nescience-revealer it is very cogent logic to hold that the *ajñāna* has a triple function or modification even at that state. This triple modification is not projective of any *vikṣepa* for all objec-

tive experience is absent there. It is neither of the *āvaraṇa* for *Sākṣin* is not veiled. What then is the nature of this triple function of *ajñāna*? *Prakāśātmayati* has here laid out a very vital conclusion of his School. He has here shown that this *ajñāna* being revealed by the *Sākṣicaitanya* is nevertheless modified into piecemeal consciousness of itself, of the bliss and of the *Sākṣin*, for the *Sākṣicaitanya* being *itself* eternal is not eternal as being revealed in *suṣupti* being realized in and through these three states. Thus the *ajñāna* as associated with the Pure Self is operative even when it is revealed by the *Sākṣin*, in *suṣupti*, thus vouchsafing for that triple nature being possible of remembrance in our waking life.

We quote here the very vital lines from the *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa*: “*nanu-ajñāna-sukhānubhavyoḥ, Sākṣicaitanyasya cāvināśinaḥ saṁskārābhāve kathamutthilasya trayāṇāmanusmarāṇaṁ syāt? ucyate-ajñānagatacaitanyābhāṣajanmopādhitvāt ajñānasukhasākṣivikalpānubhavasya ajñānāvasthābhedenacaitanyābhāṣānāṁ bhinnatvāt tadvināśasaṁskāraja-smaraṇaṁ ajñāna-sukha-sākṣicaitanyākāram ajñānaviśiṣṭātmaśrayameva sambhūyate, nāntaḥkaraṇāśrayamiti*” (P. 325). In this passage, *Prakāśātmayati* gives us the logical explanation of the remembrance of the *suṣupti*-consciousness through the modifications (*vr̥ttis*) of the *ajñāna* itself in its triple mode—as the *Sākṣin*, the blissful and the nescience-revealer. Herein he strikes a very vital note in the Advaita system. The *avidyāvṛtti* (modification of the nescience) has been enunciated by him in his School for the first time in Advaita system. Even his predecessor, *Padmapāda*, and the originator, *Bhāṣyakāra Śrī Śaṅkarācārya* himself, have not recognised any *vr̥tti* in the *avidyā* which is responsible for all the *vikṣepas* of an illusory nature in our waking and dreaming states; hence in the *suṣupti*-state also there is no necessity for postulating such *vr̥ttis*. They have held that the object itself is illusory and whenever an illusory object is revealed to the *Sākṣicaitanya*, it is capable of producing a recognition or remembrance of itself as such, as it leaves an impression of illusoriness pertaining to the superimposed object as modifying the *Sākṣicaitanya*, the revealer of it; in other words, the posterior recognition of the superimposed object is made possible even without any *ā priori* *avidyāvṛtti*. But it is *Prakāśātmayati* who for the first

time postulates the necessity of *avidyāvṛtti* in the case of the experience of illusory objects, and he thus even here in the *suṣupti*-state brings out the existence of the *avidyāvṛtti*—not operative in any projective way (*vikṣepaśakti*) or any veiling form (*āvaraṇaśakti*)—but as the mere falsity existing in the floating triple mode.

It is significant, therefore, as Prakāśātmayati has brought out, that in the *suṣupti*-state, the Self as *Sākṣin* remains in its blissful and nescience-free (*mukta*) state; hence the Self of *suṣupti* is the recognizer of the *ā priori* states only in so far as *avidyāvṛtti* is operative in the tripartite way. The Self is, therefore, the recognizer of what it was, and there is, therefore, no incongruity, as apprehended, that the *ahaṅkāra* or Ego is the recognizer, in the waking state, of the Self in its *ā priori* states in *suṣupti*.

Further interesting studies in the controversy ranging between the recognition of *avidyāvṛtti* in *suṣupti* (and for the matter of that in any state) and non-recognition of it can be made from the monumental work *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and its masterly commentary *Laghucandrikā* (*Gaudābrahmānandī*) by Brahmānanda Sarasvatī. Mudhusūdana has very ably analysed the problem in its pros and cons, and has shown the viewpoints of the two Schools in a very logical way. The two Schools have been represented by him as the School of Sureśvara's *Vārtika* (i.e., *Byhadāranyakabhāṣyavārtika*) and the School of Prakāśātmayati's *Vivaraṇa*. Vārtikakāra, he shows, has apparently been in conflict with Vivaraṇakāra in so far as the possibility of any *avidyāvṛtti* in the *suṣupti*-state is concerned; but on clearer scrutiny he shows that Vārtikakāra could not but admit some sort of *vṛtti* even at that state. Vārtikakāra apparently says that the state of *suṣupti* can be compared with the state of *pralaya* (dissolution of the universe), and hence there is no need for any remembrance of the nescience hanging in the *suṣupti*-state. Rather, this nescience is ever attendant on the Self, and in the waking life we are inevitably bound by its effects. Hence there is no special necessity to postulate the existence of any *avidyāvṛtti* so that it should be remembered afterwards as having had its revelation to the *Sākṣin*. *Suṣupti* is a state akin to complete dissolution and hence no particular modes of the *avidyā* are necessary. But over against this view,

Vivaraṇakāra has brought out the tripartite *avidyāvṛtti* in *śuṣupti* to account for remembrance. Nevertheless, as Madhusūdana says, there is only an apparent divergence between the two, as Vārtikakāra has had to recognize some sort of *vṛtti* which is unique (and not tripartite) to explain recognition or remembrance. We quote below the apt passages from the two works cited above:

"saṁskārajanyāvidyāvṛtityaive śuṣuptiviśiṣṭājñānabhānāt parāmarśatvopapallete. kevalājñānānīśe tu tulyasāmagrikavāt dhārāvāhikatvameva : ata eva kāryopādhivināśasaṁskṛtām ajñānamātrameva pralayoḥpamāṁ śuṣuptirityabhipretya Vārtikakārapādaiḥ saṁsuptājñānasmarāṇamapākṛtam. tathā cōktam—'na śuṣuptigavijñānam nājñāśiṣāmili smṛtiḥ, kālādyavyavadhānatvāt na hyātmasathamaśītabhāk. (I). na bhūta-kālasprk pratyak na cāgāmiṣprgīkṣyate. svārthadeśaḥ parārtho'rtho vikalpastena sa smṛtaḥ'. (II). ityādyavyākṛtāprākṛityāyām. Vivaraṇakāraistu 'abhāvapratyayālabhanā vṛttirnidre'ti Yogasūtrānusāreṇa tamogunātmakāvaraṇamatrālabhanā kacidvṛtīḥ śuṣuptirityabhipretya taduparaktacaitanyasya tannāśenaiva nāśāttatkālīnajñānānubhavajanītasamskāravaśena 'na kimcidavediṣam'iti smaraṇamabhyupelamili Vārtika-Vivaraṇayorapyavirodhaḥ. ata evoktaṁ Vārtikakāraiḥ Uṣasti-Brāhmaṇe—'na cedanubhavaavyāptiḥ śuṣuptasyābhyupeyate nāvedīṣam śuṣupto'hamili dhīḥ kimbalād bhavel'—ityādi. abhiprāyas-tu varṇitaḥ, evaṁca Sākṣyajñānasukhākārāstisro'vidyāvṛttayaḥ, śuṣuptyākhyaikaiva vā vṛttirityanyadetaḥ". (Advaitasidhi—Nirnaya Sagar Edn. Pp. 558-559.)

"tathācānumityādivṛttināśasya hetutāyāḥ kṣiptatvena prakṛte vṛttirāvaśyakī. kimca-citsvarūpasyaiva sukhātvena jāgaramadhye'pi tatsmṛtisambhavana śuṣuptyuttarameva sukhāmāsamili smṛtirityatra bījābhāvah, tasmāt śuṣuptau sukhākārā vṛttirāvaśyakī. saivājñānākārā śuṣuptistadaviśayakāpi tatsūkṣmāvasthā tatsmṛtihetuḥ, vṛttimātrasyaiva nāśe tadviśayasyeva tatrāpi smṛtihetutvakalpanāt. jñātatvena hi sarvaiḥ smaryata iti Bhāmatyāmadhyāsabhāsyasthāyāmuktam. tathā caitādyasūṣuptau svarūpasukhe cōktānubhavo na cedabhyupeyate, 'nāvedīṣam'iti dhīṣtadubhayaviśayikā kimnibandhanetyanena tadubhayaviśayakatvānurodhena saṁsuptavṛttirāvaśyakī. tatasca tasyāmevājñānākāratvam svīkṛtya tadubhayasmṛterajñāne'pi smṛtitvamānubhaviḥ nāpalapanīyamiti jñāpitam. varṇita iti.

Vivaraṇasya yo'bhiprāya uktaḥ, sa eva 'na cedityādivārtikasye-yarthah'—[*Laghucandrikā* (Gauḍabrahmānandī), Nirṇaya Sagar Edn ; P. 559].

From these rather copious quotations from the two of the latest dialectical works of Advaita Vedānta, following in the main the Vivaraṇa School, it is evident that the *avidyāvṛtti* as enunciated by Prakāśātmayati has been one of the greatest contributions towards the epistemological explanation of dreams and illusions and pure states of the Self's existence as in dreamless slumber. All our moments of life whenever *avidyā* has any existence by way of projection as in dreams and illusions or by way of veiling of the underlying consciousness as in our waking life of difference and distrust or by way of a passive element as in our dreamless slumber, we have a logical and epistemological necessity to admit an *avidyāvṛtti* which is created, even though *avidyā* is revealed directly to the Witness-Consciousness along with the object which it superimposes or projects. Whenever there is any *avidyā* to be revealed directly to a Witness-Consciousness, there is a corresponding *vṛtti* along with the object that is *differently acted upon* by the *avidyā*, or in other words, the *avidyāvṛtti* leaves room for the remembrance of the falsely cognized phenomenon whenever the *āvidyaka* state ends. Till the rise of the transcendental consciousness, everything is phenomenal or illusory and *avidyā* exists as a force till that state is reached. Hence relatively every moment of our lower and lower experience of the phenomenal or illusory worlds is negated whenever its relative truth is dispelled by a higher truth. Such relative truths are all *āvidyaka* till the rise of the transcendental consciousness, and hence all such states are remembered as such as we rise higher up in the elicticism of Truth.

To come back to our original discussions we can conclude this discussion by showing that Prakāśātmayati has very consistently given us his own views as to the state of *śuṣupti*. To controvert the Yoga (Pātañjala) view that *śuṣupti* or dreamless slumber is a state of the *ahankāra* or Ego and hence it is the Ego that remembers it (cf. *abhāva-pratyayālambanā vṛttirni-drā: Yogasūtra*), he has solidly established the Advaita view of *śuṣupti* as the pure state of the Self (*Ātman*)—state brimful with unruffled *avidyā* as revealed to the *Sākṣin* ; hence

it is the Self that remembers the *suṣupta*-state—the Self that is always attended with nescience—thus vouchsafing for the *saṁskāras* and *suṣupti* to be revealed to the waking Self, and not to the waking *ahaṅkāra*, call this Self, as Prof. K. C. Bhattacharyya has done in his *Studies in Vedantism*, 'a lower dimension' of Reality. The *ahaṅkāra* cannot be regarded as the recognizer of the states of the Self in *suṣupti*, for that will bring in an obvious epistemological difficulty. Hence, as Akhaṇḍānanda and Vidyāraṇya have brought out, it is the Self that is both experiencer and recognizer of the states of *suṣupti*, while the *antaḥkaraṇa* merely vouchsafes for the expression in words of that *a priori* experience. (*antaḥkaraṇaṁ tu smṛtasyārthasya śabdānuviddhaṁvyavahāramāpādayati—Vivaraṇa-pramēya-saṁgraha—Vasumati* Edn.—Pt. II. P. 80). This view of the *Vivaraṇa* has been very clearly brought out by Prakāśātmayati, and it seems striking that his analysis of the *suṣupti*-state strikes a very significant originality from his predecessor's viewpoint. His analysis of the nature of the Self as the Witness, blissful and nescience-revealer *esse* in *suṣupti* had not been formulated by any of his predecessors so cogently and forcefully. His advocacy of the tripartite *avidyāvṛtti* in *suṣupti* is a landmark in Advaita thought. The Witnessing Self in *suṣupti* is the revealer of *avidyā* and its tripartite *vṛtti* so that bliss and nescience-revelation are the states which are also revived in our waking life. The positive states of bliss and nescience as realized in *suṣupti* have been rather unacceptable to Padmapāda. He has rather subscribed to the negative experiences of absence of sorrow (*duḥkhābhāva*) and absence of particularized knowledge (*jñānābhāva*)¹⁴¹. These facts will rather go against the analysis of Prakāśātmayati who has amply demonstrated that experience of any *abhāva* cannot be logically established in *suṣupti*, for the experience of the *pratiyogin* or counterpart is also absent there. Thus it is only by postulation (*arthāpatti*) that such *abhāva* is merely known later on. Hence Prakāśātmayati reconciles his predecessor's analysis by saying that it is not the real Advaita view, but is

¹⁴¹ *na tat svāpe sukhānubhavasāṁskārajaṁ smaraṇam, kiṁ tarhi? sukhāvacamarśo duḥkhābhāvanimittaḥ—(Pañcapādikā, P. 322).*

vyapadeśo'pi sukhāṁ sūptāṁ na kiñcinmayā cetitamiti hi dr̥ṣyate—(Pañcapādikā, P. 323).

merely a suggestion from the opponents' point of view to exclude their interpretation of Ego's experience of such positive experience¹⁴².

Thus a very significant exposition of the *suṣupti*-state of the Self has been given by Prakāśātmayati and following him Akhaṇḍānanda and Vidyāraṇya have also added fruitful supplements to that exposition. This exposition of the state of *suṣupti* is not only a psychological analysis of the mind but is rather a corner-stone of Advaita metaphysics; for, it is this problem which analyses the state of the Pure Self as unmoved by any objective factors except as the Witness of the uncreative mass of *avidyā* that is the only blind principle without calling up the subjective reaction toward any objective world. It, therefore, gives the clue to Advaita metaphysics of the nature of Self as experienced in and through our psychological and epistemological moments of existence in waking, dreaming and dreamless states. Prakāśātmayati, following Padmapāda, shows that there is an essential difference between the *ahaṅkāra* and the *Ātman*. Akhaṇḍānanda brings out the real intention of Padmapāda by showing that the Advaita view on the nature of the Self is essentially different from the Naiyāyika and the Prābhākara views on it. The tirade of attacks on these two Schools on this point as made by Prakāśātmayati, has been brought out in fuller details by us above. Akhaṇḍānanda here reminds us about these two Schools which seek to make Self a known entity. He merely suggests here that the Naiyāyikas who seek to make the knowledge of the Self as different from the knowledge of the object, but at the same time depending on the mind, commit a logical and psychological fallacy by making knowledge of the Self (either vouchsafed for by the latter through an inane relation, or being vouchsafed for by another knowledge in a relation of identity) assume a dual rôle of a subjective process involving an objective counterpart. But there is no bifurcation in knowledge which as a system is coherent and unitary. Again, the Prābhākara theory of the Self as the seat of *samvit* or consciousness fails to make for the invariable revela-

¹⁴² *sarvathāpi suṣupte'jñānasukhānubhava-sambhavāt asambaddhamidaṁ tīkā-kāreṇoktamiti, satyam, paramatamāśrityedamuktam na svamatamiti na doṣaḥ—(Vivaraṇa, P. 326).*

tion of the subject however much they try to establish it by the theory of *tripuṭīpratyakṣa*; for knowledge of the object cannot necessarily generate revelation of the subject in every act of knowledge, as the subject is sought to be revealed like the object. Unless the subject becomes the *primus* of all revelation, how can one vouchsafe for its invariable revelation, however clearly the object is known. These factors of difficulty, as brought out by Akhaṇḍānanda, stand in the way of the real analysis of the Self, and thus the chasm between the Ego and the Self becomes wider and more gaping to be shown by Advaitists. (cf. *nīlādīpratyayādanya eva manojanita ātmaviśayaḥ pratyayaḥ, tatsādhakam yannaiyāyikādimatām tanna sambhāvati, karma-kartṛ-virodhāt saṃvidāśrayatayā ātmasiddhiriti yad guruṇocyate tadapyasaṅgalam anyākārajñānasyānyasādhakatvā sambhavāt; pariśeṣāt svaprakāśatvamityarthaḥ. svaprakāśatvameva tatropasamhṛitam, talaḥ kathamuktamahanākārabhedasyāpyupasamhṛtiḥ tatrāha ahaṅkāreti, ahaṅkārasya viśayānubhāvādhiṇasiddhitvādātmanaśca tadvaiparītyād bhedaḥ: loc. cit. P. 326*). Thus the Ego being different from the Self on logical and epistemological grounds, Prakāśātmayati, following his predecessor, shows that the *śruti* or scripture also supports this Advaitist view of their difference. Akhaṇḍānanda says that this scriptural testimony is necessary because the logical proofs for such difference to be established need always to be supported by *śruti*. Hence Prakāśātmayati has given us some reference to scriptural testimony over and above the logical. In the Upaniṣad we find an interesting discussion on this aspect of difference between the two. Here we find that the Self or Brahman is regarded as omnipresent; (*Sa evādhastāt sa evopariṣṭāt*). The highest Reality is the Self that is all-pervasive. But even there the Ego (*ahaṅkāra*) is also regarded as partaking of this all-pervasive nature of the Self, (*athāto ahaṅkāradeśaḥ*), which nature is, however, again ascribed to the Self (*athāta ātmādeśaḥ*). Thus there is a clear indication of the fact that the Ego, which we regard as omnipresent and equal to the all-pervasive Self, is falsely regarded as such; in fact, the Self is the only omnipresent Reality. The scriptural evidence of the ascription of all-pervasiveness to the Ego, is, however, never meant to show the absence of difference between it and the Self, in the same

way as the absence of difference between the individual self (*jīva*) and the Universal Self (*Brahman*) has been sought to be established. *Prakāśātmayati* vehemently opposes such an apprehension which is not without justification. But he shows that there is a fundamental difference in the concepts of the *jīva* and *Brahman* on the one hand and the *ahaṅkāra* and *Ātman* on the other. There is fundamentally the recognition of difference in the former case (*jīva* and *Brahman*) at every step of our existence and the scriptures therefore try to establish that there is really an absence of difference and difference is merely an illusion. But when in the case of the *ahaṅkāra* the illusory difference makes the Self appear as non-different from *ahaṅkāra*, this non-difference is, however, as false as the loss of sight of the real nature of unity. Unity of *jīva* and *Brahman* is one of the theses of the scriptures, but this unity never means false unity. False non-unity (as in *jīva* and *Brahman*) is as bad as false unity (as in *ahaṅkāra* and *Ātman*). While the first is due to nescience in its veiling capacity or *āvaraṇaśakti*, the latter is due to it in its projecting capacity or *vikṣepaśakti*.¹⁴³ Now, therefore, the question arises as to how two objects falsely known as unitary can both be omnipresent. If the Ego is omnipresent like the Self, the Ego should not be regarded as different in essence from the latter, as the *jīva* is in essence non-different from *Brahman*. The difference of *jīva*hood from *Brahman*hood is false and hence both are of equal essence. Is the Ego then such an entity, in essence not different from the Self, although this essence which is sought to be claimed to be same by the opponents is shown to be false in so far as the essence of the Self as self-luminous (*svaprahāśa*) is not same in the Ego and the Self? Is not the charge of the Advaitists based on this false unity springing from the losing sight of the essence that in the not-Self is never

¹⁴³ *tatra yuktaṁ bhedenā pratipannayorjīva-Brahmaṇorekatvasiddhyarthastadupadeśah, ahaṅkārasya tu pūrvamerātmaikatrapratipatteḥ prthag-upadeśo bhedesiddhyartha iti gamyate. Brahmaṇaḥ parokṣasya pratyakṣatvasiddhaye'hamātmatvamupadiśya punastadvyudāśenā mukhyātmatvam-upadiśatityarthaḥ—(Vivaraṇa, P. 327).*

ahaṅkāratmanorabhedasya śāstre saṁskāraarahitānāmopi siddhatvāt nābhedhapratipattiyarthaṁ prthagupadeśasya kiṁtu bhedapratipattiyarthaṁ itiyarthaḥ—(Tattradīpana, P. 327).

present in the way the not-Self is conceived in the light of the opponents. The Ego is sharply divided from the Self in the essence of self-luminosity, but the *jīva* is not so in essence from *Brahman*. To circumscribe the *jīva* within the limits of *non-essence* of *Brahman* is false and such difference of the two concepts is false. But the Ego is always the projecting play of *avidyā* and is ever circumscribed; thus it is never the Self and hence never omnipresent. To answer such a charge, Akhaṇḍānanda very skilfully shows that the omnipresence of the Ego is merely a secondary implication like the famous *arundhatīmyāya*. As the Ego is the immediate object of our perception, the Self which is experienced as a mediate principle in so far as omnipresence is concerned (for none directly experiences his Self as omnipresent, but only indirectly through the *śruti*), the *śruti* first makes the Ego *secondarily* omnipresent; but this attribution of omnipresence is due to the fact that the Self as the *primary* omnipresent principle should be established as the most directly experienced. The very minute star called *Arundhatī* is shown to a newly-wed bride, but as that star is ordinarily invisible directly, the direct sight of the star is made by the direct showing of a bigger star beside it but the direct sight of the bigger star is of only secondary importance, while the primary importance of directness is attached to the *Arundhatī* star. Thus there is no contradiction or inconsistency from the Advaitists' viewpoint if the Ego is regarded as *omnipresent* secondarily only to show that the Self is *primarily* omnipresent as a directly experienced principle.

CHAPTER IX

A DETAILED EXAMINATION INTO THE STATUS OF OTHER THEORIES REGARDING THE EVOLU- TIONARY PROCESS—CULMINATING IN THE TRUE ADVAITA CONCEPT OF THE IMAGE-CHARACTER (PRATIBIM- BĀTVA) OF THE JĪVA.

The Advaitist is, therefore, faced with the questions regarding the nature of the Ego. If it is established that the Ego is entirely different *in essence* from the Self which is self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*) while the former is luminous with borrowed light (*paraprakāśa*), it becomes evident that the Ego is a false creation as being superimposed on the nature of the Self and hence the full nature and status of the Ego should be brought out *vis-à-vis* the Pure self. This task has been amply executed by Padmapāda who has made full exposition of the Ego in its entirety. Prakāśātmayati has further analysed the exposition of his predecessor whose implications have been fully brought out regarding the nature of the Ego. The implications, as brought out by Prakāśātmayati, come under the following headings: (a) the nature of the *material cause*; (b) the nature of the *efficient cause*; (c) the nature of *itself*; (d) the nature of the *means of knowledge* of it; (e) the nature of its *manifestations*; (f) the nature of its *śuṣupta* state. Now each of these problems is shown to spring from the opponents' reluctance to admit the Advaita view of the Ego that it is not the Self. This has been very cogently brought out by Akhaṇḍānanda. He says that an object like the Ego must have some material cause which should determine its status as real, illusory or totally imaginary. The Ego should have a distinct status of its own that is neither *equal in essence* with the Self, nor a real or imaginary entity. If it is *equal in essence* with the Self, or in other words, if it is regarded as of the same status with the Self in deep slumber, the opponents put forward a theory which has been more than fully exploded above. This theory, as we have tried to leave no stone unturned to expose, contains-

serious epistemological, psychological and metaphysical difficulties to merit any serious consideration. The Self is of a higher 'dimension' of Reality in every state of our life, but the Ego is not on that account anywhere near the Self. Hence that Ego is an entity belonging to the region of the not-Self. Nevertheless, it is a positive entity and therefore should be referred to a material cause. Now this material cause is not real, for that would make the Ego as real (as the Self); it cannot also be imaginary (*asa*) for that would make for a cause-and-effect relation between a non-existent entity and its product, which is absurd. Hence it should be regarded to spring from a cause that is illusory (*añirvācyam* or *sadasadbhāṣā vilakṣaṇam*). Thus, the Advaitist theory of causation as making for illusory manifestation (*vivarta*) has to be accepted. Even then an efficient cause is necessary and if the opponents seek to make the *jīva* or *Īśvara* as such, that will entail difficulties; for the former is limited and the latter is devoid of any quality to make the Ego a subservient entity. That is to say, *Īśvara* is too passive a spectator to make any action for such entities to emerge. However, the Ego must have an intrinsic nature which cannot be the nature of the Self which is *viśayitvam*. Thus it should have the nature of *viśayatvam* or not-Self and for that matter proofs of knowing such nature must be forthcoming. Now the usual means of knowledge such as perception cannot establish the Ego, nor can the *Sākṣin* be a proof, for it is ever unruffled (*kūḷastha*). Hence the Advaitist view that it is merely revealed by the *Sākṣin* as being associated with the mental modifications (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) is the only acceptable hypothesis. If the nature of its manifestations (*kāryam*) is postulated as that of doer and enjoyer (*kartṛva-bhokṛtva*) seeing that the Pure Self as *Sākṣin* cannot have them, then a problem arises why that nature is not enduring even in the *suṣupta*-state. These are the lights which Akhaṇḍānanda has flashed upon the necessity of each aspect of the Ego, indicated by *Prakāśātmayati*.

Padmapāda has given us the true exposition of the Ego in all its aspects. It is *Prakāśātmayati* who has shown us each aspect as expounded by his predecessor. As to the nature of the material cause his predecessor has shown us that it is the eternal nescience (*anādiravidyā*), as *māyā*, *prakṛti*, *śakti*, *supti*

etc., that is the *upādāna* of the Ego. Thus the Ego being dependent on *avidyā* as its material cause is of same status with it, for the real material cause is *Brahman* (*abhinnanimittoṣādānattva*) which is always higher than the illusory (*anirvacanīya*) which is superimposed on the unity of *Brahman* or *Ātman* by the power of *avidyā*. As to the nature of the efficient cause, it is *Īśvara*, for, as Akhaṇḍānanda says, it is possessed of the quality, though false, of creating and guiding the Ego. The Ego is possessed of two aspects as its nature—*vijñānaśakti* and *kriyāśakti* or the cognitive and active powers. Its manifestations are those of *kartṛtva* (doer-ship) and *bhokṛtva* (enjoyer-ship). The means of knowing it cannot be ascertained, for it is revealed only to the *kūṭastha-caitanya*—the unruffled Absolute Consciousness. Still such Consciousness vouchsafes for the revelation of the Ego that is falsely superimposed on it. The Ego is revealed with no other knowledge, but is always revealed as being in false unity with Absolute Consciousness. It is, in this sense, as Akhaṇḍānanda shows, that Padmapāda calls it *svayamprakāśamāno'parokṣaḥ* (P. 328), and not in the technical sense, for Absolute Consciousness alone is such. As to the question of the existence of the false manifestations of *kartṛtva* and *bhokṛtva* pertaining to the Self (though originated in the Ego) during *susupti*, Padmapāda shows that when all the functions of the primal nescience are inoperative, those false manifestations also cannot logically endure, as those are the products of *avidyā*. The question posed by Prakāśātmayati that the vital function (*prāṇaśakti*) still remaining in *susupti*, the Ego cannot be consistently said to have no function at that time, is easily resolved by himself, who shows that the vital function belongs to the *prāṇa*, a distinct principle of five functions (*pañcadhā vyāpārahetor prāṇasya*), but the Ego consists of the function to guide such *prāṇa*. Hence if the Ego is inoperative it does not mean that the *prāṇa* is also inoperative, for the Ego can also passively guide. But such a reply is too easily given to be believed in. Hence he suggests that if the Ego is regarded in its parts containing the cognitive and active aspects, then it is better to regard that the former aspect is inoperative while the latter is not. Lastly, however, Prakāśātmayati shows that if *susupti* is considered from the angle of *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda* (creation from cogni-

tion) which an old Vedantist like Maṇḍana has subscribed to, then this state becomes merely a void having no creation due to the absence of any cognition, as distinct from dreaming or waking life. Hence even the vital functions seem to be the creations from another wakeful person's cognition, but the man in deep sleep is immersed only in his primal *subtle body*.

Prakāśātmayati, following Padmapāda, analyses the viewpoints of the opponents, one by one, against the doctrine of *avidyā* or *ajñāna* as propounded above by the Advaitists. His object is, however, to show that in no other way than the Advaitist theory is the nature of the evolution of the cosmos tenable or meaningful. He first brings out, in a nutshell, the Sāṅkhya views on the subject. He shows that the Sāṅkhyas do not regard as necessary the Advaitist conception of the *ahaṅkāra* or Ego as the product of *avidyā* which is revealed to the Witness-Consciousness (*Sākṣicaitanya*)—and this revelation is possible only in three ways, viz., as a power (*śakti*) that is associated, though falsely, with the *Sākṣin*, or as related with the substrate, though not as a power, as a quality or *guṇa* associated with the substrate, or as being super-imposed (*adhyasta*) as the snake is on the rope; for they hold that it is the *prakṛti* or *pradhāna* that is responsible for the evolution of the cosmos including the *ahaṅkāra* and this *prakṛti* is never, in any way as indicated above, revealed to any *Sākṣin* or Witness-Consciousness. This evolution is again of three types, viz., *dharma-pariṇāma*, *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma* and *avasthā-pariṇāma*. The first is with regard to the evolution of the whole series of effects like *mahat* or *buddhi* (cosmic intelligence), *ahaṅkāra* (Ego) etc. The past, present and future references in such evolution are what is meant by the second type of evolution. The third type includes the variations in the temporal references as above. Hence the Sāṅkhyas conclude that there need not be any evolution from Consciousness as the background of the process of evolution due to *avidyā* but primal Matter as *Prakṛti* is the necessary explanation of such evolution. This theory of evolution from unconscious Matter without any conscious background is seriously challenged by Prakāśātmayati. He shows that the Sāṅkhya view, rejecting as it does any dependence on the *Sākṣicaitanya* that vouchsafes for the products like the Ego from Matter (*Prakṛti*), does a positive dis-

service to the epistemological explanations of the Ego-Consciousness; for it fails to account for the revelation of the Ego as 'I'—the subjective element in such revelation—and merely makes room for its revelation as the blind not-Self—the objective reference in revelation. Thus the Ego without being referred to the *Sākṣicaitanya* is ever either a blind not-Self or a *real* entity with no subjective reference in the act of experience. But these are all far from the truth. The Ego is out-and-out revealed by the *Sākṣicaitanya* to which however, it is, as a product of *avidyā* which is directly revealed to such *caitanya*, related in some way or the other. Thus the out-and-out false (*anirvacanīya*) *avidyā* is responsible for the revelation of the Ego to the *Sākṣicaitanya*, thus vouchsafing for the Ego to be a *false* product produced out of the imposition of the not-Self on the Self. This is possible only in the *anirvacanīyahyāti* of the Vedantists as otherwise the Conscious Self and the Unconscious Ego could never be related.

Prakāśātmayati next examines the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika standpoint with regard to the status of *antaḥkaraṇa*. He shows that this School regards the *antaḥkaraṇa* as nothing apart from the *manas*, as an instrument (*karaṇa*) in the origination of knowledge (*jñāna*) pertaining to the Self (*Ātmā*). Their argument is based on the fact that the Advaitist conception of *antaḥkaraṇa*, as an adjunct (*upādhi*) to the Self (*Ātmā*) or Consciousness (*jñāna* or *viññāna*) delimiting as it does the All-pervasive Reality within its own sphere for practical and empirical necessities, is never existent as such; for, they hold, that the Self as the subject in knowledge merely requires an instrument for its contact with the object, and that instrument is nothing but the mind or *manas*. Hence for empirical purposes, it is quite capable of generating knowledge in the subject and thus the postulation of an *antaḥkaraṇa* different from it becomes perfunctory. They refute the Advaitists' argument in favour of the recognition of an *antaḥkaraṇa*—not as an instrument but as an adjunct—to show that such defences are unnecessary. Their findings show that the empirical processes of knowledge (*vyrttijñānas*) must not, as the Advaitist urges, necessarily pre-suppose an *āśraya* (substratum) in the *antaḥkaraṇa*, for it is well within the limits of logic to hold that

the Self is such substratum.¹⁴⁴ Again, to make the Self the doer (*kartr*) and enjoyer (*bhoktr*), they argue, it is not indispensable as in the Advaitist view that there should be an adjunct to the Self—which though not possessed of such qualities is limited by the *antaḥkaraṇa*, its adjunct; for, they hold, that it is not inconsistent to hold that the Self is active and conative through the instrumentality of the *manas*. Nor should there be any necessity as in the Advaitist view, they argue on, of a false differentiation to be established between the Pure Self as *Brahman* and the individual Self as *Jīva*, for they will not admit of any such falsity in the concept of the two but a reality in their nature testifying to the empirical reality of the Self as *Jīva*; and hence the Self as *Jīva* is too true as the doer and enjoyer to admit of any false adjunct like the *antaḥkaraṇa*. Lastly, the Advaitist recognition of the decay and destruction of the adjunct in death does not in the opponents' view, merit any serious consideration; for they will show that the Self is never subject to such decay and destruction and hence the adjunct to support the Self's claim to a different adjunct after the fall of the first, is weak logic. Hence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas argue that the Self is never in need of any adjunct (*upādhi*) like the *antaḥkaraṇa*, as the Advaitists suppose, but it is sufficient for the mind to account for the empirical Self. Even *buddhi* or intellect they regard as identical with *jñāna* or knowledge and *upalabdhi* or cognition (cf. *buddhirupalabdhirjñānamityanarthāntaram—Akṣapāda Sūtra*). Thus to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas the intellect or *buddhi* cannot be a distinct adjunct like the Advaitists' *antaḥkaraṇa* or the Sāṅkhya-Pātañjala's *buddhi*, but is nothing apart from the cognition that through the instrumentality of the *manas* appears in the Self. There is no question of reflecting the *caitanya* or Consciousness on it, as in the Sāṅkhya-Pātañjala system, or delimiting the *caitanya* as in the Advaita system. Here there is a cut-and-dried process of cognition that has the subject as its substratum and the mind as the instrument. Even the Sāṅkhya-Pātañjala view that the cognitive state (*upalabdhi*) is nothing but a reflection of Consciousness

¹⁴⁴ *jñānādīnāmātmaśrayatvenāpyupapatter na pariśeṣāntaḥkaraṇaprasiddhiriti yabhisandhiḥ—(Tattvadr̥ṣṭi, P. 331).*

on *buddhi*, for it is the Self or *Puruṣa* as Pure Consciousness that has the reflection on *buddhi* to make for the appearance of knowledge, is not paid heed to by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. Their immutable conclusion is that the Self need have no adjunct like *buddhi* or *antaḥkaraṇa* for knowing, that is possible through the instrumentality of the mind (*tasmād-varṇitamantaḥkaraṇaṁ nāsti—Vivaraṇa*, P. 331). To make for the Self an adjunct like *buddhi* in the cognitive process is to commit an endless series of subjects to the necessity of diverse cognitive processes—such is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika standpoint.

To answer these rather loose forms of logic Prakāśātmayati tightens up his belts to establish the Advaitist conception of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, over and above the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya-Pātañjala views. He first throws overboard the first camp by showing that the *buddhi* and the *viññāna* cannot be identical, for *buddhi* is a substance having functions and qualities, while *viññāna* is never a substance. The substantiality of *buddhi* is proveable from the *śrutis* (like *buddherguṇenātmaguṇena caiva hyārūgramātro hyavaro'pi dṛṣṭaḥ* where it is said to be possessed of modification, and *yadā pañcaiva liyante jñānāni manasā saha, buddhiṣca neṅgate tatra paramātmānamaśnute* where it is said to have modulations which cease at the time of *mukti*). Prakāśātmayati rather pushes forward these arguments regarding the nature of *buddhi* as a substance—distinct from Consciousness or *caitanya* which is more strictly *viññāna*; however, he also admits that by *viññāna*, sometimes in the *śrutis*, *buddhi* is referred to where derivatively it means the means (*karaṇa—viññāyate anena*) of knowledge and not knowledge as such. In such cases, like *viññānam jajñam tanute, viññānena vā Rgvedam viñānāti manasā hyeva paśyati*, *viññāna* refers to *buddhi* as a substance having functions and not to Consciousness without any functions, or, rather, consciousness as the resultant, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view. In establishing thus that *buddhi* is necessarily a functional means, Prakāśātmayati has completely thrown overboard the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contention that it is identical with the non-functional Consciousness. He, however, does not stop there, for he shows that the Sāṅkhya-Pātañjala theory of *buddhi* as a distinct entity from the mind or *manas*—the former being merely the reflecting foil

to *caitanya* or Consciousness—also suffers from bad logic. To regard *buddhi* and *manas* as distinct entities on the ground of their distinct functions, as the Sāṅkhya-Pātañjala system seeks to do is without any logical necessity; for, as Prakāśātmayati shows, the two entities have really no distinct functions. It is, however, Akhaṇḍānanda who shows that *viññāna* or *buddhi* and *manas* are both the conditions general in any act of cognition; hence there may only be a difference in their *vṛttis* or modifications or modulations but never in their real nature which is of making cognition arise from a condition general, i.e., a condition that is involved in every act of cognition.¹⁴⁵ Therefore Prakāśātmayati concludes from the Advaitist point of view that the *manas* is nothing apart from *buddhi*; they are not as an instrumental and a subjective factor respectively in cognition as the Sāṅkhya-Pātañjala seeks to establish, but it is one *antaḥkaraṇa* as the condition general for the empirical revelation of Consciousness that on different functional occasions is designated as the *manas* having qualities like desire (*kāma*), determination (*saṅkalpa*) etc., and as the *viññāna* or *buddhi* having activities of modulations or modifications in empirical knowledge (like reflection of the Sāṅkhya-Pātañjala system). The Advaitist conclusion, therefore, as brought out by Prakāśātmayati, comes to this that the *antaḥkaraṇa* is a necessary adjunct to Consciousness for empirical purposes and it is also an adjunct for the various states of Consciousness—as waking, dreaming, dreamless, reflective and mental—to be revealed. Even the vital state (*prāṇavyāpāra*) belongs to such an adjunct and therefore when such a state (i.e., vital) stops in death, Consciousness is said to go out of the adjunct to a different adjunct. This in a nutshell is the Advaitist defence of *antaḥkaraṇa* as a necessary adjunct to Consciousness and as the *only* functional adjunct at that. The *śrūtis*¹⁴⁶ also are in support of such a conclusion.

Prakāśātmayati further adduces arguments from proofs (*pramāṇas*) over and above the *śrūtis* and their implications.

¹⁴⁵ *viññāyateneneti viññānam buddhirityarthah. buddhi-manasorvṛtti-bhedādbhede'pi na svarūpeṇa bhedaḥ; tathāca katham tadapalāpaḥ? ityūśayaavānāha—tatheti. jñānotpattau manasaḥ sādḥāraṇakāraṇatvād buddheścu tādyktrābhīdhānāt na svarūpabheda ityarthah—(Tattvadīpana, P. 332).*

¹⁴⁶ (a) *sadhīḥ svapno bhūtreḍaṁ lokāṁ sañcarati—*

(b) *viññānamayaḥ manomayaḥ—*

(c) *kaśmin utkrānta utkrānto bhaviṣyati—*

He shows that the *śrutis* and their implications like *arthavāda* are necessary, but these should be backed up by valid proofs. Thus, according to his analysis, there is a very cogent proof like *arthāpatti* or *anyathānupapatti* which makes it necessary that there should be an *antaḥkaraṇa* as an adjunct to the Pure Self. The proof comes to this that as Pure Self is partless, formless and all-pervasive, its various stages of empirical life implying a finitude or limitation make it imperative that there should be an adjunct to limit it. How such an adjunct is *antaḥkaraṇa*? This *antaḥkaraṇa* is, however, an adjunct in the sense that its qualities are all illusorily superimposed on the Pure Self, the Pure Self has not, or cannot have, any such qualities. These qualities belong to the *antaḥkaraṇa* and are falsely transferred on the Pure Self, like the reddishness of a shoe-flower (*japā-kusumam*) on a crystal-stone (*sphaṭika-maṇi*). Here, therefore, is introduced a discussion by Prakāśātmayati, following Padmāpāda, of the nature of *sopādhika bhrama* or illusion due to an adjunct. In such cases of illusion, there is a necessary adjunct like the shoe-flower or the *antaḥkaraṇa* for their qualities like reddishness or pleasure, pain etc., to be superimposed on a substratum (like the crystal-stone or Pure Self). In *nirupādhika bhrama* (cases of direct illusion without any medium of adjunct), however, as in the cases of *śukti-rūpya* (a shell appearing as silver) or *aham manusyaḥ* (I am a human being), there is clearly no need for any adjunct to make for the superimposition of one's qualities upon another. Hence here the adjunct like the *antaḥkaraṇa* makes for its qualities to be superimposed on the substratum, i.e., the Pure Self, but these qualities are all necessarily false. About the falsity of these qualities, suffice it to say that as in the appearance of reddishness on the crystal-stone, there is no cause or condition that is necessary and antecedent for the usual crystal-stone to appear as reddish, such reddishness, therefore, must necessarily be false in existence and even in cognition. (cf. *mithyātvam sphaṭikalauhityasya, kṛpā-pratītisattayoh karanābhāvādityarthah—Vivaraṇa, P. 333*).

Prakāśātmayati dismisses the apparent objections to the Advaitist contention that there is a tinge of the *antaḥkaraṇa* on the Self when the former delimits the latter, whence all empirical behaviour of the Pure Self ensues. The objections centre round the fact that either this tinge (*uparāga*) should be regarded

as merely superimposed on the Self (which admission will necessarily make the analogy of the reddishness of the shoe-flower on the crystal-stone that looks reddish not applicable at all, for there reddishness is admitted to be *produced*, besides making an *anyathākhyāti* theory of the quality of reddishness existent elsewhere appear on a substratum) or as *produced illusorily* upon a substratum (which admission is also fraught with the objection of the production of two qualities—one real as of the *antaḥkaraṇa* and another illusory as of the Self). Thus there are veritable horns of the dilemma in admitting a tinge of the *antaḥkaraṇa* appearing on the Pure Self. Prakāśātmayati, following Padmapāda, skilfully brings forth the true Advaitist conception of this tinge appearing on the Pure Self. He shows that both the above horns of the dilemma are more apparent than real, for according to the Advaitist conception, there is a rational compromise of the two horns. He brings out that the tinge, as belonging to the *antaḥkaraṇa*, is falsely super-imposed on the Self, for the *antaḥkaraṇa* itself is super-imposed (*adhyasta*) on the Self. Thus there is no question of *anyathākhyāti* where a superimposition merely of the relation of an object existent elsewhere with the substratum is recognized; but here there is the superimposition, not merely of the relation but also of the object along with its qualities (which constitute the tinge) on the Pure Self. The analogy of the crystal-stone looking reddish is merely called for in making the qualities of the *antaḥkaraṇa* appear on the Pure Self, but that does not restrict itself to the mere superimposition of the relation of the tinge upon the substratum, but also makes for the illusory character of the superimposed and its qualities. Prakāśātmayati thus dismisses the apparent objection of *anyathākhyāti* directed towards the superimposition of the qualities of the *antaḥkaraṇa* on the Pure Self. He also dismisses the other apparent objection that there would appear two kinds of qualities—one real and the other illusory—by showing that though there are two subjects (the Self and the *antaḥkaraṇa*) yet they are merged into one by the act of *adhyāsa* (superimposition) and hence one set of qualities appears in that act. Now there may very well be an inter-change of the sets of qualities in an act of super-imposition, as is indicated by Śaṅkara in the preamble to his *Bhāṣya* (*adhyāsabhāṣya*) as *itaretarādhyāsa* (mutual super-

imposition) of the substrata and qualities of the Self and the *antaḥkaraṇa*.¹⁴⁷ Now this tinge of the *antaḥkaraṇa* seems to be not revealed by the Self, for it is the Self that gets the superimposition of the tinge. To such an apparent objection, Prakāśātmayati's reply from the Advaitist standpoint is that there is no necessary relation between the tinge and its revelation (*uparaktatva* and *bhāśakatva*), for though it cannot be proved that an untinged (*anuparakta*) entity is the revealer (*bhāśaka*) as opposed to a tinged one, yet that involves an inherent want of necessity making for bad logic. Revelation does not necessarily mean that there should be an absence or presence of any tinge (i.e., external qualities) that is revealed. Even if the crystal-stone cannot reveal the reddish tinge of the shoe-flower because the former is tinged with the latter, it does not necessarily follow that the Pure Consciousness or Self that is the substratum of the superimposition of the tinge of the qualities of the *antaḥkaraṇa* also should not be able to reveal that kind of tinge. For, as Prakāśātmayati rightly points out, revelation is by the merits of Consciousness or unconsciousness inherent in the substratum, and not due to its being tinged. A conscious entity reveals all the falsely superimposed objects on itself, even though it partakes of the tinge of those objects, while an unconscious substratum like the crystal-stone merely receives the tinge of the external, reflected quality and can never vouchsafe for its revelation.¹⁴⁸ These cryptic lines of Prakāśātmayati serve as one of the bed-rocks of Advaitist metaphysics for it is on a correct explanation of the concept of revelation (*prakāśa*) as the inherent nature (*svabhāva*) of Consciousness (*Caitanya*) that the whole system of *adhyāsa* as superimposition, though illusory, upon It, as having made the Pure Self in the light of the limited Ego etc., becomes clear, specially as the light of the Pure Self vouchsafes for the ultimate falsity of the whole process of superimposition on It. *Adhyāsa* is not merely a fact (*a fait accompli*) but also a fact of un-accomplishment (*a fait*

¹⁴⁷ *tathāpyanyonmasmin anyonyātmakatām anyonyadharmānścādhyāsyatāretarāvivekena atyantaviviktayordharmadharminormithyā'jñānanimittasatyānte mithunīkṛtya 'ahamidam mamedam'iti naisaragiko'yaṁ lokavyavahārah—(Brahmasūtrabhāṣya of Śaṅkara; adhyāsa-bhāṣya).*

¹⁴⁸ *jādyacaitanye avabhāśakatvānavabhāśakatvayornimitte, noparaktatvānuparaktatve ityarthah—(Vivaraṇa, P. 336).*

non-accomplī), when the Pure Consciousness will reveal all the false super-imposition on It. Thus understood, the fact of superimposition of the Ego and its qualities upon the Pure Self, becomes all the more clearly understood, for it is the Pure Self that vouchsafes for the unreality of the superimposed objects and its qualities. The Ego and its qualities are, no doubt, superimposed on the Self, but it is the Pure Self that vouchsafes for their revelation (*bhāsakaṭva*) by Itself. Otherwise, no *adhyāsa* of the nature of blind ballets upon blind substrata would have been possible, for such an *adhyāsa* would have never been known at least to the *Sākṣī-caitanya*, and hence would have been always unknown. *A propos* this conclusion of the Advaitists, the conscious objector raises his voice once more only to be drowned in the higher pitch of the Advaitist reply. The objection ensues from the apprehension that even Pure Consciousness cannot be said to be the revealer (*bhāsaka*) of the superimposed, for It is also devoid of any cognitive process like the unconscious entity (say, the crystal-stone, and this admission is from the *anyathā-hyāti*-standpoint, for the Advaitist never admits the substratum as inert but as Consciousness delimited in it) to vouchsafe for the revelation of the super-imposed. In fact, the Pure Self or Consciousness cannot be said to have any epistemological process, like the knowledge of the tinge of superimposition, to say that such a tinge is existent, though falsely so; for, in that case, Consciousness or Self loses its Pure-ness. Nor can it be said that it can reveal even without such processes, for It is the revealer of objects on Its own merits of self-luminosity; for, self-luminosity may at best make Itself independent of any such processes but cannot by that make the objects revealed at the same time. Impelled by the conscious objector on these horns of the dilemma, Prakāśātunayati in full force brings out the Advaitist reply. His reply is that the epistemological processes are never needed by Pure Consciousness to shine not merely in Its own light, but also for the revelation of everything superimposed on It. Thus Pure Consciousness, whenever revealed, makes for the revelation of the superimposed objects and is never for that matter in need of any epistemological processes. Self-luminosity of Pure Consciousness is, therefore, enough grounds for the admission

of the fact that all super-imposed objects are naturally revealed in the light of the Pure Self that is beyond all epistemological processes. Revelation of the superimposed is inextricably bound up with the revelation of the Pure Self in its own light, for, to be superimposed on Pure Self or Pure Consciousness means that there is no need for any epistemological processes for that Self or Consciousness to reveal the objects superimposed. Such processes are called into being when there is a special urge to know them in particular ways of immediacy or non-immediacy. But superimposed objects, like the *antaḥkaraṇa* or its qualities, are in direct touch with Consciousness as *Sākṣin*. Hence *vyttis* or no *vyttis*, it can be deduced that a direct contact with Pure Consciousness makes for the revelation of the objects, at least to the *Sākṣin*. The *vyttis* are necessary for the *pramāṭṛcāṇa* (the epistemological subject), which in the form of *Jīva*, requires various forms of *vytti* to know the external objects and even internal ones. The *Sākṣin* is, however, ever the Witness to all these changeful *vyttis* which are called into being in the case of the knowledge of the external objects and are also not absent in the case of the internal perceptions of pleasure, pain and the mind—all subjective states *per se*—but nevertheless the latter are always in direct contact with the *Sākṣin* where the *vyttis* are merely logical postulates to be admitted for the explanation of later recollection (*smṛti*) but are not directly needed.¹⁴⁹ Such being the metaphysical position of the Advaitist, *Prakāśātmayati* takes courage in both hands to show that there is an inextricable contact between the Pure Consciousness and everything else super-imposed on It, whence, naturally, nothing is outside Its knowledge as being super-imposed. The epistemological processes, therefore, are of secondary import, for these are required when there is the operation of the epistemological subject as *pramāṭṛ* and hence all sorts of *vyttis* are postulated to make a tinge of the super-imposed (e.g., the *antaḥkaraṇa*) on the Pure Consciousness ;

¹⁴⁹ *antaḥkaraṇatadāharmādīnām vṛttirīṣayābhyupagame kevalasākṣivedyā-
tvābhyupagamavirodhā iti vācayam : nahi vṛttirvinaḥ sākṣirīṣayatvaṁ
kevalasākṣivedyatvaṁ hintu indriyānumānādipramāṇavyāpāramāntareṇa
sākṣirīṣayatvaṁ—(Vedānta Paribhāṣā, C. U. Edn. P. 72).*

otherwise all facts of the empirical and epistemological world would come and go without their being ever *known* in their bearings and settings, but would have only been superimposed entities without any subjective and objective reference; Pure Consciousness would then have been the necessary guarantor of all superimposition and all revelation as such. Thus, as on the one side, there is an inextricable and innate relation between the Pure Consciousness and the *directly* superimposed entities like the *antaḥkaraṇa* and its qualities, so also on the other side, all external objects, as superimposed on It, may be said to be revealed to It whenever such superimposition has taken place. Hence the gulf of the epistemological process is not necessary to vouchsafe for the revelation of the superimposed either internal or external; for, it is well seen that such processes, whether called into being or not, are merely secondary to the revelation of such objects—that call their aid to be known in epistemological settings. Hence it is that the cryptic remark of Prakāśātmayati: *avyavadhānena citsamsarga eva pratibhāsaheṭuḥ* (Vivaraṇa, P. 336) assumes gigantic metaphysical import to understand the real implications of the remark. The conscious objector has not yet been satisfied with the analysis of *antaḥkaraṇa* and its knowledge *vis-à-vis* Pure Consciousness, as given so elaborately by Prakāśātmayati from the Advaitist standpoint. He may argue on, that the *antaḥkaraṇa* cannot be said to be belonging to the category of the not-Self (*idam*), as opposed to Pure Consciousness as Self (*anidam*); for, it is also *directly* revealed without any *necessary* epistemological aid, like the Advaitist *Sākṣin*. To this apparent objection also Prakāśātmayati gives a sweeping reply in consonance with the Advaitist position. He says, though following in the footsteps of his predecessor, Padmapāda, that the Self and not-Self are two categories determined not by their depending or otherwise on any epistemological aid, but by the fact that the one is of the nature of Pure Consciousness, while the other is of the nature of being revealed by the former. This empirical method is sufficient ground for the admission of their metaphysical difference. Thus whether there is any gulf of the epistemological aid or no, as Akhaṇḍānanda shows it to be impossible to postulate any pure case of absence of such aid in our empiri-

cal behaviour,¹⁵⁰ the fact that the *antaḥkaraṇa* belongs to the category of the not-Self is borne out by such deeper analysis of its nature in contradistinction to that of the Pure Consciousness.¹⁵¹ In our empirical behaviour, it should be remembered that the Pure Consciousness cannot be categorized along with the *antaḥkaraṇa*, the not-Self, though there is an inalienable *adhyāsa* between the two; for, as Prakāśātmayati brings out, there is also a distinctness of the *antaḥkaraṇa* which tries to delimit Pure Consciousness, but Pure Consciousness as Self is merely tinged with such superimposition of the *antaḥkaraṇa* and its qualities, thus making for the distinctness of the not-self, i.e., *antaḥkaraṇa*, as belonging to the category of the not-Self. Prakāśātmayati brings out more fully the Advaitist reply to the apparent inconsistency as tried to be shown by the opponents in regarding the *antaḥkaraṇa* as belonging to the category of the not-Self. They try to show that as the *ahaṅkāra* is merely separated by the veil of nescience (*ajñānavyavadhāna*), it should not be held to belong to the category of the not-Self—as there is no gulf of the epistemological aids to know it which is directly revealed to the *Sākṣin*. Hence the contention of the Advaitist, as brought out by Prakāśātmayati, that the category of the not-Self is revealed through the medium of *vṛttis*, while the category of the Self is revealed without any dependence on such media, is held to be inconsistent by the objector who holds that the *ahaṅkāra* is equally independent of any *vṛttis*, as it is merely separated by the veil of ignorance. Hence the Advaitist has to justify his claim on the *ahaṅkāra* belonging to the category of the not-Self, and this task is ably undertaken by Prakāśātmayati and supported by Akhaṇḍānanda. They show that as the *ahaṅkāra* is separated by the veil of nescience (*ajñānavyavahita*) the objector cannot consistently hold that it is nevertheless not separated by any *vṛtti*, and should belong to the category of the Self, as is manifestly done by him. But the Advaitist reply would be that such a contention regarding the

¹⁵⁰ *kevalavyatīrekūbhāvānna jñānakriyāvyavadhānatāyāḥ prayojakatvam*—(*Tattvadīpana*, P. 337).

¹⁵¹ *arthataścitsvarūpatā'nidamaṁśatā; caitanyakarmatā cedamaṁśatā, na jñānakriyāvyavadhānenetyarthaḥ*—(*Vivaraṇa*, P. 337).

ahaṅkāra as belonging to the category of the Self is a mere illusory knowledge, for whenever the *ahaṅkāra* is said to be separated by the veil of nescience, it is taken for granted that its revelation is not independent of any *vyṭti* at all, for though there is the absence of any ordinary epistemological aid like the contact of the sense with the object, there is nevertheless an inevitable relation with *ajñāna* that makes for its revelation; in fact, a *vyṭti* is recognised by the Vivaraṇa School to belong even to *ajñāna* to account for, at least, the recognition of the recollection of illusory objects. Thus the *ahaṅkāra*, though separated merely by the *ajñāna*, is undoubtedly an object of the category of the not-Self—the Self standing revealed always in its own light, while the objects of the category of the not-Self are always in need of some sort of *vyṭtis*—either contactual when depending on *pramāṇas* or merely conceptual when though not depending on *pramāṇas*, is merely postulated as being directly revealed to the *Sākṣin* (*kevalasākṣivedya*). In the case of *kevalasākṣivedyatva* even, there is a gulf, a necessary medium of *ajñāna* or of its own nature (*svaviśaya*) to make for the revelation of the objects of the category of the not-Self, and *ahaṅkāra* undoubtedly belongs to this category. (cf. *vyṭtiyavadhānena siddhireva śarīrendriyaviśayāñāmida-miti pratibhāsitā, tadavyavadhānasiddhirevānidampratibhāsitā—Vivaraṇa*, P. 337; *indriyasannikarṣajam jñānam vyṭtiśabdārthaḥ, vyṭtiśabdasya yathāśrutamarthamādāyāhaṅkārasyāvya-vadhānasiddhimākṣipati-nanvajñāneti—Tattvadīpana*. P. 337).

Prakāśātmayati brings out very systematically the Advaitist interpretation of *pratibimba*, as in that of the face on a mirror. This discussion is necessitated by the fact that though Pure Self or Consciousness is analysed as being tinged (*uparākṣa*) with the superimposition of the external objects and their qualities, yet It is also regarded as the substratum for the appearance of *pratibimbas* like the *ahaṅkāra*. His analysis suggests that such analogies merely make for the oneness of the *bimba* (Pure Consciousness) and *pratibimba* (*ahaṅkāra*), or in other words, between *Brahman* and *Jīva*. He adduces elaborate arguments to show that the separate experience of the *pratibimba*, say, of the face on the mirror is not tenable on strict logical analysis. We need not go into details of his arguments, but suffice it to say that as the *pratyabhijñā* or

recollection of a previous or anterior entity from an existent entity is a proof of the one-ness of the perceived, the *bimba* or face being experienced as the *à priori* entity from the experience of its *à posteriori* *pratibimba* can be said to be one with it. He shows the arguments, logically tenable, in favour of the impossibility of the *pratibimbas* as different from the *bimba*, in so far as such a difference is negated from the very fact that an entity, existing outside, has a shadow inside a particular medium, like water or mirror. Prakāśātmayati first tries to silence his objectors by showing that such shadows (*pratibimbas*) may be regarded as transformations of the parts of the mirror in the image of the original entity (*bimba*), whence their difference should be a thing of the past, for such transformation of the mirror-reflection due to a particular entity outside may be regarded as the very entity itself. This *pariṇāma*vāda, proceeding from the *sāṅkhyavāda* theory, may be adduced by the Sāṅkhya-Pātañjala School in consonance with its metaphysical stand. But Prakāśātmayati vehemently upturns this view, tentatively accepted, by saying that there cannot be any real *pariṇāma* of the reflection from its original counter-part. The reflection, if it exists at all, is the creation of the Self's nescience and hence false, through and through. This is the backbone of all the arguments accumulated by Prakāśātmayati on this point. He has tried to show elaborately that if there were a real transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the reflection (*pratibimba*) on the parts of the mirror it would have endured even when the original counterpart would be removed. But that is far from the case. The reflection changes from the variations in posture, movements and presence or absence of the man whose face is reflected. The reflection of the face on the mirror cannot also be said to go out as soon as the original counterpart itself changes from the place, as in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory which explains the destruction of an effect due to the change of the cause or condition responsible for a particular effect (*nimittāpāye naimittikasyāpyapāyah*). The favourite example in this regard is that of the 'knowledge of mutuality' (*apekṣābuddhi*) that is responsible for the appearance and disappearance of the knowledge of two-ness (*dvaitabuddhi*). Knowledge of two-ness ever involves that there are two mutually dependent

entities to give rise to such a knowledge. This knowledge of mutuality is what they conceive as responsible for the appearance and disappearance of the knowledge of two-ness. But such a view is hardly tenable, for even though the *nimitta* (cause or condition) sometimes is absent from a place, its *naimittika* (effect) can go out temporarily, but nevertheless that does not really mean that it is due to the absence of the *nimitta*; for it is well observed that when a different effect intervenes, the cause or condition is merely intervened in its *latent* forceful potentiality by that temporary effect. When a matting which is rolled up for, say, years together is spread out by the hand, the spreading lasts so long as the temporary *saṃskāra* (potentiality) done with the hand is operative, after which the more powerful *saṃskāra* of being rolled up for, say, months again operates; otherwise if the absence of the temporary *saṃskāra* of out-stretched-ness meant the rolling-up of the matting, there would have always been the rolled-up state generated by the more formidable *saṃskāra* of years. Thus the rolled-up state being temporarily checked is generated again by that formidable *saṃskāra* and not by the mere absence of the out-stretched-ness of the matting.¹⁵² Prakāśātmayati shows that on the showing of this analysis it will be clear that the reflection of the face upon the mirror should persist even after the original counterpart is removed, for that image has a strong *saṃskāra* to rise up, being reflected on a mirror many times. If that be the case, there should not be anything to stand in the way of its persistence,—even if a different image is reflected, for that different image is merely a temporary check for the original image strongly and frequently imprinted on a particular mirror (say, the image of my face daily on my own mirror). But that would be an absurd contention, for no one can say with definiteness that the reflection of his face on his own mirror is a persistent factor of experience. Thus the reality of the reflection as transformation (*pariṇāma*) of its parts is untenable on all hands.

From these analyses Prakāśātmayati drives at a very

¹⁵² *nimittāpāyamātrañcedvivaraṇāpūyaḥ. saṃskārābhāve saṃveśeteti bhāvaḥ—(Vivaraṇa, P. 340).*

saṃskārābhāve saṃveśanopajano māstu, tathāpi viruddhakāryotpattau pūrvavinaśaḥ katham ityāśaṅkyāha—nimitteti—(Tattvādīpana, P. 340).

fundamental Advaita position about the nature of the reflection (*pratibimba*). He tries to establish that the reflection, as of the face on the mirror, is not a real transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the parts of the mirror, for then there would inevitably ensue the question that the reflection, inspite of the absence of the original counter-part, should endure as having been really transformed in that form once it is imprinted from the counter-part. No amount of arguments would be able to save its being absent at any time, for the fact of the absence of its counter-part (*numittāpāye naimittikasyāpya-pāyah*), for it is well established that this Vaiśeṣika contention does not hold good in the matter of temporary absence of a *nimitta*, if there had been a stronger potentiality (*saṃskāra*) to which such temporary absence of the *nimitta* is secondary and may or may not be called in aid to explain the position of the eclipse of its effect. He also shows that the reflection can never be a real transformation of the original counter-part, for it has no conditions precedent for origination. He puts it in a syllogistic way; *na darpaṇādaḥ, mukhyavyaktantarāmasti, tājjanmakaraṇaśūnyaivāt; śaśamastake viśānavaditi* —(*Vivaraṇa*, P. 341). He then goes on to examine the objections of the opponents that the Advaitist contention of the one-ness of the original counterpart (*bimba*) and its image (*pratibimba*) is untenable, for these objectors show that even posterior recollection of the one-ness is not warranted to prove the real one-ness of the two, as there is well such posterior recollection of one-ness in an illusory silver (as on a piece of shell). To this rather apparently forceful objection, Prakāśātmayati brings out the real nature of illusory objects and the absence of one-ness between the substratum and the superimposed. His analysis of *bādhā* (negation) brings out the full implications of the Advaitist theory where the superimposed is the creation of *avidyā* and hence illusory (*prātibhāsika*) through and through. He shows that negation or *bādhā* of the superimposed (*adhyasta*) makes it wholly negated in its own nature (of illusoriness or falsity), when, for example, a piece of shell is falsely cognised as a piece of silver, the latter is negated, not as being absent at that particular place and time (as would be held by the various *sakhyātivādins*), but as being wholly an illusory object that is merely cognised falsely

(*prātibhāsika*) having no *real* nature of its own. If this be the basic principle of negation from the Advaitist standpoint, it becomes evident that it does not merely postulate a *relation* that is false, and necessarily which is negated afterwards, but recognizes the *intrinsic* falsity of the object itself. Hence Prakāśātmayati very rightly analyses the difference of the nature of negation that is made in the case of a reflection or image (*pratibimba*); here he shows that there is merely the posterior knowledge (*pratyabhijñāna*) of the absence of any image on a particular adjunct, say, that of my face on the mirror, which does not necessarily entail that the image is *intrinsically* false, but merely suggests that it is the image on reflections of an original counter-part with which it is in oneness. The appearance of the original counter-part on a different adjunct or substratum as belonging to that adjunct is what is negated, but neither the appearance *as such* nor the adjunct *as such* is false or illusory and hence negated. The disappearance of the image of my face does not, therefore, necessarily mean that the image is *in itself* false, or the adjunct (mirror) is *in itself* false, for neither the image nor the mirror is negated but is only shifted from the original places to show that the original counter-part is the only substratum for all images to appear—images that are all *in essence* one with it. Such being the position that Prakāśātmayati so ably drives at, following in the steps of his predecessor, it remains to judge fairly the nature of the image (*pratibimba*) *vis-à-vis* its relation to the original counter-part (*bimba*) and the adjunct (*upādhi*). True it is that the image is not negated for it is *not different in essence* from the original counter-part; the appearance of the image on any adjunct is not separate from the counter-part in the sense that the adjunct makes it appear where there should have been really the existence of the counter-part itself. But as that counter-part is known *as the image* due to the adjunct (mirror) which has a relation only with the counter-part, it becomes evident that the image should appear, *not* as different from, but as one with the counter-part. The function of the adjunct (*upādhi*), then, is to create the bifurcation which is naturally not to be there; but as the image is bifurcated from the counter-part, there is some kind of a power or potency that is responsible for this

phenomenon—though unnatural. It comes to this, then, that the *bheda* or difference is engendered in the place of *abheda* or unity due to some power or potency that inevitably makes unity succumb to diversity. This is the true philosophy of *avidyā* or nescience, the mother of all difference and diversity. The totally illusory (*anirvacanīya* or *mithyā*) is that which is superimposed on some substratum, where ordinarily that would not be super-imposed. Hence the *pratibimba*, though not different from the *bimba*, has the appearance of a distinction, however unwanted it might be. This distinction of *bheda* is, therefore, totally false or illusory and what should be negated is this wrong ascription of *bheda* on *abheda*—of the distinction of a *pratibimba* on its unity with *bimba*. Thus it becomes clear as day-light that the quality or *dharma* of *bhinnatva* is illusory, not the *bhīdyamāna*—for there is no *bhīdyamāna* as such, which is one with that with reference to which it is *bhīdyamāna* (different). In the case of the appearance of the silver on a piece of shell, the silver is out-and-out illusory, for the silver appears purely out of *avidyā* on a substratum where it is ordinarily absent. Here, therefore, the *bhīdyamāna* is not one with that with reference to which it is so, for here the *bhīdyamāna* itself is engendered by *avidyā*, and hence is illusory and, therefore, negated. From these considerations, therefore, it comes out as a moot question how to determine that *avidyā*, the generator of diversity, should be taken as generating illusoriness in the appearance of diversity—sometimes in the object itself and sometimes in the mere quality without affecting the object. Here, as *Prakāśātmayati* brings out, are considerations to be weighed carefully in determining the nature of illusion—whether it is born out of any adjunct (*upādhi*=*sopādhika bhrama*) or is not due to any adjunct (*nirupādhikha bhrama*). Reserving our discussions on this very important problem, we should presently engage ourselves in determining the nature of the *pratibimba* as reflected on the adjunct which may be taken as the eternal nescience (*avidyā*) and not any common one like a mirror. For purposes of consistency it should be borne always in mind that such common adjuncts like the mirror are alone not responsible for the appearance of the image, unless it is backed up by nescience present in the percipient. Hence the *pratibimba*

should be regarded in the light of its non-difference from the *bimba* when no nescience intervenes, or should ordinarily intervene, to generate it as different from the latter. In other words, the *pratibimba* is one with the *bimba* without any adjunct, which, in the restricted sense we have adopted, makes for the difference to appear. Thus the objection with which the conscious objector may come up before the Advaitist is ably refuted by Prakāśātmayati who shows that there is no necessity to postulate the falsity or negation of the *pratibimba* on the ground of scriptural passages like *Tat Tvam Asi* (*Ghāndogya Upaniṣad* 6/8/7) which seem to be unjustified if the *Tvam* is not negated by *Tat*. Prakāśātmayati's analysis shows that such passages do not postulate the negation of the *Tvam* but only the Unity of the two concepts *Tat* and *Tvam*—the only Reality. Like posterior recollection (*pratyabhijñā*) of a previous experience as '*so'yaṁ Devadattaḥ*'—this is the Devadatta whom I saw previously—these *śruti*-passages merely indicate that the verbal distinction involved in *Tvam* is merely syncreticised with its Unity with *Tat*, as the previous experience of space, time etc. along with Devadatta is syncreticised with his perception of unity in the present context.¹⁵³ Thus it is clear that there is no necessary negation of the appearance of the *pratibimba*, i.e., the *Tvam*-element, when the *bimba*, the *Tat*-element is realized syncretically with it. What is negated is the *upādhi*, the adjunct, called *avidyā* along with the false perception of the quality of *bhinnatva* generated by it. Hence while *jīvatva* is negated as being the false creation of *avidyā*, the *Jīva* as non-different in essence from *Brahman* is merely realized as such, and never negated. To substantiate the trend of arguments in this regard, we can refer to the *śruti*-passage: *Jīvāpetam vāva kiledam mriyate na Jīvo mriyate* (*Ch. Up.* 6/11/3) wherein it is stated that *Jīva* is eternal being non-different from *Brahman* and can, therefore, never die; what die are the false associations of body and senses that are left out as being unrelated in any way to the essenti-

¹⁵³ *so'yaṁ Devadatta itivat tādātmyaparam, na parārthabādhaparamiti pariharati—maivamiti—(Vivaraṇa, P. 342).*

tadataddeśādvaiśiṣṭyaparitṛyāgena yathā so'yamityāder Devadattasvarūpaparatvam, tadadvācāyāmśaparitṛyāgena cittādātmyaparatvāt na bādha-kātvamasyāpityarthah—(Tattvadiṣṭana, P. 342).

ality of the *Jīva*. They are not warranted but for the existence of the false adjunct of *avidyā* and its false creations in the difference of body etc. Padmapāda also suggests this Advaitist interpretation of the absence of negation of the *pratibimba*, i.e., *Jīva*, when it is syncretically realized along with *Brahman*, by saying that if there were any such negation, the form of negation would have been 'Thou art not (there)' (*na Tvamasī'ti*) but it is simply 'Thou art That' ('*Tat Tvam Asi*'). From this syncretic realization there is nothing to assert that there should be a negation of the *Tvam*-element to justify its Unity with the *Tat*-element. It is rather clearer to hold that the *Tvam*-element is *really* the *Tat*-element not different from it; only the false associations of accretions are there due to the inherent *avidyā*. To declare *avidyā* and all its children as illusory does not necessarily warrant that what is not due to it—but is above board of all *avidyā*—is also illusory and therefore to be negated. Negate the *avidyā* and all what it can touch and produce, but you can never negate what is *non-negatable*, if we can use such a phrase,—such is the true import of the *śruti*s. The analogy of the image of the face on the mirror, so elaborately brought out by Prakāśātmayati, rests on this solid Advaitist doctrine of the reality of unity between *Jīva* and *Brahman*. The facial image is similarly not to be negated for it cannot be, as being non-different from the counter-part. The *upādhi*—though here it is the mirror, yet being backed up by *avidyā*—may cause its appearance, yet it is by no means negatable. The only false and therefore *negatable* associations are the accretions of posture and direction that are seen to follow from it. Negate them as much as you like, but the image lasts not as a false entity, but as the very manifestation of the counter-part that is in association with the mirror and revealed as different.

Prakāśātmayati following his predecessor further goes on to analyse the nature of the *pratibimba* to show that its appearance cannot be denied if there be an adjunct in contact with the *bimba*. The *bimba* has an appearance on an adjunct if the power of *avidyā* is operative, and even then it cannot be said that the *pratibimba* should cease to appear when

we have knowledge of the *bimba* as the only reality. He first goes on to dismiss the objection of the Prābhākaras that there is no such thing as a *pratibimba* over and above the *bimba*, which being recognised without its relation with the trunk (*grīvā*), [*samsargāgraha* = *grīvāsthātvenāgrahaṇāt*—*Tattva-dīpana*, P. 434], appears on the mirror; truly speaking, there is no such separate entity as the *pratibimba*. This *akhyātivāda* theory of the Prābhākaras, says Prakāśātmayati, is negated by our common experience alone which shows the facial image as turning towards the man whose face is reflected on the mirror and therefore as one which seems to be there on the mirror and not non-existent as the Prābhākaras imply. It, therefore, takes him no pains to show that the appearance of the image, though non-different from the counter-part, cannot be denied altogether. He now goes on to analyse whether the image should at all be existent when the knowledge of the original counter-part is realised as the *only* real knowledge. In other words the problem boils down to this that when we have the knowledge of the original counterpart (*bimba*) as the reality behind the appearance of the image (*pratibimba*), should the latter still appear? This question arises from the fact, hinted at by Padmapāda, that a unitary entity (*dravya* and not *jāti* or *guṇa* etc.) can never be *real* when it appears simultaneously and in its entirety at two places; for, no such *dravya* with such bi-polar existence is conceivable whence it should be conceded that one of its aspects is false. So when *bimba* is known as true, the *pratibimba* is false and should not appear any longer. To answer such possible objections, Prakāśātmayati, following his predecessor, has meticulously shown that the appearance of the image *as distinct on a different adjunct* is what is false, for such duality of space means a creation, out of our nescience, of the image *as existent distinctly*. Hence the creation of *māyā* (or *avidyā*) as it is, we cannot but recognize its appearance, though in fact the *bimba* is one with the *pratibimba* without any spatial or temporal distinction as *really present*. Such being the real position of the Advaitists, Prakāśātmayati brings out that the 'appearance' of the *pratibimba* need not necessarily be expunged from our sight when we have the real knowledge of the *bimba*. Here he brings out a discussion, hinted at by us above but reserved for the time being,

regarding illusions of two kinds—viz., *nirupādhika* (without any adjunct or *upādhi*) and *sopādhika* (with an adjunct or *upādhi*). He shows that in *sopādhika bhramas* like the present instance of facial image or that of the reflected tree with its upper branches and foliages appearing on the surface of a tank as being over-turned, there seems to be no ground for the admission of any work of *māyā* or *avidyā* for such reflected appearance, as the real nature of face as above is being fully known, there nevertheless remaining such and such appearance. But the Advaitist answer is that even if there be *tattvajñāna* (knowledge of reality) there may yet appear *sopādhika bhramas*; therefore, *tattvajñāna* is not in conflict with the appearance as otherwise of the reality, for though the real incentive to such appearance is, no doubt, *avidyā* pertaining to the percipient consciousness yet there is a material adjunct like water or mirror which rakes it up. Thus when such raking up takes place, *ātmāvidyā* (*avidyā* pertaining to percipient consciousness) transforms itself into the appearance of the image. In *sopādhika bhramas*, therefore, when the percipient consciousness has no direct knowledge of itself as the substratum of the *avidyā* responsible for the appearance of the image, mere knowledge of the reality of one aspect of the appearance (the *bimba*) cannot dispel the other aspect of it (the *pratibimba*). Thus in *nirupādhika bhramas* like the appearance of the silver upon shell, the direct knowledge of the shell is sufficient to dispel the ignorance covering up shell-consciousness and hence as soon as the shell-consciousness is revealed, the ignorance covering it up and responsible for the appearance of the silver is no longer there. Thus there is a deep-rooted metaphysical theory to support the epistemological position brought out by Prakāśamayati to support the continued experience of the image in *sopādhika bhramas*. In such cases, therefore, the appearance of the image can be expunged only when the material adjunct (like water) is removed so as to make for the percipient consciousness to have the direct or immediate knowledge of itself as being the seat of the nescience responsible for such appearance. The *Jīva*, therefore, as a reflection of *Brahman*, ceases to appear only when the adjunct of *avidyā* responsible for its duality in space and time is removed, thus vouchsafing for the direct know-

ledge of the Self or *Brahman* as the dispeller of any reflection outside itself. The rôle of the adjunct, therefore, is not a whit unimportant, for it is the most important medium for the appearance and disappearance of the image—to retard or reveal the direct knowledge of the Self. In *nirupādhika bhramas*, *avidyā* veiling up the object-consciousness creates something other on it and hence the super-imposed comes and goes when that nescience is dispelled, even if the Self or the percipient consciousness be not known directly as the ground of all nescience. The knowledge of the piece of shell without any *avidyā* is enough to show that there is no silver that illusorily showed itself upon it. The piece of shell might be pushed forward to be related with the percipient consciousness (*pramāṭṛ-caitanya* which is here designated as the Self) to be brought out in its own direct experience (*viśaya-pratyakṣa*) when the percipient consciousness also may be regarded as worthy of direct experience for the directness of the shell, but such *far-flung epistemological* steps are warranted in *nirupādhika bhramas*, as in *sopādhika bhramas* where the object-consciousness is in no wise veiled, yet there is the appearance of the image. These facts have been very lucidly summarized by Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadīpana* thus: *adhiṣṭhānayaṭhātmyajñānasyādhyāsavirodhitvāt tasmin satyapyadhyāsa iti katham? iti cet-tatra vaktavyam-sarvatra tattvajñānasyādhyāsavirodhitvam uta kvacit? nādyah, tattvajñāne satyapi sopādhikabhramadarśanādityāha-naceti, kutra tarhi jñānasyādhyāsavirodhitvam? iti prcchāyām dvitīyāṅgikāreṇottaramāha-kimtviti, idamatrābhipretam-ūrdhvaḥgrāvṛkṣa-jñānasya bhramahetutvam nāsrīyaṭe, kimtūrdhvaḥgrāvṛkṣasya jalapratibimbitavṛkṣasya caikyāvaccchinātma'pāroḥsajjñānābhāvādajñānanivṛttiḥ, tadabhāvāśca jalalakṣaṇopādhipratibandhāt tatra pratibandhakativṛttya'parokṣajñānenājñānādinivṛttiḥ—(P. 344).*

From these elaborate discussions as to the nature of the *pratibimba*, Prakāśātmayaṭi brings out the real implications of the negation of the false knowledge of associations which *Jīva* as *pratibimba* are endowed with. He first shows as unfounded the objection against the impossibility of negation of such false knowledge because of the *Jīva's* being a *pratibimba* of *Brahman* not as a false entity but as one in essence with It, whence even the direct knowledge of unity may, as has been explained

above, not be able to dispel the false knowledge of associations. He shows that in the case of the appearance of *Jīva* there is an essential difference from the ordinary *pratibimbās* like the facial image, for in the latter cases they are all unconscious and cannot be dispelled without the physical removal of the material adjunct like the mirror ; but in the former case of *Jīva*, he is always conscious and therefore any true knowledge will automatically dispel the false associations with which the *Jīva*, is connected much unlike the associations falsely ascribed to the facial image as being turned toward (*pratyak*) the man whose face is reflected. In such cases the unconscious image and its associations are removed not by mere real knowledge but also when the material adjunct is removed. The conscious character of the *Jīva* is undisputed unlike the unconscious image, for the latter cannot move of itself without the movements of the *bimba* whence it is clear to say that it is never a conscious agent. It cannot also be argued that the *bimba*, i.e., *Brahman* should have the real knowledge, for it is the *bimba* like the man (*Devadatta*) whose face is reflected that is the real possessor of such knowledge. Here also this essential difference of the character of *Jīva* as conscious must needs postulate that it is not the claim of the *bimba* or counterpart as *bimba* to possess true knowledge as in the case of the reflection of the unconscious image of the face ; it is the agent, who as conscious possesses the false knowledge, that should also possess the True Knowledge eclipsed by false associations and as appearing otherwise ; and this postulation is with regard to the conscious *Jīva*—falsely associated as severed from *Brahman* in its accretions. Thus the thesis as put forward by *Prakāśātmayati* is one of the bed-rocks of Advaita metaphysics and also epistemology, for, on a correct understanding of it hinges the true import of illusory knowledge (*adhyāsa*). *Adhyāsa* as being due to *avidyā* or *ajñāna* belongs to the conscious percipient who, as being subjected to it, must needs get rid of it by the dawn of right knowledge. Right knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) is the destroyer of *avidyā* or false, illusory cognition which is in direct conflict with it ; hence no unconscious adjunct or substratum can be said to have any right knowledge, for it is never under the subjection of any illusion. *Ajñāna* or *avidyā* can never veil an unconsci-

ous entity, as has been elaborately discussed above, and hence it is never in need of any dispelling of it. The ordinary material adjunct like the mirror or water, which is in contact with the *bimba*, merely creates a duality in the image-perception in which sense it is false. But neither the image is the possessor of any *ajñāna*, nor the original *bimba* the possessor of any right knowledge; for both are inert, unconscious entities which can never have any false or true knowledge. In the case of the *Jīva*, however, he has a special privilege of being conscious and this privilege makes him the possessor of the false knowledge of duality due to false accretions related with him. Though he is non-different from *Brahman*, yet it is he who loses sight of that unity and, though one in essence, falsely identifies himself with duality or plurality of body, mind etc. The reflection as reflection is, therefore, never false, for it is not-different from *Brahman*, the Supreme Reality, but the *Jīva*-reflection is somewhat unique in character than ordinary reflections. The consciousness that is in the *Jīva* is veiled as being severed from *Brahman*, but the facial image is not so veiled, nor the face itself, for, it is, as has been already brought out, the consciousness of the percipient subject which is, under the influence of material adjuncts, subjected to an *avidyā* (*ātmamoha*), thus vouchsafing for the duality of the images to appear. Hence in such cases the images have nothing to do with the dawning of right knowledge, nor is the *bimba* or face as such concerned in any way with such an advent. The *pratibimbās* linger on inspite of the dawning of right knowledge, and the *bimbās* also are not prevented from being reflected by such dawning of right knowledge—so long as the material adjunct is there. It is only the conscious percipient as *pramāṇī* who is directly the enjoyer of any fruits of false or true knowledge, inspite of the fact that there is a reflection or there is none. Thus Prakāśātmayati's analysis of the dawning of right knowledge carries us direct into the heart of Advaitist metaphysics and epistemology, by showing that not because of the fact that a particular Entity, say, *Brahman* is the original from which there is a reflection, say, of *Jīva*, should there be a recognition of Its being the possessor of false knowledge as well as true knowledge; for no other cases like those of the facial images can

prove that the *bimbas* are such entities. It is the nature of *avidyā* to cling fast to consciousness and not to any mere *bimba*. Hence it is the nature of *tattvajñāna* to rise in that which is under the spell or *ajñāna*. Thus considered, it is no good logic to hold that *Brahman*, the *bimba*, is the possessor of true knowledge, for *ajñāna* does not directly affect It. Here, however, we may consider the plausibility or otherwise of such an argument; for, it is well known that in Advaita Vedānta, it is the *Brahman* as Pure Consciousness. That is declared as being the substratum of *ajñāna*. When *ajñāna* is said to cling to Consciousness, it is the Consciousness as Self that is veiled by it. At least, the Vivaraṇa School does not admit any difference between the substratum or locus (*āśraya*) and the object (*viśaya*) of *ajñāna*, for it is *Brahman* That is both. The Bhāmatī School, however, regards the *Jīva* as the locus of *avidyā* or *ajñāna*. Now if such be the metaphysical position of the two Schools, how can Vivaraṇakāra consistently maintain here that is the *Jīva* that is the focus of *ajñāna* and also the locus of right Knowledge?¹⁵⁴ To answer such an awkward situation, we should do well to understand the metaphysical conflicts in this regard between these two Schools. The Vivaraṇa School admits that it is Pure Consciousness that is both the locus and the object of *ajñāna* for the fact that It is veiled (*viśaya*) by the *ajñāna* and also becomes reflected as the *Jīva* in being the substratum (*āśraya*) of *ajñāna*. The reflection of the *Jīva*, in itself being the creation of *ajñāna*, cannot be the locus of *ajñāna*.¹⁵⁵ Thus out of logical consistency, the Vivaraṇa School has accepted this position, however much the Bhāmatī School may try to support that *Jīva* being eternal (*anādi*) may be regarded as the substratum of *anādi ajñāna* without the fear of mutual dependence like the eternal seed-sprout-series (*anādi bījāṅkuranyāya*). But the admission here by the Vivaraṇakāra of *Jīva* as the locus of *ajñāna* or *ajñāna* to support that right Knowledge should belong to him (*Jīva*) seems very much loosened in

¹⁵⁴ na bimbatvakṛtam tattvajñānāśrayatvam, kintu bhrāntatvakṛtam, tadapyajñatvakṛtam, tadapi Jivatvanimittamiti bhāvaḥ—(Vivaraṇa, P. 346).

¹⁵⁵ āśrayatva-viśayatva-bhāginī nirvibhāgacitireva kevala pūrvasiddhatamaso hi paścīmo nāśrayo bhavati nāpi gocaraḥ—(Saṅkṣepa-Sārīraka, 1/319).

logic. We can, however, justify that Prakāśātmayatī here tries to substantiate the difference of the *Jīva* from the ordinary images as that of face on mirror to show that it is a Conscious Entity—*granted that it is Jīva*—which is in ignorance and with right knowledge. *Brahman*, in the interpretations of his School, reflects as the *Jīva*, thus making for the duality of appearance in the latter; the latter, however, is non-different from the former. Hence all duality necessarily being illusory is the product of *ajñāna* clinging on to Pure Consciousness; when that veil goes away, right Knowledge as unveiled and unprojected dawns.

Such being the analysis of the position of the Vivaraṇa School with regard to the problem of illusion in the context of the reflection (*pratibimbavā*) of *Brahman*, it becomes easier for us to understand which direction Prakāśātmayatī's arguments even in their seemingly paradoxical presentations as above are leading us to. It is merely not a battle of words to win the cause of logic, but it is the cogent and coherent presentment of one's viewpoints that counts in logical analysis. We think that we have amply tried to show above that this place of paradoxical logic is resolved by understanding the main thesis of Prakāśātmayatī that Pure Consciousness as *Brahman* being projected as a reflection as *Jīva*—which being one in essence with other accretions appearing as severed from It—is the ground of all illusions and the disappearance of illusions. But that does not in any way mean that *Brahman* is the possessor of right Knowledge or is liberated from bondage, for though disappearance of illusions comes within Its purview, It is never affected by such disappearance, for It is also not the enjoyer of any difference, though false, as Its reflection *Jīva* is. It is beyond all enjoyment, either of duality or of unity, for It is ever One and Accomplished (*Ekam Sat*). How can It be affected, then, by any false accretions that may hinge upon Its reflection, *Jīva*, for it is the *Jīva* that as Consciousness loses, under false sight, the vision of the pristine purity of that Consciousness. So *Brahman* postulated as the ground of all *ajñāna* as also its object in this School, is from the highest metaphysical standpoint an enigma—for Pure Consciousness merely contacts the *avidyā* but is never contaminated by it. It is the most general logical as well as

metaphysical postulate to testify to the existence of *avidyā*, but is not mixed up in the dirty whirlpool of it in empirical and pragmatic associations. Judging from all sides we can merely acquiesce to what Akhaṇḍānanda has mildly suggested after all arguments on this point—*sarvajñādirūpe ajñānāśrayatvasya viruddhatvāt tadviparītajīvasyājñātvamṛtyarthah. etac-cāṅgīkṛtyoktam, vastutasu cinmātratantramajñānam*—(*Tattva-dīpana*, P. 347).

CHAPTER X

THE IMAGE-CHARACTER (*PRATIBIMBATVA*) OF *JIVA* FURTHER EXAMINED—WITH OTHER HYPOTHESES BEING PROVED UNTENABLE

From the above considerations of the fundamental Advaitist position, we may proceed with confidence to agree with what *Prakāśātmayati* has laid bare before us regarding the reflection of *Jīva* from *Brahman*. The conscious objectors may again come up with their inevitable array of charges in the nature of the bad logic of dilemmatic arguments. But it is to be borne in mind that the above fundamental Advaitist position does not suffer from the illogicality proved by such dilemmatic arguments. The main dilemma flung towards such a position is with regard to Pure Consciousness losing its all-conscious character or its own intrinsic nature as having been affected by such knowledge also. To be more definite and clear, *Brahman*, the Pure Consciousness, as the locus of all illusions must be postulated to have the knowledge of such illusions also to justify its all-conscious character; and that admitted, it will have to be postulated also that It is not unaffected by such knowledge of duality (the false knowledge of all false creation that is denoted by the term *samsāraṇa*). There is no *via media* for It. Hence, to understand the real Advaitist reply, we should do well to follow what *Prakāśātmayati* has himself said. He says that *Brahman* as the *bimba* being all-knowledge, it is quite in the fitness of things that It should be the substratum or locus of all illusory knowledge of *adhyāsa*, but that does not in any way warrant that It is also a creature bound down by that process of *adhyāsa*. *Adhyāsa* gets its meaning when it is referred to It as the locus of itself; otherwise no *adhyāsa* would be upon purely unconscious entities which are not the objects (*viśayas*) of *ajñāna*, nor upon a Nihil or Void for that is *adhyāsa* upon no substratum at all. The postulation of *Brahman* or Consciousness is, therefore, a logical necessity from the Advaitist point of view of *adhyāsa*, and *adhyāsa* is not a dialectical process for the inclusion of

Pure Consciousness within its process, for Pure Consciousness is always outside that process. It does not therefore, follow as a logical corollary from the ground of *adhyāsa* that such a ground, i.e., Pure Consciousness, is absorbed in *adhyāsa*. The ground of all *adhyāsas* is ultimately the Self or Consciousness (*Ātman* or *Brahman*), for it is That which being veiled is also the ground of any *avidyā* that is operative for the appearance of a purely illusory object upon such a ground. Even in ordinary *nirupādhuika bhramas* of a shell appearing as silver, it is the Consciousness of the percipient subject (self) that being in union with the Consciousness delimited by the shell is clung fast to by the ignorance (*avidyā*) which is capable of transforming itself into the false silver. But the Pure Consciousness to which the false silver is revealed *directly* along with its cause, i.e., *avidyā*, is not in any way affected by the falsity of the creation of ignorance that is operative only in the empirical world of behaviour and action. Thus in the higher grade of *adhyāsa* where the *Jīva* as a reflection of *Brahman* is mixed up "in the fifth of birth and death" the Pure Consciousness as such is merely reflected under the spell of ignorance as something other than Itself—which the reflection *as such* does not warrant. Hence the *bimba* or *Brahman* being reflected as *Jīva* is not a whit affected with the falsity that is associated to the reflection under the spell of nescience (*avidyā*)—as limitedness, birth and death etc. Hence the dilemma put forward by the objectors dies out automatically when we can show that all-knowledge belongs to *Brahman*, no doubt, but the illusory knowledge of *adhyāsa* is *merely* certified to by Its presence. Really such *adhyāsa* is in the actual empirical world of false associations that are indulged in by the *Jīva* not in his pristine purity but under the spell of false ignorance.¹⁵⁶ The speciality of the *pratibimbatva* of *Jīva* is further brought out by *Prakāśātmayati* when he shows that as in ordinary cases of images like that of the face upon the mirror, the image (reflection) stays on as long as the *upādhi* (material adjunct like mirror) is there, in spite of real knowledge of unity of the face and the image having dawned in the man, so in the case

¹⁵⁶ *Brahmāpi svātmani Jive pratibimbe saṃsārām paśyadapi tattva-jñānitvād nānuśocati; tattvajñānasamsarāṇe cāradātāśyāmātr-ādīvaṇnetare-taratra vyavatiṣṭhate*—(*Viramaṇa*, P. 347).

of the *Jīva*-reflection it might be of the same nature of non-negation of duality even after the real knowledge of unity, had the *Jīva* been of the same nature with the facial image. But the *Jīva* having no material adjunct like the mirror save the out-and-out false *avidyā*, there cannot be any moment of false knowledge when the root-cause of all such knowledge, i.e., *avidyā*, is totally destroyed at the dawn of the transcendental Knowledge of Unity. Akhaṇḍānanda clearly brings out this difference of the nature of *Jīva*-reflection from that of the facial image-reflection.¹⁵⁷ The character of the *Jīva* as reflection (*pratibimba*) is finally brought out by Prakāśātmayati by an appeal to proofs of perception as well as *śruti* (as well as *smṛti* and *sūtra*). He dismisses the possible objection that *Jīva* being limited by blind nescience cannot be the conscious seat—that is in essence not different from Pure Consciousness—for the possibility of any *ajñāna* or posterior *tattvajñāna*; similarly also he finds no reason in the argument that *Brahman* being All-pervasive cannot be reflected by limited nescience. The *Jīva* is a reflection by ordinary experience of his conscious nature that is only acted upon by the limited knowledge wrought by nescience; otherwise it is not different in any way from All-Consciousness—it is not in any way limited as unconscious by the nescience that acts upon it. The nature of *Jīva* as a *pratibimba* is, moreover, substantiated in the different strata of Vedantic literature, viz., the *śruti*, the *smṛti* and the *sūtra* (*Brahmasūtras*).¹⁵⁸ *Brahman* as All-pervasive Pure Consciousness can be reflected on *avidyā* as *Jīva* in the same way as all-pervasive sky studded with stars appears as reflected on a limited watery surface. Reflection of the all-pervasive is possible if there is an adjunct to work upon the all-pervasive entity to make for its appearance that is not in essence different from it; had the reflection been different altogether from the reflected, we could question whether the reflected all-pervasive entity should at all be reflected on an adjunct as limited. But when the reflected entity is not such

¹⁵⁷ *Brahmavyatirikṭasyāhaṅkāraḍeraññānamūlatvād jñānenājñānanivṛtty-
aupādhikabhṛtmanivṛttisambhavadītyabhiprāyaḥ* (*Tattvadīpana*, P. 347).

¹⁵⁸ *rūpaṁ rūpaṁ pratirūpo bābhūva.*

ekadhā bahudhāva ca dṛśyate jalacandravat.

ata eva copamā sūryakādīrat—(Br. Sūt, 3/2/18).

an entity as to be different altogether from the image which is reflected, who can question the plausibility of the image appearing on a limited adjunct but not on that account being limited by it? Limitation is not *real* in the all-pervasive entity even appearing as circumscribed, for this is a characteristic created out of the false bifurcation of the limited and the limiting where in fact no such bifurcation is ever true either in the one or in the other. Thus the reflection of *Brahman* as *Jīva* should be recognized on all hands as the most authentic proof of the real unity of all existence that is running through both, but *falsely* bifurcated in the creation of accretions of associations in the latter. (cf. *latpratibimbavatvaṁ cidrūpatvaṇca sāstrapratipannaṁ pratyakṣapratipannaṇca na nirākartum śakyata iti bhāvaḥ*—*Vivaraṇa*, P. 348).

Prakāśātmayati next takes up his pen to establish his own theory of reflection (*pratibimbavāda*) of *Jīva* against another equally strong theory of limitation (*avacchedavāda*) advocated mainly by the Bhāmatī School. It is rather interesting to study the metaphysical differences of these Schools. Dr. Asutosh Sastri in his book *Vedāntadarśana-Advaitavāda* (in Bengali) has sounded a rather discordant note on the point whether the Bhāmatī School as initiated by Vācaspati-miśra can be said to advocate *avacchedavāda* as is commonly attributed to him. He has tried to adduce some independent arguments to show that Vācaspati advocated no less the *pratibimbavāda* than in any other School (*Vide-Vedāntadarśana-Advaitavāda*—Pt. I. Pp. 320-321; also P. 337). But Vācaspati has definitely advocated *avacchedavāda* as an independent¹⁵⁹ line of argument where he has not followed Maṇḍanamīśra, his model of following, who in his *Brahmasiddhi* has supported *pratibimbavāda*. (cf. *Yo Jīvo niyantā loke siddhaḥ sa paramātmairva upādhyavacchedakalpitabhedastathā vyākhyāyata ityasakṛdāveditam*—Bhāmatī on Br. Sūt. 1/2/18—*Antaryāmyadhikaraṇa*; P. 254; Ed. M.M. A. Sastri, *Nirnaya Sagar* Edn).

¹⁵⁹ Dr. Sastri has referred us to Bhāmatī on Br. Sūt. 1/4/22, 2/2/28, 2/3/43 to show Vācaspati's admission of *pratibimbavāda* of *Jīva*. A very interesting study of both the views has been made by Appaya Dīkṣita in *Vedāntakalpitaruparimala* (on Br. Sūt. 1/1/4). He has however shown his leaning towards *avacchedavāda* towards the end.

nanu-Jīvā api Brahma-tattvāvyatirekādviśuddhasvabhāvāḥ,
tat katham teṣu avidyāvākāśaḥ? vārtameta. na ca, tāvadbim-
bā-davadātāt pratibimbam kṛpāñādiṣu bhinnam; atha ca
tatra śyāmatādiraśuddhiravakāśam labhate—(Brahmasiddhi,
Madras Edn., Pt. I. P. 11).

paramārthena abhinnā api Brahmano Jīvāḥ kalpanayā
mithyābuddhyā bimbapratibimbacandravacca tato bhidyante;
evaṅca bheda-mātramatra kālpanikam—śāṅkhapāṇīyikā on
Brahmasiddhi; Madras Edn. Pt. II.—P. 32). Be that as it may,
Prakāśātmayati has exposed the weak points in the *avaccheda-
vāda* contentions. He has shown that this theory cannot be
accepted *prima facie* on the analogy of universal ether (*ākāśa*)
as limited by a particular container, say, a jar (*ghaṭa*). The
analogy of *ghaṭākāśa* does not and cannot warrant that *Brah-
man* is also *avacchinna* (limited) as *Jīva*, for in the former
analogy there is no necessity of any consciousness to be limited,
as ether is unconscious, through and through. Thus if ether is
limited by the jar, there is no necessity that it should also be
limited as the conscious seat of all operations, for once limited
by the jar, it is ever limited in its unconscious operations. But
in the case of *Brahman* it is not only limited as *Jīva* but also
limited in a way as to be the prime mover of all. Thus there
inevitably arises the necessity of a double limitation in the case
of *Brahman*, for, when It is limited as the *Jīva* by the
accretions of associations as body, senses etc., the unlimited
(*anavacchinna*) residue, if there may be any such distinction at
all (for when *Brahman* is *avacchinna*, It is so within the *Jīva*
in completeness, but outside *Jīva* also It is not wholly exhaus-
ted), should be either kept as such or made to be absorbed in
the limited *Jīva* for purposes of Its all-pervasive character. But
the *avacchedavāda* shall have to recognize that the all-pervasive
and all-regulative characters of *Brahman* (*sarvagatatva* and
sarvaniyanṭṛtva) should be recognized to explain adequately
their existence in the *Jīva*-limitations also. In fact, the *avac-
chedavādin* unwittingly commits himself to a double limitation
by such an inevitable position—for in the first case, *Brahman*
is merely *avacchinna* as *Jīva* and not as *sarvagata* (all-pervasive)
and *sarvaniyanṭṛ* (all-regulative) and in the second case, It is
to be recognized as both. These arguments have been very finely

expressed by Akhaṇḍānanda in his *Tattvadīpana*.¹⁶⁰ The necessity of such limitation as *sarvagata* and *sarvaniyanṭ* cannot be avoided, for it is *Brahman*, and not *Jīva* into which It is limited, that is both. So logical and metaphysical necessity forces the *avacchedavādin* to acquiesce, in spite of himself, to this unwarranted circumlocation of thought. In the *pratibimbavāda*, on the other hand, when the ether is said to exist independently of its *pratibimba*, whence the latter springs up on a watery surface, it is not illogical to hold that *Brahman* too is simultaneously Itself and the *pratibimba*, *Jīva*, with all characters present simultaneously in Its reflection as *Jīva*.

Thus giving his verdict on the *pratibimbavāda* as the only adequate explanation for the appearance of the *Jīva* (cf. *pratibimbapakṣa eva śreyān-Vivaraṇa*, P. 348), *Prakāśātmayati* shows that the *upādhi* for such appearance is *avidyā* or nescience which is also illusory in itself like the accretions of false associations born of it in *Jīva*. Hence the elimination of *avidyā* is the only real way for the elimination of all the false associations of difference that the *Jīva* creates, though falsely, as very real expressions of his relation to *Brahman*; in fact, not only should *Jīva* be regarded as one in essence with *Brahman* but should have the *upādhi* of *avidyā* completely obliterated by the awakening of the transcendental Knowledge of Unity. Thus the illusorionness of the *upādhi*, obliterated as soon as such Knowledge dawns, cannot be denied—as making it continue for the appearance of duality in *Jīva* till such transcendental Knowledge.

To examine the nature of the *upādhi* we are at once drawn into the apparent anomaly as to which is the real *upādhi* for the reflection of the *Jīva*. After all has been said and done, *Padmapāda* has succinctly said that the Ego-hood (*ahaṅkartyiva*) is the cause of the appearance of the *Jīva's* knowledge of diversity as real, veiling as it does his real Knowledge of Unity

¹⁶⁰ *avacchinnapradeśeṣvanavacchinnasya dviguṇīkṛtya vṛttyayogāt—* (*Vivaraṇa*, P. 348.)

sarvagatasya Brahmana upādhyavacchedo prathamamekā vṛttiḥ, punaravacchinne'pi niyantrtvādisiddhyartham anavacchinnasya vṛttyantaram-āśrayaṇīyam, na caitadupalābdhacaramiti dviguṇīkṛtya vṛttyanvapaṭtiḥ, gaganasya travacchinne vṛttyanaṅgikārād raiṣamyamiti bhāvaḥ— (*Tattvadīpana*. P. 348).

(cf. *sa cāhaṅkariṭṭvamālmano rūpam manyate, na bimbakalpa-Brahmaikarūpatām—Pañcapādikā*, Pp. 348-349). Thus here seems to be an apparent anomaly in regarding the Ego-hood, and not nescience so repeatedly brought out previously, as the cause (or adjunct—*upādhi*) for the appearance of the *Jīva* with his inevitable false Knowledge of duality. *Prakāśātmayati* resolves this apparently irreconcilable position by showing that there is perfect logic in his predecessor's remark that Ego-hood has a part to play in the emergence of such false knowledge. For, the *upādhi*, though undoubtedly the *avidyā*, the creator of all false knowledge,—is that which veils the Pure Consciousness that is *Brahman* without any duality. Such a conception of the *upādhi* unmistakably makes us consider how the Pure Consciousness can be veiled. If we examine the stages of our empirical life, we can say with confidence that all the stages are not equally strongly under the veil of one uniform type of false knowledge and false behaviour.¹⁶¹ In Pure Consciousness the measure of duality is determined not merely by *avidyā*, but also by the nature of false associations that ensue upon it. In our dreamless state of slumber, the Pure Consciousness has been bereft of all external and internal associations, and thus has merely the solidified *avidyā* as existing without any projections out of it to make Itself standing in a relation with it of mere subjectivity. In our dreaming and waking lives, we are associated, by and by, with the Ego-hood (*ahaṅkariṭṭva*) and all it encircles within itself, viz., possession of the accessories of body etc. Ego-hood is not generated out of *avidyā* so long as the first active principle of duality, viz., the mind or *antaḥkaraṇa* is not superimposed upon the Unity that is Pure Consciousness. The vast empirical edifice of our activities is built, brick by brick, upon the plinth of the *antaḥkaraṇa* or mind through which Pure Consciousness finds channels of expressions in diverse ways. In fact, *antaḥkaraṇavṛttis* are the first and foremost means of the unity of consciousness to get diversified. However, the *antaḥkaraṇa* should again have its *vṛttis* in concrete centres like bodily organisms and thus the field of the knowledge of duality is further extended. We

¹⁶¹ *caitanyaśyāvacchedakavikalpatārātamyena
amyāt—(Vivaraṇa, P. 349.)*

vyavahārikalpatārāt-

now do not merely know through the *antaḥkaraṇa* but also in and through our body and all its attendant necessities of a unique character. So, as Prakāśātmayati analyses, the dreaming Self is merely in contact with the *antaḥkaraṇa* through which it seems to be a creature of a world where his body and its unique functions are inoperative; only a mental world created out of *avidyā* to make such self live, move and have its being in persists. But in the waking life, the Self is knowing through the *antaḥkaraṇa*, no doubt, but expressing all the physical ways and means to make itself a creature of its self-created uniqueness that is duality. Such being the very nature of the life of *Jīva*, it is but natural that Padma-pāda should not merely make him a creature of *avidyā*, pure and simple, but also of all the gross and yet grosser accretions that are entangling him into the unloosable mesh of duality. The force of *avidyā* makes the *Jīva*, no doubt, appear in the image of *Brahman*, but the *Jīva* means more than a nescience-fangled creature; he is also a fully associated being in all the paraphernalia of such nescience. Thus his Ego-hood is in the very nature of his knowledge and existence as a bifurcated being in his waking, and to a smaller extent, dreaming life. However, the different strata of his existence, entailing as they do (as we have seen), diversified forms of *upādhi*—all children of *avidyā*—do not make him different selves in such different strata or stages. The same waking man goes to sleep and is again absorbed in deep, dreamless slumber. The distinctness of his own self endures uniformly, and is not further distinct or diverse in such stages. For, as Prakāśātmayati and Akhaṇḍānanda, specially, have aptly shown that when a *Jīva* has the primary *upādhi* of *avidyā* to make him distinct, no amount of internal multiplication or diversification of the *upādhis* will make the same *Jīva* as diverse. But when such a *Jīva* is not made to be regarded as distinct primarily by *avidyā*, his internal diversifications multiply as making himself different creatures under circumstantial diversities of the attendants of *avidyā*.

Prakāśātmayati analyses the peculiar nature of the state of *suṣupti* where there is seen a cessation of all the gross functions of the body; the self is absorbed into itself, so to say, being only in relation with solidified *avidyā* through the

subtle body (*liṅgaśarīra*). Thus there being no scope for false knowledge (*bhṛānti*) in such a state of the physical existence, the *Jīva* may be said to have no knowledge of duality from *Brahman*. Thus the *suṣupti*-state becomes a state without any false knowledge due to the definite working of the *avidyā*; such being the apparently justifiable argument from the opponents' point of view, it becomes indispensable that the real nature of this state *vis-à-vis* *avidyā* has to be brought out from the Advaitist point of view. Prakāśātmayati proceeds to achieve this end with utmost precision of thoughts. He shows that, no doubt, the *suṣupti*-state is bereft of any gross physical functions, yet it cannot be said to be outside the realm of ignorance, and all the attendant false knowledge of divisions. The knowledge of divisions need not be due to its being strictly produced out of *avidyā* (*avidyā-kārya*), for such knowledge may be justified on other grounds as well. Such knowledge is possible in the *suṣupti*-state because of the fact that division and its knowledge in *suṣupti* are dependent, though not produced, on *avidyā* (*avidyā-tantra*). This fact is significantly hinted at by Prakāśātmayati and is clearly stated by Akhaṇḍānanda.¹⁴² But even if such a standpoint is taken up by the Advaitist, his ground must be securely laid against the possible objection that such a knowledge of divisions, though dependent on *avidyā*, cannot be said to have originated in the *suṣupti*-state as in the *pralaya*-state, for such two states are bereft of any active functions—thus making all divisions naturally alien to the *Jīva* who is in such states of an all-ceasing existence and making *avidyā* reside only in Pure Consciousness which should therefore be the substratum of such divisions; moreover, if such divisional knowledge is admitted to be unproduced (*akārya*) in the *suṣupti*-state, it must be admitted to be eternal and hence no relation with the *avidyā* on which it is dependent can be said to exist. To such heavy charges—metaphysical and epistemological—replies should be as precise as possible and this task of precision is so ably executed by Prakāśātmayati from the standpoint of

¹⁴² *atha bhṛāntijñānamanapekṣyaiva arthagata eva vibhāgaḥ kalpyate* (*Vivaraṇa*, P. 349.)

bhēdaya nāvidyākāryatvaṁ kintutattantaratvam, ataśca bhṛāntya-bhāve'pi bhēdopattiriti gūḍhābhāsandhiḥ (*Tattvadīpana*, P. 349.)

his School. He admits that Pure Consciousness should not be the *real owner* of all divisions and their knowledge; such divisions and their knowledge spring from *avidyā* which clings fast to Pure Consciousness, no doubt, but it is the *Jīva* that owns all the false associations and their knowledge springing from the primal *avidyā*. Thus in the *suṣupti*-state also there should be a *Jīva* who has fallen from his original purity and who is ever and ever in the possession of all false associations. The division into *Jīva* and *Brahman* is as true in the *suṣupti*-state as in other states. But such division may be said to be only a logical necessity and not due to any positive existence of false knowledge; and if such a logical necessity is merely admitted, then the causal character of *avidyā* from which such knowledge is *produced* may be said to be a fiction, for such knowledge may well be regarded as springing from eternity (*anādi*) and from non-falsity (*avibhrama*). To answer such charges against the Advaitist, Prakāśātmayati shows that the divisions and their knowledge are dependent on *avidyā* (*avidyātantra*), though they are eternally present (*anādi*) and hence in *suṣupti* they are operative in the way as to make *Jīva* a divided being. The effects of *avidyā* are existent even in the *suṣupti*-state, though not in the same physical operations as in other states and hence divisional knowledge of the *Jīva* even in that state is to be admitted as being under the spell of *avidyā* (*avidyātantra*). Eternality of that knowledge cannot make it independent of the influence of *avidyā* in so far as it is not created out of the latter, for here eternity itself of such knowledge is under the spell of the latter. Such an influence of *avidyā* is evident even in the unproduced relation of the Self with *avidyā* (*ātmāvidyāsambandha*), for such a relation exists even from eternity. It cannot be held that the *avidyā*, *before* its relation with the Self, is existent and hence the relation is effected and not eternal, for it has *à priori* absence (*prāgabhāva*). Such a hypothesis is untenable, for *avidyā* cannot exist independently without the *à priori* presence, and not *à priori* absence, of the relation that subsists between itself and the Self, for *avidyā* itself is blind or inert and is revealed only by the Self or Consciousness. Moreover, such relation being *ipso facto* eternal for the fact of the related *avidyā* being so it follows that such a relation is

not produced in any way, but is still under the spell of *avidyā* to exist with all the baneful effects that the *avidyā* produces. It is clear, therefore, that in the *suṣṭi*-state also there is an inevitable effect of division that is false, subsisting on *avidyā*, though not created at that state for being unjustified in such a passive state of cessation of all functions.

Such a divisional knowledge springing out of *avidyā*, though not produced out of it,—is nevertheless not attendant on Pure Consciousness, but on the consciousness appearing as *Jīva*. This is evident from a logical analysis which will further corroborate the position that the *Jīva*-consciousness will also make the Pure Consciousness *appear* in such divisional knowledge, yet will make room for its destruction. For, the division being the effect of *avidyā*, it goes without saying that it is illusory, and Pure Consciousness, that is One and Uniform, cannot be its real substratum. Thus though Pure Consciousness will *appear* as the divided *Jīva*-consciousness, it is the latter that will be the real substratum of all the false associations of divisions. Hence it is really the qualificative (*viśeṣaṇa*) *avidyā* that makes the qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) *Jīva* the real seat of all such false knowledge, and Pure Consciousness sits as merely reflected in its nature in the *Jīva*-consciousness, but never on that account makes the divisions uneradicable being co-eval with itself; it is the *avidyā* that is the *creatrice* of such divisions and their knowledge which are obliterated whenever such divisions are nipped in the very bud of *avidyā*. Thus though Prakāśātmayati holds that the divisions are dependent on *avidyā* (*avidyātantra*), he equally asserts that such divisions are also false and eradicable. In Pure Consciousness there cannot be any such divisions. It only appears as an image to make for the divisions to be evolved out of *avidyā*—not as produced products but merely as dependents. Such being the status of the knowledge of divisions that ensue from *avidyā* being dependent on it, there remains very little to add to the establishment of falsity inspite of eternality of such divisions. It has been shown above that there is nothing to debar the divisions from depending upon *avidyā* (*avidyātantra*), even though they are not produced out of it, as the eternal relation of the Self with *avidyā* is dependent on *avidyā* itself and hence false. Thus though *avidyā* is the *creatrice*

of all divisions, such divisions and their knowledge cannot be said to be produced out of it, only to justify the passive state of *suṣupti*; hence the conscious objector, lurking in his lurch, may come forward with the argument that when divisions are not produced (*kārya*) and are yet there from eternity, it can be safely concluded that they are not to be destroyed by true Knowledge, as the Eternal, Unproduced Self is. In fact, such a syllogistic form from the objector's point of view has been posed by Akhaṇḍānanda.¹⁰³ Therefore the objector would have us admit that the *vibhāgas* (divisions) are produced (*kārya*) from the *avidyā* on which they depend. But Prakāśātmayati ably shows that there is no such invariable concomitance between unproduced-ness (*akāryatva*) and undestroyed-ness by Knowledge (*jñānānivarṭtyatva*), when it is shown that the unproduced entities are nevertheless destroyed by Knowledge, unlike the Eternal Self, for the fact of their depending on *avidyā*.¹⁰⁴ Thus the divisions being clearly shown to have been born out of the adjunct (*avidyā*), as in the common cases of reflection on mirror, water etc. (where, *avidyā* is also present at the background, as we have discussed above), there remains very little to add that the *avidyā* is the real originator of all divisions; but Prakāśātmayati also shows that the other adjuncts which are gradual accretions like the *ahaṅkāra* (Ego-hood) are also the grosser adjuncts for the reflection of all the divisions that are enjoyed by Jīva-consciousness.

The real implications of the Jīva-consciousness as a reflection (*pratibimba*) of Brahman are, however, antagonised with by the School of Bhagavad-Bhāskara, the Vedantic teacher of the theory of *bhedābheda* (identity-in-difference). The Bhāskara School wants the Advaitist to admit that the Jīva should not be regarded as a reflection in order to justify his bondage and liberation (*bandha-mokṣau*) for which purposes he should be regarded not as a reflection, but as a real concrete entity that exists differently from Brahman but has also a relation of identity with It. Such being the Bhāskara posi-

¹⁰³ *vibhāgasyāvidyātantratrūṭ ghaṭādivat kāryatvam, akāryatve jñānānivarṭtyatvam na syāt, avidyātiriktatve satyanāditvādātmatvat ityāśaṅkya ubhayatrāpi vyabhicāramāha avidyēti. (Tattvadīpna, P. 351.)*

¹⁰⁴ *avidyātantrāṇām cānirvacantyatvamāditvaṅca avidyāsambādhavanna virudhṃyate (Vivaraṇa, P. 351.)*

tion, Prakāśātmayati opposes, tooth and nail, this *bhedābheda* theory trying to expunge the reflectional character of the *Jīva*. He shows that such a view, as advocated by the Advaitists, is based upon solid foundations of logical and metaphysical arguments. The reflectional character of the *Jīva* makes him identical in essence with *Brahman*; hence the Bhāskara view that the image is not an entity (*vastu*) like the *Brahman*, for it is a mere reflection of identity, and hence it cannot be the seat of bondage and liberation, proceeds from a misunderstanding of the real implications of the *Jīva* as a reflection. For, the *bhedābheda*vādīn thinks that the *Jīva* should be a real one as an entity which is not wholly identical in essence with *Brahman*. But the Advaitist position is that the *Jīva*, being identical in essence with *Brahman*, does not exhaust himself for any other associations, that are appended to him. The seat of bondage and liberation is the *Jīva*-consciousness, no doubt, but the *Jīva*-consciousness as identical with *Brahman* in essence; all other associations that are credited to it are negated by the dawning of real Knowledge. Hence the *bhedābheda*vādīn need not be unduly anxious to establish that the *Jīva* having no existence of his own, being a pure reflection of *Brahman*, should not be the seat of any bondage or liberation. It is well-nigh clear from the Advaitist standpoint that the *Jīva* is real, even as real as *Brahman*, in his essence, and thus may be a ground of illusory knowledge of divisions that is bondage as also of liberation from them. But the Advaitist does never on that account advocate that the *Jīva*-consciousness being in bondage means that *Brahman* also is in such a state. What he tries to bring out is that the *Jīva*, being a reflection, is, nevertheless, *Brahman* in the essence of Consciousness, and hence it is he who is a legitimate ground of all false knowledge of divisions that are falsely associated with himself. The adjunct of *avidyā* makes the real nature of Pure Consciousness that is *Brahman* appear as *Jīva*, only to make Pure Consciousness above board of all the effects of it. Hence, naturally, the *Jīva*, though *Brahman* in essence, is the seat of all the effects of false associations with himself and therefore is in bondage and is in need of liberation from them. Hence Prakāśātmayati concludes that the Bhāskara School blunders when it says that the *Jīva* is not an entity, being a

reflection, whence his bondage and liberation are impossible, from the utter ignorance of the real implications of the nature of *Jīva* as a reflection from Pure Consciousness—a reflection that is real in essence with the reflected but screened by a veil to appear not as such.¹⁶⁵

It remains for us to judge the relative merits of the two types of *adhyāsa* or super-imposition, viz., *nirupādhika* and *sopādhika*, as has been tried to be expounded by the Advaitist teachers. Prakāśātmayati shows that this reflectional theory of the *Jīva* supposes a reflection of it from *Brahman* for substantiating that the Pure Consciousness is tinged with the associations that enter into *Jīva*-hood as well as their qualities, similarly as the crystal-stone becomes reddish when the shoe-flower is reflected on it, that is to say, the crystal-stone as qualified by the red shoe-flower is reddish and not by itself. This is the real necessity to admit of illusions due to an adjunct (*sopādhika-bhramas*). The facial image is also a reflection of the face and is a *bhrama* only by making a quality due to the superimposition of the directions and postures of the image that spring from the adjunct. Hence the *sopādhika-bhramas* are always trying to make a superimposition of the qualities of the false associations on the unity of experience, for which an *upādhī* is playing the chief rôle, for, it is this that makes the divisions due to it as being superimposed on an entity that is logically immune from such divisions and hence which are false. It is not, therefore, inconsistent to assume that the divisions and their knowledge are false being dependent on the powers of *avidyā* even if they are not created out of it. Production from *avidyā* is barred by the logical necessity envisaged in the *susupti*-stage where there are no workings or functions of either the external or the internal organs. Hence, even if it be said that being dependent on *avidyā* means a falsity or illusoriness of the depending entities in the same way as the falsely created entities are false, there is perfect logical and metaphysical consistency; for, to depend on *avidyā* means that the dependent effect is existent as an illusory or super-imposed entity, i.e., super-imposed on

¹⁶⁵ *tasmāt parasiddhāntāparijñānavilasito'yaṁ sarvasaṅkaravādinō vibhramah—(Vivaraṇa, P. 352.)*

the reality of Consciousness. Had it not been so, we could never have maintained that the relation of *avidyā* to *Ātman* is false, i.e., we would have been led to believe that *avidyā* has a *real* relation to *Ātman* (Self or Consciousness) for such a relation is never produced. Such a relation exists from eternity (*anādikālapravṛtta*), and hence it is never created in point of time. Thus though the eternally existent relation of *avidyā* with *Ātman* is admitted, it is never contemplated that the relation is true or real, being eternal, that is, unproduced. Relation of the *avidyā* with the Self is eternal *ipso facto*, for no *a priori* absence of the relation can be contemplated, for whenever *avidyā* is existent it is existent as being related with the Self or Consciousness that reveals it. Yet eternity as suggesting non-production (*akāryatva*) of such a relation cannot debar us from holding the utterly false or illusory character of it, for *avidyā* has a relation established with its revealer—that is, Self or Consciousness,—never as a transcendental truth like the Self, but as false as *avidyā* on which it depends for empirical necessities. Divisions and their knowledge antagonising with the knowledge of Unity are created in the transcendental truth of the Self by the false relation that subsists between itself and the *avidyā* which being eternal and illusory makes such a necessary relation as eternal, yet as illusory, like itself. To be eternal like *avidyā* cannot postulate that the relation is not necessarily false, being eternal; for, then we have to postulate the most devastating hypothesis of possibility of truth in the utterly illusory entity like *avidyā*. These very vital implications of the knowledge of divisions (*bhedajñāna*), flowing out of *avidyā* being not necessarily produced out of it, have been brought out by the cryptic remark of Prakāśātmayati: *avidyātantrāṇāṁ cānirvacanīyatvamanāditvāmcāvidyāsambandhavanna viruddhyate*—Vivaraṇa, P. 351).

Such being the nature of all forms of super-imposition that there should be a knowledge of something as *different* where the difference is unwarranted, from which taking something on some other thing follows, it is to be judged as to how in *sopādhika* and *nirupādhika-bhramas* such a false identity takes place. In *sopādhika-bhramas* there is an adjunct which serves for the knowledge of division to take place, though falsely, upon a unitary existence, but there does not end

the journey of any *adhyāsa*. All *adhyāsas* pre-suppose that the qualities of a different entity which we experience must be falsely imputed upon a different substratum. In other words, even if there are no real divisions, actually speaking, between an entity and its own nature, yet under the spell of *avidyā* and the *upādhi* (in *sopādhika-bhramas*), we make a division firstly and then make one possessing the false divisions as the true Reality which it is not. In *nirupādhika-bhramas* also though an adjunct is not operative to make one appear as the other falsely, yet there is a knowledge of division at first to make room for the appearance of one as the other. Thus adjunct or no adjunct, all *bhramas* postulate a superimposition of something (and the qualities) on some other thing. In *sopādhika-bhramas*, sometimes the qualities that are real in appearing in their own place are transferred on some other substratum, on which their existence is perceived, though really these should not be so perceived. In the appearance of the crystal-stone as reddish, the reddishness of the shoe-flower which is reflected due to the mirror of the crystal-stone appears unified with the substratum where it is naturally absent.

If we further analyse the nature of *nirupādhika-bhramas* we shall see that in such cases of illusion where no adjunct is operative (e.g., mistaking a rope for a snake), there is a superimposition of something (e.g., the snake) on a different substratum (e.g., the rope) on the strength of no adjunct aiding *avidyā*, but out of the *avidyā* itself. The difference of the two is as clear here as not to depend on any external adjunct, like the mirror or water or crystal, for the first propeudetic of *adhyāsa* to be created, viz., the existence (though false) of a difference. Hence in spite of the absence of any such adjunct, the omnipotent *avidyā* can make one to be mistaken for the other. What, then, remains there in *nirupādhika-bhramas* to make room for any quality or anything beside the object to be in the field of such an illusion? We can say that when such an inter-mixture, though false, of the objects has been complete, not depending on any adjunct external to *avidyā*, there may yet be the super-imposition of the quality or relation of the superimposed of a sylvan surrounding on the substratum, as the quality of fright which generally adheres to the real snake may well be transferred on the rope appearing as snake. The

subsidiary appendages in *nirupādhika-bhramas* depend upon an adjunct, that is the object, to which these appendages relate (i.e., frightening relating to snake). Similarly, in the case of the *nirupādhika-bhrama* of Ego-hood (*ahaṅkāra*) on *Brahman* or *Ātman*, we have no other adjunct save *avidyā* and its powers. Here though the *Jīva* possessing the *ahaṅkāra* is a reflection (*pratibimba*) of *Brahman* or *Ātman*, yet there is the reflection-reflected-relation (*pratibimba-pratibimbi-bhāva*) between the *Jīva* and *Brahman*, only that the *ahaṅkāra* as a creation of *avidyā* is an entity that is self-evidently distinct from *Brahman* and stands separate by itself, but is yet superimposed on *Brahman* or Pure Consciousness. Hence it will be seen that when the *ahaṅkāra* is made to be superimposed by *avidyā* on *Brahman*, there is no primary need of the adjunct (here it being *avidyā*) to create a *mock-division*, as it is necessary in the case of the *Jīva*-consciousness which without that primary business of *avidyā*, would have been eternally the same with *Brahman*-consciousness, thus excluding all *adhyāśas*. When the *ahaṅkāra* is thus superimposed on *Brahman* the qualities or appendages relating to it are then transferred on *Brahman*, thus making the relation of such appendages to *Brahman* as false and depending on an entity to which these naturally belong. Such appendages of the *ahaṅkāra* are primarily *karṭṛtva* (doer-hood) and *bhokṭṛtva* (enjoyer-hood) and these are then superimposed on Pure Consciousness along with their real substratum, viz., the *ahaṅkāra*. These nice distinctions of the two kinds of *bhrama*—*sopādhika* as well as *nirupādhika*—and their real bearings in the metaphysical theories of *Jīva* and *Brahman* have been brought out by *Prakāśātmayati*, and specially, *Akhaṇḍānanda*.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁶ *nirupādhikādhyaśaḥ pariniṣpannāhaṅkāropādhikaḥ karṭṛtvādhyāśa itī kathayitum (Vivaraṇa, P. 352).*

*darpaṇadṛṣṭāntena Jīva-Brahma-vibhāgasyaupādhikatvaṁ siddham, sphatikadṛṣṭāntena karṭṛtvādermithyātvaṁ vibhāgaḥ, * * * * **
nirupādhikarajjusarpodāharaṇam yuktamityarthaḥ, alaktakopādhinimit-
nirupādhiketi, ahaṅkārasya nirupādhikādhyaśaparinīṣpannatvamatroktam,
ta-lauhityavat karṭṛtvādikamapi nirupādhikam ityuktam, atra rajjusar-
padṛṣṭāntena nirupādhikatvamucyata itī virodhamāśāṅkya tātparyamāha-
nirupādhiketi, ahaṅkārasya nirupādhikādhyaśaparinīṣpannatvamatroktam,
pūrvatra karṭṛtvāderaupādhikatvamityavirodha ityarthaḥ—(Tattvadīpana,
P. 352.)

APPENDIX

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE VIVARAṆA SCHOOL OF ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

To follow the Vivaraṇa School of Advaita Philosophy, we have to begin with the original work of the School by Padmapādācārya, one of the direct disciples of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, viz., *Pañcapādikā*, and have to go through a long chain of works bringing down its tradition. Prakāśātmayati wrote his famous commentary, *Pañcapādikā-Vivaraṇa*, in about 1200 A.D. That separated the commentary from the original work by about a span of four centuries. But a few other commentaries had also been written on the original work of Padmapādācārya, viz., *Pañcapādikā*.

The *Pañcapādikādarpaṇa*, a *ṭīkā* on *Pañcapādikā* by Amalānanda, and another *ṭīkā*, viz., *Pañcapādikāṭīkā* by Vidyāsāgara were written, which are yet to be published. Now, as to the dates of these two authors, we can say that Amalānanda, if identified with the author of *Kalpataru*, a *ṭīkā* on Vācaspatimiśra's well-known commentary, *Bhāmātī*, on Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, should be placed after the work of Prakāśātmayati was written, for the author of the *Kalpataru* belongs to the middle of the 13th century A.D. Amalānanda has another work called *Sāstradarpaṇa* on Advaita Vedānta (Published in Sri Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam). As to the date of Vidyāsāgara, we can reasonably place him before Prakāśātmayati, for the former wrote the *Pañcapādikāṭīkā* independently of the influence of the latter. These two hypotheses are however tentative, and whether Amalānanda, the writer of the *Pañcapādikādarpaṇa*, is to be identified with the author of the *Kalpataru* has yet to be fully examined and whether Vidyāsāgara flourished before the work of Prakāśātmayati remains yet to be more fully investigated. (The difficulty that lies in these investigations is rarity of these two Mss.).

Coming to *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa* of Prakāśātmayati, we land ourselves in the epoch-making period of this School, and henceforward move towards a history of the dialectical litera-

ture of Advaita Philosophy which bases itself solidly upon the conclusions arrived at in clear terms by Prakāśātmayati. The work is placed at the end of the 12th century A.D. or at the opening of the 13th. From the colophon of his work we know that his real name is "Svaprakāśānubhavabhagavat" or simply "Svaprakāśānubhava," and he was the disciple of Ananyānubhava (cf. *arīhaṭo'pi na nāmnaiva yo'nanyānubhavo guruḥ*—Introductory stanza. No. 6, *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa*). But the more commonly known name of the author of the *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* is Prakāśātmayati or Prakāśātman (cf. Introductory stanza, No. 7). A commentary on *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* of much obscurity has been published from Calcutta (Calcutta Sanskrit Series No. 1—Ed. by M. M. Anantakrishna Sastri from Metropolitan Publishing House, including nine commentaries on *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara), and is known as the *Rjuvivarāṇa*, whose author, according to the colophon, is Viṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāya, son of Janārdana. Tradition has it that Janārdana later took to the monastic name of Ānandagiri.¹ Ānandagiri, also known as Ānandajñāna, was probably a native of Gujerat and lived in the middle of the 13th Cent. A.D. He was a pupil of two teachers, viz., Anubhūtiśvarūpācārya and Śuddhānanda.² Mr. Tripathi considers that he was the monastic head of the Dvārakā Mutt. He wrote the famous *ṭippanas* on the *Upaniṣad-Bhāṣyas* of Śaṅkara and the well-known commentary *Nyāyanirṇaya* on the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara. (Vide, Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II., P. 193). Swami Prajñānānanda Sarasvatī has, however, put him after Vidyāraṇya in the 15th Century A.D.³

However, the most widely known commentary on the *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* is *Tattvadīpana* by Akhaṇḍānanda Muni. In the introductory verses of his commentary, it is found that he pays high tributes to Śrībodhaprthivīdhara, his preceptor, perhaps Ānandagiri. (M. M. A. K. Sastri's Sanskrit Introduc-

¹ Regarding identification of Janārdana, father of Viṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāya, and Ānandagiri (who later took this monastic name) and also regarding identification of Janārdana as the preceptor of Akhaṇḍānanda, author of another famous commentary on *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* viz., *Tattvadīpana*, vide *Tarkasamgraha* (Baroda, 1917)—Introduction by Mr. Tripathi.

² Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II., P. 192.

³ Vide *Vedāntadarśaner Itihāsa* (in Bengali) (Pt. I. Pp. 92-93).

tion to Calcutta Sanskrit Series No. 1, wherein he has also subscribed to the view that Janārdana and Ānandagiri are equal and also that this Ānandagiri is the preceptor of Akhaṇḍānanda). Tradition is also very strong to regard Akhaṇḍānanda as one of the disciples of Ānandagiri (Mr. Tripathi's Introduction to *Tarkasaṃgraha*—Baroda). But this tradition is somewhat contradicted by the author's own colophon where he describes himself as the disciple of Akhaṇḍānubhūti. But this may have an appellative significance. We can put him to a period contemporaneous with *Rjvivaraṇa* by Viṣṇubhaṭṭopādhyāya and in the middle of the 16th the *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* of Dharmarājādhvarīndra was composed which supposes the full development of the *Vivaraṇa* along with its commentary-literature.

Another commentary on the *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* was written by Nṛsiṃhāśramamuni whose date is the beginning of the 16th Century A.D. This work is known by the name of *Vivaraṇabhāvaprakāśikā* and has yet to be published. Still another work following the *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* written by Rāmānanda Sarasvatī is known as the *Vivaraṇopanyāsa*, and has been published from Benares.

Now we come to Dharmarājādhvarīndra whose *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* is one of the most well-known works on Vedānta Epistemology. Dharmarājādhvarīndra was the disciple of Śrīmadvenkaṭanātha whose preceptor was Nṛsiṃha or Nṛsiṃhāśrama, and his date is the middle of the 16th Century A.D. This work marks a mile-stone in the history of the dialectical literature of Advaita Vedānta, for it deals exhaustively with different means of valid knowledge and the epistemological problems connected therewith. This work follows the *Vivaraṇa* School and quotes the author of the *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa*.

The other well-known dialectical works of Advaita Philosophy are *Tattvapradīpikā* by Citsukhācārya (end of 12th Cent. A.D.), *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhāḍya* by Śrī Harṣa (end of 12th Century A.D.) and *Pañcadaśī* (in verse) by Vidyāraṇya (end of 14th Century A.D.). All these works follow the tenets of the *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* in matters of conclusions of the Advaita Metaphysics.

Of special interest for the study of the *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* is the *Vivaraṇaprameyasāṃgraha* of Vidyāraṇya. Vidyāraṇya is

the monastic name of Mādhava who was Chief Minister of Bukka I, King of Vijaynagar, who flourished towards the close of the 14th Century A.D.⁴ His other important works on Vedānta are the *Pañcadaśī* referred to above and *Jīvanmuktiviveka*. This *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha* is a lucid analysis of the conclusions arrived at by Prakāśātmayati in his *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa*. Without this handbook the work of Prakāśātmayati cannot be fully studied.

Two other important metaphysical and logical descendants in this School are Sarvajñātmamuni (End of 8th Century A.D. —cf. the last verse of *Samkṣepa-sārīraka*) and the commonly-designated Prakāṣārthakāra or Prakāṣārthavivaraṇakāra (Circa, 11th-13th Century A.D.) known by his work. The former wrote the magnificent versified form of logical disputation in Vedānta known as the *Samkṣepa-sārīraka*. Vidyāraṇya's *Pañcadaśī* referred to above is also in verse bringing out clearly the metaphysical side of Advaita Philosophy. *Prakāṣārthavivaraṇa* was written by an author having no special name to be known by, and is a faithful study in the dialectical art of establishing the Advaita theories. These two works reveal many dark corners in the philosophy of the Advaita School of Vedānta following the current initiated by Padmapāda.

⁴ There is an interesting study on the traditional identity of these two in *IHQ*, Vol. VI., No. 4 (Pp. 701 ff.) by B. Rama Rao in his article, "Vidyāraṇya and Mādhavācārya."

ERRATA

Page	Line	For	Read
1-63		Nyaiyāyikas	Naiyāyikas
2	36	Vivarāṇa	Vivarāṇa
3	6	saravāṇa	śravāṇa
3	9	svādhyāyo' dhyetavyah	svādhyāyo' dhyetavyah
3	12	...	insert & before etāvadare
3	26	take their	take its
9	4	vidhānām	vidhānām
12	28 ff.	vidhyāyaka	vidhāyaka
17	13	judgment	judgement
19	1	postulated	possible
19	16	bhāvābhavātmata	bhāvābhavātmata
30	21	postulation	postulation
32	39	...].
34	2	ajñāna	ajñāna
34	6	inspite	in spite
35	38	syāivāsthābheda	syāivāsthābheda
37	35	(karma)	(karma)
37	40	karmas	karmas
38	6 ff.	karmas	karmas
39	12	judgments	judgements
41	5	Virarāṇa	Vivarāṇa
41	6	Akhaṇḍānanda	Akhaṇḍānanda
41	16	Form	From
41	20	whence	whence
44	27	Pañcapādikā.	Pañcapādikā,
44	29	striyām	'striyām
44	31	...	, after Tattvaṭīpana
47	15	uttarottarasiddher	uttarottarasiddher
47	18	Tattvaṭīpana.	Tattvaṭīpana,
48	38	anyataranirdeśe	anyataranirdeśe
48	40	Tattvaṭīpana.	Tattvaṭīpana,
52	15 ff.	judgment	judgement
53	4	judgment	judgement
54	30	judgmental	judgemental
54	39.	judgment	judgement

Page	Line	For	Read
55	29 ff.	judgment	judgement
56	35	doṣanimittaḥ	doṣanimittaḥ
57	5	viśiṣṭajñeyanimitto	viśiṣṭajñeyanimitto
57	38	svasambandhesvartheṣu	svasambaddheṣvartheṣu
58	15 ff.	vyāvahārika	vyāvahārika
63	27	well-known	well known
66	12	Advaitist	Advaitists
67	1	upto	up to
69	1	upto	up to
69	25	...) after 'probandum'
70	21	Naiyāyikas	Naiyāyika
70	39	...	(before Pañcapādikā
71	13	that	and
74	24	but	as
79	9	pratiṣṭāpannatve	pratiṣṭāpannatve
81	3	...	, after 'ignorance' and after 'one'
81	30	Consciousness	consciousness
82	29 ff.	Consciousness	consciousness
83	14	wherefrom	wherefrom
84	39	disvahaṁ-pratyayaḥ	disvahaṁpratyayaḥ
84	40	uttarotaraghaṭāderiti	uttarottaraghaṭāderiti
85	5	ṛtṭih	ṛtṭih
87	35	āyattatvādicchā	āyattatvādicchā
87	40	prasiddhyabhāve' pīti	prasiddhyabhāve' pīti
88	39	Rjuvivarana	Rjuvivarana
90	3	...) after adhyāsabhāṣya
90	39	Vivarana.	Vivarana,
92	36	Pañcapādikā.	Pañcapādikā,
93	25	...	'is' after 'this'
96	33	viśiṣṭadeśakāla- sambadham	viśiṣṭadeśakāla- sambaddham
97	16	priest	priest
97	19	udgātā	udgātā
98	24	no	any
99	15	vyāvahārika	vyāvahārika
102	30	yo'rtho' haṅkārah	yo'rtho' haṅkārah
105	6	pradīpaprabhāvat	pradīpaprabhāvat
105	12	...) after 'sanction'

Page	Line	For	Read
107	16	<i>anīśaya</i>	<i>anīśayā</i>
107	35	<i>kāryakāraṇabhāva</i>	<i>kāryakāraṇabhāva</i>
108	8	<i>Bhagavadgīta</i>	<i>Bhagavadgītā</i>
108	23	<i>Sāksi-caitanya</i>	<i>Sākṣicaitanya</i>
109	39	<i>śraṇāḍi</i>	<i>śravaṇāḍi</i>
111	20	<i>sāṁvit</i>	<i>saṁvit</i>
112	14	<i>sarvajñātva</i>	<i>sarvajñatva</i>
114	28	<i>kāraṇamevāsthitam</i>	<i>kāraṇamevāvasthitam</i>
116	16	...	delete — after 'Purc'
117	21	<i>jñānabirodhi</i>	<i>jñānavirodhi</i>
118	37	<i>āvaccchinā</i>	<i>āvaccchinā</i>
118	39	<i>biddhyānāḍi</i>	<i>viddhyānāḍi</i>
118	39	<i>Gīta</i>	<i>Gītā</i>
118	39	13/20	13/19
119	34	judgments	judgements
120	1	<i>Prakāśātmayati</i>	<i>Prakāśātmayati</i>
121	8	inspite	in spite
121	37	apperance	appearance
126	32	<i>pūramātma</i>	<i>pūrvamātma</i>
126	34	...	<i>jñānam</i> after <i>pratyakṣa</i> in line 33
126	43	<i>nāṭirekarādhītyam</i>	<i>nāṭirekarādhītyam</i>
126	44	<i>ītyāha</i>	<i>ityāha</i>
127	3	fundmentā	fundamental
128	26	<i>Bhāṣyakara</i>	<i>Bhāṣyakāra</i>
128	38	<i>avidyayā'grhyamāṇā</i>	<i>avidyayā'grhyamāṇa</i>
128	39	<i>lakṣaṇāmso</i>	<i>lakṣaṇāmso</i>
129	36	csce	case
133	8	<i>ayasasca</i>	<i>ayasaśca</i>
136	5	<i>kṣti</i>	<i>kṣiti</i>
136	18	<i>Prakāśātmayati's</i>	<i>Prakāśātmayati's</i>
142	6	idential	identical
145	31	<i>Udyotakara</i>	<i>Uddyotakara</i>
145	36	<i>organs</i>	<i>organs</i>
146	9 ff.	<i>Udyotakara</i>	<i>Uddyotakara</i>
155	36	<i>Bhāṭṭa</i>	<i>Bhāṭṭa</i>
157	38	<i>vyāpāravatvamātram</i>	<i>vyāpāravattvamātram</i>
157	39	<i>vyāpāravatvam</i>	<i>vyāpāravattvam</i>
158	30	...	, after 'subject'

Page	Line	For	Read
162	1	<i>jñānatā</i>	<i>jñātātā</i>
164	25	he	the
166	29	"consciousness as the 'I'"	"consciousness as the 'I'"
167	39	" <i>nedamaṁśaḥ</i> "	" <i>nedamaṁśaḥ</i> "
171	3	<i>Pañcapādikā.</i>	<i>Pañcapādikā,</i>
171	36	<i>Prābhākara</i>	<i>Prābhākara</i>
175	40	<i>Tattvapradīpikā</i>	<i>Tattvapradīpikā</i>
178	19	self-luminous nor	self-luminous, or.
178	33	<i>cetansyāpi</i>	<i>cetanasīyāpi</i>
180	22	inspite	in spite
180	33 ff.	<i>karma</i>	<i>karmāṇ</i>
181	36	<i>Tattvadīpana.</i>	<i>Tattvadīpana,</i>
182	2	<i>pramāṇaphalatvūt</i>	<i>pramāṇaphalatvūt</i>
182	4	...	[before ' <i>Tattvadīpana</i> '
182	4	<i>Tattvadīpana.</i>	<i>Tattvadīpana,</i>
183	33	conscious,	conscious.
183	38-39	<i>vyāpikāraya</i>	<i>vyāpikārya</i>
188	6	consciousness,	consciousness.
188	9	<i>Tattvadīpana.</i>	<i>Tattvadīpana,</i>
188	15	<i>Vivaraṇa.</i>	<i>Vivaraṇa,</i>
189	28	<i>pītasāṁvit</i>	<i>pītasāṁvit</i>
189	35	<i>hetuvenānubhavatvam</i>	<i>hetuvenānubhavatvam</i>
190	21 ff.	principi	principii
191	4	<i>pītasāṁvit</i>	<i>pītasāṁvit</i>
191	13	<i>viśeṣavyāvṛtityā</i>	<i>viśeṣavyāvṛtityā</i>
191	19	...	delete 'on' after 'even'
191	36	<i>pītasāṁvido</i>	<i>pītasāṁvido</i>
191	38	<i>siddhyati</i>	<i>siddhyati</i>
192	10 ff.	principi	principii
192	31	<i>samvidah</i>	<i>samvidah</i>
194	23	seem	seems
195	16	something,	something.
195	20	...) after 'lamp'
195	36 ff	<i>vyavicārah</i>	<i>vyabhicārah</i>
195	37	<i>viśeṣanam</i>	<i>viśeṣanam</i>
197	7	<i>citsvabhāva.</i>	<i>citsvabhāva</i>
197	21	"I"—consciousness	"I"—consciousness
197	39	<i>viśayānubhavameva</i>	<i>viśayānubhavameva</i>

Page	Line	For	Read
198	1	Prakāśātmayati's	Prakāśātmayati's
200	39	viśayāvabhāsaḥ	viśayāvabhāsa
201	31	draṣṭṛtvam	draṣṭṛtvam
201	37	syāt mānākāratvān	syātmānākāratvān
201	38	tadadhīna	tadadhīna
202	34	ahanākāra syāditi	ahanākāraḥ syāditi
202	37	prāsaktiḥ	prasaktiḥ
204	30	Tattvadīpana.	Tattvadīpana,
205	33	judgments	judgements
205	40	vṛttiyāva	vṛttīva
206	5	...	delete) after 'sukha'
206	10	sukhi	sukhī
207	33	duḥkhasambandhi	duḥkhasambandhī
210	22 ff.	remembrance	remembrance
210	36	...) after 'explains'
211	30	vyavahārika	vyāvahārika
212	7	sākṣicaitanya	sākṣicaitanya
212	14	sukhānubhavayoḥ	sukhānubhavayoḥ
212	14	sākṣicaitanyasya	sākṣicaitanyasya
212	27	Schoool	School
213	1	avidyāvṛtti	avidyāvṛttiḥ
214	13	smṛtiḥ	smṛtiḥ
214	20	na	'na
214	22	vārtikahāraiḥ	vārtikahāraiḥ
214	26	Advaitasidhi	Advaitasiddhi
214	27	Edn.	Edn ;
215	31	electicism	eclecticism
219	25	jivahood	jīvahood
219	35	bhedesiddhyartha	bhedasiddhyartha
221	5	(Title) IMAGE-CHARACTER	IMAGE-CHARACTER
222	12	añirvācyam	anirvācyam
223	4	pādānattva	pādānatva
224	34	to	to
226	17	...	delete , after 'view'
227	18	proveable	provable
229	11	Self,	Self ;
231	37	naisargiko'yaṁ	naisargiko'yaṁ
233	39	sākṣivīśayatvam	sākṣivīśayatvam
233	39	...	, after 'Edn.'



Page	Line	For	
234	25	antahkaraṇa	
237	29-30	presence	
237	31	focē	face
239	5	inspite	in spite
239	19	mukhyavyaktāntaram	mukhavyaktyantaram
239	20	lajjanmakaraṇa	lajjanmakāraṇasūnyatvāt
		kūnyatvāt	
240	14	appeorance	appearance
243	8	...	'before' na
246	18	...	'not' after 'are'
246	30	ajñānānivr̥ttih	ajñānānivr̥ttih
248	27 ff.	inspite	in spite
249	4	or	of
249	9	...	delete . after
			'Consciousness'
249	18	...	'it' after 'that'
249	18	focus	locus
249	37	tadapyajnatvahr̥tam	tadapyajnatvahr̥tam
253	19	fifth	filth
253	36	inspite	in spite
254	36	ajñānānivr̥ttyaupādihikā	ajñānānivr̥ttyaupādihikā
254	37	Tattvadīpana	Tattvadīpana
257	5	inspite	in spite
257	13-14	pratibimbapakṣa	pratibimbapakṣa
257	24	illusorionness	illusoriness
257	40	Tattvadīpana.	Tattvadīpana,
258	8	predecessor's	predecessor's
262	35	inspite	in spite
262	39	dependen	dependent
263	16	he	the
266	31	avidyātāntrāṇām	avidyātāntrāṇām
266	32	viruddhyate	virudhyate
267	30	inspite	in spite
268	31	pariniṣpannāhaṅkāro-	pariniṣpannāhaṅkāro-
		pādhikāḥ	pādhikāḥ
268	38	virodhamāśāṅkya	virodhamāśāṅkya
268	39	nirupādhikādhyā-	nirupādhikādhyāsa-
		apariniṣpanatvam	niṣpannatvam
271	22	Dharmarājādhava-	
		rīndra	Dharmarājādhvarīndra



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